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Terms of reference 
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Australia’s Export Credit Arrangements 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 
 
I, Bill Shorten, Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Financial Services and 
Superannuation, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998 hereby 
request that the Productivity Commission undertake an inquiry into Australia’s export 
credit arrangements. The Commission’s final report should be provided within nine months 
of receipt of this reference. 
Background 
The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) is the government provider of export 
credits, insurance, reinsurance and other financial services that support Australian exports 
and overseas investments.  EFIC was established in its current form under the Export 
Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC Act) as an independent statutory 
corporation wholly-owned by the Commonwealth of Australia.  As set out in the Statement 
of Expectations, EFIC operates under a “market gap” mandate – it is only to provide 
services to viable projects where the private sector is unwilling or unable to provide support. 
EFIC was last reviewed, by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 2006.  
A recommendation of that review was that a future review be carried out by an independent 
consultant in around four years’ time of that review.  A further recommendation was that the 
next review make a thorough assessment of the costs and benefits of moving to a 
competitive neutrality regime, given EFIC’s current exemption on the grounds that it does 
not compete with the private sector. 
Australia now has an extensive and sophisticated capital market containing a range of 
commercial intermediaries providing a diverse range of services.  The activities and 
international obligations of export credit agencies (ECAs) in Australia and internationally, 
as well as the trade financing role of multilateral development banks, have also undergone a 
considerable transformation since government export credit arrangements were established.  
Given this, it is appropriate that the government’s role in the provision of export credits, and 
support for Australian exports and overseas investments through financial products and 
services more broadly, be extensively reviewed. 
Scope of the Inquiry 
In undertaking its inquiry, the Commission is to: 
1. Review the rationale for, and extent of, government involvement in the provision of 
insurance, reinsurance and other financial services and products which support 
Australian export trade; 
2. Review the presence or otherwise of market gaps for EFIC’s products and services, 
and whether or not these constitute market failures, taking into account developments 
in the private sector’s willingness and capacity to provide the  insurance, reinsurance 
and financial services required by Australian exporters; 
   
VI TERMS OF REFERENCE  
 
3. Given the above, assess EFIC’s status, its objectives, and the appropriateness of 
current arrangements in fulfilling those objectives. This will include examining its 
operations against the functions in the EFIC Act and making recommendations 
where appropriate concerning EFIC’s governance, powers, functions and priorities 
(including possible changes to the EFIC Act); 
4. Review the scope, type, volume and delivery of products and services offered by 
EFIC; and the level of compliance costs for businesses accessing EFIC’s financial 
products and services; 
4.1.  Assess EFIC’s management of credit and funding risks; 
5. Consider EFIC’s pricing and service arrangements and their impact on private sector 
involvement in insurance, reinsurance and financial services which support 
Australian export trade; 
5.1. Assess the impact of EFIC’s pricing and service arrangements on incentives for 
Australian exporters to access private sector providers; 
5.2. Review EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality legislation; 
6. Review EFIC’s funding arrangements and capital adequacy ratio; 
7. Assess the interactions between EFIC’s operations and other government programs; 
and consider whether there are alternatives to the direct provision of financial 
products and services that would continue to achieve EFIC’s objectives; 
8. Assess the nature and quality of the information and advice provided by EFIC to the 
Australian Government and the public; and 
9. Consider any other matter that may be relevant to the provision of export credit 
arrangements in Australia. 
As part of its inquiry the Commission is also requested to consider, where relevant, the 
evolution in policies of export credit agencies internationally, including EFIC’s interaction 
with other export credit agencies, credit insurers and multilateral agencies; developments 
in relevant international agreements including the OECD and the WTO; and EFIC’s 
implementation of OECD commitments on export credits. 
The Commission is to hold hearings for the purpose of its inquiry, and provide both a draft 
and a final report.  The reports are to be published.  The Government will consider the 
Commission’s recommendations, and its response will be announced as soon as possible 
after the receipt of the Commission’s report. 
 
BILL SHORTEN 
(Received 1 September 2011). 
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Note to readers 
The Commission seeks to have as much information as possible on the public 
record. This information is available on the Commission’s website. However, under 
certain circumstances the Commission will accept sensitive material in confidence, 
for example, if it was of a personal or commercial nature, and publishing it would 
be potentially damaging to individuals or commercial dealings.  
As this inquiry relates to EFIC’s place in the market and its operations (including 
the scope, type, volume and delivery of products and services offered by EFIC; its 
credit and funding risks; and the interaction between EFIC and private sector 
providers of export finance and insurance), the Commission was provided with 
material from EFIC, some of which was marked ‘commercial-in-confidence’. 
The Commission used this material extensively in its analysis, but has taken steps to 
protect the confidentiality of commercial material related to individual transactions 
and third parties. The Commission has generally restricted its commentary to types 
of transactions rather than specific transactions. The Commission has not released 
information about particular dealings that would identify the firm where that 
information is commercially sensitive and not on the public record. In most other 
instances the Commission has drawn information from publicly available sources. 
The Commission has taken considerable care not to release commercially sensitive 
material. It has de-identified some material. Some material that EFIC considers 
commercial-in-confidence, almost exclusively relating to EFIC has been included in 
this report, or where the material relating to a transaction is now on the public 
record or dated. The Commission has released this material after considering the 
public interest and deliberating on what is necessary to meet the terms of reference. 
The Commission has been asked to examine EFIC’s operations and the delivery of 
its products. To do this in a rigorous and transparent way and to ensure that the 
evidence used by the Commission to support its conclusions is clear, it is necessary 
to discuss the nature and extent of EFIC’s dealings with individual firms. In doing 
so, the Commission has relied on publicly available data and in some cases data 
provided to it by EFIC; the Commission’s approach to the use of such data provided 
by EFIC is discussed above. The Commission wishes to make clear that it has only 
identified individual firms where it has been necessary for its analysis and it does 
not question the legality of the transactions involved or the motivations of EFIC’s 
customers and their financial advisors in entering into transactions with EFIC.
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Key points 
• The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) has been established to 
facilitate and encourage Australian export trade through the provision of financial 
services. EFIC is expected to conduct its origination business (loans, guarantees, 
insurance) on a commercial basis. EFIC also manages the national interest account. 
• Virtually all of Australia’s exports, by volume and value, take place without EFIC’s 
assistance. EFIC’s support goes to relatively few firms and often on a repeat basis. 
By value most of the support is targeted to large corporate clients. These clients 
account for more than three quarters of the value of EFIC’s signings in 2010-11. 
• Over the past five years, EFIC has earned most of its income through the investment 
of surplus funds and its capital and reserves, not the provision of financial services. 
EFIC’s commercial account operations have yielded a low rate of return, with some 
facilities subsidised by taxpayers. 
• EFIC’s commercial account objective should be to efficiently address the limited 
number of market failures that impede otherwise commercially viable export 
transactions. 
• While few, if any, markets conform to the competitive ideal, there is no convincing 
evidence of systemic failures that impede access to finance for large firms or for 
resource-related projects in Australia.  
– EFIC should not continue to provide facilities to large corporate clients or for 
resource-related projects in Australia, including suppliers to those projects, on the 
commercial account. 
• Financial markets may be affected by information-related failures. These are likely to 
be limited to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with limited export 
experience or attempting to access emerging export markets. 
• Accordingly, EFIC’s role should be to demonstrate to the private sector that providing 
export finance to such newly exporting SMEs can be commercially viable.  
• To fulfil this demonstration role, EFIC should provide export finance services on the 
same basis as the private sector. This means: 
– setting prices to cover the expected full economic costs of provision; and 
– being subject to competitive neutrality arrangements, including earning an 
appropriate return on equity, setting prices commensurate with risk, and paying a 
tax-equivalent charge and a debt neutrality fee. 
• EFIC’s commercial account product range should normally be limited to guarantees, 
including the provision of bonds on behalf of the exporter. 
– When directed by the Minister, the product range may extend to reinsurance for a 
limited period, to cover sovereign and country risk insurance provided to newly 
exporting SMEs by the private sector, when financial markets in the buyer’s 
country are temporarily disrupted. 
• Measures should be introduced to enhance the transparency of EFIC’s activities to 
the Minister, the Australian Government and the public. 
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Overview 
What the Commission has been asked to do 
The Productivity Commission has been asked to undertake a public inquiry into 
arrangements for the provision of export credit through Australia’s export credit 
agency, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC). The terms of 
reference for this inquiry require the Commission to, among other things:  
• review the rationale for government involvement in the provision of export 
finance and insurance 
• assess EFIC’s management of credit and funding risks 
• review EFIC’s pricing and service arrangements and assess their impact on 
incentives for Australian exporters to access private sector providers of export 
finance and insurance products 
• review EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality policy. 
The Commission’s approach to this inquiry is to consider the rationale for 
government provision of export finance and insurance through EFIC on the 
commercial and national interest accounts. In keeping with the Productivity 
Commission Act 1998, the Commission has taken an economy-wide perspective. 
This involves identifying if there is a market failure warranting intervention, 
determining the most appropriate form of intervention, and evaluating whether 
EFIC’s activities and governance arrangements efficiently implement that 
intervention. 
The Commission has followed its usual transparent and public processes, releasing 
an issues paper and a draft report for written comment, conducting public hearings 
and meeting with stakeholders. Feedback on the draft report, including material 
provided by EFIC, was drawn on in finalising this report with some findings and 
recommendations amended accordingly. 
The Commission has undertaken economic analysis consistent with its terms of 
reference, basing its findings and recommendations on the evidence available. This 
economic analysis does not constitute a performance or compliance audit of EFIC’s 
financial and legal affairs. 
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The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
Australia has had an export credit agency (ECA) since the establishment of EFIC’s 
predecessor, the Export Payments Insurance Corporation, in 1957. EFIC was 
established in its current form in 1991 under the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC Act) to facilitate and encourage Australian export 
trade through the provision of financial services (box 1). 
The financial services EFIC offers include loans, guarantees and insurance 
products, and published information relevant to Australian exporters. Beneficiaries 
of EFIC’s services include exporters and their suppliers, their buyers and financial 
intermediaries, subject to satisfying eligibility criteria specified in the EFIC Act. 
EFIC is able to provide financial services to firms located in Australia which 
contribute to the production of exports but do not themselves export. This has 
enabled EFIC to provide facilities to suppliers to resource-related projects located in 
Australia. 
Box 1 EFIC’s functions and duties 
EFIC has the following functions under the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) (EFIC Act) (s. 7): 
• encourage and facilitate Australian export trade 
• encourage banks and other financial institutions carrying on business in Australia to 
assist in financing export contracts 
• manage the Australian Government’s aid-supported loan program 
• provide information and advice regarding insurance and financial products available 
to support Australian exports. 
EFIC’s duties under the EFIC Act (s. 8) include: 
• improving and extending the range of financial services available to exporters 
• complying with directions given by the Minister 
• providing its services and products as efficiently and economically as possible. 
The commercial account and the national interest account 
EFIC operates using two accounts — the commercial account and the national interest 
account. The Minister cannot require EFIC to obtain ministerial approval for a particular 
transaction, or direct EFIC to enter into a particular transaction, on the commercial 
account. The Minister may direct EFIC more generally as to how it performs its 
functions under s. 9 of the EFIC Act. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 1 (continued) 
The Minister can approve, or direct, transactions on the national interest account that 
are in the national interest, although by convention Cabinet approval is sought. EFIC is 
able to refer transactions to the national interest account for approval by the Minister. 
EFIC manages national interest account facilities through a service level agreement 
with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. EFIC is reimbursed for any losses 
on the national interest account, remits any profits to the Australian Government and 
receives a fee for its administration. 
EFIC’s business operations 
In 2009-10, EFIC provided 54 facilities to 41 exporting firms on the commercial 
account. About 45 000 firms exported goods and services in the same financial year. 
EFIC’s origination business provides loans, guarantees and insurance products under 
eligibility criteria specified in the EFIC Act. The origination business is further separated 
into a structured trade and project finance division that supports large corporate clients, 
and a small and medium-sized enterprises and mid-market division. A treasury function 
borrows on domestic and international capital markets, structures cash flows in 
Australian and foreign currencies, and manages EFIC’s investment portfolio of capital 
and reserves. At 30 June 2011, EFIC had 85.8 full-time equivalent employees. 
Key financial indicators 
At 30 June 2011, EFIC’s capital base was about $408 million of paid-in equity and 
retained earnings and $2.4 billion in debt. EFIC held $1.3 billion in liquid assets. The 
EFIC Act provides for EFIC’s debt to be guaranteed by the Commonwealth, although 
this guarantee has never been called. EFIC has access to $200 million of callable 
capital payable by the Commonwealth. 
Profits generated by EFIC are either retained to increase the size of its capital base or 
paid to the Australian Government as a dividend. EFIC has paid about $75 million in 
dividends over the period 2006-07 to 2009-10. 
Ministerial Statement of Expectations 
The Minister communicates expectations of the EFIC Board through the publicly 
released Statement of Expectations (SoE). A key requirement in the SoE is that EFIC 
is not to compete directly with commercial providers of finance, as this is the basis for 
EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements, and the basis for EFIC’s 
‘market gap’ mandate. 
The need for EFIC to fill a gap in the market was stated in the second reading speech 
when the EFIC Act was debated in Parliament. The market gap has been formally 
defined in the SoE ‘as circumstances where the credit and insurance sectors are not 
able or are unwilling to provide credit and insurance services to financially viable 
Australian export transactions or overseas projects’.  
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EFIC’s role in export finance and insurance markets 
International trade typically takes place on the basis of cash or short-term credit, 
without intermediation through financial markets. For those firms that do require 
export finance and insurance, Australia has relatively deep and liquid financial 
markets and is recognised as a regional leader in finance and insurance. Finance and 
insurance is the largest sector in the Australian economy, accounting for 
about 10 per cent of GDP in 2010-11. Many importers and exporters can also access 
international markets for trade finance and insurance. 
EFIC is a small ECA by global standards. While it is difficult to estimate the exact 
percentage of Australian exports assisted by EFIC on the commercial account, it is 
likely to be no more than a few per cent. Virtually all Australia’s export trade, by 
volume and value, takes place without EFIC’s assistance. 
Government programs and services for exporters 
In addition to the services provided by EFIC, the Australian, state and territory 
governments provide a range of financial and advisory products and services that 
directly assist exporters (box 2). The coverage of this assistance is highly 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector and only a fraction of exporters receive 
this assistance. There is also a number of Australian Government programs that 
offer financial assistance to businesses in general, including those involved in 
exporting. Receiving financial support from these programs does not preclude firms 
from accessing EFIC’s financial services. 
 
Box 2 Government assistance to exporters 
In addition to EFIC’s activities, government assistance to exporters is provided through: 
• other Australian Government direct export assistance programs, including the Clean 
Energy Trade and Investment Strategy 
• Austrade and Tourism Australia 
• Australian Government general assistance programs to businesses that provide 
tariff concessions, training assistance, information and advice, and start-up 
assistance 
• state and territory government initiatives including trade missions and direct 
financial assistance. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2 (continued) 
Australian Government direct financial assistance for exporters is estimated at 
$522 million in 2010-11. This does not include direct financial assistance provided 
through export-related programs by state and territory governments, or the value of 
general assistance programs that benefit exporters. Importantly, it does not include 
assistance by way of the Australian Government’s Enhanced Project By-law Scheme 
(EPBS), which provides tariff duty concessions to large projects having an approved 
plan to use local suppliers. 
Australian Government direct financial assistance that is specific to exporters 
comprises: 
• the Export Market Development Grants (EMDG) scheme –– businesses with annual 
turnover of up to $50 million can apply for up to seven grants to partly reimburse 
expenses incurred in promoting exports. Latest figures show about 95 per cent of 
recipients had annual turnover less than $20 million 
• Tradex –– provides a cashflow benefit for importers who intend to export goods by 
exempting them from the relevant duty at the time of import 
• the Duty Drawback Scheme –– enables businesses to obtain a refund of Customs 
duty paid on imported goods where those goods will be treated, processed, or 
incorporated into other goods for export, or are exported unused since importation. 
Australian Government direct funding for export programs, 2010-11 
$ million 
Industry EMDG Tradex Duty Drawback  Total funding 
Primary industries 3.8 0.3 – 4.1 
Mining 1.4 0.3 – 1.7 
Manufacturing 47.6 33.9 74.5 155.9 
Services industry groups 90.3 4.7 – 95.0 
Total all industries 143.1 39.2 74.5 256.7 
The Australian Government also provides general business support: 
• Commercialisation Australia is a competitive, merit-based assistance program 
offering funding and resources to accelerate the business building process for 
eligible Australian companies and entrepreneurs. 
• Supplier Access to Major Projects helps Australian industry participate in major 
Australian and international projects by providing funding to assist research and 
identification of capable Australian suppliers. The program is funded through the 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education 
(DIISRTE). 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2 (continued) 
• Australian Industry Participation (AIP) Plans encourage the use of Australian 
industry in projects and global supply chains. Companies applying for large 
Commonwealth grants (generally above $20 million) or other schemes, are required 
to implement an AIP Plan and so provide opportunities for local suppliers. This 
requirement includes participants in the EPBS. About $230 million in tariff duty 
concessions was provided to project proponents, including a number of large 
resource projects, under the EPBS in 2010-11. The Commission was unable to 
ascertain the proportion of EPBS support provided to exporters. 
• A range of research and development (R&D) tax concessions is available to eligible 
Australian companies. These programs include the R&D Tax Concession, Premium 
R&D Tax Concession, R&D Tax Offset, Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, Early 
Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships and Pooled Development Funds. 
• There is a range of programs specifically directed at small start-ups and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that can be utilised by exporters, including: 
– the Small Business Support Line — an AusIndustry program to provide small 
business owners with a single point of contact to access information and referral 
services to help better manage their business 
– Enterprise Connect — a DIISRTE initiative that offers advice and support to 
eligible SMEs.  
 
EFIC’s operations on the ‘commercial account’ 
EFIC’s clients operate in a number of export sectors, including mining, 
manufacturing, construction, and ship building and operation (figure 1). 
EFIC’s recent transactions on the commercial account are characterised by: 
• a focus on large corporate clients. More than three quarters of the value of 
EFIC’s signings in 2010-11 were facilities provided to large corporate clients 
(defined by EFIC as having annual turnover greater than $150 million). EFIC 
provided 11 facilities to these clients, with a total face value of more than 
$450 million in 2010-11 (table 1) 
• substantial support for large resource projects, and related infrastructure, 
located in Australia. In 2010-11, EFIC provided: 
– a US$100 million export finance guarantee to the Wiggins Island coal export 
terminal consortium for a $3 billion project to increase coal export capacity at 
the Port of Gladstone 
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– a US$270 million insurance policy to Brookfield Australia Pty Ltd for the 
Brookfield rail project to upgrade the rail line from Morawa to Geraldton 
– a US$250 million export finance guarantee to the Santos liquefied natural gas 
project in Gladstone. 
Figure 1 Principal recipients of EFIC’s facilities 
Face value of commercial account facilities, 30 June 2011 
 
Table 1 EFIC support for large corporate firms 
Commercial account, 2010-11 
Underlying exporter Sector Facility 
Value 
(A$mil equiv) 
Leighton Asia (Northern) Construction Loan 76.7 
Austal Ship building Loan 66.8 
Leighton Holdings Construction Bonding line 50.0 
UGL Limited Construction Bonding line 50.0 
Brookfield Australian Investments Construction Bonding line 48.0 
Incat Tasmania Ship building Loan 37.5 
Anglo Coal Australia Mining Risk participation agreement 30.3 
Transfield Services Professional Bonding line 30.0 
Thornycroft Maritime & Associates Professional Export finance guarantee 25.5 
McConnell Dowell Corporation Construction Bonding line 25.0 
Clough Groups Construction Bonding line 16.6 
During 2011-12, EFIC extended its activities to include support for suppliers to 
resource-related projects through the provision of bonds, bonding lines and 
guarantees. EFIC has disclosed its approval of six facilities located in Australia 
Construction 24%
Mining 14%
Other 5%
Ship building and
operation 31%
Other manufacturing 26%
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since 1 July 2011, with a total face value $128 million (in addition to the three 
resource-related projects above). EFIC confirmed at the public hearings that two of 
these facilities were provided to suppliers to resource-related projects. There is 
insufficient public information available about the remaining four facilities. 
EFIC also assists small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) on the commercial 
account. In 2010-11, 90 facilities were signed with SMEs with a face value of about 
$135 million. Facilities with SMEs accounted for just over 20 per cent of the total 
face value of EFIC’s commercial account signings that year (figure 2). In its 2011 
annual report, EFIC noted strong demand for products typically used by SMEs, 
such as working capital guarantees. 
Figure 2 EFIC signings by business size 
As a proportion of total face value, commercial account, 2010-11 
 
Rationale for government intervention in export finance 
National interest objectives 
Export credit agencies are established for a number of purposes, including meeting 
broader objectives of government in the ‘national interest’. National interest 
arguments may include the delivery of foreign aid or meeting foreign policy 
objectives, such as regional stability and growth. For example, in 2009-10 the 
Australian Government granted a US$250 million loan on the national interest 
account for a liquefied natural gas project in Papua New Guinea. 
Large corporate 
clients 77% 
SMEs 23% 
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The EFIC Board is able to refer a project to the national interest account for 
consideration by the Minister if it considers there is a high degree of country or 
project-related risks, or if the exposure would exceed EFIC’s internal limits for the 
commercial account. Projects may also be jointly supported on the national interest 
and commercial accounts. Where support for a proposal is being sought on both 
accounts, the commercial account component should be supported by EFIC for 
commercial reasons only. 
The Commission sees no reason at this time to change the arrangement between the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and EFIC to manage national interest 
account facilities after they have been approved by the Minister. An assessment of 
alternative arrangements should be included in the next independent review of EFIC 
to ensure current arrangements meet government objectives at least cost. 
In the Commission’s view, analysis of national interest account facilities should 
include an assessment of whether the proposal is the most cost-effective way of 
meeting the outcomes intended by the Australian Government. The Minister should 
publicly articulate the justification for a national interest account facility after its 
approval. 
Market failure rationales for government intervention on the commercial account 
Where markets — including financial markets — are well-functioning they promote 
efficiency by allocating resources to their highest value uses. Markets may be 
vulnerable to some forms of market failure (box 3) and few, if any, markets 
conform to the ideal of perfect competition. 
A number of rationales for government intervention in export finance and insurance 
markets have been raised by inquiry participants and in some of the literature. These 
rationales include: increasing the level of exports produced in the economy to 
generate multiplier effects (including during financial crises to ameliorate any 
slump in international trade); alleviating cost and competition pressures for 
exporters; offsetting the activities of other countries’ export promotion activities, 
including through their ECAs; and addressing perceived problems in financial 
markets that lead to a shortfall in the availability of finance and insurance. 
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Box 3 Five sources of ‘market failure’ 
Externalities arise when the actions of an individual or firm create a benefit or a cost 
for others who are not a party to the transaction, and these impacts are not reflected in 
market prices. 
Public goods arise where consumption of a good is non-rivalrous (consumption by 
one person does not affect the amount available to others) and non-excludable (people 
cannot be prevented from consuming the good). Producers and consumers cannot 
capture the full benefits of provision and payments for provision cannot be enforced. 
Consequently, public goods are likely to be under-provided by the private sector. 
Inadequate information about a transaction can occur where there are institutional or 
cost barriers preventing parties to a transaction obtaining relevant information about 
the characteristics of a transaction (most notably risks) and/or each other. In such 
cases, market participants may adopt simplified decision rules based on a reduced set 
of information. 
Information asymmetry arises where one of the parties knows more about key 
aspects of the transaction than the other. One possible consequence is ‘adverse 
selection’ — a bias toward entering into lower quality or higher risk transactions. 
Another potential problem is ‘moral hazard’, which occurs when a party modifies its 
behaviour after the transaction to exploit any information advantage. 
Lack of effective competition may arise in the presence of market characteristics 
such as natural monopoly or when the market has a small number of firms that are 
able to restrict output and maintain prices above optimal levels. A small number of 
participants in the market, alone, is not evidence of the exercise of market power. The 
threat of new entrants may discourage the use of market power.  
 
Any intervention through EFIC should generate net benefits to the economy 
In order for government intervention to increase exports and generate net benefits to 
the economy, that intervention must target failures in financial markets that are 
impeding otherwise commercially viable export transactions in a way that generates 
a net benefit to the economy. Promoting exports per se will generally only shift 
domestic resources (labour and capital) away from more profitable activities and 
potentially drive down prices of the exports (benefiting foreign buyers). This would 
reduce, rather than increase, Australia’s aggregate income. 
However, government intervention in markets is never perfect and the cost of 
particular interventions will generally need to be weighed against their benefits. 
Government policies can distort market outcomes where, for example, poorly 
designed regulation increases the cost of supply of export finance and insurance and 
prevents some transactions from happening altogether. 
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The Commission has undertaken an evaluation of EFIC’s operations on the 
commercial account to determine whether they are consistent with a market failure 
rationale for government intervention. 
Do EFIC’s operations address market failures? 
Support for large resource projects located in Australia 
EFIC has extended its operations to the provision of financial services to firms 
undertaking resource projects and related infrastructure (box 4), and to domestic 
firms supplying goods and services to those projects, including Greyhound 
Australia (box 5). 
 
Box 4 Brookfield rail upgrade – market failure or company policy? 
In early 2011, Brookfield Rail commenced an upgrade of the rail infrastructure between 
Geraldton and an iron ore mine located in Karara, Western Australia. The mine is a 
joint venture between Gindalbie Metals and Chinese company, Ansteel. The rail 
infrastructure is part of the general rail system in the mid-west of Western Australia, 
formerly operated by the Western Australian Government. 
EFIC disclosed its involvement in the upgrade in the second half of 2011. 
EFIC has provided a US$270 million insurance policy to Brookfield Australia Pty Ltd for 
the Brookfield rail upgrade project. The purpose of the facility is to insure the credit risk 
on a letter of credit issued by a AA- rated bank owned by the Chinese government. 
More than half of the facility will be reinsured by another export credit agency. 
Brookfield Rail is a wholly owned subsidiary of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P., a 
company with extensive worldwide operations. The company’s other interests include 
European ports, Canadian freehold timberlands and US electricity transmission. The 
parent company, Brookfield Asset Management, is listed on the Toronto and New York 
Stock Exchanges, and in 2007 acquired Australian construction firm Multiplex. 
In the year ending 31 December 2011, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. reported 
a net income of US$440 million, and had more than US$13 billion in assets. 
Brookfield Australia Pty Ltd noted in its submission to the Commission, ‘there was no 
obligation on Brookfield Rail, regulatory or otherwise, to invest in the track upgrade 
unless it determined the commercial rationale warranted the investment and the 
assumption of associated risks’. That is, Brookfield Rail entered into the rail upgrade 
project based on commercial returns to the company. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 4 (continued) 
The submission further noted EFIC’s support was sought because ‘Brookfield Rail was 
required to secure additional debt financing in order for the investment program to 
provide the return profile required to warrant the investment of equity by its parent’. 
EFIC’s submission to the draft report noted that Brookfield Rail and its lenders were 
unprepared to accept the risk of a government owned Chinese bank without risk 
mitigation in place. Rather than EFIC’s involvement being driven by a failure in financial 
markets, it was the company’s internal policy that determined more debt was needed 
and, in turn, Brookfield Rail’s lenders who determined that insurance was needed to 
enable the investment to go ahead.  
 
Submissions to this inquiry asserted that EFIC’s assistance for resource-related 
projects located in Australia was required to overcome a shortfall of capital for 
projects across the infrastructure, energy and mining sectors. The Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry argued that EFIC’s provision of services for 
larger transactions and companies is justified on the basis that smaller companies 
can ‘coat tail’ large scale projects as suppliers. 
EFIC argued in its submission responding to the draft report: 
In the current circumstances in which Australia finds itself, of an historically 
unprecedented resource investment boom and impaired markets for cross-border 
project and structured trade finance, EFIC’s retreat from onshore financing would 
imply slower resource investment and slower subsequent export growth. Contrary to 
the Commission’s view, such deferred investment and exporting would not be a case of 
the market denying resources to uncommercial projects in the interests of efficient 
resource allocation. It would rather represent a sacrifice of real economic opportunity in 
the near term. 
 
Box 5 Should EFIC have supported Greyhound Australia? 
In 2012, EFIC provided a $5 million performance bond on behalf of Greyhound 
Australia for it to meet the terms of a $105 million contract to provide transport services 
for a mining operation at Wheatstone in Western Australia. The facility is one of the first 
under a new initiative to serve suppliers contributing to the production of exports but 
who themselves do not export. Under the initiative, suppliers ‘must form an integral part 
of the overall resource export project’ to be eligible for EFIC’s support. Eligible 
suppliers can apply to EFIC for bank guarantees, working capital support and 
longer-term finance. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 5 (continued) 
A market gap? 
The ‘market gap’ identified by EFIC was the unwillingness of Greyhound Australia’s 
bankers (including ANZ which is also the company’s former majority shareholder) to 
provide a bond with less than full-cash cover. This was despite Greyhound Australia’s 
long history in the coach industry, its financial restructure and its other contracts to 
service mining operations. At public hearings EFIC stated: 
The performance bond is for six years. There is no bank in Australia that is willing to take 
risk on Greyhound for six years. There is just not the slightest question about it. What EFIC 
has done is provide that bond to Greyhound to enable it to win business. 
Greyhound Australia’s inability to source a performance bond with less than full-cash 
cover may in part stem from its financial situation — an insolvency and turnaround 
advisory firm was appointed by ANZ to restructure the company in 2006 and in recent 
times, Greyhound Australia has undertaken a review of its business strategy. 
An inability to source a financial product because of a firm’s particular financial 
situation does not constitute a market failure. A range of alternatives may have arisen if 
EFIC had not provided a performance bond. For example, Greyhound Australia may 
either have renegotiated the terms of service, provided a bond with full-cash cover or 
the contract may have been awarded to another firm. In fact, EFIC’s actions precluded 
those outcomes. It stated: 
We gave them the financial support they needed to ensure that they won that business and 
it couldn’t go elsewhere. 
Local content? 
Information provided to the Commission by EFIC indicates Greyhound Australia was 
the preferred tenderer over a number of Australian competing tenderers, and one with 
foreign ownership. When assessing Greyhound Australia’s application for the 
performance bond, EFIC did not seek to confirm which firm was the next preferred 
tenderer. This was despite stating at public hearings: ‘what is important is the 
Australian content component, and this is why this initiative has been started’. EFIC’s 
focus was on Greyhound Australia’s ability to proceed with the contract, and less so on 
whether its support for Greyhound disadvantaged local competitors. 
Relationship to exports? 
At public hearings, EFIC was also unable to present a clear rationale as to why coach 
operators servicing domestic resource projects should be eligible for assistance when 
other suppliers, such as cleaners and caterers, are not. In assisting Greyhound 
Australia, EFIC has adopted a very broad definition of exports, a precedent bringing a 
significant risk that it will continue to extend its activities where no market failures are 
present.  
An imbalance between demand for, and supply of, capital is not a market failure — 
this happens in all markets. Balance is typically restored over time through changes 
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in the market price. The Commission has found no convincing evidence to indicate 
there are regulatory or other barriers that impede access to debt or equity finance for 
large firms, or resource and infrastructure projects located in Australia that would 
justify EFIC’s involvement. 
The Commission also found: 
• Following a dip during the global financial crisis (GFC), lending by banks to 
non-financial corporations has returned to pre-GFC levels. While the volume of 
lending by European domiciled banks in Australia has declined, this has been 
more than offset by increased lending by Australian and Asian domiciled banks 
(figure 3). Australian firms also continue to access debt and equity in domestic 
and international markets, although finance may be more expensive than was 
the case prior to the GFC. 
• Private sector investment in infrastructure over the past 10 years has nearly 
doubled. Investment in the mining sector, although declining slightly in 
2009-10 following the GFC, has recovered to be about 20 per cent higher than 
its 2008-09 value. 
Figure 3 Volume of lending has returned to pre-GFC levels 
 
In short, it is not evident to the Commission that there are market failures affecting 
the provision of capital to resource projects in Australia, and related infrastructure, 
that require intervention by the Australian Government through EFIC. 
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EFIC’s large corporate clients have options to secure finance elsewhere 
EFIC’s commercial account activity is largely focused on large corporate clients —
many of these are publicly listed companies and some have global operations. In 
recent years, many of EFIC’s large clients have successfully raised finance in 
private debt and equity markets. This has included raising private debt with tenor 
(the term of the facility) of 10 years or longer. Further, several of EFIC’s large 
corporate clients reported strong financial positions and were optimistic in their 
annual reports about their ability to fund future investments. 
EFIC’s provision of export finance and insurance to these firms cannot be justified 
on the basis of failures in financial markets, since these firms are able to access 
other (albeit possibly more costly) sources of capital. Alternatively, it may be the 
case that other sources of finance were not available for any of a number of 
commercial reasons related to the characteristics of the proposed project or export 
transaction. 
The export supply chain — no evidence of market failure 
In supporting resource-related projects located in Australia, including suppliers to 
those projects, EFIC has moved beyond what is necessary to address any market 
failures affecting exporters’ access to export finance or insurance. EFIC’s support 
for Greyhound Australia, for example, was not based on a market failure — EFIC 
stated it stepped in to ensure Greyhound Australia was able to win the contract to 
supply transport services for mining staff, when the firm’s banks were not willing to 
provide a performance bond on terms acceptable to Greyhound Australia. It is 
possible a more efficient firm would have provided the transport services if EFIC 
had not intervened. 
International financial crises — can EFIC cushion a slump in exports? 
Inquiry participants, including EFIC, argued that significant market disruptions, 
such as the GFC, justify government intervention through ECAs to at least partially 
offset any slump in exports due to a tightening of credit markets. However, surveys 
have shown that the decline in the provision of trade finance during the GFC was 
primarily due to lower levels of international trade and resulting lower demand for 
trade finance products. The behaviour of financial institutions, including ECAs, was 
less important relative to changes in demand. In the Commission’s view, providing 
export finance and insurance with the aim of ameliorating the decline in 
international trade would have been unsuccessful and does not represent a sound 
rationale for EFIC’s future involvement in financial markets. 
   
 AUSTRALIA’S 
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
18 
A ‘market gap’ is not necessarily a market failure 
EFIC’s market gap mandate is meant to constrain its activities to parts of the market 
that are not served by the private sector, thereby seeking to ensure it complements, 
rather than competes with, private sector providers. For the most part, the private 
sector appears to offer the same types of products as those offered by EFIC 
(although this does not mean they are offered in all markets, such as those with high 
sovereign risk). However, the terms and conditions, including price, at which EFIC 
offers these products may be different to that of the private sector. EFIC stated in its 
submission to the Commission’s Issues Paper that one of the reasons clients seek 
their support is that EFIC is able to assist with long-term financing arrangements 
beyond the capacity of the private market. 
Capital, like other resources, is scarce. As a result, private sector providers will seek 
to finance or insure those transactions with the highest rate of expected return. In 
financial markets, scarcity of capital means that exporters must pay more to secure 
finance or insurance for higher risk transactions — such as those with long tenor — 
than for low risk transactions. As a result, higher risk transactions will not go ahead 
where the cost of financing or insuring those transactions makes the transaction 
commercially unviable. This is not a market failure, but an essential feature of 
efficient financial markets that is consistent with prudent financial management. 
A call for EFIC’s assistance is not evidence of failures in financial markets 
Participants to this inquiry have presented evidence to the Commission to support 
EFIC’s assistance to firms in circumstances that are not market failures (box 6). In 
some instances, calls for EFIC’s assistance are based on private decisions about 
preferred business models and a firms’ risk preferences, rather than failures in 
financial markets. Challenges in securing finance for large projects are not of 
themselves an indication of market failure or other systemic problems with the 
capital market generally, or in relation to any given sector. The concerns reported in 
submissions are typically about the finance terms and conditions. Similarly, 
overcoming any market distortions caused by other ECAs is not sufficient to justify 
government intervention through EFIC. Australia is unlikely to be able to drive 
change in the policies of other ECAs. Attempting to do so through EFIC offering 
subsidised facilities is likely to be counter-productive. 
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Box 6 Many calls for EFIC’s assistance are not based on market 
failures 
Inquiry participants, including EFIC, its clients and private sector providers of export 
finance and insurance discussed the role that EFIC was performing in financial 
markets: 
• Thiess Pty Ltd argued that it needed EFIC’s support to implement its growth 
strategy in the current financial environment: 
As part of our growth strategy, Thiess has leveraged the technical and operational strengths 
of its domestic operations into international markets. This strategy requires funding, bonding 
and insurance lines which, given current global economic circumstances, can be challenging 
to source through private sector institutions. Continuation of our growth is therefore 
connected to a reversal of private sector trends in risk and credit, and support from the 
[export credit agencies]. 
• According to EFIC, Leighton Holdings ‘turned to EFIC for assistance when it 
reached its approved offshore leasing limits with its banks’. 
• Marine Western Australia Inc. argued that EFIC’s involvement was a form of 
assistance to overcome cost pressures faced by the ship building industry:  
In today’s climate probably the biggest impediment to shipbuilding is the height of the 
Australian dollar … the name of [the assistance program] … or the agency is not as 
important as the actual assistance ... 
• In justifying the need for repeat business with Shark Bay Salt, EFIC observed: 
The cost to the exporter of moving to another bank was prohibitive due to ‘switching costs’ 
and without switching, other banks would have little incentive to support a ‘one-off’ (relatively 
small) export transaction. 
• Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd observed: 
EFIC’s involvement from April 2011 and final commitment in September 2011 was a critical 
component for WICET being able to complete the financing. WICET’s mandate could have 
been withdrawn by the Queensland Government had Financial Close not been achieved 
within the State’s timeframe. 
• According to Brookfield Australia Pty Ltd, an insurance policy provided by EFIC 
(box 4) was required to secure additional debt financing in order for the investment 
program ‘to provide the return profile required to warrant the investment of equity by 
its parent’. 
• When questioned whether it would consider finding other equity partners, Bronx 
International Pty Ltd considered it would only happen ‘if we wanted to diversify into 
a different sort of business’. 
(Continued next page)   
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Box 6 (continued) 
• EFIC has provided facilities to Santos to develop liquefied natural gas projects in 
Papua New Guinea and Australia. In a 2011 press release, Santos stated that ECA 
facilities are a part of Santos’ funding strategy. In defending its assessment of the 
market gap, EFIC noted: 
Santos is also funding the development of the PNG LNG project in which it has a 
13.5 per cent interest, in addition to the large scale, existing operations in Australia and 
offshore, which require constant development and maintenance expenditure. 
• In response to the Commission’s draft findings and recommendations, the ANZ 
stated: 
It is open to the government to … leave the funding gap to foreign ECAs. However, those 
ECAs will be pursuing their own national interest. In most cases this means insisting on 
foreign equity in Australian projects and/or that the projects import goods and services from 
outside of Australia. 
These are not examples of market failure. In some cases, calls for assistance have 
arisen from a firm’s decision to enter into export contracts or projects that private sector 
providers consider commercially unattractive due, for example, to the size of the 
transaction or the firm’s other financial exposures. In other cases, EFIC has provided 
assistance because the firm is reluctant to seek alternative sources of finance, 
including equity, or the firm is seeking to meet its internal risk management policies.  
In sum, while few if any markets conform to the competitive ideal, there is no 
convincing evidence of systemic failures in financial markets that impede access to 
finance for large firms, or for proponents of resource-related projects and their 
suppliers. Any intervention in financial markets through EFIC to ameliorate 
declines in international trade is likely to be unsuccessful. 
That said, there may be some instances of information-related failures in financial 
markets that may impede or prevent otherwise commercially viable export 
transactions. The Commission’s proposed changes to EFIC’s mandate and 
governance arrangements to align its operations with these potential market failures 
are discussed in later sections. 
EFIC’s assistance creates ‘distortions’ where there are no market 
failures 
The market gap concept is not sufficient to ensure that EFIC’s activities are 
addressing inefficiencies in financial markets caused by market failure. If EFIC is 
supporting firms where no market failure is present, then public funds are crowding 
out private funds in the financing of a project or export transaction, and risk is 
unnecessarily transferred to taxpayers. In addition, EFIC’s support may enable a 
less efficient firm to prevail over a more efficient competitor. 
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In the Commission’s view, EFIC’s support for projects such as the Wiggins Island 
coal export terminal and the Brookfield rail upgrade in Western Australia was not 
based — and could not be justified — on a market failure rationale for government 
intervention. 
In its submission to this inquiry Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd, the 
owners of the coal terminal assets, stated that this project ‘would not have 
proceeded at that time without the support of [export credit agencies and 
government supported financiers]’. The submission further stated ‘WICET’s 
mandate could have been withdrawn by the Queensland Government had Financial 
Close not been achieved within the State’s timeframe’. 
The fact that some projects may be postponed because they are unable to secure 
finance is not necessarily indicative of a market failure. It may be that market 
participants require more information about a project before committing, or that the 
project is not commercially viable at this time. As capital is scarce, EFIC’s support 
for a project where there is no market failure will have the dual effect of 
encouraging a greater level of investment than is efficient in areas that receive 
EFIC’s assistance, and the drawing of resources away from more productive uses, 
including parts of the economy that are export-oriented.  
EFIC’s relatively small size limits the economy-wide consequences of such 
distortions. However, some of EFIC’s facilities are of sufficient magnitude to pose 
non-trivial financial risks to the Commonwealth. These risks would be increased 
significantly if the Australian Government were to accept the proposition advocated 
by Citibank and the ANZ to increase EFIC’s maximum exposure limit per 
transaction. Citibank, for example, noted that other ECAs can have financial 
exposure to a single transaction of greater than $500 million. 
Is EFIC crowding out? 
In the Commission’s assessment, some of EFIC’s activities have a crowding out 
effect that is distorting the allocation of resources within the economy, and this has 
detracted from its performance. EFIC may crowd out other providers of export 
finance and insurance, other sources of capital, alternative projects that may have 
been undertaken by clients, and domestic firms competing with the firm EFIC is 
assisting. EFIC’s participation in financial markets where market failure is not 
present will also entrench the status quo of EFIC’s support, preventing the 
development of private sector capacity to provide export finance and insurance. 
That some of EFIC’s activities are crowding out follows from the reality that the 
market gap mandate is not sufficient to ensure that EFIC will only intervene to 
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support welfare-enhancing projects or export transactions that are impeded by 
failures in financial markets. 
Equity effects and resource allocation 
When EFIC intervenes and enables a project or export transaction to proceed that 
would not have otherwise done so, the exporting company, its workers, and 
associated industries will benefit by being able to produce and sell more output for 
export. Where private sector providers of finance and insurance are involved in the 
transaction, they also share in the benefits of EFIC’s participation. 
The beneficiaries of EFIC’s assistance are relatively few — it services only a small 
number of Australia’s 45 000 exporting firms. However, because EFIC is distorting 
the allocation of resources in the economy, the costs are widespread and include 
those borne by domestic competitors of EFIC’s clients and, more broadly, the 
taxpayer. 
EFIC and exporters — incentives for repeat facilities 
EFIC has a relatively small client base, but a high proportion are repeat users of its 
services — more than 20 times in the case of one salt producer (box 7). The nature 
of such financial assistance to firms suggests there may be little incentive for some 
exporters (or private sector financiers) to change their business models. If the 
provision of export finance can be undertaken on a commercial basis, then the 
private sector should be willing to take on those transactions. If EFIC’s financial 
services are not provided on a commercial basis, then the firms may be subsidised 
and the incentive to improve firm level efficiency is dulled. It also means that 
private providers cannot compete on the same terms. 
EFIC and private sector providers  
EFIC often conducts business with an exporter in conjunction with another 
intermediary (usually the exporter’s or buyer’s bank). EFIC noted in its most recent 
annual report that its support of finance and insurance providers is a core part of its 
functions:  
One of EFIC’s functions is to encourage banks, other financiers and insurers to support 
exports and overseas investments. Our participation in larger transactions can often 
encourage private financiers to share the risks involved. 
Some private sector providers, including the ANZ, the Commonwealth Bank and 
Westpac, have formal partnership arrangements with EFIC. Private sector providers 
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benefit directly from EFIC’s involvement in transactions through risk transfer from 
the provider to EFIC and from earning higher returns. 
Box 7 One salt producer’s multiple credit guarantees 
EFIC has provided a salt producer, Shark Bay Salt, with more than 20 documentary 
credit guarantees for salt exports to Indonesia since 2009-10.  
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC stated it provided the support because Shark 
Bay Salt’s Australian bank could not confirm letters of credit due to its internal 
counterparty and country limits on Indonesia. Moreover, it stated that the cost to Shark 
Bay Salt of moving to another bank was prohibitive. 
EFIC has not provided any support to Shark Bay Salt’s Australian competitors, yet the 
majority of salt production is exported in bulk from northern Western Australia — a 
large share of this salt is exported to South East Asia, including Indonesia. 
Three points arise from this example: 
• There is no inherent need for EFIC to assist Shark Bay Salt, demonstrated by other 
salt producers being able to export without this assistance. 
• EFIC’s support allows Shark Bay Salt to avoid the business costs of switching 
banks — giving it an advantage against competing salt producers. 
• EFIC’s support lowers the cost to the bank of meeting its internal prudential policies.  
In some cases, this relationship is built into a bank’s business model. The ANZ, for 
example, lists structured export finance in partnership with ECAs as part of its 
products package and states that this partnership gives their clients ‘access to an 
additional source of competitively priced, long-term debt for major capital and 
infrastructure projects’. 
However, this indicates that there is an incentive for financial institutions to develop 
their business models based on the presence of ECA support, rather than developing 
their business models to replace ECA (or in this case EFIC) support. 
Clients and partners support EFIC 
The Commission has received submissions from EFIC’s clients and financial sector 
partners indicating their support for EFIC’s services. It is not unusual that supported 
firms, or their representatives, put forward arguments for continued government 
intervention that improves their returns or reduces their risks. Similar arguments 
were used against the dismantling of import tariffs. 
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EFIC’s financial management and performance 
EFIC earns more income from investing its capital than from providing financial 
services to exporters 
The primary reason for the establishment of EFIC is to provide export finance and 
insurance services. However, the origination business (box 1) has accounted for less 
than half of EFIC’s income in each of the past five years (figure 4). The majority of 
EFIC’s income is generated through the investment of its capital and reserves and 
the interest margin between its borrowings and investment of surplus funds (the 
treasury margin). 
Figure 4 EFIC earns less than half of its income through origination 
 
EFIC is able to borrow cheaply on domestic and international capital markets using 
its statutory government guarantee (currently AAA) and invest those funds in higher 
returning securities and deposits. At 30 June 2011, EFIC had $1.3 billion of liquid 
assets, where its capital and reserves, surplus liquidity portfolio and market 
recognition portfolios are invested. This is more liquidity than it needs to meet the 
requirements of its prudential management policies. 
The Australian Government made an allowance for a special dividend of 
$200 million to be paid from EFIC’s capital and reserves in the 2012-13 Budget. 
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Management of capital 
EFIC maintains capital well above the prudential minimums established by the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority for other financial institutions and 
EFIC’s internal minimums. This explains why EFIC’s total income is dominated by 
income from investing its capital and reserves. As a wholly government owned 
entity, EFIC does not face the same incentive to productively manage capital as a 
private sector firm. 
The size of EFIC’s treasury operations and its capital requirements should be 
commensurate with the size and product offering of the origination business it 
supports. The Commission’s view is that EFIC’s treasury operations, liquidity and 
capital needs, and dividend policy should be subject to regular review by The 
Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation. 
Risk management 
In 2010, Standard & Poor’s found that EFIC’s commercial account exposure 
(excluding political risk insurance and reinsurance) was consistent with 
counterparty risk of about BBB, the same as Bank of Queensland’s long term credit 
rating. 
Despite this, EFIC has at times had high exposure to particular sectors, parties and 
countries. For example, at its peak in 2007, EFIC’s gross commercial account 
exposure to ship building and operation was 56 per cent of the total exposure on that 
account. EFIC’s exposure to ship building and operation, excluding sovereign and 
semi-sovereign exposures and reinsurance, was about 36 per cent of total exposures 
between 2005 and 2007. 
In 2010, EFIC’s internal auditors observed that EFIC had large exposures to some 
countries, such as Zambia and Sri Lanka, and to ship building and operation. The 
auditors recommended that EFIC consider enhanced ‘stress testing’ and scenario 
analysis tailored to country and industry specific risks. On the basis of the material 
presented by EFIC, the Commission understands that this recommendation was not 
adopted. 
EFIC’s high exposure to certain countries and industries, which drew the attention 
of the EFIC Board and the internal auditors, indicates that some aspects of its credit 
risk management have not always been sufficiently robust. In the Commission’s 
view, it is important that EFIC revise its risk management policies to include a limit 
on exposures to particular industries. 
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Is EFIC operating on a commercial basis? 
EFIC has reported modest accounting profits in 19 of the past 20 years. However, 
this is not sufficient to conclude that EFIC is operating on a commercial basis (or 
that it is generating a net benefit to the economy). Further, EFIC’s exemption from 
competitive neutrality arrangements means that its accounting profits do not take 
into account the expected full economic cost of providing financial services, 
including income tax expense, lower borrowing costs and the opportunity cost of 
capital. 
EFIC’s return on equity was higher than the Australian Government’s ten year bond 
rate over the past 10 years (figure 5). However, the return on Australian 
Government bonds (considered low risk given the Australian Government’s AAA 
credit rating) does not represent an adequate benchmark for EFIC’s financial 
performance, given the risk EFIC incurs on the commercial account. EFIC’s low 
rate of return on equity indicates the Australian Government has not received an 
adequate return for the risk it has incurred from EFIC’s operations. 
Figure 5 EFIC’s financial performance — low returns to government 
equity 
 
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC stated that its return on equity reflects its 
concentration risks — a function of the niche in which it is required to operate — 
and this lowers gearing and return on equity. The Commission does not consider 
that a market failure (or even a market gap) mandate requires EFIC to deliver low 
returns to the Australian Government’s equity investment. 
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Is EFIC subsidising the provision of export finance and insurance? 
EFIC has stated that it does not provide subsidised finance, but applies commercial 
principles with prices that reflect risk. However, EFIC’s pricing strategies do not 
ensure that all facilities are priced to earn a commercial rate of return on equity. 
This means EFIC’s expected income from some facilities does not cover the 
expected full economic costs of providing export finance and insurance, including 
the opportunity cost of capital. These facilities are effectively being subsidised in 
advance by taxpayers. 
Where a facility is subsidised, the subsidy will likely be shared between exporters, 
buyers, and other providers that are party to the transaction (including the private 
sector or other ECAs). It will almost certainly be the case that the exporter will 
receive a share of any subsidy — the size of the share will depend on the 
characteristics of the market and how the production and consumption of the 
exported good or service changes as price changes. 
A future role for EFIC — addressing information-related market failures 
EFIC’s operations on the commercial account should be reoriented to addressing 
market failures that affect newly exporting SMEs seeking to access export finance. 
The Commission’s proposed role for EFIC will require significant changes to its 
mandate, scope of operations and governance arrangements. 
There are two information-related market failures that may warrant government 
intervention through EFIC on the commercial account, albeit on a more limited 
basis than at present:  
• Problems may arise where private sector providers adopt simplified decision 
rules to lower transaction costs that may lead to the rejection of commercially 
viable export transactions. 
• Markets may be ‘missing’ due to a temporary information failure relating to 
country or sovereign risks in the buyer’s country. This may occur through 
severe disruption to financial markets. For example, civil unrest in countries, 
such as Sri Lanka or Iraq, may temporarily reduce the ability of private sector 
providers to properly calculate the risk of an export transaction. 
These two potential information-related market failures may prevent commercially 
viable export transactions from proceeding. 
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Does EFIC have advantages in addressing information-related market failures? 
EFIC may be able to help overcome information-related market failures, where they 
occur, through a demonstration effect for private sector providers. To achieve this, 
the Commission proposes that, following approval, EFIC release information about 
a facility to the market to enable private sector participants to judge over time the 
viability of servicing SME and similar clients. This approach may have advantages 
over mere information dissemination — the credibility of the generated information 
may be higher because of greater financial consequences to EFIC of making a 
mistake.  
EFIC has experience in providing assistance to SMEs, including those seeking to 
access emerging export markets (box 8) and a capacity to adapt its services to the 
needs of SME clientele — several SME participants commented that EFIC provided 
them with guarantees and bonds that could not be sourced from the private sector. 
EFIC also has skilled staff (a point noted by several inquiry participants) and 
well-established relationships with private sector providers that would reduce its 
transaction costs in performing a demonstration role. 
 
Box 8 EFIC’s assistance to a small and medium-sized enterprise 
EFIC’s assistance enabled Environment Systems & Services (ES&S) to access 
additional working capital to fulfil export contracts for the provision of meteorological 
and geotechnical equipment in Asia and the Pacific region. EFIC provided an export 
working capital guarantee to the company’s bank, the ANZ, enabling the bank to lend 
the same amount to ES&S. The additional working capital helped ES&S bridge the 
time difference between incurring costs and receiving payment from their clients. In a 
submission to this inquiry, ES&S indicated that the exports concerned would not have 
gone ahead without EFIC’s assistance.  
 
Pricing EFIC’s facilities on commercial terms 
For EFIC to efficiently address any potential information-related market failures, it 
must acquire information on the export transaction at a cost no greater than private 
sector providers, or charge accordingly. EFIC’s business model would also need to 
be consistent with a demonstration role. If it is to show that providing export 
finance to exporting SMEs can be commercially viable, it should do so on the same 
basis as the private sector, with price covering the expected cost of provision. 
This means EFIC should be subject to competitive neutrality arrangements, 
including earning an appropriately benchmarked rate of return on equity, setting 
prices that are commensurate with the level of risk undertaken, and paying a 
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tax-equivalent charge and a debt neutrality fee. Put another way, if demand for 
EFIC’s services occurs only because those services are subsidised, this would 
indicate that the export transactions are not commercially viable. 
Aligning EFIC’s operations to a demonstration role 
A reorientation of EFIC’s mandate toward a demonstration role focusing on newly 
exporting SMEs will require changes to the scope of EFIC’s operations to service 
those firms where it is most likely that the intervention in financial markets will 
generate benefits to the Australian community. 
EFIC’s definition of an SME as a firm with annual turnover of up to 
$150 million encompasses substantial firms whose challenges in securing financial 
services are not the result of market failures that should be corrected by government 
intervention through EFIC. The Minister should amend the Statement of 
Expectations to require EFIC to define a small and medium-sized enterprise as an 
entity, including any related entities, with fewer than 100 full-time equivalent 
employees or annual turnover of less than $50 million. 
EFIC’s recent expansion of its operations to include support for suppliers to 
resource-related projects is problematic. It is based on provisions of the EFIC Act 
that are very broad, conceivably covering any transaction in the export supply chain 
(box 5). This creates the risk of EFIC supporting projects and firms that are 
increasingly remote from the original export focus of the EFIC Act, and from 
market failures affecting exporters’ access to finance or insurance. There is a risk 
that, through its expansion into those areas, EFIC will provide assistance to those 
that do not require it or to less efficient firms that do, while acquiring the focus and 
characteristics of an investment bank. To remove this risk, the EFIC Act should be 
amended to remove all references to EFIC providing support to those indirectly 
involved in Australian export trade. 
Further, EFIC’s operations should be targeted at information-related market failures 
that are impeding otherwise commercially viable transactions that directly relate to 
the export of goods and services from Australia. For this reason, EFIC facilities that 
are provided on the commercial account should be limited to transactions that are 
based on an export contract as defined in the EFIC Act. 
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Improving EFIC’s governance arrangements 
Clarity of purpose 
Clear objectives are essential for establishing an organisation’s priorities, and are 
the basis for holding it accountable for its performance. EFIC is currently required 
to perform its functions only in circumstances where the private sector is not able or 
willing to provide credit and insurance services to financially viable export 
transactions. At the same time, there is an expectation that EFIC’s commercial 
account operations are to be conducted on a commercial basis — although a specific 
performance measure to assess whether EFIC is meeting this expectation, such as a 
target rate of return on equity, has not been set by the Australian Government.  
A need for more transparency 
EFIC has some of the building blocks for a strong governance framework, such as a 
merit-based board with members who have experience in managing financial 
institutions. However, some of EFIC’s internal governance processes are weak. For 
example, the Commission has found that facilities to support suppliers to 
resource-related projects in Australia have been approved without adequate 
eligibility criteria to determine whether the good or service provided is integral to 
the ultimate goods produced for export. 
EFIC’s governance practices, including its internal audit program, are not sufficient 
to ensure that its activities are consistent with the operational restrictions set out in 
the Statement of Expectations and Part 4 of the EFIC Act. Further, there is a lack of 
clarity in the information it provides to the Australian Government, and to the 
public, and this impairs EFIC’s accountability. 
EFIC should be required to publicly release its corporate plan and publicly report 
against a performance management framework. It should also inform the Minister 
about commercial account transactions after they have been approved. 
A number of submissions to this inquiry raised concerns about the environmental 
and social consequences of EFIC’s operations, and EFIC’s disclosure practices. 
EFIC should be required to release more information relevant to environmental and 
social impact assessment, and the Australian Government should remove EFIC’s 
special exemption from the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (while retaining 
protection for Cabinet and commercial-in-confidence material). 
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Assessing the need for ongoing assistance to newly exporting SMEs 
EFIC’s operations on the commercial account at present are poorly directed and 
inequitable. A focus on the so-called ‘market gap’ has meant that EFIC has not 
targeted its operations to address market failures, but rather to areas that should be 
the domain of the private sector. EFIC’s pricing and project selection criteria distort 
the allocation of resources within the trade finance sector and within the economy, 
and these distortions would be magnified with any expansion of EFIC’s commercial 
account operations. 
The reforms to EFIC’s mandate and operations recommended in this report seek to 
reorient EFIC’s operations to address information-related market failures 
confronting SMEs and to improve EFIC’s governance arrangements. The 
Commission’s proposed reforms are summarised in table 2. 
EFIC’s performance against this more clearly defined and rigorous objective should 
be independently reviewed three years after a revised Statement of Expectations is 
issued by the Minister or the amendments to the EFIC Act have been passed by 
Parliament, whichever occurs first. The review should consider whether the 
rationale for government intervention based on information failures remains valid. It 
should also determine whether the provision of financial services through EFIC has 
been effective, and if it is the most efficient way of addressing any failures in 
finance markets that are impeding otherwise commercially viable export 
transactions. 
If the private sector increasingly recognises opportunities to service newly 
exporting SMEs and the demand for EFIC’s services gradually declines over time, 
this should be considered a policy success. If on the other hand, EFIC struggles to 
develop a sustainable business, this would be evidence that either the market 
failures of concern are not extensive or they are not amenable to being addressed 
through the direct provision of financial services by EFIC. These matters would 
need to be considered in the independent review. 
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Table 2 Selected features of current and proposed arrangements 
EFIC’s activities on the commercial account 
 Current arrangements Proposed arrangements 
Objective Facilitate and encourage 
Australian export trade 
Operate in the market gap 
Address potential information-related market failures 
affecting newly exporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises’ (SME) access to export finance 
Policy 
mechanism 
Provision of export finance 
and insurance that is not 
always priced on a 
commercial basis 
Demonstrating to the private sector that providing 
export finance to exporting SMEs can be 
commercially viable 
Transparent and limited provision of export finance to 
SMEs, reflecting expected full economic cost 
Governance  Insufficient internal and 
independent oversight of 
compliance with mandate  
Internal audit program and independent review of 
compliance with mandate  
Improved transparency through publication of 
corporate plan 
 Reporting arrangements that 
are inadequate to assess 
EFIC’s performance 
Reporting against a performance management 
framework reflecting the clearly defined, rigorous 
objective. More frequent reporting to the Minister 
Independent review against the new limited mandate 
three years after revised Statement of Expectations or 
legislative amendments have passed 
Scope and 
focus  
Focus on large corporate 
clients, and resource-related 
projects in Australia  
Focus on newly exporting SMEs 
A direction from the Minister to cease support for 
resource projects located in Australia, and related 
infrastructure, and suppliers to those projects 
 Broad range of products 
overlapping with those offered 
by the private sector 
Product range limited to guarantees and bonds, 
including the provision of bonds on behalf of exporters 
 No limits on the number of 
facilities per client. Often 
repeat clients 
Normally three facilities per client. Proposals beyond 
the three facility limit should either relate to an 
emerging export market, or require approval by the 
Board, be notified to the Minister and be included in 
EFIC’s internal audit program and independent review 
 Support can include provision 
of facilities for transactions 
indirectly related to Australian 
export trade 
Transactions limited to those based on an export 
contract 
 Relationships with financial 
institutions beyond 
demonstration role 
Engagement with financial institutions based on 
demonstrating commercial viability through 
transparency in pricing, facing the expected full 
economic cost of provision 
Operational 
 outcomes 
Low rate of return on equity Return on equity appropriately benchmarked  
The price of some facilities is 
not sufficient to cover 
expected full economic costs 
Pricing that reflects the expected full economic cost of 
provision, underpinned by compliance with 
competitive neutrality arrangements 
 Strategic conduct by clients Low incentive for strategic conduct by clients due to 
appropriate pricing, transparency and increased 
disclosure requirements 
 Misallocation of resources that 
impose an efficiency cost on 
the Australian economy 
Private sector provision of export finance to newly 
exporting SMEs achieved through a demonstration 
effect 
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Findings and recommendations 
Provision of financial products 
Most products offered by EFIC are also offered by the private sector, although the 
price and other conditions of provision may differ. 
There can be sound commercial reasons why private sector providers do not offer 
some products or are unwilling to provide them to some exporters or buyers. Such 
cases are not market failures. 
Rationale for government intervention 
The following arguments are not sound policy rationales for government 
involvement in export finance and insurance through EFIC: 
• EFIC can assume more risk than the private sector is willing to accept because 
it is government owned. 
• EFIC is necessary to address cross-border regulatory problems faced by 
exporters.  
• EFIC can be used to address problems arising from insufficient competition in 
Australian financial markets. 
• EFIC can address imbalances in the supply of, and demand for, capital. 
The decline in the provision of trade finance during the global financial crisis was 
primarily due to lower levels of international trade and resulting lower demand for 
trade finance products. As such, government policy aimed at ameliorating the 
decline in international trade through the provision of export finance and insurance 
through EFIC would not have been successful. 
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The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
define a small and medium-sized enterprise as an entity, including any related 
entities, with fewer than 100 full-time equivalent employees or annual turnover of 
less than $50 million. 
The only potential rationale for government involvement in export finance and 
insurance through EFIC relates to information problems affecting access to export 
finance and insurance by newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
possible sources of those problems are: 
• inadequate information about the credit history and standing of the exporter, 
which could result in private sector providers employing rigid generalised rules 
and not forming an assessment on the merits of the transaction 
• inadequate information about the risk associated with some emerging markets, 
which could result in private sector providers refusing to provide services for 
transactions in those markets 
• temporarily missing markets due to severe disruption in the importing country. 
Pricing of EFIC’s products 
EFIC does not pay income tax, is not required to earn a particular rate of return on 
equity and the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 provides for its 
liabilities to be explicitly guaranteed by the Commonwealth. This lowers its 
borrowing costs relative to private sector providers, giving it a commercial 
advantage that may discourage market entry by potential competitors. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
commission an independent review of the process it follows to allocate an EFIC 
risk score (ERS) to a facility. This review should include a comparison of the 
ERS of each facility at signing and at maturity to examine any changes over time. 
Evaluating the forecasting accuracy of expected losses compared to actual losses 
will help ensure that EFIC prices risk appropriately. EFIC should report the 
results of this review to the Minister. 
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 
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Not all of EFIC’s facilities are priced to earn a commercial rate of return on equity 
and hence, do not cover their expected full costs, including the opportunity cost of 
capital. These facilities are effectively being subsidised by taxpayers. The 
beneficiaries of these subsidies likely extend beyond EFIC’s clients and may include 
private sector providers, other export credit agencies and the buyer of the exports. 
The Australian Government should amend the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC Act) to ensure EFIC’s activity on the commercial 
account complies with competitive neutrality arrangements. This will require 
EFIC to pay a tax-equivalent charge and a debt neutrality fee. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to: 
• require the pricing of EFIC’s commercial account facilities to reflect the 
expected full economic cost of provision, including the opportunity cost of 
capital, taxes paid by private sector participants and the benefit that EFIC 
obtains from the government guarantee 
• set an appropriately benchmarked rate of return on equity following 
consultation with the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance 
• require EFIC to identify in its annual report and corporate plan that part of its 
revenue that relates to not having to pay a tax-equivalent charge and debt 
neutrality fee, until the EFIC Act is amended to apply competitive neutrality 
arrangements. 
Filling the ‘market gap’: not a role for government 
The concept of the market gap can cover circumstances where there is no market 
failure that would warrant government intervention through EFIC. EFIC has 
provided assistance on the basis of the market gap in circumstances that are not a 
result of market failure including: 
• a reluctance by firms to dilute the equity of existing shareholders by taking on 
additional equity partners as a firm expands 
• firms exhausting other forms of debt or equity finance 
• meeting the credit preferences of the firm’s owners 
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• participants making EFIC’s involvement a precondition of the transaction or 
project proceeding 
• reluctance by an exporter or buyer to incur the transaction costs of finding more 
supportive bankers 
• firms reaching the prudentially determined credit limits of their banks 
• private sector providers declining to supply services because of recent financial 
distress of the client 
• timeframes determined by approval processes, including government approval 
processes, not being met without EFIC’s assistance 
• private sector providers seeking to make a transaction or project more attractive 
through EFIC’s participation. 
The Minister should remove the ‘market gap’ mandate from the Statement of 
Expectations as it lacks rigour and does not ensure that EFIC’s activities 
generate a net benefit to the economy. 
There is no convincing evidence that there are problems relating to the provision of 
capital to large Australian resource-related projects, or the suppliers to these 
projects, which require intervention by the Australian Government through EFIC. 
Where EFIC’s activities are not addressing a market failure, EFIC will be 
distorting the allocation of resources within the economy. These distortions include 
potential crowding out of other sources of finance, other projects, or competitors of 
EFIC’s clients. 
At present, EFIC’s relatively small size limits the economy-wide consequences of 
this. However, some facilities are of sufficient magnitude to pose non-trivial 
financial risks to the Commonwealth. 
EFIC and private sector providers 
Some financial market participants have a partnership relationship with EFIC, 
being able to benefit directly from EFIC’s involvement in facilities, through both 
risk transfer and higher returns. 
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Risk management 
EFIC’s internal auditors observed that EFIC has had high exposure to certain 
industries, including ship building and operation, and to a few countries. 
The Commission considers that some aspects of EFIC’s credit risk management 
have not always been sufficiently robust. 
EFIC should revise its risk management policies to include a limit on exposures 
to particular industries. 
EFIC’s capital adequacy ratio at 30 June 2011 was well above the minimum level 
specified by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority guidelines and EFIC’s 
internal benchmarks. The extra capital held by EFIC has an opportunity cost that is 
borne by the taxpayer. 
Financial and operational performance 
A large proportion of EFIC’s income is earned through its treasury operations, 
with EFIC’s origination business accounting for less than half of its income in each 
of the past five years. 
The Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation should regularly 
review the need for, and the scope of, EFIC’s treasury function to ensure that the 
size of treasury operations is commensurate with the size and product offering of 
the origination business it supports. 
The first review of this type should include an assessment of EFIC’s capital 
requirements and dividend policy, and be completed by June 2013. 
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The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 should be amended to 
allow the Minister to direct the Board of EFIC to return capital to the Australian 
Government when the Minister determines that EFIC has surplus capital, after 
seeking the views of the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance. 
The Australian Government has not received an adequate return for the risk it has 
incurred from EFIC’s operations. This may reflect a number of factors, including 
that some facilities are not priced to reflect their expected full economic cost (given 
the risk incurred), a high level of retained capital, and possibly high operating 
expenses. 
Enhancing the transparency of EFIC’s operations 
Consistent with the findings of the Uhrig Review, the Australian Government 
should amend the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 to 
exclude Australian Public Service personnel from the EFIC Board. Where the 
EFIC Board considers departmental advice beneficial, officials from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should be invited to present to board 
meetings for the relevant agenda items and to answer questions relating to those 
items. 
The Commission is not satisfied that the EFIC Board is provided with sufficient 
information in board papers to evaluate whether facilities submitted for approval 
on the commercial account are meeting the requirements set out in the Minister’s 
Statement of Expectations with regard to pricing, or to determine that EFIC is not 
competing with the private sector. 
EFIC’s compliance with the operational restrictions in the Minister’s Statement of 
Expectations and Part 4 of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 
has not had sufficient focus in independent reviews or EFIC’s internal audit 
program over the past five years. 
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The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
include in its regular internal audit program an assessment of its compliance with 
the operational restrictions, as set out in the Statement of Expectations, any 
relevant directions from the Minister, and Part 4 of the Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation Act 1991. Board papers should be sufficiently robust to 
ensure that they can be used in EFIC’s internal audit program to confirm that 
EFIC is complying with its mandate. 
There is insufficient clarity in the information provided by EFIC to the Australian 
Government and the public, and this impairs EFIC’s accountability. 
The Minister should table EFIC’s corporate plan in Parliament and, in due 
course, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 should be 
amended to require this. 
EFIC should provide quarterly progress reports to the Minister against its 
corporate plan, including information about facilities on the commercial account 
executed during that quarter. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require the EFIC 
Board to establish a performance management framework, based on a more 
clearly defined and rigorous objective under the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991, directed at market failures affecting small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The framework should be developed in consultation 
with other Australian Government agencies, and use relevant performance 
benchmarks and indicators for EFIC’s business units, including treasury 
operations. 
EFIC should report its performance against this framework in its annual report 
and corporate plan. 
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National interest account 
Proposed facilities with national interest objectives should only be considered in 
the context of the national interest account. 
The Australian Government’s assessment of national interest account facilities 
should include analysis of whether the proposal is the most cost-effective way of 
achieving intended outcomes. 
The Australian Government should clearly and publicly articulate the 
justification for a national interest account facility after it has been approved by 
the Minister. 
Information on the performance of national interest account facilities should be 
collated and publicly reported by the Australian Government. 
Environmental and social responsibility 
Increased public disclosure of information relevant to environmental and social 
impact assessments, including contractual terms to manage and mitigate risk, 
would enhance the transparency of EFIC’s operations to the public and to the 
Australian Government. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
publicly disclose its prospective involvement in any facility with potentially 
significant environmental or social impacts. This includes all category A projects, 
and ‘non-projects’ and bonds where it has been determined that there is potential 
for significant environmental and social impacts. 
Information relating to the environmental and social classification of projects 
and the reasons for their approval should be predictable and disclosed in the 
annual report and on EFIC’s website. This information should include 
assessment benchmarking and processes, conditions of approval and 
consequences for non-compliance. Information that is relevant to EFIC’s 
assessment of environmental and social impacts should be made public. 
EFIC should make public its involvement in supporting projects that are subject 
to environmental assessment in Australia. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.5 
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The Minister, by way of a direction under the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991, should articulate which international obligations, 
including human rights obligations, EFIC is required to comply with. 
EFIC’s compliance with those obligations should be included in its internal audit 
program with outcomes publicly reported, including in EFIC’s annual report. 
The Australian Government should remove EFIC’s special exemption in relation 
to matters done under Parts 4 and 5 of the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 from the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (while 
retaining protection for Cabinet and commercial-in-confidence material). 
Limiting the scope of EFIC’s activities 
As soon as possible, the Minister should direct EFIC to cease providing financial 
services for transactions that are not based on an export contract as defined in 
section 3 of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC Act). 
This includes resource projects located in Australia, and related infrastructure, 
and suppliers of goods and services to those projects. 
The Australian Government should not broaden the eligibility criteria under 
Part 4 of the EFIC Act. Specifically, the EFIC Act should not be amended to 
allow EFIC to enter into loans for the export of non-capital goods. 
EFIC’s future role 
Until it is next reviewed by an independent body, EFIC’s role on the commercial 
account should be limited to demonstrating to the private sector that providing 
export finance to newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
can be commercially viable. This demonstration role should be articulated in the 
Minister’s Statement of Expectations. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.7 
RECOMMENDATION 9.8 
RECOMMENDATION 10.1 
RECOMMENDATION 10.2 
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EFIC should demonstrate that the provision of financial services to newly 
exporting SMEs can be done on the same basis as the private sector — with price 
covering the expected full economic cost of provision. 
In respect of the commercial account, the Australian Government should make 
amendments to the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC 
Act) to: 
• reorient EFIC’s objective to addressing information-related market failures in 
financial markets affecting newly exporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) seeking access to export finance 
• specify that EFIC is to demonstrate to the private sector that providing export 
finance to newly exporting SMEs can be commercially viable 
• clarify that assistance is only to be provided in respect of export contracts as 
currently defined in the EFIC Act 
• remove references to EFIC providing support to persons indirectly involved in 
Australian export trade 
• limit the financial products offered by EFIC to guarantees and bonds falling 
within the definition of ‘guarantee’ under section 3 of the EFIC Act 
• allow for the product range to include the provision of reinsurance cover for 
sovereign and country risk insurance provided by the private sector in times of 
disruption in particular markets, subject to ministerial direction. 
A limit of three facilities per client should normally apply to EFIC’s future 
operations on the commercial account. Proposals to exceed this limit should be 
subject to at least one of the two conditions below: 
• the export transaction is in an emerging export market or 
• the facility has been explicitly approved by the EFIC Board (and not by a 
delegate), is notified to the Minister and is included in EFIC’s internal audit 
program and independent review of EFIC’s operations. 
The limit of three facilities should not apply to political risk reinsurance facilities 
provided pursuant to the direction by the Minister. 
EFIC should publish information on the facilities it approves on the commercial 
account within a month of execution, including the name of the firm, price and 
other terms of provision. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.3 
RECOMMENDATION 10.4 
RECOMMENDATION 10.5 
   
 FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
43 
Implementation and review 
Where possible, the Minister should give effect to the proposed changes to 
EFIC’s operations through a ministerial direction or a revised Statement of 
Expectations, until such time as the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
Act 1991 can be amended. 
EFIC’s performance against the more clearly defined and rigorous objective 
should be independently reviewed three years after a revised Statement of 
Expectations is issued by the Minister or the amendments to the Export Finance 
and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 have been passed by Parliament, whichever 
occurs first. 
This independent review should consider whether the rationale for government 
intervention remains valid, and whether the provision of financial services 
through EFIC is the most effective and efficient way of addressing any failures in 
financial markets that are impeding otherwise commercially viable export 
transactions. This review should also include examination of alternative 
arrangements for post-approval administration of the national interest account. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.6 
RECOMMENDATION 10.7 
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1 Introduction 
The Australian Government has asked the Productivity Commission to inquire into 
Australia’s arrangements for the provision of export credit through the Export 
Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC). The terms of reference for the inquiry 
require the Commission to consider, among other matters, the rationale for 
government provision of export finance and insurance products and the efficiency 
of providing these products through EFIC.   
The current minister responsible for EFIC is the Australian Government Minister 
for Trade and Competitiveness. For the purposes of this report, ‘the Minister’ refers 
to the Australian Government Minister responsible for EFIC, unless otherwise 
specified. 
1.1 Background to this inquiry 
EFIC is Australia’s export credit agency — the government provider of export 
credits, insurance, reinsurance and other financial services that support Australian 
exports and overseas investments. Although its activities can be traced back to the 
1950s, EFIC was established in its current form in 1991 under the Export Finance 
and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) (EFIC Act) as an independent 
statutory corporation wholly owned by the Commonwealth of Australia. As set out 
in the Minister’s Statement of Expectations, EFIC is to operate a commercial 
account under a ‘market gap’ mandate — it is only to provide services to viable 
projects where the private sector is unwilling or unable to provide support.  
EFIC also manages the national interest account (NIA) on behalf of the Australian 
Government. Each NIA transaction is approved by the Minister. National interest 
considerations may include the delivery of foreign aid or meeting foreign policy 
objectives, such as regional stability and growth.  
EFIC has been subject to a number of government reviews since its inception 
(box 1.1). EFIC was last reviewed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
in 2006. The review made a number of recommendations on EFIC’s governance 
arrangements, including proposed amendments to the EFIC Act that are relevant to 
this inquiry. 
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Box 1.1 Previous reviews of EFIC 
EFIC has been subject to a number of direct reviews within government since its 
inception. 
• In 2000, an interdepartmental steering committee under the direction of the Minister 
conducted a review of Australian Government involvement in the provision of export 
credit and finance through EFIC. The review found that there was limited private 
sector support for medium-term export finance and political risk insurance, but 
expanding private sector provision of short-term export credit insurance. The review 
considered that EFIC’s export finance business should remain with EFIC but 
identified options for reforming EFIC’s short-term export credit insurance business, 
including phased privatisation. EFIC’s short-term export credit insurance business 
was divested in 2003. 
• In 2003, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) commissioned Ernst 
& Young to assess the appropriateness of EFIC withdrawing from the short-term 
export credit insurance market. EFIC and Gerling NCM formed an alliance to 
provide the opportunity to demonstrate Gerling NCM’s capacity to meet exporters’ 
needs for short-term insurance. The review assessed Gerling NCM’s performance 
against certain divestment benchmarks. EFIC’s short-term export credit insurance 
business was subsequently divested in 2003. 
• DFAT reviewed EFIC in 2006 and found that: 
– the divestment of EFIC’s short-term insurance business had been successful, 
with the market effectively served by the private sector since the divestment 
– the ‘market gap’ in which EFIC operates was shrinking due to greater private 
market capacity for export finance and insurance, but the review found no strong 
evidence that EFIC was consistently extending its support beyond the market 
gap or undercutting private providers on price 
– although private capacity had increased, long-term insurance markets, 
particularly political risk insurance, remained the domain of export credit 
agencies 
– there was no evidence that EFIC’s abolition would result in the private market 
‘filling the gap’, with the private sector ‘simply unwilling’ to cover some risks and 
tenors 
– small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were not well served by the private 
market, which has reservations about the durability and profitability of many 
SMEs. This is particularly the case with SMEs that are new or irregular exporters. 
(Continued next page)  
 
   
 INTRODUCTION 47 
 
 
Box 1.1 (continued) 
– the responsibilities of management and the Board of EFIC to operate in the 
market gap should be set out in the Minister’s Statement of Expectations (SoE). 
The SoE should include a statement of principle that EFIC’s pricing is not to 
undercut the pricing of the private sector when private support is present, and not 
to undercut pricing for comparable risks when private support is absent and, 
where appropriate, that EFIC charge a premium for the additional risk or quality 
of service it is providing. 
Broader government reviews also have implications for EFIC. 
• The 2003 Uhrig Review of the corporate governance of statutory authorities and 
office holders found that statutory authorities whose major activities are commercial 
in nature will generally be better suited to operate under a board. To be effective, 
such a board would need to have powers similar to those of the board of a publicly 
listed corporation, including the power to appoint and remove the Managing 
Director. The Uhrig Review considered that boards should be subject to annual 
assessments to ensure government gets the best performance from the board. 
• The 2008 Mortimer Review of Australia’s export policies and programs found that:  
– A common problem among new exporters was a lack of understanding about 
financial products available and where to obtain finance. 
– There was scope for increased cooperation between Austrade and EFIC to raise 
awareness of EFIC’s products. 
– The Australian Government should enact a limited expansion of EFIC’s powers 
to enable it to assist Australian companies seeking to invest offshore, where 
these companies are small and new to offshore investment and where the private 
sector is unwilling to provide support. 
– It would be desirable to have a common framework for the design and monitoring 
of financial assistance programs for exporters, and the Government should 
commit to regular assessment of such programs. 
– Any financial assistance that is not clearly directed at demonstrated market 
failures and does not result in additional exports should be abolished or phased 
out. 
Sources: DFAT (2001; 2006; pers. comm., 8 May 2012); Mortimer (2008); Uhrig (2003).  
 
Over the past 25 years there has been substantial change in the Australian financial 
sector. Australian businesses now have access to extensive and sophisticated capital 
and insurance markets, both domestic and foreign, with financial intermediaries 
providing a range of services. The activities and international obligations of export 
credit agencies in Australia and internationally, as well as the trade financing role of 
multilateral development banks, have also undergone a considerable transformation 
since government export credit arrangements were established in Australia. Given 
this, it is appropriate that the government’s role in the provision of export credits, 
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and support for Australian exports and overseas investments through financial 
products and services more broadly, be extensively reviewed. 
1.2 What has the Commission been asked to do? 
The Commission has been asked to undertake a public inquiry into Australia’s 
arrangements for the provision of export credit through EFIC. This includes: 
• reviewing the rationale for government involvement in the provision of export 
finance and insurance, and assessing current arrangements against the 
requirements of the EFIC Act 
• assessing EFIC’s management of credit and funding risks 
• reviewing EFIC’s pricing and service arrangements and assessing their impact 
on incentives for Australian exporters to access private sector providers of 
export finance and insurance products 
• reviewing EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality policy 
• assessing the interactions between EFIC and other government programs and 
considering alternatives that would achieve EFIC’s objectives. 
The Commission’s approach 
The Commission’s approach to this inquiry takes into account the matters specified 
in the terms of reference and is ultimately directed by the general policy guidelines 
in the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cwlth) (PC Act). Among other things, 
section 8 of the Commission’s Act directs it to: 
(a) improve the overall economic performance of the economy through higher 
productivity in the public and private sectors in order to achieve higher living standards 
for all members of the Australian community 
(b) encourage the development and growth of Australian industries that are efficient in 
their use of resources, enterprising, innovative and internationally competitive. 
In keeping with the PC Act, the Commission has taken an economy-wide 
perspective. This involves identifying if there is a market failure warranting 
intervention, the most appropriate form of intervention, and evaluating whether 
EFIC’s activities and governance arrangements efficiently implement that 
intervention. 
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1.3 Conduct of the inquiry 
The Commission has followed its usual transparent and public processes, with an 
overarching concern for the wellbeing of the Australian community as a whole. 
The Commission: 
• met informally with EFIC, banks, insurance companies, representatives of large 
and small businesses, the ACTU, and government officials (listed in 
appendix A) 
• released an issues paper in October 2011 outlining a range of issues on which it 
was seeking comment and information from participants: 27 submissions were 
received 
• released its draft report Australia’s Export Credit Arrangements on 22 February 
2012 and sought feedback on the proposals in that report. A further 89 
submissions were received 
• held public hearings in Perth, Canberra and Sydney (table 1.1). The Commission 
scheduled an additional hearing day in Sydney to allow for the public 
examination of EFIC’s final submission. 
Table 1.1 Schedule of public hearings 
Location Date 
Perth Friday, 23 March 2012  
Sydney Monday, 26 March 2012 
Canberra Tuesday, 27 March 2012 
Sydney Wednesday, 4 April 2012 
The Commission has given consideration to all submissions received during this 
inquiry. Feedback on the draft report, including material provided by EFIC, was 
drawn on in finalising this report with some findings and recommendations 
amended accordingly. 
The Commission has undertaken economic analysis consistent with its terms of 
reference, basing its findings and recommendations on the evidence available. This 
economic analysis does not constitute a performance or compliance audit of EFIC’s 
financial and legal affairs. 
The Commission expresses its gratitude to all those who assisted with this inquiry 
process. 
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2 Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation 
 
Key points 
• Many countries make use of officially backed export credit agencies (ECAs) to 
facilitate the provision of finance and insurance services to promote exports. ECAs 
can offer a range of financial services including: credit to exporters or their foreign 
buyers, guarantees, bonds, and credit and political risk insurance. 
• The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) has been established to 
facilitate and encourage Australian export trade through the provision of financial 
services. It provides these services on a commercial account (CA) and manages the 
national interest account (NIA) on behalf of the Australian Government. 
• The Minister can approve, or direct, transactions on the NIA that are in the national 
interest. EFIC is reimbursed for any losses on the NIA, remits any profits to the 
Australian Government and receives a fee for its administration. 
• EFIC is to operate the CA on commercial terms and generate revenue to fund its 
operation through fees and premiums for its services. Under the EFIC Act the 
Australian Government guarantees payments to all EFIC’s creditors. 
• EFIC maintains a treasury operation that it uses to facilitate borrowing on domestic 
and international capital markets to fund its origination activities, to structure 
Australian dollar and foreign currency cash flows arising from transactions and to 
manage EFIC’s investment portfolio of capital and reserves. 
• EFIC is exempt from the Australian Government’s competitive neutrality 
arrangements. This means EFIC is not subject to requirements to earn a particular 
rate of return, does not pay income tax and a number of other taxes, and does not 
pay a debt neutrality charge to offset the competitive advantages provided by its 
explicit government guarantee. This places EFIC at a considerable advantage to 
private providers. 
• At present EFIC is generally focused on large firms and often repeat customers. 
Virtually all Australia’s export trade, by both volume and value, takes place without 
EFIC’s assistance. In 2009-10 EFIC provided 54 facilities to 41 clients on the 
commercial account. In the same financial year there were about 45 000 goods and 
services exporting businesses in Australia. 
• In addition to EFIC’s services, the Australian, state and territory governments 
provide a range of financial and advisory products and services that assist 
exporters. The Commission estimates that the gross value of budgetary assistance 
to exporters provided by the Australian Government was $522 million in 2010-11. 
This does not include general support programs that are available to exporters, or 
assistance provided by state and territory governments.  
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2.1 The role of international trade in the economy 
International trade increases aggregate welfare by allowing specialisation along the 
lines of comparative advantage, thereby redirecting resources to their highest valued 
uses, and expanding the consumption choices available to consumers and producers 
in trading nations. International trade can also generate gains in productivity and 
allow benefits from economies of scale. Competing in international markets may 
also confer dynamic (long-run) benefits that arise from the development or transfer 
of more efficient management skills and technologies, and the training of 
higher-quality labour.  
In 2010-11, Australia imported goods and services to the value of $277 billion and 
exported goods and services to the value of $297 billion, or about 20 per cent of 
GDP (ABS 2011a). This inquiry will focus on Australia’s export market (box 2.1) 
but imports, as well as exports, raise the productivity and wellbeing of a nation’s 
citizens. 
 
Box 2.1 The characteristics of Australia’s export market 
In 2009-10 there were about 45 000 goods and services exporting businesses in 
Australia. Goods accounted for 79 per cent of the value of exports. The mining industry 
was the main goods exporting industry, accounting for 48 per cent of the total value of 
goods exported, despite being only 1.3 per cent of exporters. The travel services 
industry was the main services exporting industry, accounting for 63 per cent of the 
total value of services exports. 
Based on ABS definitions of business size (box 2.4), in 2009-10 there were 4274 large 
businesses exporting goods. These businesses represented only 10 per cent of all 
businesses exporting goods but accounted for more than 90 per cent of the total value 
of all goods exports. In contrast, medium-sized businesses represented 49 per cent of 
all goods exporters by number, but accounted for only 6 per cent of the total value of 
goods exports. Small businesses made up 41 per cent of all goods exporters and 
contributed less than 1 per cent of the total value of goods exports. 
In 2010, Australia’s main export markets were: China, with 23 per cent of the total 
value of exports; Japan (16 per cent); the Republic of Korea (8 per cent); India 
(7 per cent); and the United States (5 per cent). 
Sources: ABS (2011c); DFAT (2011b).  
A well-developed finance sector facilitates trade. Financial markets enable trade by 
providing credit that allows trading partners to bridge the time between an export 
order and payment for goods and services produced. Financial markets also 
facilitate debt and equity investment in domestic infrastructure that supports export 
industries. Furthermore, financial institutions allow and secure money flows across 
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borders, provide information about foreign countries and their ‘riskiness’, and 
insure against trade-related risks (Grath 2008). 
Trade finance and the role of export credit agencies 
Many governments provide trade finance and insurance through export credit 
agencies (ECAs) as a means of increasing exports, as they see increased exports as a 
way of raising national income. An increase in the volume of exports may increase 
national income but that is not always the case. For example, in order to sell more 
exports, prices may need to fall, offsetting any increase in export volumes. 
In economies that are close to or at full employment, efforts to increase exports will 
come at the expense of other sectors as labour and other resources are drawn from 
other parts of the economy. It is not necessarily the case that income and 
employment will rise. 
In other cases, policies that support exports may enhance the competitiveness of 
foreign companies that directly compete with Australian exporters. For example, 
support may be given to Australian exporters that produce goods or services used in 
overseas mining projects that compete in international markets with output from 
Australian mines. Governments also use ECAs to achieve other objectives such as 
supporting industries considered important to national security or securing greater 
certainty over imported resources required for domestic industries. 
Export credit can reduce the risk associated with an export transaction by giving a 
buyer time to distribute goods for resale before making payment to the exporter, or 
in the case of capital goods, time to generate revenue through use in production 
processes. The maturities of trade finance facilities are closely linked to the type of 
export (Wang et al. 2005). Generally, capital goods require longer term credit 
arrangements due to their high cost, while consumer goods are usually financed 
through short-term credit (Madura 2008). For this reason, ECA assistance is usually 
biased toward the finance of capital goods on the basis that they generally require 
large repayments and longer tenor1 (Wang et al. 2005). The perceived need for 
ECAs to assist the financing of capital goods does not necessarily reflect any 
inefficiency in financial markets. 
ECAs can be government departments, government corporations or private 
companies administering an account for or on behalf of government, separate from 
the commercial business of the institution. ECAs provide a range of products 
                                                 
1 The term of the facility. 
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including credit to exporters, guarantees, bonds, insurance against non-payment of 
obligations, and direct loans to exporters, financiers or overseas buyers. The 
operation of ECAs in other countries is discussed in more detail in appendix C. 
Australia’s ECA, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) is a small 
ECA by global standards. While it is difficult to estimate the exact percentage of 
Australian exports assisted by EFIC, it is likely to be no more than a few per cent. 
Virtually all Australia’s export trade, by both volume and value, takes place without 
EFIC’s assistance. 
2.2 Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
Australia has had an ECA since the establishment of EFIC’s predecessor, the Export 
Payments Insurance Corporation (EPIC) in 1957. EPIC operated as an insurer of 
last resort for exporters and this role was significantly expanded with the 
establishment of EFIC in 1974. EFIC obtained additional powers to insure 
financiers of exporters, insure overseas investments, guarantee tenders and 
performance, and lend to purchasers of Australian capital goods. 
In 1985, EFIC’s powers were transferred to the Australian Trade Commission 
(Austrade) and it was re-established in 1991 as a statutory authority under the 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) (EFIC Act). 
Functions 
EFIC was established to facilitate and encourage Australian export trade through the 
provision of financial services and insurance products, and publish information 
relevant to Australian exporters. Its main functions under the EFIC Act are to: 
• encourage and facilitate Australian export trade 
• encourage banks and other financial institutions carrying on business in 
Australia to assist in financing export contracts 
• manage the Australian Government’s aid-supported loan program2  
• provide information and advice regarding insurance and financial products 
available to support Australian exports (EFIC Act, s. 7). 
                                                 
2 The government mixed credit program, the Development Import Finance Facility, was 
discontinued on 23 July 1996. However, EFIC is still required to manage a portfolio of 
outstanding loans. 
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EFIC undertakes these functions by providing export finance and insurance 
products for eligible transactions using two accounts — the commercial account 
(CA) and the national interest account (NIA). 
Commercial account 
EFIC is expected to conduct its origination business on a commercial basis 
obtaining a rate of return reflecting the risk undertaken (Emerson 2011). Risks 
underwritten on the CA are carried initially by EFIC and any losses are borne from 
EFIC’s accumulated capital and reserves. As EFIC is explicitly backed by a 
government guarantee, the government would ultimately bear any losses over and 
above EFIC’s resources (to date this has not occurred). The Minister cannot require 
EFIC to obtain ministerial approval for a particular transaction, or direct EFIC to 
enter into a particular transaction, on the CA. However, the Minister may direct 
EFIC more generally as to how it performs its functions or the exercise of its 
powers under s. 9 of the EFIC Act. 
National interest account 
The Minister can approve, or direct, transactions on the NIA that are in the national 
interest although, by convention, Cabinet approval is sought. EFIC is able to refer 
transactions to the NIA for approval by the Minister. According to EFIC, referred 
NIA transactions tend to involve financial commitments too large for EFIC’s 
balance sheet, or ‘a risk — commercial or political — too great for EFIC to 
consider at any level on its Commercial Account’ (EFIC, sub. DR90, p. 17). 
EFIC manages the NIA facilities after approval by the Minister through a service 
level agreement with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. EFIC is 
reimbursed for any losses on the NIA, remits any profits to the Australian 
Government and receives a fee for its administration. Any budgetary appropriation 
from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to EFIC that relates to the NIA is through the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and is scrutinised by the Australian 
Parliament (EFIC, sub. 18; DFAT, pers. comm., 11 May 2012). 
Governance 
EFIC’s governance framework consists of the legislative and administrative 
controls through which external stakeholders, such as the Minister, exercise control 
over EFIC, and the internal corporate governance as overseen by EFIC’s Board. 
EFIC’s external governance framework is largely determined by the EFIC Act and 
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the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) (CAC Act). 
EFIC’s governance arrangements are discussed further in chapter 9. 
The CAC Act sets out requirements in relation to aspects of EFIC’s corporate 
governance, financial management and reporting. As a CAC authority, EFIC is 
required to notify the Minister of certain significant events such as the acquisition or 
disposal of interests in companies or other ventures. The EFIC Board must also 
keep the Minister informed about EFIC’s operations and provide any information 
required by the Minister or the Minister for Finance. The CAC Act also gives the 
Minister and the Minister for Finance broad powers to require EFIC to provide 
information about its activities (DOFA 2005). 
The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 
EFIC is a statutory corporation under the EFIC Act and is part of the Australian 
Government’s Foreign Affairs and Trade portfolio — with the Minister for Trade 
and Competitiveness having responsibility for EFIC. Under the Act, the Minister: 
• may give written directions to EFIC in respect of the performance of its 
functions or the exercise of its powers if satisfied that it is in the public interest 
that directions be given (EFIC Act, s. 9). Current ministerial directions include 
transactions related to uranium, Iran, Zimbabwe and to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (Emerson 2011) 
• must appoint board members3 to their statutory positions (EFIC Act, s. 34). The 
Minister can also terminate appointments under certain circumstances 
(EFIC Act, s. 43) 
• either approves the recommendation from the Board on the payment of a 
dividend to the Australian Government or directs the payment of a different 
specified dividend by written notice to EFIC (EFIC Act, s. 55). 
The EFIC Act requires that members of EFIC’s Board and its employees keep client 
information confidential. EFIC has partial exemption from the Freedom of 
Information Act 1982 (Cwlth). EFIC must report annually to Parliament. EFIC’s 
                                                 
3 The EFIC Board consists of the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson; Managing Director; the 
government member; and as many other members, not fewer than two or more than five, as the 
Minister determines in writing to be appropriate. An appointed member, other than the 
government member, must be appointed for a term of three years. They are eligible for 
reappointment but must not hold office as a member of the Board for a total of more than two 
terms; or if the member has been appointed at any time as the Chairperson, three terms (EFIC 
Act, s. 35). 
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annual reporting requirements are set out in the EFIC Act and the CAC Act 
(box 2.2). 
 
Box 2.2 EFIC’s formal reporting arrangements 
Australian Parliament and the Minister responsible for EFIC 
• Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) (EFIC Act) — reporting 
obligations including determinations regarding callable capital, recommendations on 
payment of dividends, determinations regarding insufficient capital and reserves to 
meet liabilities. 
• Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) (CAC Act) — reporting 
obligations including significant events, EFIC operations, budgetary estimates, and 
interim reports. 
• Annual report tabled in Parliament by the Minister. 
• EFIC is required to adhere to Parliamentary processes including Senate Estimates 
and Budget reporting requirements. 
• EFIC’s Statement of Intent in response to the Minister’s Statement of Expectations 
(publicly available). 
• A corporate plan that must meet the requirements of Part 7 of the EFIC Act. The 
corporate plan is not publicly available. 
• EFIC is expected to respond in a timely manner to any request for assistance in 
formulating policy from the Minister, or the Department of Foreign Affairs and  
Trade (DFAT). 
• Inform the Minister and DFAT of any approaches to restructure or relieve 
outstanding Development Import Finance Facility loans. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
• The Secretary of DFAT (or their alternate) is the Government’s representative on 
the EFIC Board. 
• A service level agreement sets out reporting responsibilities for the management 
and administration of the national interest account (NIA). 
• EFIC is expected to provide DFAT with full information on NIA transactions and NIA 
management. 
• EFIC is to provide DFAT and any other relevant agencies with any non-legally 
privileged information they request to support them in preparing advice on policy 
related aspects of export credits and EFIC’s operations. 
Gazettal notice 
• For NIA transactions, EFIC must publish a notice of details of a transaction entered 
into: the nature and extent of the insurance, indemnity or guarantee, or in the case 
of a loan, the amount provided and the extent of Australian Government liability. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2.2 (continued) 
Reports on EFIC’s treasury operations 
• Quarterly report on treasury counterparty exposure to both DFAT and the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation indicating EFIC’s compliance with the 
investment constraints of the CAC Act. 
Audit 
• External audit of EFIC’s accounts in accordance with the CAC Act through the 
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), currently contracted to Ernst & Young. 
• Other ANAO audits that may cover EFIC. 
• Internal audit function, currently contracted to Deloitte. 
Other 
• Freedom of Information compliance (noting EFIC’s partial exemption). 
• Compliance reporting to the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre. 
• Australian Government fraud control guidelines, copyright, and procurement plans. 
Sources: CAC Act; EFIC Act; EFIC (sub. 18); Emerson (2011).  
 
Eligibility criteria for provision of export finance and insurance 
Beneficiaries of EFIC’s services include Australian exporters, their buyers and 
financial intermediaries, subject to satisfying eligibility criteria specified in the 
EFIC Act (table 2.1). EFIC is able to provide financial services to firms located in 
Australia which contribute to the production of exports but do not themselves 
export. This has enabled EFIC to provide facilities to suppliers to resource-related 
projects located in Australia. 
Under Section 3 of the EFIC Act, transactions must meet one of four criteria to be 
eligible for EFIC’s services: 
• eligible export transaction: a transaction relating to the export of capital goods 
manufactured wholly or substantially in Australia to be exported from Australia 
(including associated services), or the rendering of services for a person carrying 
on business in a foreign country 
• export contract: a contract or agreement for the export of goods produced in 
Australia, whether in whole or in part, or for the rendering of a service to a 
person outside Australia 
• carrying on Australian export trade: includes any transaction (including the 
rendering of a service) involving a benefit flowing directly or indirectly from 
overseas to a person carrying on business or other activities in Australia 
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• overseas investment transaction: a transaction involving either: 
– an acquisition of an interest in a foreign corporation proposing to carry on 
business in a foreign country 
– a right to share in the income or assets of a company carrying on business in 
a foreign country 
– lending or guaranteeing repayment of money in connection with a business in 
a foreign country 
– the transfer of money or other equipment in connection with a business in a 
foreign country (including a related business). 
Table 2.1 Eligibility criteria and how they are interpreted 
Section Financial product 
Terminology used 
in the EFIC Act What this means 
14 Export payments 
insurance 
Carrying on 
Australian 
export trade 
Transactions connected to a benefit flowing 
from overseas to a person carrying on 
business in Australia, including projects 
located in Australia, and associated supply 
chains.  
16 Guarantees for loans 
to Australian 
suppliers 
Carrying on 
Australian 
export trade 
As above. 
17 Guarantees for loans 
to overseas buyers  
Export contract Transactions involving the export of goods 
manufactured wholly or in part in Australia, or 
services rendered to a person outside 
Australia. 
18 Guarantees to 
co-lenders 
Eligible export 
transaction 
Transactions involving the sale, production, 
supply, installation, operation, maintenance 
and repair of exported capital goods 
produced wholly or substantially in Australia, 
or services rendered to a person outside 
Australia. 
23 Loans Eligible export 
transaction 
As above. Loans can be given to those who 
are not a party to the transaction. 
19 Tender guarantees 
and performance 
guarantees 
Export contract 
and eligible export 
transaction 
Transactions involving the export of goods 
manufactured wholly or in part in Australia, or 
services rendered to a person outside 
Australia. 
22 Insurance of 
overseas investment 
transactions 
Overseas 
investment 
transaction 
Transactions involving the acquisition of 
interest in a foreign business or of a right to 
share its income and assets; provision of 
loans or guarantees to foreign business; 
transferring of money or equipment to a 
foreign business. 
Source: EFIC Act. 
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The EFIC Act is not the only determinant of whether EFIC can offer access to its 
products: 
The conditions of access to EFIC’s products are governed by the EFIC Act, OECD 
Arrangement [on Officially Supported Export Credits] and EFIC’s own management 
policies, such as Australian content requirements, and its Policy and Procedure on 
Environmental and Social Review of transactions. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 34) 
As noted by EFIC, the eligibility criteria for some products under the EFIC Act are 
broader than for others: 
Section 16 of the EFIC Act uses ‘Australian export trade’ as its criterion, which is a 
benefits-based test (see the definition of ‘Australian export trade’ in section 3(5)). 
Consequently, ‘Australian export trade’ is a broader eligibility criterion than the 
‘eligible export transaction’ test. Section 18 on the other hand uses the term ‘export 
contract’ as its criterion which is defined in section 3(1) to cover goods generally, 
provided they are produced or manufactured wholly or in part in Australia. This is also 
a broader eligibility criterion than the ‘eligible export transaction’ test. (sub. 18, 
appendix A, pp. 33–34) 
EFIC previously advised the Commission that ‘the inconsistent product criteria can 
result in some products being less accessible than others’ (sub. 18, appendix A, 
p. 33) and further stated that: 
The prescriptive drafting of Part 4 [of the EFIC Act] can limit EFIC’s ability to both (i) 
provide assistance where a business or transaction deserving of EFIC’s support does 
not meet the specific product requirements and (ii) develop innovative products and 
forms of assistance. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 34) 
However, the EFIC Act’s eligibility criteria are very broad, conceivably covering 
any transaction in the export supply chain. For example, EFIC recently provided a 
$5.1 million performance bond on behalf of Greyhound Australia for the transport 
of staff to a site in the Pilbara where a gas plant is being constructed (EFIC 2012f). 
EFIC has also claimed that there may be scope under s. 23 of the EFIC Act for it to 
provide direct finance to foreign-owned resources projects in Australia, such as the 
Ichthys LNG project in northern Australia (trans., p. 295). 
Ministerial Statement of Expectations 
The Minister communicates his or her expectations of the EFIC Board through the 
publicly released Statement of Expectations (SoE) which, among other things, 
reiterates the requirement for EFIC to comply with General Policy Orders as set out 
in the CAC Act and with the requirements of the EFIC Act. A key requirement of 
the current SoE is that EFIC is not to compete directly with commercial providers 
— the basis for EFIC’s ‘market gap’ mandate — and the rationale for EFIC’s 
exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements. 
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The need for EFIC to fill a gap in the market was stated in the second reading 
speech when the EFIC Act was debated in Parliament. The market gap has been 
formally defined in the SoE as: 
 … circumstances where the credit and insurance sectors are not able or are unwilling 
to provide credit and insurance services to financially viable Australian export 
transactions or overseas projects. (Emerson 2011, p. 1) 
Statement of Intent 
The EFIC Board is required to respond to the SoE through a publicly released 
Statement of Intent that confirms EFIC’s intention to meet the Minister’s 
expectations (EFIC 2011a). Through the Statement of Intent, EFIC has 
acknowledged the Minister’s requirement for EFIC to not compete directly with 
private sector providers of trade finance and insurance and charge prices that reflect 
the risk undertaken: 
 ... EFIC is to perform the functions specified in the EFIC Act only in circumstances 
where the credit and insurance sectors are not able or are unwilling to provide credit 
and insurance services to financially viable Australian export transactions or overseas 
projects. … EFIC pricing will not undercut the private sector and will reflect the risk 
undertaken ... (Mohl 2011, p. 1) 
Corporate plan 
The EFIC Board is also required to prepare a corporate plan (EFIC Act, s. 48). The 
plan is not publicly released. The EFIC Act states the plan must include information 
on EFIC’s financial targets and strategies, with the Board having regard for: 
• the need for EFIC to generate reserves sufficient to support expansion of its 
operations 
• the adequacy of EFIC’s capital 
• any direction by the Minister for the payment of a dividend by EFIC for the 
financial year to which the target relates (EFIC Act, s. 49). 
International obligations 
The Minister requires EFIC to have regard to international agreements and 
commitments that Australia is a party to including the Australian Government’s 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) commitments (such as the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures). Agreements identified by the Minister in 
the SoE include the United Nations Convention against Corruption, the OECD 
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Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits and 
the Equator Principles (Emerson 2011). 
In addition to those agreements identified by the Minister in the SoE, EFIC states 
that it respects a number of other international agreements including the OECD 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits; the OECD Principles and 
Guidelines to Promote Sustainable Lending Practices in the Provision of Export 
Credits to Low Income Countries; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; 
and the Berne Union Guiding Principles (box 2.3). EFIC also states that: 
EFIC, as a member of the Export Credits Group (ECG) of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), complies with the OECD Council 
Recommendation on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits. The 
Recommendation outlines measures to be undertaken by ECG members to deter and 
combat bribery in connection with officially supported export credits. (EFIC ndb) 
 
Box 2.3 International agreements 
EFIC states that it ‘respects the international agreements to which Australia is a party 
that relate to its business’ (EFIC 2011a, p. 46). These agreements include: 
The Equator Principles 
A set of voluntary standards for determining, assessing and managing social and 
environmental risk in project financing. The principles apply to new project financing 
with total project capital costs of US$10 million or more. 
OECD Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export 
Credits 
A non-binding recommendation that intends to promote good environmental practice. 
The recommendation applies to projects financed with officially supported export 
credits with a repayment term of at least two years. EFIC states that its compliance 
with the OECD Common Approaches is monitored by peer review from other export 
credit agencies (ECAs), as well as semi-annual reporting to the OECD. 
OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits 
A non-binding ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ that sets out the most generous export credit 
terms and conditions that may be offered by participants to the OECD Arrangement. 
EFIC states that as a result of the OECD Arrangement it can only provide support for 
up to 85 per cent (or 80 per cent for ships) of the eligible contract value of a 
transaction. The OECD rules for project finance in high income countries also require 
that the ECA supported component of any loan syndication is less than 50 per cent of 
the total syndication. Investment insurance, short-term working capital facilities and 
bonding facilities are not covered by the OECD Arrangement. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2.3 (continued) 
OECD Principles and Guidelines to Promote Sustainable Lending Practices in 
the Provision of Official Export Credits to Low Income Countries 
This agreement seeks to ensure that the provision of official export credits to public, or 
publicly guaranteed, buyers in low income countries reflects sustainable lending 
practices by supporting the buyer country’s economic and social progress without 
endangering its financial future and long-term development prospects. 
OECD Recommendation on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits 
Provides a number of guidelines to deter and combat bribery in officially supported 
export transactions, including that ECAs inform exporters requesting their support 
about the legal consequences of bribery in international business, and require 
exporters to declare that neither they, nor anyone acting on their behalf, have been 
engaged or will engage in bribery for the supported transaction. 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
The OECD Guidelines provide voluntary principles and standards for business conduct 
in areas such as employment and industrial relations, human rights, environment, 
information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, 
competition, and taxation. 
United Nations Convention against Corruption 
The Convention against Corruption obliges state parties to implement a range of 
anti-corruption measures. It establishes mechanisms for the prevention and 
criminalisation of corruption, as well as for international cooperation and asset 
recovery. Australia meets its obligations under the Convention through a combination 
of Commonwealth legislation; the work of various Australian Government bodies; 
procedural safeguards; self-regulation; and cooperation with regional and international 
authorities. 
World Trade Organisation Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Prohibits governments or their ECAs from providing guarantees or insurance to 
exporters at rates below that necessary to recover long-term operating costs. The 
Agreement also prohibits the provision of finance at a rate less than the cost in 
international capital markets. A country can use the World Trade Organisation’s 
dispute settlement procedure to seek the withdrawal of the subsidy or the removal of its 
adverse effects. 
Berne Union Guiding Principles 
The Berne Union is an international association for export credit and investment 
insurance. The Guiding Principles are a set of non-binding principles encouraging good 
governance among Berne Union members. 
Sources: Attorney-General’s Department (2011); EFIC (sub. 18; 2011a); Equator Principles Association 
(2006); OECD (2006a; 2007; 2008b; 2011a; 2011b).  
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It should be noted that these agreements contain numerous exemptions and 
concessions that limit their effectiveness. Moreover, with the exception of the WTO 
Agreement and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, these 
agreements are non-binding and lack rigorous enforcement mechanisms. 
Corporate governance 
EFIC’s Board is responsible for EFIC’s corporate governance — managing EFIC’s 
affairs and overseeing its operations. EFIC states that it has a corporate governance 
framework consisting of: the Australian Stock Exchange’s Corporate Governance 
Principles; a risk management framework (RMF); and a financial control 
framework (EFIC ndm). 
The RMF describes the manner in which EFIC’s risk appetite is established and 
controlled. EFIC’s Board has ultimate responsibility for setting EFIC’s risk appetite 
and tolerances, and EFIC’s management is responsible for implementing 
Board-approved risk management strategies and policies. As part of the RMF, EFIC 
reports that it maintains a list of risks that it manages across its business, divided 
into the following categories: 
• strategic — risk to revenues, earnings and product offerings as a result of 
ineffective corporate planning, specific government policy, trade policy or 
legislative implications, or poor decision-making or implementation of decisions 
• reputational — risk of deterioration in the reputation of EFIC arising from 
adverse publicity 
• credit and country — risk that a counterparty will default on obligations 
resulting in a financial loss 
• market — risk of any fluctuation in the value of a portfolio resulting from 
adverse changes in market prices and market parameters including interest rates 
and exchange rates 
• operational and financial — risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal operational or financial processes and systems as well as the actions of 
people or from external events. EFIC has grouped operational risks into a 
number of sub-categories: general processes; external regulation; internal 
policies; domestic and international laws; and events (EFIC ndq). 
EFIC states that its financial control framework contains various guidelines for the 
management of capital adequacy, large exposures and treasury operations 
(EFIC ndk). 
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EFIC’s business operations 
EFIC’s origination business provides loans, guarantees and insurance products. The 
origination business is separated into a structured trade and project finance unit, 
responsible for supporting large corporate clients, and a small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and mid-market unit to support SMEs (defined by EFIC as 
businesses with annual turnover of less than $150 million) (EFIC 2011a). EFIC’s 
definition of SMEs differs from that used by other Australian Government agencies 
and Australian financial institutions (box 2.4). 
 
Box 2.4 Definition of small and medium-sized enterprises 
The definition of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) varies across 
government agencies and the finance sector. Treasury submitted to the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services: 
There is no single universally accepted definition of a small or medium-sized enterprise. A 
variety of definitions are used by industry participants. These are generally based on the 
size of a business’s annual turnover, number of its employees, the size of its borrowings, or 
a combination of these characteristics. (PJCCFS 2011, p. 2) 
For example, within the Westpac group SMEs are defined as businesses with up to 
$1 million in business lending and up to $2 million in total borrowings. St George Bank 
defines SMEs as businesses with lending of up to $1 million and annual turnover 
between $1 million and $5 million. The National Australia Bank defines ‘small business 
customers’ as businesses with annual turnover between $1 million and $5 million, and 
‘medium business customers’ as businesses with annual turnover between $5 million 
and $50 million. Other Australian financial institutions adopt different definitions of 
SMEs. 
The definition of SMEs also varies across the Australian Government. For example, to 
be eligible for small business tax concessions, a business must have annual turnover 
of less than $2 million. Alternatively, the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cwlth) defines ‘small 
business employer’ as an employer that employs fewer than 15 people. The Treasury 
definition of SMEs is based on total business income. AusIndustry’s Enterprise 
Connect program for SMEs provides assistance to businesses with annual turnover 
between $2 million and $100 million. For the purposes of its Export Market 
Development Grants scheme, Austrade defines an SME as an exporter with annual 
revenue of less than $50 million.  
The ABS uses a number of criteria to define export business size:  
• small exporters — having fewer than 20 employees and estimated annual goods 
and services tax (GST) turnover range of less than $1 million and exports of less 
than $1 million annually 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2.4 (continued) 
• large exporters — having 200 or more employees or estimated annual GST 
turnover range of $20 million or more or exports of $20 million or more annually 
• medium exporters — all businesses other than those defined as small or large. 
The Australian Securities and Investment Commission also uses multiple criteria to 
assess company size, defining a company as a large proprietary company if it satisfies 
two of the following three criteria: 
• The consolidated revenue of the company and any entities it controls is $25 million 
or more for the financial year. 
• The value of the consolidated gross assets of the company and any entities it 
controls is $12.5 million or more at the end of the financial year. 
• The company and any entities it controls have 50 or more employees at the end of 
the financial year. 
The definition of SMEs adopted by EFIC, of businesses with an annual turnover of less 
than $150 million, allows EFIC to classify larger businesses as SMEs than the 
definitions used by other Australian Government agencies and private sector providers. 
This figure is three times higher than the upper limit turnover figure that the National 
Australia Bank uses to define medium-sized businesses. 
Sources: ABS (2011c); ASIC (2010); ATO (2011a); AusIndustry (2009); Austrade (2012); PJCCFS (2011).  
 
EFIC maintains a treasury operation that it uses to facilitate borrowing on domestic 
and international capital markets to fund its origination activities, structure 
Australian dollar and foreign currency cash flows arising from transactions, and 
manage EFIC’s investment portfolio of capital and reserves. EFIC states that the 
treasury operation is managed to minimise the cost of funding origination activities 
and to maximise the return on its investments (EFIC 2011a). 
EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements 
EFIC derives financial benefit from government ownership. EFIC’s establishment 
was funded through an initial government injection of funds that forms part of 
EFIC’s capital base. Under the EFIC Act, the Australian Government guarantees 
payment to all EFIC’s creditors (although this guarantee has never been called). 
EFIC also has access to $200 million of callable capital payable by the 
Commonwealth. 
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EFIC is exempt from the Australian Government’s competitive neutrality 
arrangements for all its current activities4. Consistent with this exemption, the EFIC 
Act exempts EFIC from paying income tax and a number of other taxes, although 
EFIC is subject to the Goods and Services Tax and Fringe Benefits Tax. It is also 
not required to achieve a particular rate of return or pay a debt neutrality charge to 
offset the competitive advantages provided by the government guarantee. EFIC is 
not subject to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s requirements, 
although it states that it voluntarily adheres to some of the Authority’s prudential 
standards (EFIC 2011a). 
EFIC’s client base 
In 2009-10, EFIC provided 54 facilities to 41 exporting firms on the CA. In the 
same financial year, there were about 45 000 goods and services exporting 
businesses in Australia (ABS 2011c). Productivity Commission estimates based on 
unpublished EFIC data indicate that it has provided 458 facilities over the past 
10 years to approximately 180 separate clients on the CA. EFIC’s clients operate in 
a number of export sectors, including mining, manufacturing, construction, and ship 
building and operation (figure 2.1). 
EFIC also assists SMEs on the CA. In 2010-11, 90 facilities were signed with SMEs 
with a face value of about $135 million. In its 2011 annual report, EFIC noted 
strong demand for traditional SME products, such as working capital guarantees 
(EFIC 2011a). 
EFIC’s annual reports show EFIC often engages the same firms in repeat 
transactions on its CA over several years. McConnell Dowell, for example, had 
eleven approved facilities with a total face value of more than $137 million between 
2004 and 2011. Ship builder Incat had four facilities approved between 2002 and 
2011. EFIC’s annual reports indicate that between 2002 and 2011, four firms 
received EFIC’s assistance more than 10 times with one entering into 
21 transactions with EFIC since 2009-10. 
                                                 
4 EFIC is subject to competitive neutrality arrangements in respect of its (now divested) 
short-term credit insurance business. 
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Figure 2.1 Principal recipients of EFIC’s facilitiesa 
Face value of commercial account facilities, 30 June 2011 
 
a Facilities outstanding include the face value of loans, guarantees, insurance and bonds.  b ‘Other’ includes 
agriculture, forestry and fishing; wholesale trade; financial and insurance services; information media and 
telecommunications; professional, scientific and technical services; and rescheduled debts to the governments 
of Egypt and Indonesia that could not be classified.  c Mining includes contract mining. 
Data sources: EFIC (pers. comm., 2 December 2011); Productivity Commission estimates. 
According to Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished EFIC data, 
EFIC provided facilities to 271 unique firms between 1992 and 2011. Of these, 
EFIC provided 221 firms with between one and three facilities, while 50 firms were 
provided with four or more facilities (figure 2.2). However, firms with four or more 
facilities with EFIC accounted for 53 per cent of EFIC’s total CA transactions by 
number between 1992 and 2011. EFIC suggested to the Commission that: 
… [the Commission’s] analysis [of EFIC’s transactions over the period 1992 to 2011] 
is skewed by the divestment of EFIC’s short-term trade insurance business in 2003. 
Focussing on transactions post-2003, EFIC has supported 30 companies with four or 
more transactions … (sub. DR90, p. 81) 
Construction 24%
Mining 14%c
Other 5%b
Ship building and
operation 31%
Other manufacturing 26%
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Figure 2.2 Number of firms EFIC provided with four or more facilitiesa, b, c 
Commercial account, 1992–2011 
 
a Excludes companies with three or fewer transactions.  b Some assumptions have been made about the 
relationship between corporate entities.  c All transactions, including assistance to a buyer. 
Data sources: EFIC (pers. comm., 3 November 2011); Productivity Commission estimates. 
However, the Commission found a similar pattern of EFIC transactions over this 
shorter time period. Firms provided with four or more facilities accounted for 
49 per cent of EFIC’s total number of CA transactions over the period 2003-04 to 
2010-11. 
The history of repeat transactions suggests EFIC’s operations are inconsistent with 
EFIC pursuing a demonstration role for private sector providers and effectively 
locks in the status quo in export finance and insurance markets. Repeat transactions 
reduce the incentive for exporters to find alternative sources of finance or alter their 
business practices. 
The majority of the value of the facilities provided by EFIC relate to a small number 
of large corporate clients. EFIC entered into 11 facilities with large corporate clients 
(defined by EFIC as having more than $150 million in annual turnover) on the CA 
with a total face value of more than $450 million in 2010-11. These facilities 
accounted for more than three quarters of the total face value of EFIC’s CA 
signings that year (figure 2.3). In contrast, EFIC provided 90 facilities to SMEs in 
2010-11 but these accounted for 23 per cent of the total value of EFIC CA signings 
that year (EFIC 2011a). This is despite large companies usually having greater 
access to private finance options than SMEs (chapter 7). 
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Figure 2.3 EFIC signings by business sizea 
As a proportion of total face value, commercial account, 2010-11 
 
a EFIC defines large corporate clients as businesses with more than $150 million in annual turnover and 
SMEs as businesses with annual turnover of less than $150 million. 
Source: EFIC (2011a). 
Key financial indicators 
The value of transactions entered into by EFIC varies considerably from 
year-to-year, as does EFIC’s operating profit (table 2.2). It is worth noting that 
where EFIC has recorded an operating profit, these are accounting profits and do 
not necessarily indicate EFIC is generating an economic profit. An economic profit 
would require income to exceed reported expenses, including taxes, plus the 
opportunity cost of funds. The opportunity cost reflects the benefits forgone by 
taxpayers from having their funds used by EFIC compared to alternative activities 
such as education and health. Chapters 6 and 8 contain further analysis of EFIC’s 
pricing strategies and financial performance. 
Profits on the CA are either returned to the Australian Government as dividends or 
retained by EFIC to increase the size of its capital base. As directed, EFIC paid a 
dividend of $28.7 million for the year ending June 2010, representing 75 per cent of 
the CA profit for the preceding financial year (EFIC 2011a). EFIC paid about 
$75 million in dividends over the period 2006-07 to 2009-10. The Australian 
Government made an allowance for a special dividend of $200 million to be paid 
from EFIC’s capital and reserves in the 2012-13 Budget (Australian 
Government 2012). 
Large corporate 
clients 77% 
SMEs 23% 
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Table 2.2 Key financial indicators 
2007–2011 
 Units 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
Face value of new facilities signed $million 554 369 577 971 593 
Operating profit CAa $million 40.7 19.7 33.6 38.3 30.2 
Dividendb $million 20.4 9.8 16.8 28.7 .. 
Equityc  $million 359.8 331.2 376.7 407.6 408.1 
Return on average equity CA % 11.9 5.7 9.5 9.8 7.4 
Operating profit NIA $million 70.4 4.8 -0.2 9.4 7.7 
a EFIC does not pay tax on its profits.  b Paid the following year.  c At end of financial year (not including 
$200 million callable capital).  CA commercial account.  NIA national interest account.  .. Not applicable 
Source: EFIC (2007–11; pers. comm., 12 October 2011). 
Commercial account and national interest account exposures  
EFIC reported exposures (before provisions) of $961 million on the CA and 
$686 million on the NIA at 30 June 2011 (EFIC 2011a). However, around 
75 per cent of total NIA exposures are loans made under the Australian 
Government’s aid-supported mixed credit program, the Development Import 
Finance Facility. This facility was discontinued in 1996 (EFIC, sub. DR90). These 
loans include all NIA exposures to Indonesia ($492 million), China ($25 million) 
and the Philippines ($8 million) (table 2.3). The largest non-aid supported exposures 
on the NIA are to Egypt, the United States and Papua New Guinea. 
The Australian Government reported a total contingent liability in relation to EFIC 
of $3.4 billion at 31 March 2012. The $3.4 billion contingent liability comprises 
EFIC’s liabilities to third parties ($2.7 billion) and overseas investment insurance, 
contracts of insurance and guarantees ($0.7 billion). Of the total contingent liability, 
$2.8 billion is held on the CA and the remaining $0.6 billion on the NIA (Australian 
Government 2012). 
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Table 2.3 National interest account exposures by country 
30 June 2011 
 Value Share of total 
 $million % 
Indonesiaa 492.3 71.8 
Egyptb 101.2 14.8 
United States 28.5 4.1 
Chinaa 24.6 3.6 
Papua New Guinea 15.8 2.3 
Cuba 9.7 1.4 
Philippinesa 7.6 1.1 
Australia 4.5 0.7 
Japan 1.5 0.2 
Total 685.7 100.0 
a Development Import Finance Facility exposure.  b In the mid-1980s EFIC paid credit insurance claims on 
exports to Egypt. These debts were subject to rescheduling through the Paris Club. Egypt has paid all 
amounts due under the rescheduling in full and on time. The balance of rescheduled debts owed by Egypt is 
$101 million. 
Source: EFIC (2011a). 
EFIC in a broader context 
EFIC operates within the context of other Australian Government programs to assist 
exporters and an international network of ECAs. 
Australian trade policy 
Australia has reduced its own barriers to international trade mainly through 
domestic industry assistance reform initiatives, reinforced by participation in 
multilateral trade agreements. Australia has derived substantial economic benefits 
from the trade liberalisation process with the gains from unilateral liberalisation 
dominating external trade policy considerations (Banks 2010). More recently, 
Australian governments have entered into bilateral trade agreements (PC 2008). As 
the Commission has previously stated: 
 … contrary to mercantilist notions that focus on export promotion and market access 
and often cloud debates about trade policy, the main benefits that arise from trade 
liberalisation result from a country purchasing its inputs and final goods from the 
lowest cost sources of supply, and exposing its industries to greater import competition 
by reducing its own trade barriers. (PC 2010b, p. xxvi) 
   
 EXPORT FINANCE 
AND INSURANCE 
CORPORATION 
73 
 
Government services and programs for exporters 
The Mortimer Review of export policies and programs noted the importance of 
program coordination at all levels of government, and between government and 
business, to meeting trade and investment objectives (Mortimer 2008). 
In addition to the services provided by EFIC, the Australian, state and territory 
governments provide a range of financial and advisory products and services that 
directly assist exporters (box 2.5). The coverage of this assistance is highly 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector and only a fraction of exporters receive 
this assistance. There is also a number of Australian Government programs that 
offer financial assistance to businesses in general, including those involved in 
exporting. Receiving financial support from these programs does not preclude 
businesses from accessing EFIC’s services. 
The Commission estimates that the gross value of budgetary assistance to industry 
provided by the Australian Government was about $9 billion in 2010-11. It is 
estimated that about 6 per cent, or $522 million, was export assistance (PC 2012). 
Assistance provided by state and territory governments is in addition to this amount. 
EFIC’s relationship with Austrade 
Austrade is the Australian Government’s international trade, education and 
investment promotion agency. The Minister expects EFIC to work closely with 
Austrade in a coordinated approach to delivering services to Australian businesses 
(Emerson 2011). Austrade and EFIC have worked together on particular issues, for 
example, in the development of products, and on individual business opportunities 
such as the sale of fast ferries to Europe. Austrade also supports EFIC by sharing 
information such as economic analysis, risk management perceptions, and trade and 
investment research (Austrade, sub. 14). 
EFIC and other export credit agencies 
EFIC participates in international associations and forums of export finance and 
insurance providers. These include the Berne Union (box 2.3) and the Asian Exim 
Banks Forum (a forum of Asian ECAs). These arrangements seek to encourage 
cooperation between members and provide a forum in which members can 
exchange information about international trade, and develop and promote improved 
governance and transparency in export finance. 
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Box 2.5 Other government assistance and programs for exporters 
In addition to EFIC’s activities, Government assistance to exporters is provided 
through: 
• other Australian Government direct export assistance programs including the Clean 
Energy Trade and Investment Strategy 
• Austrade and Tourism Australia 
• Australian Government general assistance programs to businesses that provide 
tariff concessions, training assistance, information and advice, and start-up 
assistance 
• state and territory government initiatives including trade missions and direct 
financial assistance. 
Australian Government direct financial assistance for exporters is estimated at 
$522 million in 2010-11. This does not include direct financial assistance provided 
through export-related programs by state and territory governments or the value of 
general assistance programs that benefit exporters. Importantly it does not include 
assistance by way of the Australian Government’s Enhanced Project By-law Scheme 
(EPBS), which provides tariff duty concessions to large projects having an approved 
plan to use local suppliers. 
Australian Government direct financial assistance that is specific to exporters 
comprises: 
• the Export Market Development Grants (EMDG) scheme –– businesses with annual 
turnover of up to $50 million can apply for up to seven grants to partly reimburse 
expenses incurred in promoting exports. The latest figures available show about 
95 per cent of recipients had annual turnover less than $20 million 
• Tradex –– provides a cashflow benefit for importers who intend to export goods by 
exempting them from the relevant duty at the time of import 
• the Duty Drawback Scheme –– enables businesses to obtain a refund of Customs 
duty paid on imported goods where those goods will be treated, processed, or 
incorporated into other goods for export, or are exported unused since importation. 
The Australian Government also provides general business support: 
• Commercialisation Australia — a competitive, merit-based assistance program 
offering funding and resources to accelerate the business building process for 
eligible Australian companies and entrepreneurs 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 2.5 (continued) 
Australian Government direct funding for export programs, 2010-11a 
$ million 
Industry EMDG Tradex Duty Drawback  Total funding 
Primary industries 3.8 0.3 – 4.1 
Mining 1.4 0.3 – 1.7 
Manufacturing 47.6 33.9 74.5 155.9 
Services industry groups 90.3 4.7 – 95.0 
Total all industries 143.1 39.2 74.5 256.7 
a Totals may not add due to rounding. 
• Supplier Access to Major Projects — a program that helps Australian industry 
participate in major Australian and international projects by providing funding to 
assist research and identification of capable Australian suppliers. The program is 
funded through the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and 
Tertiary Education (DIISRTE). 
• Australian Industry Participation (AIP) Plans encourage the use of Australian 
industry in projects and global supply chains. Companies applying for large 
Commonwealth grants (generally above $20 million) or other schemes are required 
to implement an AIP Plan and so provide opportunities for local suppliers. This 
requirement includes participants in the EPBS. About $230 million in tariff duty 
concessions was provided to project proponents, including a number of large 
resource projects, under the EPBS in 2010-11. The Commission was unable to 
ascertain the proportion of EPBS support provided to exporters. 
• A range of Research and Development (R&D) tax concessions is available to 
eligible Australian companies. These programs include the R&D Tax Concession, 
Premium R&D Tax Concession, R&D Tax Offset, Venture Capital Limited 
Partnerships, Early Stage Venture Capital Limited Partnerships and Pooled 
Development Funds. 
• There is a range of programs specifically directed at small start-ups and SMEs that 
can be utilised by exporters, including: 
– the Small Business Support Line, an AusIndustry program to provide small 
business owners with a single point of contact to access information and referral 
services to help better manage their business 
– Enterprise Connect, a DIISRTE initiative that offers advice and support to eligible 
SMEs. 
(Continued next page)  
 
   
76 AUSTRALIA’S 
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
 
Box 2.5 (continued) 
Most state and territory governments have advisory offices in Australia and overseas to 
assist exporters, and also organise trade missions and exhibitions for exporters to 
meet contacts overseas and promote their products. State and territory governments 
also provide direct financial assistance through export related programs. Some of the 
assistance packages, by jurisdiction, include: 
• New South Wales — the Global Growth program offers an adviser to clients to 
assist with developing export strategies and grants to help implement those 
strategies 
• Victoria — First Step Exporter offers a grant of up to $10 000 to Victorian 
companies seeking to research and explore opportunities in their first export 
markets 
• Queensland — the Export Advisory Service works with companies to help them 
become export ready, select export markets and find overseas business partners 
• South Australia — the Gateway Business Program contributes 50 per cent of 
eligible expenses incurred by exporting businesses in developing their international 
markets 
• Western Australia — the Industry Facilitation and Support Program has a number of 
objectives including export promotion and contributes 50 per cent of eligible 
expenditure (up to $25 000) to successful applicants 
• Tasmania — the Export Market Assistance Scheme and Springboard To Market 
Program provide assistance to exporters in their marketing activities 
• Northern Territory — the Trade Support Scheme allows Northern Territory based 
organisations to offset up to 50 per cent of the cost of marketing activities 
associated with exporting 
• Australian Capital Territory — TradeConnect provides grants to help new and 
existing ACT exporters build global opportunities and enhance their international 
competitiveness. 
Sources: AusIndustry (2009; 2012); Austrade (2012); Business Victoria (2011); DEEDI (nd); Department 
for Manufacturing, Innovation, Trade, Resources and Energy (2012); Department of Commerce (nd); 
Department of Economic Development (2012); Department of Economic Development, Tourism and the 
Arts (nd); Department of the Chief Minister (nd); Department of Trade and Investment (nd); DIISR (2011); 
DIISRTE (nd); PC (2012).  
 
EFIC has reciprocal risk participation agreements with foreign ECAs (EFIC, 
sub. 18). These agreements provide a formal process for risk-sharing international 
projects that have contributions from exporters from more than one country. Under 
these agreements, the main contractor negotiates credit coverage for the entire 
transaction with its country’s ECA or the ECA of the country with the largest share 
of the contract (the lead ECA). The lead ECA then arranges support from the ECAs 
of the sub-contractor countries (follower ECAs). 
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EFIC has participated in risk-sharing arrangements with foreign ECAs for a number 
of recent domestic and international projects (table 2.4). For example, in 2010 EFIC 
supported a liquefied natural gas project in Papua New Guinea with ECAs from 
China, Italy, Japan and the United States (EFIC 2010a). EFIC has emphasised the 
role it plays in arranging the participation of other ECAs: 
 ... EFIC, with substantial reinsurance from Canada’s EDC [Export Development 
Canada], was able to assist Brookfield Rail access support from a Chinese bank to 
finance a rail upgrade project for a new iron ore mine in Western Australia; and Santos 
turned to EFIC and ECAs from Italy and Canada and Malaysia to fill the gap in 
commercial bank capacity for term debt to finance the development of the Gladstone 
LNG project. (sub. DR90, p. 8) 
Table 2.4 Projects where EFIC has participated in risk-sharing 
arrangements with other export credit agencies 
2009–2011 
Transaction name Participating ECAsa  
Gladstone LNG project EFIC; Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero 
(SACE), Italy; and Export Development Canada 
(EDC)  
PNG LNG project EFIC; Export-Import Bank of China; SACE, Italy; 
Export-Import Bank of the United States; and 
Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
Wiggins Island coal export terminal project EFIC and EDC 
Brookfield rail project EFIC and EDC 
a There may be other participating ECAs whose participation has not been made public. 
Sources: EDC (nd); EFIC (2010a; 2011e; 2012f); Santos (2011c). 
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3 Private sector provision of export 
finance and insurance 
 
Key points 
• A large proportion of global trade (about 90 per cent) takes place without assistance 
from export credit agencies. 
• Importers and exporters face many similar risks. Importers, and the vast majority of 
exporters, successfully use private sources of finance and insurance. 
• The Australian and international finance and insurance markets offer a range of 
products to help importers and exporters manage their cash flow and commercial 
risks, such as credit risk.  
• Most of the products offered by EFIC are offered by the private sector with the 
differences relating primarily to the terms and conditions, including price, at which 
the products are offered.  
• Transactions that the private sector may be reluctant to accept on the same 
conditions (or under any conditions) as EFIC include: transactions with small or 
medium-sized enterprises that have little or poor credit history; transactions 
involving high-risk or post-conflict countries; and long-tenor transactions.  
• Compared to private sector options, EFIC’s provision of export finance and 
insurance services benefits exporters in several ways, including: 
– supporting transactions the private sector may consider to be too risky due, for 
example, to a firm’s size or the country to which the firm is exporting 
– more favourable terms and conditions, such as reduced collateral requirements 
or longer repayment terms 
– allowing firms to forgo the additional costs associated with other sources of 
finance, such as equity.  
 
This chapter reviews the extent to which the products and services offered by the 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) are available in the private 
sector. An analysis of the extent to which any gaps constitute market failure is 
presented in subsequent chapters. 
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3.1 The role of finance and insurance in trade 
International trade involves transactions across more than one national legal, 
political or financial system, exposing importers and exporters to a number of risks 
(box 3.1). Exporters (or importers) may seek to reduce these risks by transferring 
them to a third party, which accepts the risk for a fee. Trade finance and insurance 
products are offered by private sector intermediaries such as banks, insurance 
companies and government export credit agencies (ECAs), such as EFIC. 
However, a large proportion of global trade takes place without the assistance of 
ECAs.  
Most trade finance does not come from official export credit agencies (ECAs) but 
rather from the private sector. Approximately 65 to 90 [per cent] of finance is extended 
between firms in a supply chain relationship or between individual units of the same 
firm’. (Hufbauer 2011, p. 1)  
International trade typically takes place on the basis of cash or short-term credit, 
without intermediation through financial markets. Up to two thirds of the value of 
global merchandise trade is organised using either ‘open account’ or 
‘cash-in-advance’ terms (Asmundson et al. 2011). In these transactions, the buyer 
and the seller are able to agree on terms to share the credit or country risk without 
intermediaries, although they may mitigate and manage their risks in other ways 
(for example, diversifying by selling to a number of buyers across a range of 
markets). 
Where transactions are undertaken on open account terms, the exporter delivers the 
goods to the buyer without payment, and the buyer is expected to pay on delivery 
according to the sales contract. Under this arrangement the exporter draws on 
working (or other sources of) capital and bears much of the credit risk involved in 
the transaction. For cash in advance arrangements, the buyer is extending working 
capital to the exporter and bears much of the credit risk. 
The Berne Union (2011) estimates that about 10 per cent of world trade is supported 
by its members, who include public and private sector providers of trade finance 
and investment insurance. Estimates of the share of world trade supported by ECAs 
and an estimate of EFIC’s share of the Australian market are not available. 
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Box 3.1 Risks faced by exporters and importers in cross-border 
transactions 
Exporters and importers face a number of risks in conducting transactions:  
• credit risk — the possibility of a client (either the buyer or seller) defaulting on their 
obligations by the agreed date. An importer could find that a product they paid for is 
not delivered as promised in the event that an exporter becomes bankrupt. 
Guarantees and insurance also give rise to credit risk if the issuer defaults  
• country risk — arising from the political situation in the destination or source 
country. For example, an importer could find that products that have been paid for 
cannot be delivered on time because of war in the exporter’s country  
• sovereign risk — arising from policy changes in foreign countries such as 
expropriation or nationalisation of assets 
• market risk — arising from macroeconomic fluctuations such as changes in the 
exchange rate between the date of the agreement and the receipt of payment  
• price risk — the value of the commodity may change between the date of the 
agreement and date of payment 
• tenor risk — several of the above types of risk, for example, country risk or price 
risk, increase with the duration of the contract. Consequently, long-term contracts 
are generally more risky than short-term contracts 
• product risk — for the exporter, it is the risk that the product sent is not acceptable 
to the buyer and a warranty is called. For the importer, it is the risk that the goods 
do not meet their requirements 
• operational risk — arising from general business operations, such as fraud.  
• transportation risk — to the client, it is the possibility that goods are lost or 
destroyed en-route 
• reputational risk — the client could be subject to negative publicity as a result of 
involvement in socially, politically or environmentally sensitive projects. For 
example, a firm importing timber harvested from an environmentally sensitive area 
may receive bad publicity. 
Sources: Grath (2008); Freixas and Rochet (2008).  
 
3.2 Finance and insurance markets 
Australia’s finance and insurance markets 
Finance and insurance is the largest sector in the Australian economy, contributing 
$137 billion at current prices or about 10 per cent of GDP in 2010-11 
(ABS 2011a; 2011b). For those firms that do require export finance and insurance, 
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Australia has relatively deep and liquid financial markets and is recognised as a 
regional leader in finance and insurance (AFMA 2011). The Commonwealth Bank 
noted that: 
 … the Australian syndicated and club loan market in 2011 recorded a total loan 
volume of US$115,667m … The 2011 loan volumes were the highest over the last 
decade, with the quantum driven by a high level of refinance activity (55% by volume) 
and significant activity in project financing (>12% by volume). (sub. DR100, p. 2) 
The 2011 World Economic Forum’s Financial Development Report ranked 
Australia fifth among the world’s financial centres (table 3.1), and second in terms 
of financial access by individuals and businesses to different forms of capital and 
financial services. Australia ranked highly in banking (seventh) and ranked second 
in financial access (access by individuals and businesses to different forms of 
capital and financial services) (WEF 2011). The most recent Global Financial 
Centres Index ranks Sydney fifteenth and Melbourne eighteenth among the world 
financial centres (Long Finance 2011). The four major Australian banks have a 
Standard & Poor’s rating of AA-, indicating that they face a relatively low 
probability of default (S&P 2011c).  
Table 3.1 Top 10 countries ranked by efficiency of their financial markets 
Based on overall index ratinga 
Economy 2010 rank 2010 score (1 to 7) 
Hong Kong SAR  1 5.16 
United States  2 5.15 
United Kingdom  3 5.00 
Singapore 4 4.97 
Australia 5 4.93 
Canada 6 4.86 
Netherlands 7 4.71 
Japan 8 4.71 
Switzerland 9 4.63 
Norway 10 4.52 
a Each country is ranked on a range of factors, policies and institutions that define deep and effective financial 
markets. 
Source: WEF (2011). 
International finance and insurance markets 
Many Australian importers and exporters also access international markets for 
finance and insurance services. However, international financial markets have faced 
considerable challenges since the last review of EFIC in 2006. 
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In particular, events during the global financial crisis (GFC) led to a severe 
recession in some nations, a sharp decline in world trade volumes and a tightening 
of credit conditions in the United States and Europe, with flow-on effects for 
international financial markets (De Michelis 2009). During this period, banks 
increased the price of finance and collateral requirements, and reduced counterparty 
exposure limits, to protect against heightened credit risk and to meet regulatory 
requirements. 
Since 2008, banks have been subject to new capital rules under the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) guidelines based on the Basel II 
framework. While APRA has not yet finalised its response to Basel III, banks may 
need to increase their collateral to meet requirements designed to improve the 
stability of the financial system. Some participants to this inquiry noted that stricter 
capital requirements are likely to increase the price of finance (Clifford 
Chance, sub. DR52; Australian Institute of Export, sub. DR107). 
During the GFC, the repricing of risk was evidenced by larger spreads between 
BBB-rated corporate bond rates and Australian Government bonds between late 
2007 and early 2009. Although the spreads between BBB-rated corporate bond rates 
and Australian Government bonds increased significantly between 2007 and 2009, 
the movement in spreads was offset by a fall in bond rates. Figure 3.1 indicates that 
BBB-rated corporate bond yields fluctuated over the past decade, but have settled at 
about 7 per cent since 2010.  
A number of submissions suggested that private appetite for longer tenor 
transactions has remained tight since the GFC (Allens Arthur Robinson, sub. DR42; 
King & Wood Malleson, sub. DR84, National Australia Bank, sub. DR92).  
Credit Agricole suggested that in the absence of ECA support: 
Private insurers are very often unable to offer these large durations and with shorter 
maturities, some investors would be faced with a refinancing risk, considered as 
unacceptable by lenders; then some projects could not materialize. (sub. DR75, pp. 1-2) 
Santos also claimed that: 
 … access to financing has been difficult and a number of market participants have 
been withdrawing ... (sub. DR64, p. 2). 
However, there is evidence that shows some firms have been able to obtain 
long-term finance. This is discussed in section 3.5. A discussion of the impact of the 
2008-09 financial crisis on the demand and supply of trade finance is undertaken in 
chapter 5. 
   
84 AUSTRALIA’S 
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1 BBB corporate bond yield and spread above Commonwealth 
Government securities 
1 to 5 year BBB-rated corporate bonds, per cent 
 
Data source: Reserve Bank of Australia (pers. comm., 11 April 2012). 
Risk management options for private sector providers  
Financial institutions specialise in managing and mitigating risk, using a number of 
methods to do so (box 3.2). In the private sector, prudential regulation, competitive 
pressures and profit maximisation give firms strong incentives to adopt sound 
financial risk management practices, and engage in continuous improvement of 
their assessment, pricing and controlling of risk.  
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Box 3.2 Risk management methods used by financial institutions 
Financial institutions can manage and mitigate risk by: 
• diversifying and hedging on an aggregate level — banks and insurance firms can 
reduce their overall level of credit and market risks by holding a broad range of 
weakly correlated (and offsetting) assets and liabilities, and by operating in a range 
of markets 
• tightening the provision of finance or insurance — reducing the amount of finance or 
insurance extended, either in total or to certain borrowers 
• reducing aggregate exposure to a project or counterparty by forming syndicates 
• reinsuring with insurance firms 
• using risk-based pricing — charging higher interest rates or premiums to high credit 
risk clients 
• developing infrastructure — technology and skilled staff to improve the accuracy 
and efficiency of managing various risks 
• following risk management policies — internal rules and procedures governing the 
provision of credit and insurance 
• setting terms and conditions — for example, on the minimum level of collateral held 
by the borrower, or the terms on which an insurance product may be offered 
• enforcing covenants — stipulations on agreements that require, for example, the 
borrower to: 
– periodically report their financial position 
– refrain from paying dividends, repurchasing shares, borrowing further, or other 
specific, voluntary actions that negatively affect the firm’s financial position 
– repay a loan in full, at the lender’s request, in certain circumstances such as a 
change in the borrower’s debt-to-equity ratio 
• requiring loan insurance — requiring the applicant to insure against the risk of 
default. 
Sources: Asmundson et al. (2011); Freixas and Rochet (2008).  
3.3 Comparison of products offered by EFIC and 
private providers 
EFIC offers a range of products to manage and mitigate the various risks faced by 
exporters. EFIC’s products can be broadly grouped into loans, insurance, 
guarantees, bonds and research (table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Products offered by EFIC 
Product Description 
Loans  
Direct loan A direct loan to an exporter or foreign buyer of capital goods 
Producer Offset loan A loan against tax rebates receivable from the Australian Government’s 
Producer Offset scheme (for eligible film, documentary or television 
production companies) 
Funded export finance 
guarantee 
A direct loan to a bank to on-lend to a buyer or exporter 
Insurance  
Political risk insurance  Insures lenders, investors or contractors against losses arising from 
events such as civil unrest and the inability to repatriate funds 
Bond insurance Insures the exporter in the event that a bond is wrongfully called 
Credit insurance  Insures the exporter in the event of non-payment by a buyer 
Guarantees  
Export working capital 
guarantee  
A guarantee to an exporter’s bank for the exporter’s payment 
obligations, when the bank provides the exporter with working capital 
EFIC headway working 
capital guaranteea 
A guarantee to an exporter’s bank for the exporter’s payment 
obligations when the bank extends the exporter’s trading limit 
Export finance guarantee A guarantee to the buyer’s or exporter’s bank for the bank’s provision 
of finance  
Documentary credit 
guarantee 
A guarantee to an exporter’s bank that a buyer’s bank will meet the 
obligations of a documentary credit payable to the exporter 
Foreign exchange facility 
guarantee 
A guarantee to a foreign exchange provider for the exporter’s payment 
obligations, when the foreign exchange provider extends the limit of the 
exporter’s foreign exchange facility 
Risk participation 
agreement 
Partially guarantees the financier in the event of non-payment 
Reciprocal risk 
participation agreement 
Partially guarantees (or insures) another export credit agencies’ risk 
Bondsb, c  
Advance payment bonds Compensates the buyer for funds advanced to the exporter in the event 
of non-completion of the contract 
Performance bonds Compensates the buyer in the event the exporter fails to honour its 
obligations under the contract 
Warranty bonds Compensates the buyer in the event the exporter’s goods do not meet 
contractual warranty obligations after a project is complete 
US bonding line Compensates the buyer in the event of non-performance by the 
exporter. Provided under an arrangement with a registered US surety 
bond provider 
Research  
Country profiles Information on the risks of doing business in various countries 
World risk developments 
newsletter 
Monthly newsletter summarising global economic developments 
Economics chartpack Monthly summary of world economic conditions 
a The EFIC headway working capital guarantee was discontinued in December 2011.  b The bond products 
offered by EFIC fall within the definition of ‘guarantee’ under s. 3(1) of the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth).  c EFIC can provide a bond directly to the buyer on the exporter’s behalf or 
provide a guarantee as security to a bank, which in turn provides the bond to the buyer.  
Sources: EFIC (2011a; pers. comm., 13 April 2012). 
   
 PRIVATE SECTOR 
PROVISION 
87 
 
Over the past five years, loans have made up the largest proportion (by value) of 
EFIC’s products, followed by bonds and guarantees (figure 3.2). 
Figure 3.2 EFIC’s commercial account facilities 
Share of total value, by product, 2006-07 to 2010-11 
 
a  Based on the face value of signings in each year and is not equivalent to EFIC’s exposure at 30 June 2011. 
Sources: EFIC (2006; 2007; 2008a; 2009a; 2010a; 2011a). 
Loans  
EFIC provides direct loans to buyers and exporters for the purpose of financing 
eligible export transactions. A funded export finance guarantee is a loan from EFIC 
to a financier, who then on-lends to foreign buyers or exporters. EFIC has increased 
its provision of funded export finance guarantees since they were first offered in 
2009. At 30 June 2011, it had exposure of about $117 million to this product 
(EFIC 2011a). 
The Producer Offset loan allows eligible producers of Australian films, 
documentaries and television programs to obtain cash flow against their anticipated 
producer offset tax rebate. 
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Direct loans 
EFIC has claimed that the private sector is less willing to provide longer tenor loan 
products: 
In normal market conditions, the private sector has ample appetite and capacity to 
support borrowers’ needs with tenors of up to five years. During the GFC, in Australia, 
this tenor appetite was reduced in the syndicated loan market. Beyond that five year 
horizon, financial transactions tend to be more highly structured, and often related to 
asset- specific or project finance. This is the market segment in which export credit 
agency … financing is more prevalent, as fewer private market participants have the 
risk appetite for such assets. (sub. DR90, pp. 14-15) 
A large proportion of EFIC’s loan book is long-term debt. For example, EFIC 
provided a $50 million direct loan over a ten year period to Orica Limited, the 
world’s largest supplier of commercial explosives, to construct an ammonium 
nitrate manufacturing plant in Indonesia (table 3.3). Orica was able to obtain a loan 
from EFIC that matched their requirements at a time ‘when the commercial market 
[had] limited appetite for longer tenor financing’ (EFIC ndo).  
However, long-term debt can be obtained from a variety of private sector sources 
including international and domestic banks, retail investors, traded and untraded 
bonds, national and international banking syndicates and superannuation funds 
(Icon Group International Inc. 2007). Shorter-term loans obtained from the private 
sector may also be refinanced on maturity.  
Producer Offset loan 
The Australian Screen Production Incentive (ASPI) is an Australian Government 
incentive program to promote film, television and other screen production. The 
Producer Offset is one of three streams under ASPI that provides a 40 per cent tax 
offset1 on qualifying Australian production expenditure on a feature film and a 
20 per cent tax offset if the film is not a feature film (Screen Australia nd).  
EFIC has established a loan program to finance recipients of the Producer Offset tax 
rebate to support Australian films, documentary and television productions with 
international distribution agreements (Screen Australia, sub. DR46; EFIC, 
sub. DR90). The loan program provides cash flow to assist production funding by 
providing upfront access to funds, and bridging the funding gap between the 
incidence of production costs and receiving the Producer Offset (EFIC ndp). 
                                                     
1 Tax offsets directly reduce the amount of tax the individual or company must pay. Each dollar 
of tax offset reduces the tax payable amount by a dollar, regardless of the taxable income 
(ATO nd).  
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Table 3.3 EFIC’s commercial account loans 
2006-07 to 2010-11 
Primary counterparty Project description 
Project 
country 
Maximum   
 
tenora (yea
rs)   
Value   
(A$ mil)b 
Share 
of all 
loans 
(%) 
2006-07      
Lumwana Mining Copper mine Zambia 9.0 54.5 7.8 
B&N Bank Supply, install banking 
software 
Russia 6.6 3.8 0.5 
2007-08      
Emirates Aluminium Aluminium smelter & power 
supply plant 
UAE 16.1 142.8 20.4 
2008-09      
Lumwana Mining Copper mine loan increase Zambia 7.0 12.8 1.8 
Leighton Holdings Mining equipment leases Indonesia 6.0 202.2 28.9 
2009-10      
ExxonMobil PNG 
LNG Servicesc 
Liquefied natural gas project Papua New 
Guinea 
17.0 109.5 15.7 
African Underground 
Mining Services 
Finance new equipment Mali/Ghana 3.7 16.2 2.3 
Orica Limited KNI Project –– ammonium 
nitrate plants 
Indonesia 9.9 51.3 7.3 
2010-11      
Rock Island Production Film production producer offset Australia 0.5 0.5 0.1 
Who-Four Film production producer offset Various 1.9 0.5 0.1 
Mindful Films Film production producer offset Various 0.6 0.1 0.0 
Danske Faerger A/S High speed catamaran Denmark 12.4 66.8 9.6 
Incat Tasmania Construction of catamaran Australia 1.5 37.5 5.4 
   10.7 698.4 100.0 
a Tenor was calculated as the difference between agreement and maturity dates. However, some loans did 
not begin drawing down on the agreement date, so the actual tenor will be less than this 
approximation.  b A$ value is at the time the facility was signed, and is obtained from EFIC annual reports, 
except for loans made in 2008-09. The A$ value in 2008-09 was calculated using the average exchange rate 
for that year (A$1= US$0.74).  c Facility was shared over the commercial account ($US100 million) and 
national interest account ($US250 million). 
Sources: EFIC (2007–2011; pers. comm., 8 November, 2011). 
EFIC has signed contracts with the producers of the movie Satellite Boy (2012), the 
telemovie Panic at Rock Island (2011), the documentary series Who Do You Think 
You Are (2012) and Outback Fight Club (2011) (EFIC 2011a).  
EFIC noted in a submission to a review of the Australian Independent Screen 
Production Sector that in ‘some cases banks and other financial institutions may 
support a production, however, they may require additional property security and 
pre-payment of interest’ (EFIC 2010c, p. 1). Private finance providers and some 
state government organisations offer finance to recipients of the Producer Offset tax 
   
90 AUSTRALIA’S 
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
  
 
rebate. In addition to those in table 3.4, private providers such as Aver Media, 
Fulcrum Media Finance, National Bank of California and Abacus Film Fund are 
listed on the Screen Australia website as also offering cash flow facilities or 
brokered finance for Producer Offset applicants (Screen Australia nd). 
 Table 3.4 Provision of finance against the producer offset tax rebate 
Private and government providers 
Provider Product offeringa 
Private providers  
IFS Capital Limited Up to 80-90 per cent of anticipated producer offset tax rebate with a 
minimum size of $1 million  
Media Funds 
Management 
90 per cent of the anticipated producer offset tax rebate at the lower 
end of the market 
Chesterfield Offset 
Finance 
Provides up to 90 per cent of the anticipated producer offset tax rebate 
Government providers  
Film Victoria Up to 85-90 per cent of anticipated producer offset tax rebate. Limit of 
$3 million per project  
Screen Queensland Support is capped at the lesser of $6 million per project or 50 per cent 
of the project’s budget 
Screen NSW Provides loans up to $100 000. 
South Australian Film 
Corporation 
A $3 million financing facility to assist projects by obtaining cash flow 
from the producer offset tax rebate 
a Terms and conditions of product offering may be different to those offered by EFIC. 
Sources: Chesterfield Offset Finance (nd); IFS Capital (pers. comm., 3 April 2012); Film Victoria (nd); 
Media Funds Management (nd; pers. comm., 3 April 2012); Screen Australia (nd); South Australian Film 
Corporation (nd); Screen NSW (sub. DR91); Screen Queensland (nd);. 
Screen Australia also noted that several banks and financial institutions provide 
offset loan facilities to production companies, although smaller transactions were 
‘not of particular interest to the banks and larger finance companies’ (sub. 17, p. 2). 
Other participants to this inquiry noted the importance of the Producer Offset 
scheme to the Australian film and television industry and that ‘EFIC’s loan facility 
helps to maximise the intended benefit of the Producer Offset legislation ... ’ 
(Screen Producers Association of Australia, sub. DR55, p. 2). The Commission has 
been advised that at the time the Producer Offset scheme was introduced by the 
Government, it was not envisaged that EFIC would be a participant in the scheme.  
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EFIC noted that the initiative they took with Screen Australia: 
 … literally came about from a conversation where the chairman of Screen Australia 
was speaking with a film producer and identified the issues that, for smaller-budget 
features, there was simply a gap that the commercial market wasn’t filling, that it was 
very restricted in the Australian domestic context.  So EFIC as a statutory authority 
does have the ability to be more flexible in taking up these policy concerns and trying 
to respond to them. (trans., p. 139) 
Chapter 10 provides a discussion of EFIC’s future role in the Producer Offset 
scheme, based on market failure rationale. 
Insurance 
Insurance is a risk management tool that offers compensation for a specified event. 
EFIC products include political risk insurance, bond insurance and credit insurance. 
Insurance brokers, such as Alliance Insurance Services Pty Ltd, Aon Corporation 
Australia Limited and PSC Insurance Group (a member of the Wells Fargo Global 
Broker Network), facilitate exporters’ and importers’ access to products 
underwritten by multi-national insurance companies (Aon Australia 2012; NIBA 
2012; PSC Insurance Group 2012). 
Many of the insurance products offered by EFIC appear to be offered by private 
sector insurance brokers (box 3.3). As with direct finance, there may be differences 
related to the terms and conditions, including price, on which insurance products are 
offered.  
Political risk insurance 
Political risk insurance (PRI) provides compensation for policy holders for specific 
country or sovereign risk events that result in financial loss. These events may 
include forced abandonment of a product due to a war in the foreign country or the 
nationalisation of assets such as foreign investments in infrastructure. The exact 
events covered, and the definition of those events, varies from contract to contract. 
In addition to providing compensatory value in the event of claims, PRI can help 
investors access finance or obtain better terms and conditions. 
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Box 3.3 Insurance brokers 
A number of insurance brokers offer services specifically aimed at exporters, such as 
Atia Insurance Services, Jardine Lloyd Thompson, Marsh Australia, National Credit 
Insurance Brokers and Strathearn Insurance Brokers. The National Insurance Brokers 
Association has an online tool for finding a broker based on locality and services 
offered including export-related insurance products. 
Brokers fulfil important functions in the market. They reduce transaction costs for their 
clients by matching buyers and sellers across disparate locations and sources, and 
reduce the costs associated with searching for information about insurance products.  
The widespread existence of brokers suggests that their expertise is valued by market 
participants and that the market for export insurance products is sufficiently developed 
to create a demand for these services. There are about 800 insurance broking firms in 
Australia, ranging from multinational brokers to small businesses employing less than 
10 people. 
Source: NIBA (2012).   
 
Political risk insurance encourages investment in emerging markets by transferring 
risk from investors to the insurers’ shareholders, in EFIC’s case, the Australian 
Government. For example, EFIC recently provided Orica with PRI to protect its 
investment in an ammonium nitrate plant in Indonesia (EFIC 2011a). 
Political risk insurance is provided by large firms on a case-by-case basis and at 
times, certain countries (such as Iraq) may be deemed too risky for coverage 
(Atradius pers. comm., 6 May 2012). Private sector providers are willing to 
consider a range of transactions, including some high risk propositions, however, 
the terms and conditions of cover and premiums will reflect the risk of the 
transaction. 
Many insurance companies offer political risk insurance in the Australian market 
including Atradius, Chartis, Coface and Euler Hermes (Allianz) (Atradius nd; 
Allianz 2011; Chartis Insurance nd; Coface ndb). Euler Hermes (Allianz) stated that 
it provides large export firms with a full range of products to cover exporters 
against country or sovereign risk events (Allianz 2011; Euler Hermes 2010). EFIC 
noted that: 
Today, comprehensive ‘non-honouring of sovereign obligation’ policy is commonly 
available from almost all specialist political risk and trade credit insurers, albeit only a 
small number have the ability to offer long tenors in excess of ten years … Now 
political risk insurance represents a small and infrequent portion of EFIC’s business. 
(sub. 18, appendix A, p. 29) 
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Bond insurance 
Bond insurance protects the exporter in the event that an advance payment or 
performance bond is wrongly called. Buyers may require the exporter to provide a 
performance bond if they make an upfront payment. For example, if the exporter is 
unable to fulfil their contractual obligations due to political unrest in the buyer’s 
country, the buyer may demand payment on the performance bond. Bond insurance 
can reduce the exporter’s financial losses, provided that the buyer has met the 
obligations under the insurance policy. It is uncommon for EFIC to enter into this 
type of transaction (EFIC 2011a). 
Bond insurance is also available through private sector providers such as HSBC and 
Winley Insurance Group (HSBC 2012; WIG 2012). 
Credit insurance 
The vast majority of credit insurance, also known as export payments insurance, is 
provided on short-term contracts (Morel 2011). EFIC no longer provides short-term 
insurance. A past review of EFIC (DFAT 2001) received feedback from private 
sector insurers that EFIC’s provision of short-term credit insurance was crowding 
out the private sector. In early 2002, EFIC formed an alliance with a private 
insurance company, Gerling NCM, to provide the opportunity to demonstrate its 
capacity to meet exporters’ needs for short-term insurance (DFAT,  pers. comm., 
8 May 2012). Following a DFAT review, the Government decided to divest the 
short-term insurance business to Gerling NCM (later renamed Atradius) in 
August 2003. 
Consequently, EFIC only offers credit insurance if the export contract has a 
payment period of more than two years. Where the availability of long-term cover 
from the private sector is limited, cover for an extended tenor may still be provided 
(possibly at a higher cost to the exporter) through continuous renewal of a 
short-term policy (Coface nda).  
In 2005, EFIC offered medium-term payments insurance as part of its contract to 
Thales, which provided air traffic management systems to Aeronautical Radio of 
Thailand Ltd (EFIC 2005). If Aeronautical Radio of Thailand Ltd defaulted on its 
payments due to a commercial or political event defined in the export payments 
insurance policy, EFIC would provide compensation to Thales.  
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Guarantees 
A guarantee is an enforceable promise by a third party that an exporter, buyer or 
financial institution involved in the export contract will meet its obligations. EFIC 
offers guarantee products to financial institutions, exporters and overseas buyers.  
Recent examples of guarantees issued by EFIC include: 
• $2.7 million working capital guarantee to assist Westpac in providing a working 
capital loan to Ferra Engineering Pty Ltd (EFIC ndj; sub. 18)  
• $3.8 million export finance guarantee provided to National Australia Bank to 
facilitate the provision of working capital to Parnell Manufacturing Pty Ltd, a 
manufacturer of veterinary pharmaceuticals (EFIC 2011a)  
• a documentary credit guarantee to Westpac, the exporter’s (GP Graders) bank, to 
guarantee payments due from the buyer’s Turkish bank under a $673 000 letter 
of credit (EFIC nde). 
The foreign exchange facility guarantee is provided by EFIC to a foreign exchange 
provider. The guarantee encourages the foreign exchange provider to increase their 
hedging limits for exporters (EFIC 2011g). 
Many of the guarantees offered by EFIC have close substitutes available from 
private sector providers. For example, Australian banks provide similar products to 
a documentary credit guarantee. Westpac provides an ‘export documentary letter of 
credit’ (Westpac nda) that allows the exporter to obtain finance after the bank is 
satisfied that the conditions of the documentary credit have been complied with. 
Similarly, ANZ offers import and export finance and documentary credit 
products (ANZ nd). Clients can also use credit default swaps to hedge against 
foreign bank default risk. 
Private sector alternatives to the foreign exchange facility guarantee may serve a 
similar purpose. The foreign exchange facility guarantee allows an exporter to 
extend its trading limits with a foreign exchange provider (and then hedge foreign 
exchange risk (box 3.4)).2 This is similar to an extension of working capital by a 
bank to an exporter, although the terms and conditions of provision, such as 
collateral requirements, will be different. For example: 
 … you don’t need to provide security for a foreign exchange facility guarantee from 
EFIC. This can help to free up your working capital to take on further export contracts. 
(EFIC 2011g) 
                                                     
2 EFIC has recently made this available to SMEs (EFIC 2011g). 
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Box 3.4 Hedging foreign exchange risk 
Exporters have a range of options for hedging their foreign exchange risks, including: 
• foreign currency accounts  
• forward exchange contracts  
• foreign currency options  
• flexible forwards (or tactical forwards) that combine products to hedge exposure 
within a band of acceptable levels  
• foreign exchange swaps (or currency swaps). 
Sources: Bank of Queensland (2011); HSBC (nd); St. George (nda; ndb); Westpac (2012a; 2012b; nda; 
ndb).  
 
Absence of identical private sector coverage for guarantees arises primarily from 
the nature of EFIC’s products, rather than failures in financial markets. By design, 
they are intended to complement the products offered by the private sector by 
guaranteeing the creditworthiness of an exporter to a third party. For example, in its 
guidance on working capital guarantees given to prospective clients, EFIC (ndi) 
stated: 
 ... you may not have the assets — often in the form of real estate — that your bank 
requires you to provide as security for working capital finance. Your bank may also be 
reluctant to provide finance for an export contract if it considers that the payment terms 
of the contract are too risky. If your bank can’t assist, EFIC may be able to help you 
obtain working capital finance from your bank with an export working capital 
guarantee. 
Risk sharing agreements 
EFIC participates in risk sharing agreements with financiers. ECAs also assisted 
each other by entering into reciprocal risk participation arrangements to: 
 … jointly finance large projects that are beyond the capacity of commercial lenders or 
a single export-import bank. (EFIC 2011a, p. 42) 
For example, Export Development Canada (EDC) reinsured EFIC’s participation in 
the Brookfield rail project (EFIC, sub. DR90) (box 7.3). 
In May 2011, EFIC signed a US$65 million risk sharing agreement with the Asian 
Development Bank, encouraging exporters to export to Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Sri Lanka. EFIC also provides reciprocal reinsurance to ECAs in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States 
(EFIC 2009d). 
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EFIC noted: 
Under a typical reinsurance agreement, the lead ECA provides export credit cover, on 
its usual terms, for an entire transaction. Another ECA, assisting an exporter from its 
own country who may be a sub-contractor or other party to the transaction, reinsures 
the lead ECA in relation to that party’s involvement in the transaction. The effect is that 
the second ECA takes on that share of the risk. (2009d, p. 1) 
Bonds 
The bond products offered by EFIC act as an enforceable promise that the exporter 
will meet its obligations and are typically provided to the buyer. This may be in the 
form of a payment directly to the buyer or a guarantee to the exporter’s bank, which 
issues the bond to the buyer. In the case of US bonding lines, EFIC provides an 
indemnity to Liberty Mutual, which subsequently provides a surety bond to the US 
buyer. EFIC notes that, with the exception of the US bonding line, the other bonds 
are available from private sector banks and insurance companies (EFIC 2011a). 
Although private sector providers issue bonds, they usually require collateral, which 
may extend to the full value of the contract (Allianz nd; Bank of Queensland 2011; 
HSBC nd; QBE Insurance nd). 
 Recent examples of EFIC’s provision of bond facilities include: 
• bonds worth US$363 000 issued to the Polar Research Institute of China 
(including an advance payment bond and a performance and warranty bond) on 
behalf of Environmental Systems & Services Pty Ltd. The exporter was able to 
supply, install and commission advance satellite tracking stations at the Great 
Wall research stations in Antarctica (EFIC ndg). Environmental Systems & 
Services Pty Ltd noted: 
Without the facilities that EFIC has provided to us we would not have been able to 
undertake most of these projects in recent years and this would have had a significant 
impact on our turnover and our capacity to employ staff. (sub. 11, p. 2) 
• a performance bond on behalf of GoldPeg International Pty Ltd for 50 per cent 
of the contract value to a buyer, a dairy cooperative in Europe (EFIC ndl). 
Research products 
EFIC publishes information on the risks of exporting to particular countries and on 
developments in the world economy relevant for Australian exporters. It also 
operates an online tool, Export Finance Navigator. This provides current and 
potential Australian exporters information on export finance alternatives available 
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in the commercial market and the forms of government assistance, such as grants, 
tax concessions and EFIC products that may be available to them (EFIC ndh). 
The information provided in EFIC’s country profiles, world risk developments 
newsletter, economics chartpack and the global readiness index is also produced by 
private sector providers. Private sector providers and exporting firms use 
information from firms like Bloomberg, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Analytics, 
Fitch Ratings and various brokers, some of which is publicly available. Firms may 
also conduct research in-house. 
Other government agencies, such as Austrade, also conduct research. Austrade 
provides information to exporters about various countries. There may be differences 
between the economic information provided by EFIC, which focuses on country 
risk, and the information provided by Austrade, which the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) described as ‘more in the form of practical, 
on-the-ground advice about the peculiarities of particular overseas markets and 
commercial practices’ (sub. 19, p. 5). However, Austrade and EFIC both provide 
general trade facts, statistics and information on a country’s business and political 
environment (EFIC 2012b; DFAT nd). EFIC and Austrade appear to overlap in 
some of their analysis. 
3.4 Difference in coverage between EFIC and the 
private sector 
In its submission on the draft report, EFIC noted that the private sector offers many 
of the same products: 
EFIC has deliberately set out to make products homogenous with the private sector for 
many reasons including risk transfer, aiding comprehension and transparency. The 
homogeneity allows clients to understand and compare complex financial products, and 
EFIC to work in tandem with private providers. (sub. DR90, p. 14) 
It further observed that the differences in coverage relate primarily to the private 
sector participants being unwilling to accept the risks associated with particular 
transactions: 
Demand for this support arises for reasons of counterparty, country, asset, market and 
industry risk; and insufficient private market capacity ... The critical difference in 
EFIC’s coverage relates to the risks that EFIC is prepared to assume on behalf of 
exporters due to an absence of private sector risk appetite and/or 
capacity ... (sub. DR90, p. 14) 
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Key aspects of a transaction that affect private sector willingness to enter a 
particular transaction are discussed next. 
Tenor 
EFIC is willing to support some long tenor transactions that the private sector is 
unwilling to support (EFIC, sub. 18; sub. DR90). ANZ, for example, noted that 
financial institutions are generally unwilling to extend business credit beyond five 
to seven years due to refinancing risks (sub. 20). Similarly, Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (sub. DR100) and Investec Bank PLC (sub. DR72) suggested that there 
was limited supply of finance from private sector providers for long-term natural 
resources and infrastructure projects.  
A recent example of EFIC’s support through a long-tenor facility is the 
EUR48 million, 12 year loan to assist Danske Faerger finance the purchase of 
ferries from Australian ship builder Austal (EFIC 2011a). 
Country 
EFIC provides products to countries such as Pakistan, where ‘large macroeconomic 
imbalances and political instability mean that the risks for exporters and investors 
range from high to extreme’ (EFIC 2012b). A number of participants suggested that 
banks were unwilling to support business in the developing world (Wagner Group 
Holdings Pty Ltd, sub. DR31; Allens Arthur Robinson, sub. DR42; Mono Pumps 
(Australia) Pty Ltd, sub. DR54; Codan Ltd, sub. DR65). McConnell Dowell noted 
that it:  
 … has benefitted from the use of EFIC services directly in relation to construction 
projects in Mozambique, Laos, Singapore and Papua New Guinea. EFIC has helped 
provide insurance and bonding facilities for projects in these countries and other 
countries and thereby helped us win and execute the projects. Our view is that finding 
these services in the market would have been difficult and could have jeopardized our 
chances of winning the projects. (sub. DR29, p. 1) 
Client type and size 
The private sector may refuse some transactions on the terms required by the 
exporter because of the nature of the exporting firm. EFIC provides some support to 
smaller, newer and generally riskier firms for which the private sector has ‘limited 
appetite’ (ANZ, sub. 20, p. 4). Financial institutions may be unwilling to support 
transactions with small firms on the same terms that EFIC provides. For example, 
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they may require more collateral (EFIC 2011g). Emtivac Engineering Pty Ltd noted 
that it expected to:  
 … require assistance from EFIC for cash flow and project bonds on larger contracts 
over $1 million in value. Without the support of EFIC we would be unable to bid for 
these contracts as bank finance is not available to us without 100% cash or property 
security. (sub. DR77, p.1) 
For transactions with large firms, financial institutions may have internal 
counterparty limits that constrain their aggregate risk exposure (this was the reason 
given for EFIC’s assistance to Leighton Holdings in 2008-09) (EFIC 2011a; Thiess 
Pty Ltd, sub. DR50). The Commonwealth Bank suggested:  
 … each bank’s capacity to lend is limited by prudential and internal limits on single 
exposures, aggregation policies (including across subcontractors, equity investors, 
individual projects which share common probability of default). (sub. DR100, p. 3)  
Private sector providers will base their decisions on whether to accept a particular 
transaction on the expected return and risk of the transaction. They are unlikely to 
provide services that are not expected to make a return commensurate with the 
transaction’s risk.3 As discussed earlier, private sector providers and exporters also 
have various means of managing the risks at the source of the above constraints. For 
example, the tenor of a loan can be extended through refinancing, whereas 
counterparty constraints of financial institutions can be addressed through 
syndication with other providers.  
There is considerable overlap between financial products offered by the private 
sector and by EFIC on the commercial account, but the terms and conditions, 
including price, on which these products are offered may be different. There may be 
sound commercial reasons for private providers asking a high price for some 
facilities, or not wanting to service some markets or clients. However, this is not 
sufficient to indicate that financial markets are failing (discussed in chapter 4).  
3.5 Alternatives to using export finance and insurance 
products 
Limited availability of export finance or insurance for certain firms does not 
necessarily prevent them from proceeding with commercially viable export 
transactions. Alternatives may be available, however, they may be more costly than 
receiving support from EFIC.  
                                                     
3  A possible exception is an expected long-term payoff from building relationships with a client 
or if a client’s other activities result in highly profitable transactions. 
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Alternative methods of finance 
There is a number of other options exporters can access in place of export finance, 
in particular, equity finance and private debt (box 3.5).  
Equity raising is a typical means of expanding the capital base of a firm. For 
example, a growing firm can go through the following stages during its lifecycle: 
• sole trader 
• partnership 
• private company  
• public company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
• multinational public company listed on more than one stock exchange. 
At each stage the firm is able to bring more equity investors into the venture.  
The way that a firm finances its expansion (using debt or equity) is a private 
decision based on the risk-return trade-off (Cheulho 2010; Kisgen 2006) but the 
availability of government support can affect that commercial decision.  
Some firms are reluctant to seek additional equity as it dilutes their control with the 
creation of more shareholders and instead prefer debt or government support. 
Approaching a bank for a loan allows a firm to expand, but at some point a bank 
may limit its exposure to that firm. EFIC has pointed to this as a reason for its 
intervention. It may be the case that EFIC has supported firms because of a bank’s 
unwillingness to lend when the alternative of equity raising has not been tested. In 
effect, EFIC is favouring the existing business model of the firm. 
EFIC (2008c, p. 5) noted in its submission to the Mortimer Report: 
EFIC helps innovative companies take the next step beyond commercialisation in 
growing their businesses offshore. Moreover, the Corporation’s debt finance facilities 
ensure that this can occur without dilution of business owners’ equity interests.   
EFIC’s provision of finance and guarantees allows firms to forego costs associated 
with equity finance, both at the time of a transaction and when planning the firm’s 
capital structure (box 3.5). Although the ability of business owners to avoid the 
costs associated with raising debt and equity may be considered an advantage by 
some, those costs — and a share of the risks of the transaction — are potentially 
being borne by the Australian taxpayer.  
That said, equity finance is likely to be more difficult (and expensive) to raise for 
newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). For SMEs, markets 
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for equity are informal and fragmented, often depending on family relationships and 
acquaintances (Seppa 2010). 
 
Box 3.5 Alternative financing options 
Exporters can use the following methods to obtain finance: 
• Retained earnings — profits accumulated by a firm that are not paid out to 
shareholders as dividends are kept as retained earnings. Those earnings not 
earmarked for a specific purpose can be used to finance future investment.  
• Share issue — a firm may opt to float on the stock exchange, in which case the 
public is invited to purchase shares. A listed firm can also issue new shares. 
Common techniques used for raising finance include rights issues, in which existing 
shareholders receive the right to purchase additional shares, as well as private 
issues, which occurs when an invitation to purchase shares is restricted to a limited 
number of investors (often institutional investors, such as superannuation funds).  
• Debentures — a type of debt instrument sold to investors for a specified amount 
and commonly used by larger firms. A firm will pay interest on a debenture at 
regular intervals and will repay the face value at maturity. Security can be provided 
in the form of a fixed charge over specified assets that have not already been 
secured by other lenders. 
• Corporate bonds — a form of long-term private debt issued by large firms. They are 
similar to debentures in that they are sold to investors, who receive a periodic 
interest payment and the repayment of face value at maturity. A corporate bond is 
not secured against property, and instead of being issued publicly, is usually placed 
privately with institutional investors.  
• Convertible notes — a hybrid of debt and equity finance. It is similar to a debenture, 
except that the investor has the option to either receive the face value or purchase 
shares at a specified price. 
• Venture capital — typically used by high risk start-up firms with the potential for 
strong growth. Venture capitalists often take a significant ownership stake in the firm 
and can influence management. 
• Company structure — an organisation may have various options to change its 
business structure to obtain equity:  
– For example, a company could form a joint venture — an organisational structure 
between two or more parties. This allows parties to share returns and mitigate 
project risks.   
 
Most large firms, including EFIC’s clients, regularly utilise those sources of finance 
(tables 3.5, 3.6 and box 3.6 provide examples). 
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Table 3.5 Examples of EFIC’s clients’ equity raisings 
Client 
Issued or held on or 
over the year ending Value A$ mil Description 
Leighton Holdings 11/04/2011 740 Rights issue 
Orica 30/09/2011 490 Step-up preference sharesa 
Santos 31/12/2011 6 392 Fully paid ordinary sharesb 
Santos 31/12/2010 5 514 Fully paid ordinary sharesb 
Transfield Services 21/01/2011 294c Fully underwritten 2:9 accelerated 
non-renounceable entitlement offerc 
WorleyParsons  30/06/2010 51 Ordinary shares issuedb 
a Step-up preferences shares were reclassified to debt from 13 October 2011.  b Issued capital.  c Before 
transaction costs. 
Sources: Leighton Holdings (2011); Orica (2011); Santos (2011a); Transfield Services (2011); WorleyParsons 
(2010). 
 
Box 3.6 Case study — Santos’ ability to raise long-term finance 
Santos raised a total of EUR1 billion in subordinated notes for the Gladstone LNG 
project.  
The hybrid securities are due to mature in 2070 and can be redeemed by Santos from 
the optional redemption date — 22 September 2017.  
The securities pay investors a fixed rate of 8.25 per cent semi-annually until the 
optional redemption date. If securities are not redeemed by Santos, the notes will 
continue to pay investors 6.85 per cent above the three-month Euro Interbank Offered 
Rate in quarterly instalments until maturity.  
After issuing EUR650 million initially, Santos ‘received significant demand from 
investors for a follow-on issue’ (Santos 2010f, p. 1). A media release explained that the 
‘strong support [Santos] received from offshore and domestic investors demonstrates 
the strength of the Santos credit’ (Santos 2010e, p. 1). The success of the notes issue 
demonstrated Santos’ ‘ability to source capital from a diverse range of sources on 
attractive terms’ (Santos 2011c, p. 1).  
In addition to the issue of subordinated notes described above, Santos’ funding plan 
for the Gladstone LNG project included an equity raising, an institutional placement, 
A$2 billion of undrawn bank lines with an average maturity of five years and ‘potentially 
including bond and Export Credit Agency backed finance’ (Santos 2010c, p. 13; 
Santos 2010b, p. 5).  
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Table 3.6 Examples of EFIC’s clients obtaining debt finance 
Client Value ($mil) 
Maturity 
(years) Date of issue Description 
Leighton Finance 
Limiteda 
US$111 
US$90 
US$79 
5 
7 
10 
15/10/2008 Guaranteed senior notes 
Leighton Finance 
Limiteda 
US$600 2 8/12/2010 Syndicated bank facility 
Leighton Finance 
(USA) Pty Limiteda 
US$90 
US$145 
US$115 
5 
7 
10 
21/07/2010 Guaranteed senior notes  
Orica Limited US$335 
US$80 
US$85 
US$100 
10 
12 
15 
20 
11/08/2010 Guaranteed senior notes  
Santos A$1 450 
US$500  
2-5b 
2-5b 
31/12/2011c Undrawn bilateral bank loan 
facilities 
Transfield Services US$20 
US$50 
US$100 
5 
7 
10 
30/06/2011 Long-term senior unsecured 
notes 
Transfield Services A$150 
US$100 
A$84 
US$100 
NZ$63 
CLP5 634 
A$250 
1.5 
1.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.5 
3.5 
30/06/2011c Unsecured multi-currency 
debt facility composed of a 
number of tranches with a 
syndication of 13 banks, 
equivalent to A$731 million. 
UGL Limited A$110 5 30/06/2011c Term debt facility 
UGL Limited US$50 
US$200d 
5 
7d 
30/06/2011c Bank loans 
US Notes 
WorleyParsons US$10 
US$22 
US$175 
5 
7 
10 
03/2011 Unsecured notes 
WorleyParsons US$144 10 04/2011 Unsecured notes 
WorleyParsons US$140 
US$169 
7 
10 
05/2007 Unsecured notes 
a Wholly owned subsidiaries of Leighton Holdings.  b Facilities mature between 2014 and 2017.  c Facilities at 
reporting date.  d Tranche 2 is for US$150 million maturing June 2018 and Tranche 3 is for US$50 million 
maturing September 2018.   
Sources: Leighton Holdings (2011); Orica Limited (2010b); Santos (2011a); Transfield Services 
Limited (2011); UGL Limited (2011); WorleyParsons (2011). 
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Alternatives to insurance 
Although the risks of doing business can impose costs on exporters, insurance is not 
essential for an export transaction to proceed. Only 11 per cent of world trade was 
insured in 2009 (Mora and Powers 2011). Even if privately provided insurance 
products are not cost-effective for some exporters, they may have access to 
alternative risk management and mitigation tools (box 3.7). 
 
Box 3.7 Examples of alternative risk mitigation strategies 
Exporters may be able to manage and mitigate some of their commercial and political 
risks without using insurance by:  
• negotiating cash in advance payment terms or an irrevocable letter of credit 
• researching the creditworthiness of counterparties and foreign laws to make better 
decisions 
• hedging export orders against foreign exchange rate movements 
• reducing the proportion of exports sent to a country prone to war 
• spreading their dealings across a range of counterparties. 
Sources: Austrade (nd); Bank of Queensland (2011).  
 
Firms may also have the option of partially insuring their activities. For example, an 
exporter can use a flexible forward contract (box 3.4) to partially hedge their 
currency exposures. The option of operating with no insurance, self-insurance or 
partial insurance may be efficient for some transactions. 
Risk management and mitigation tools have costs and some may be more readily 
available to large firms. Larger firms have a greater capacity to raise equity, which 
can be used in instances of default by customers. They also have greater scale to 
diversify their operations across customers, sectors and countries. Larger firms have 
greater bargaining power in negotiating terms and conditions, including price. 
The option of not proceeding with the transaction 
In addition to risk management and mitigation tools, firms have a range of options 
when developing their business model and planning their capital structure. If a firm 
is unable to attract finance (debt or equity) or insurance, it may be that the most 
efficient outcome is for the transaction not to proceed at that time, or with the 
current business model, because more efficient firms will supply the goods and 
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services, or the resources will go to higher value activities. It may also be possible 
to attract finance by altering the transaction (discussed further in chapter 7). 
3.6 In sum 
This chapter has discussed the coverage of trade finance and insurance products and 
services by private sector providers and EFIC. A direct comparison of coverage is 
challenging, because it is difficult to ascertain a particular private provider’s 
willingness to supply a product and the terms and conditions, including price, under 
which it would be offered. Nevertheless, several conclusions can be made: 
• Most international trade is undertaken without the support of any financial 
intermediaries, and most trade finance and insurance is provided by the private 
sector. Many Australian exporters access international providers of trade finance 
and insurance services. 
• By international standards, Australia has well developed, deep and liquid 
financial and insurance markets. 
• Most of the products offered by EFIC are also available from the private sector. 
– The exception is some types of guarantees, such as the foreign exchange 
guarantee facility. By design, these products are intended to complement the 
products offered by the private sector. 
• The differences in the coverage of EFIC and private sector providers primarily 
relate to the terms and conditions, including price, on which EFIC is able to offer 
its products. There may be commercial reasons why the private sector is not able 
to match these terms, and at times, it may be more efficient for the transaction 
not to proceed. 
• In addition to private sector finance, exporters have other financing and business 
options, including raising equity or changing their business plan. 
Subsequent chapters discuss whether the differences between EFIC and the private 
sector’s coverage justify government intervention.  
Most products offered by EFIC are also offered by the private sector, although the 
price and other conditions of provision may differ. 
FINDING 3.1 
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4 Analytical framework 
Key points 
• An assessment of the efficiency of Australia’s export credit arrangements involves 
examining the rationale for government intervention, identifying the most 
appropriate form of intervention, and evaluating whether EFIC’s activities and 
governance arrangements efficiently implement that intervention. 
• Government intervention in export credit and insurance markets is only warranted if 
it addresses a market failure in a way that generates a net benefit to the Australian 
community. 
– Market failure occurs where transactions that would enhance economy-wide 
wellbeing are not proceeding. The fact that some transactions (or projects) are 
unable to attract private sector support is not a market failure and may reflect 
assessments by market participants of the expected return of the transaction. 
– Even where a market fails, the case for government intervention rests on whether 
the economy-wide benefits outweigh the costs. 
– In the absence of a market failure, government intervention would direct support 
to projects or transactions that were refused by private sector providers on valid 
commercial grounds. Intervention in the absence of market failure distorts market 
signals and the allocation of resources in the economy. 
• There is a risk of policy failure when governments intervene in financial markets by 
providing finance to projects rejected by the private sector. 
– In Australia, previous government attempts to provide finance to projects that 
have struggled to attract commercial interest have ended in commercial failure 
and imposed substantial costs on the taxpayer. 
– In general, Australian Governments have moved away from owning financial 
institutions to pursuing competitive and stable financial markets governed by a 
robust prudential structure. 
• Appropriate governance arrangements are essential to minimise the likelihood of 
policy failure and the risks to the taxpayer, as well as the reputational risks to the 
government. 
• The distribution of the costs and benefits of Australia’s export credit arrangements is 
important both for equity and efficiency reasons. 
– Some of the benefits of government support may accrue to businesses and 
individuals outside of Australia, especially the buyers of exports. 
– There are equity and efficiency considerations arising from some firms receiving 
government support, while others do not, especially when assistance flows to 
less efficient firms.  
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This chapter outlines a conceptual framework for economic analysis of Australia’s 
export credit arrangements. This framework will be applied in assessing existing 
arrangements, as well as potential options for reform. 
4.1 What are the policy design questions? 
An assessment of Australia’s export credit arrangements can be conceptualised as a 
hierarchy of interdependent policy design questions. The issues that need to be 
resolved range from the high-level questions of ensuring that the policy objectives 
are clear and that there is rationale for government intervention, to identifying 
specific areas of reform (figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 Mapping the policy questions 
Clear objectives?
Is provision of trade 
finance the best policy 
instrument?
Are the operations 
cost effective?
Are governance 
arrangements 
appropriate?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Other policy instruments
Operational changes
Internal governance reform No
Clarify objectivesNo
Retain status quo
Yes
Sound rationale for 
intervention – would 
benefits outweigh costs?
Yes
No No intervention
Co
st-
eff
ec
tiv
en
es
s
Ef
fic
ien
cy
 
The remainder of the chapter presents an overview of the issues relevant to the 
above policy questions. Subsequent chapters consider those issues in greater detail.  
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4.2 Rationale for intervention 
Objectives 
Clearly defining the policy problem is a fundamental step in the design of a new 
policy, or the assessment of an existing one. 
At a high level, there are two requirements that could apply to most policy 
objectives. First, they should be consistent with the goal of enhancing 
economy-wide welfare. This requires an understanding and recognition of the 
underlying policy problem in a broader context. For example, policies that focus 
exclusively on promoting the interests of a particular section of the community, say 
exporters, could overlook potential negative effects in other parts of the economy 
and run the risk of reducing the welfare of the community as a whole.  
Second, the objectives need to be sufficiently specific to allow adequate targeting, 
and subsequent evaluation of the policy, but not be too prescriptive to unduly 
restrict the range of options to address the problem (Australian Government 2010).  
Market failure 
Australia’s export credit arrangements could generate both benefits and costs to the 
economy. However, government intervention is only warranted when the benefits 
outweigh the costs. Generally, when markets — including financial markets —
function well, they promote efficiency by allocating resources to their highest 
valued uses. In those cases, government intervention to alter consumption or 
production (for example, by way of a subsidy) will lead to a net loss for society 
(box 4.1). Although policies of this nature benefit those that receive assistance, the 
costs borne by the rest of the community outweigh those benefits. 
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Box 4.1 The effect of subsidising production in efficient markets 
The demand and supply of a product are stylised below. The quantity of the product 
consumed and produced is measured on the horizontal axis, the value of the benefits 
and costs of the product on the vertical axis. The S curve represents the incremental 
costs of supplying additional units of the product. Its upward slope reflects the scarcity 
of the resources required to make the product — as resources become more scarce, 
the cost of each new unit produced will rise. The D curve represents the demand for 
the product. Its downward slope reflects that the incremental benefits of consuming 
more of a particular product decline as this product becomes more abundant (relative 
to other products that consumers may wish to consume). The intersection of the two 
curves shows where the incremental costs of production to society equal the marginal 
benefits of consumption and the optimal price and level of consumption and production 
are p* and q*.  
 
The government could try to increase the production and consumption of a product by 
subsidising its supply. This would increase the supply to a new curve Ss and lead to a 
lower equilibrium buyer price ps and higher level of production and consumption qs. 
The subsidy would impose a cost on taxpayers. Some of this cost would be offset by 
the gains to the beneficiaries of the subsidy — the producers and consumers of the 
product. However, some of the costs of the subsidy will not be matched by the benefits. 
This is because the subsidy leads to a level of supply at which the additional costs of 
production to society have begun to exceed the benefits of consumption. The shaded 
triangle reflects the aggregate loss to society from increasing consumption and 
production beyond the socially optimal level.  
 
Few, if any, markets conform to the competitive ideal and market failures arise for 
several reasons (box 4.2). Despite this, most markets operate in a way that enhances 
community welfare and do not require government intervention. Even when 
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government intervention appears to be necessary it is important for policy makers to 
note that government intervention is never perfect and the cost of interventions will 
generally need to be weighed against their benefits. 
 
Box 4.2 Five sources of ‘market failure’  
Externalities arise when the actions of an individual or firm create a benefit or a cost 
for others who are not a party to the transaction and these impacts are not reflected in 
market prices. 
Public goods arise where consumption of a good is non-rivalrous (consumption by 
one person does not affect the amount available to others) and non-excludable (people 
cannot be prevented from consuming the good). Producers and consumers cannot 
capture the full benefits of provision and payments for provision cannot be enforced. 
Consequently, public goods are likely to be under-provided by the private sector. 
Inadequate information about a transaction can occur where there are institutional or 
cost barriers preventing parties to a transaction obtaining relevant information about 
the characteristics of a transaction (most notably risks) and/or each other. In such 
cases, market participants may adopt simplified decision rules based on a reduced set 
of information. 
Information asymmetry arises where one of the parties knows more about key 
aspects of the transaction than the other. One possible consequence is ‘adverse 
selection’ — a bias toward entering into lower quality or higher risk transactions. 
Another potential problem is ‘moral hazard’, which occurs when a party modifies its 
behaviour after the transaction to exploit any information advantage. 
Lack of effective competition may arise in the presence of market characteristics 
such as natural monopoly or when the market has a small number of firms that are 
able to restrict output and maintain prices above optimal levels. A small number of 
participants in the market alone is not evidence of the exercise of market power. The 
threat of new entrants may discourage the use of market power.  
 
Failures in financial markets 
Market failures in financial markets may manifest in the availability of debt or 
equity being restricted in the economy as a whole, or in segments of the market. 
They may also result in ‘irrational exuberance’ in financial markets where there is 
an excess supply of credit or it is supplied at a below optimal price — also an 
inefficient outcome. The OECD noted: 
When market failures exist, financial markets may not efficiently manage financial risk, 
may not allocate resources across space and time optimally, and may be subject to other 
weaknesses. (2008a, p. 6) 
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In the past, governments have sometimes intervened to correct perceived financial 
market failures by providing finance for what they saw as commercially viable 
projects rejected by the private sector. However, governments are not necessarily as 
well placed as the private sector in assessing and pricing risk or allocating credit. 
They are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as private sector providers that 
have to account to their shareholders for their decisions. Nor do they face the same 
consequences as the private sector from poor judgements.  
Although the following is not an EFIC transaction, it does illustrate that 
governments can and do lose from providing loans and guarantees to promising 
opportunities (opportunities the private sector had rejected). Following the launch of 
the Stanwell magnesium project in March 2000, the Australian and Queensland 
Governments gave considerable support in the form of grants and loan guarantees 
(Lipton, Steinberger, and Ketcher 2003). The Australian Government was very 
confident about the project (Minchin 2001). However, despite this support, the 
Australian Magnesium Corporation faced difficulties with the Stanwell project 
leading to its termination in June 2003. The collapse of the project resulted in 
significant costs being transferred to the taxpayer. 
Government run financial organisations have similarly had mixed success in 
allocating credit to viable projects. Although some have been successful, others 
such as the Victorian Economic Development Corporation, the West Australian 
Development Corporation, and the state banks of Victoria and South Australia 
failed at substantial cost to taxpayers and the economy as a whole. 
Why can’t some transactions attract market interest? 
Even in well-functioning and competitive financial markets some transactions will 
not proceed. 
At any one time market participants will compare the costs and opportunities of a 
variety of transactions. If some transactions cannot attract market interest at any 
price or only at a very high price this could simply reflect commercial decisions 
about allocating scarce resources given relative costs, benefits and risks. In this 
context, there will always be gaps between demand and supply. Unconstrained by 
price, society’s demand for any product will typically exceed its capacity to meet it 
and, similarly, not every proposal will find a financier or insurer. It is not a market 
failure unless it is a situation where the market fails to deliver an outcome that 
would improve community wellbeing at the economy-wide level. 
Transactions that do not attract commercial interest could stem from either a market 
failure, or because the underlying commercial aspects of the transaction mean that 
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market participants prefer instead to invest in projects elsewhere that generate 
greater expected returns. Government intervention in the latter case diverts 
resources from more commercially attractive projects and runs the risk of policy 
failure — similar to that encountered by the Stanwell magnesium project discussed 
above. 
There can be sound commercial reasons why private sector providers do not offer 
some products or are unwilling to provide them to some exporters or buyers. Such 
cases are not market failures. 
When should government intervene? 
The key policy question is whether government intervention will generate a net 
benefit to the community. The test of whether government should intervene is not 
whether there is a gap between what is supplied and demanded (because there will 
always be gaps), but rather do the benefits for the economy of the intervention 
exceed the costs.  
The relevant considerations for policy are: 
• the nature and impact of the market failure and the extent to which it can be 
corrected through intervention. Evaluation of this involves identifying the 
relevant economic counterfactual against which the intervention is to be 
assessed. From a policy perspective, the question is not whether the transaction 
or project would proceed or not, but rather what is the cost at the economy-wide 
level of leaving the decision to the market participants and what is the capacity 
of the government to improve on market outcomes 
• the likely costs of government intervention, including: 
– the opportunity cost of the resources used to assist the provision and 
consumption of export finance and insurance, including the costs to 
government of raising the required funds through taxation, and any broader 
economic, environmental or social impacts of the policy 
– the administrative costs for the government and the compliance costs for 
businesses and individuals.  
A further qualifier on the rationale for, and form of, government intervention in 
financial markets is the fact that specific market failures are often not permanent 
and could change over time. Thus, even if the rationale for intervention existed 
when government first intervened, it is important to regularly assess the case for 
continuing government involvement. Furthermore, where the market failure is likely 
FINDING 4.1 
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to be of a very short-term nature, government involvement may not be warranted in 
the first place.  
Other rationales for intervention 
Government provision of export assistance generally, and export finance and 
insurance specifically, is sometimes advocated for reasons other than market failure. 
For example, some advocates for general export enhancement argue that it could 
achieve strategic trade objectives or macroeconomic objectives, such as 
improvements in the balance of payments, or increased employment. Several 
participants (for example, AMWU, sub. DR111; CFMEU, sub. 10; Incat, 
sub. DR56) noted that EFIC’s assistance could help overcome challenges faced by 
Australian exporters, such as the high Australian dollar. Sometimes the argument 
for intervention is simply that the government has natural advantages over the 
private sector in scale, ability to spread and manage risk, expertise and access to 
information.  
The Commission assesses the merits of a range of potential rationales for 
government intervention, including those discussed above in chapter 5. Where no 
market failure is found, the Commission’s approach is to conclude that there is no 
economic rationale for government intervention — that is, the economy-wide 
benefits of intervening on those grounds are likely to be exceeded by the costs. This 
is not to say that there are no private benefits accruing to participants involved in 
the intervention but rather that those benefits come at a cost to others either as a 
result of distortions, subsidies or inappropriately priced transfers of risk. 
4.3 Achieving cost-effectiveness 
Provided the in-principle rationale for government intervention is established, the 
next step involves maximising its cost-effectiveness, that is, achieving the 
objectives at the lowest possible cost.  
At the outset, this requires answering the question of whether provision of export 
finance and insurance is the most direct and effective way of addressing any market 
or government failures. In large part, the answer depends on how directly the 
instrument targets the policy problem. Beyond that, the issue is whether and how 
the current arrangements for providing export finance and insurance can be 
improved.  
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Targeting the market failure at its source 
Policies that target a market failure directly at its source can confer several 
advantages. First, it reduces uncertainty about the causal linkages between the 
policy and the intended outcome, and improves the effectiveness of the policy 
(PC 2010c). Second, the costs to the taxpayer will be lower if the scope of 
government intervention is confined solely to the policy problem. Third, to the 
extent that such targeting of the policy problem facilitates subsequent market 
solutions, it would capitalise on the advantages that markets have over governments 
in allocating resources to highest-value uses. For example, if there is incomplete 
information about the political risks of exporting to a particular country, providing 
the missing information to market participants may be a more effective and less 
costly response than direct provision of export finance and insurance. Similarly, if 
changes to financial market regulation impose an inefficient constraint on the 
availability of debt or equity to a particular exporting sector, the appropriate 
response is more likely to be found in regulatory reform or sector-wide policies than 
through government involvement in individual transactions. 
This is not to say that direct targeting of the market or policy failure will always be 
feasible or successful. There may be institutional constraints or implementation 
difficulties that make this approach impractical. It is important to consider whether 
other policy instruments could address the problem more effectively or at a lower 
cost. 
Targeting financial market failures — some past experiences 
Past government responses to perceived financial market failures have varied, 
ranging from broader policies, such as monetary policy and government ownership 
of financial institutions, to more targeted responses such as regulation of the 
financial sector and various incentive mechanisms (box 4.3). 
Over the past 30 years, and following two broad inquiries into Australia’s financial 
system, there has been a general recognition that targeted approaches to addressing 
any market failures are preferable. There has been a clear trend away from the 
potentially risky approach of government ownership of financial institutions, 
prompted by the high-profile collapses of government-owned banks such as the 
State Bank of South Australia and the State Bank of Victoria (Armstrong and 
Gross 1995; MacPherson 1993).  
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Box 4.3 Government responses to financial market inefficiencies 
Australian Governments have used a variety of policies to address perceived 
inefficiencies in financial markets, including: 
• government ownership of financial institutions — in the period up to the mid-1990s 
government-owned financial institutions were widespread. The Australian 
Government owned the Commonwealth Bank of Australia and there was a state 
government-owned bank in every state. The 1990s saw a broad trend of 
privatisation, in some cases prompted by the financial mismanagement and/or 
collapse of these institutions 
• regulation — prior to the mid-1980s financial institutions were subject to extensive 
and prescriptive regulation which greatly constrained both the number of providers 
(for example, foreign banks could not operate in Australia) and the day-to-day 
operation of existing market participants (including through lending rate controls, 
limits on what financial products could be offered, and controls on deposit amounts 
and terms). These regulations reflected macroeconomic, equity and efficiency 
concerns. Following the Australian Financial System Inquiry in 1981, the Australian 
Government commenced a process of deregulation, which relaxed many of those 
constraints. The reform continued with the 1996-97 Financial System Inquiry 
undertaken by the Wallis Committee. The conclusions of that inquiry focused on 
achieving competitive financial markets governed by a robust prudential structure 
• incentive mechanisms for consumers of financial products — the policies adopted at 
various stages included, for example: subsidised loans (such as the Green Loans 
scheme, discontinued in 2010); the current tax concessions to venture capital 
markets; and different forms of assistance to help small and medium-sized 
enterprises become market ready. 
Sources: ABA (2004); ATO (2009); Wallis et al. (1997); DEWHA (2010); Macfarlane (1998).  
 
International research also suggests that government-owned financial institutions 
generally fail to enhance economic efficiency. For example, La Porta et al. (2002) 
assessed the effects of government ownership of financial institutions in 
92 countries, including Australia. They made several findings including that 
government ownership of banks is: 
• particularly significant in countries with low levels of per capita income, 
underdeveloped financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, 
and those with poor protection of property rights 
• associated with slower subsequent financial development 
• associated with lower subsequent growth of per capita income and with lower 
growth in productivity. 
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The authors concluded: 
 … the results are consistent with the political view of government ownership of firms, 
including banks, according to which such ownership politicises the resource allocation 
process and reduces efficiency. (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 290) 
Similarly, Inter-American Development Bank researchers (Galindo and Mico 2003) 
looked at the effect of government ownership of banks on growth of manufacturing 
sectors in need of credit in 34 countries. They found:  
Our empirical evidence suggests that state-owned banks do not promote the growth 
rates of manufacturing industries that rely on external sources of funding for their 
operation, nor do they promote the growth rates of manufacturing industries that, due to 
reduced access to collateral, face tighter financial constraints. On the contrary, the 
development of a private banking industry appears to have a significant effect on such 
types of industries. (p. 10) 
The OECD (2008a) observed that the focus for governments should be: 
• establishing the pre-requisites for the operation of the financial system, 
including: 
– sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies and monetary controls 
– well-developed infrastructure for financial services, including reliable 
accounting, auditing, legal and judicial, and tax systems 
• targeting market failures at the source through either incentive mechanisms, 
competition policy, financial education, or regulation.  
Reducing the opportunity costs 
Opportunity costs of capital 
The capital used by an export credit agency (ECA) to provide its products and 
services (including any contingent liabilities of the government) has an opportunity 
cost. Opportunity cost reflects the value of the best alternative use of that capital. If 
there is a higher return from investing those funds elsewhere — either through 
government programs or by private businesses and individuals, the ECA would be 
distorting the allocation of resources (discussed below) and generating a net cost to 
the economy. 
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Distortions in export finance and insurance markets and the broader economy 
Government provision of export finance and insurance can affect the incentives and 
behaviour of both providers and consumers of these products. 
On the supply side, ECAs may crowd out private sector provision of export finance 
and insurance for commercially viable transactions if there is direct competition 
with existing providers, or if government provision creates a barrier to entry for 
other businesses. ECAs may also attract private sector provision of export finance 
and insurance beyond optimal levels through co-operative arrangements that 
effectively subsidise private providers or consumers of the supported exports. 
Distortions may also arise on the demand side of export finance and insurance 
markets. If exporters perceive a benefit from receiving these products from the 
government, rather than seeking alternative sources of funding or insurance, such as 
equity finance, they may engage in strategic behaviour to secure or retain this 
benefit. 
Government provision of export finance and insurance can also have broader effects 
across the economy, unless it is done on the basis of market failure and the benefits 
outweigh the costs. If government provision assists particular industries, resources 
would be artificially shifted to those industries at the cost of other sectors. It may be 
the case that by supporting a transaction an ECA is conferring a benefit on a 
business less efficient than one that would have undertaken the activity but for the 
ECA’s support. The various channels through which distortions could arise are 
examined further in chapter 7. 
The size of the distortion is determined predominantly by how an ECA prices its 
products and the characteristics of the affected markets. In general, distortions are 
less likely to occur if the ECA faces the same incentives as the private sector to 
price its products and services efficiently. If there are price differentials, the key 
factor determining the magnitude of any misallocation of resources is the sensitivity 
of the market participants to price changes. For example, if the demand for export 
finance is highly sensitive to price, providing the product at a subsidised price 
would lead to a greater increase in consumption and a bigger distortion than if 
demand varied little in response to price changes. 
One way of assessing whether EFIC is likely to create distortions is by examining 
how EFIC selects and prices the transactions and how it prices risk. Another 
approach involves looking at the financial performance of EFIC’s operation after 
accounting for any commercial advantages it may have by virtue of its exemption 
from competitive neutrality arrangements. This is covered in chapters 6 and 8.  
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Appropriate governance arrangements 
Ensuring that the governance structures responsible for policy development, 
implementation and oversight are effective is fundamental to the success of any 
policy. At a high level, this requires that: 
• the responsibility for components of the policy task is allocated to agencies best 
equipped to deliver them, taking into account the relevant skills, expertise and 
administrative costs, as well as potential conflicts of interest 
• adequate arrangements are in place to ensure accountability (PC 2010c). 
The risks from inadequate governance arrangements can be considerable for the 
taxpayer and the reputation of the government. 
Chapter 9 sets out the principles of good governance in greater detail and adopts 
them to assess the case for governance reform of EFIC. 
4.4 Distributional effects 
Distribution of the benefits between exporters and importers 
EFIC’s provision of a facility to an importer or exporter does not necessarily 
represent who will be the beneficiaries. The benefits may ultimately be shared by 
both the exporter and the importer, and partner private sector financial institutions 
(who would be able to increase their involvement, while achieving better conditions 
and transferring risk). The distribution of the benefits from assistance depends on 
the demand and supply characteristics in the relevant markets, and the magnitude of 
any change in prices. 
At a broad level, the following factors determine the ultimate distribution of the 
benefits: 
• the responsiveness of the demand for imports to changes in the price — if the 
world demand for a particular product is not sensitive to price, subsidising the 
supply of that product will simply reduce its price in world markets rather than 
increase the quantity consumed. Thus, the subsidy to exporters would end up 
primarily benefiting the consumers in the importing country 
• the responsiveness of the assisted exporter to changes in the price — the greater 
the increase in the export volume in response to the assistance from EFIC, the 
greater the likely fall in the price paid by the consumers in other countries, and 
the greater the benefit that will accrue to them 
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• the ability of the assisted exporter to change the world price by increasing its 
export volumes — if the increase in the export volume is large it will confer 
greater benefits on consumers in other countries through lower prices. If, on the 
other hand, the exporter cannot influence the world price, it will gain the entire 
benefit of the subsidy, albeit at a net cost to the economy, as more resources are 
shifted to export production than would have occurred in the absence of the 
subsidy (Fitzgerald and Monson 1989; Fleisig and Hill 1984). 
Even where exporting firms can benefit from EFIC’s assistance, this does not 
necessarily imply that all of the benefits received by exporters accrue to the 
exporting country. There will be a leakage of benefits overseas in circumstances 
where the parties to an export transaction supported by EFIC are foreign-owned.  
Distributional consequences within Australia — efficiency and equity 
EFIC’s activities in markets also have implications for the manner in which 
resources are distributed between various persons and entities within the Australian 
economy. The distribution of the benefits of Australia’s export credit arrangements 
is relevant from an equity and an efficiency perspective.  
Efficiency consequences 
Some may argue that the goals of EFIC would still be achieved even if a 
foreign-owned company is assisted and if prices for the exported good or service 
were falling, because exports would have increased and employment in that part of 
the economy would have increased as result. However, that is only part of the 
picture. If those resources would have been more efficiently employed elsewhere in 
the economy then there would be a net efficiency loss. EFIC’s private sector 
partners may still be beneficiaries and the importer and exporter may still consider 
they gained, but in the absence of a market failure these gains will be outweighed 
by the costs. There would be a reduction in community welfare, particularly in 
circumstances where the economy is close to full employment.1 
Equity consequences 
To the extent that one of the objectives of government policy is an equitable 
distribution of the costs and benefits in the community, the winners and the losers 
                                              
1  If the economy is operating at or close to full employment, government stimulus applied to one 
area will simply draw resources from other areas with little net impact on aggregate output. 
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and the magnitude of their gains and losses need to be identified (Australian 
Government 2010).  
In some instances, (and where a market failure rationale for intervention is not 
established) the benefit gained by an assisted exporter could come at the expense of 
domestic competitor companies who do not receive assistance. Downer EDI 
Limited (sub. DR40, p. 3) observed that ECA finance gave it a ‘competitive 
advantage when Downer is bidding on tenders in the knowledge it has access to the 
prerequisite funding’. The Commission has come across cases where EFIC’s 
assistance to one domestic producer gave it an advantage over other domestic 
producers (discussed in chapter 7).  
There may also be cases where EFIC’s assistance is directed to firms that do not 
need it, because those firms can access alternative sources of finance and insurance, 
albeit at a higher price. Considerations of the efficiency of this outcome aside, the 
fairness of conferring a benefit on those firms at the expense of the general taxpayer 
is another important consideration. 
A note on the Commission’s methodology 
In its assessment of the likely impacts of current and proposed arrangements, the 
Commission has not sought to quantify the costs and benefits for the Australian 
economy. Some participants, (for example, EFIC, sub. DR90; Malcolm Stephens, 
sub. DR93) criticised this approach. 
In the context of the issues the Commission considered in this report, a quantitative 
analysis is not required to determine whether the proposed arrangements would 
deliver a net benefit to the community. If the current arrangements fail the threshold 
test of being based on a sound rationale for government intervention, the outcome 
would be a net loss for the Australian economy. 
Further, an economy-wide modelling exercise is required to accurately measure the 
costs and benefits and associated flow-on effects of current and proposed 
arrangements. Given the small size of EFIC relative to that of the Australian 
economy, any estimates would be extremely sensitive to assumptions, difficult to 
discern from model ‘noise’ and, ultimately, highly unreliable. 
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5 Economics of export finance and 
insurance 
Key points 
• Potential rationales for government intervention in export finance and insurance 
markets have been raised in some of the literature and by participants to this 
inquiry. These include: meeting broader national interest objectives; arguments for 
export support to generate multiplier effects in the economy; and addressing 
perceived problems in financial markets. 
• Government intervention to promote exports will only be warranted where it 
addresses a market failure in a manner that generates a net benefit to the economy. 
• Government intervention in export finance markets should be targeted at failures in 
those markets that impede otherwise commercially viable export transactions. 
• There may be some instances of market failure that may warrant government 
provision of export finance through EFIC. These potential market failures are 
information-related and limited to: 
– problems arising from private sector providers adopting simplified decision rules 
to lower transaction costs 
– temporarily missing markets arising from a severe disruption in financial markets 
in particular countries. 
• These potential information-related failures are likely to be limited to newly exporting 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) — those SMEs with limited export 
experience or SMEs attempting to access emerging export markets — that are 
seeking export finance. 
• Until it is next reviewed, EFIC’s commercial account objective should be to 
efficiently address the information-related failures in financial markets that affect 
newly exporting SMEs. EFIC’s role should be to demonstrate to the private sector 
that providing export finance to these exporters can be commercially viable. 
• In cases where there is a temporary disruption in an export market, EFIC has a 
potential role in reinsuring risk. Any such assistance should be priced on 
commercial terms, limited to reinsurance, available for a defined period and include 
an exit plan. 
• In some cases, it may be appropriate that governments use export credit agencies 
to meet national interest objectives.  
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This chapter considers potential rationales for government intervention in export 
finance and insurance markets, a number of which have been raised in some of the 
literature and by participants to this inquiry. These include: meeting broader 
national interest objectives; arguments for export support to generate multiplier 
effects in the economy; and addressing perceived problems in financial markets. 
5.1 National interest rationales 
On occasion, governments use export credit agencies (ECAs) to support projects or 
transactions identified as being in the national interest. National interest 
considerations are separate from the rationales used to justify government 
intervention in export finance and insurance markets, and may include governments 
lending to foreign nations to achieve foreign policy outcomes. In other cases, 
governments have justified ECA support on the basis that protecting and 
encouraging defence-related industries is in the national interest (Fleisig and 
Hill 1984). EFIC also noted that Japan and Korea are investing in Australia through 
their ECAs to meet long-term resource security objectives by contracting purchases 
in advance (trans., p. 160).  
As discussed in chapter 2, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) 
administers a dedicated national interest account on behalf of the Australian 
Government. Through this account, the Australian Government is able to support 
transactions that it deems are in the national interest. For example, the Australian 
Government provided Indonesia with a $500 million concessional loan in the wake 
of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami (JSCFAT 2006). In another instance, the 
Australian Government granted a US$250 million loan on the national interest 
account to a liquefied natural gas project in Papua New Guinea (EFIC 2010a). The 
(then) Minister for Trade remarked: 
This project will provide a boost to PNG, the region, and Australia … Beyond 
Australia’s competitive advantage and expertise in this field, the PNG development 
could enhance the significance of our region as a global supplier of energy … the 
Australian Government, with the PNG Government, is focused on ensuring that the 
project lives up to its potential, and benefits all regions and people of PNG. 
(Crean 2009b) 
Proposed changes to governance arrangements for the national interest account are 
discussed in chapter 9. 
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5.2 Broader rationales suggested for export support 
There are many other suggested rationales for providing government assistance to 
exporters through intervention in financial markets. This section examines their 
merits. 
Supporting exports as an end goal 
EFIC was established to encourage Australian export trade through the provision of 
insurance and financial services and products. Some submissions have argued that 
the promotion of exports as an end goal is desirable: 
All companies should have access to whatever mechanisms are available to help gain 
an export, be it through EFIC or otherwise. Exports and exporters must be encouraged 
and assisted by whatever means possible. Surely that is in the best interests of the 
country! (Incat Australia, sub. DR56, p. 2) 
In addition EFIC has also pointed to research that suggests exports are inherently 
deserving of government support. It cited Hufbauer (2001) of the Peterson Institute 
of International Economics who claimed that exports were special: 
Ex-Im could have been safely retired at age 65 if there was nothing special about 
exports. But there is something special. (Hufbauer 2001) 
In the US context, Hufbauer goes on to claim that exports have been a major source 
of economic growth, and that the US government should promote exports through 
the US Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank). 
The Commission does not support this position. In order for government 
intervention to increase exports and generate net benefits to the economy, that 
intervention must efficiently target market failures that are impeding otherwise 
commercially viable export transactions. Promoting exports per se will generally 
only shift domestic resources (labour and capital) away from more profitable 
activities and potentially drive down prices of the exports (benefiting foreign 
buyers) and reduce, rather than increase, Australia’s aggregate income.  
As the Chairman of the Commission has previously noted: 
 … the production, marketing, and delivery of goods and services for export all employ 
resources and thus have opportunity costs. For Australia to gain from any particular 
exporting activity, the benefit received needs to exceed the value that could have 
obtained by using the embodied resources to supply the domestic market. Hence, it 
cannot be presumed that additions to exports, particularly if induced artificially by 
assistance, will yield a net payoff to the community. (Banks 2008, p. 11) 
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Increasing GDP and domestic employment 
The former Deputy General Counsel of the US Ex-Im Bank stated: 
Export transactions supported by Eximbank have immediate salutary effects on the 
domestic economy. Employment is increased, real income is created, and capital is 
effectively put to use in developing the country’s resources. (Rendell 1976, p. 112) 
This view was also expressed to the Commission during the course of this inquiry. 
For example, Lean Field Developments noted: 
Australia must export if it wishes to reduce unemployment, diversify domestic industry 
and increase productivity. (sub. DR78, p. 4) 
Similar sentiments were expressed by other participants including Incat Australia 
(sub. DR56) and Investec (sub. DR72), and by some authors (Tschetter 2008). 
Although efforts to promote exports may be successful at increasing production in 
export industries, in economies that are at or close to full employment, it is not 
necessarily the case that national income and employment will rise as a result. 
Abstracting from terms of trade changes and increases in the quantity of resources 
(including labour) available for production, promoting export activity in a fully 
employed economy will draw labour and other resources away from other, 
non-exporting activities, leading to lower production in those areas (Banks 2011; 
Fleisig and Hill 1984). At best, such an approach is likely to have no discernible 
effect on the number of jobs in the economy: 
 … promoting exports through subsidised financing or through government-backed 
insurance guarantees will not permanently raise the level of employment in the 
economy, but alters the composition of employment among the various sectors of the 
economy and, therefore performs poorly as a jobs creation mechanism. (Ilias 2011, 
p. 13) 
Even in situations with less than full employment of resources, an artificial shift in 
resources to the export sector (through government subsidies) will come at a cost to 
other sectors of the economy.  
Balance of payments considerations 
Policies intended to promote exports have sometimes been justified on the grounds 
that they improve a country’s balance of payments position (Gianturco 2001).  
Broadly speaking, the balance of payments consists of two main accounts: the 
current account, and the capital and financial account. The current account includes 
transactions for the purchase and sale of goods and services overseas, as well as 
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income received from, and paid to, overseas residents. The capital and financial 
account primarily measures financial transactions arising from investment activity. 
All of the transactions measured in Australia’s balance of payments accounts 
involve trading in Australian dollars and foreign exchange.  
The argument for export promotion on the grounds that it leads to a balance of 
payments ‘improvement’ has little relevance in economies with a floating exchange 
rate. This is because any change in exports arising from export assistance will result 
in a movement in the exchange rate to return the balance of payments to zero. 
Artificially increasing exports to boost the exchange rate will come at a cost to other 
exporters and domestic producers as their competitiveness will have been reduced.   
Imperfect competition and strategic trade theory 
There is a well-established base of economic literature on strategic trade theory 
suggesting that, under certain circumstances, a domestic government can use 
subsidies (for example, through its ECA) to advantage its own economy at the 
expense of an overseas competitor (for example, Spencer and Brander 1983; 
Brander and Spencer 1985; Krugman 1984). This economic literature does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that strategic trade theory is a sound rationale for 
government intervention to promote exports. 
First, a positive outcome is only possible under specific, restrictive assumptions. 
The literature generally assumes imperfect competition in the competitor nation. 
Under this theory, if an Australian and a foreign firm in an oligopolistic market 
compete for market share in a third country, a subsidy may allow the Australian 
firm to capture a larger market share in the third country. Furthermore, the gain is 
only possible if the competitor nation does not retaliate. If both countries subsidise 
exports it will lead to an outcome where both nations would be better off not having 
the export subsidy. 
Second, achieving a net benefit to the community in practice is unlikely. The 
informational costs to government of selecting the appropriate level and focus for 
its support are high as is the potential for policy error. On the other hand, these 
arrangements come at a cost to all other Australian exporters, consumers and other 
producers, through the taxes that must be imposed to fund the assistance (or a 
reduction in public sector spending elsewhere in the economy). This distorts market 
outcomes in favour of Australian exporters receiving government assistance, 
potentially reducing the competitiveness of Australian firms not receiving 
government assistance.  
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The Commission has previously noted in its report on Australia’s Anti-dumping and 
Countervailing System: 
As several of those outlining an ‘in principle’ case for strategic trade interventions have 
acknowledged, the circumstances in which there could in practice be a benefit are very 
limited, especially when the costs imposed on ‘non-strategic’ industries are taken into 
account. (PC 2009, p. 193) 
Third, as in the case of supporting infant industries, it may be politically difficult to 
wind back such support once it is established, and there may be pressure to increase 
or widen its scope by those who benefit. The Commission has seen evidence of this 
behaviour during the course of this inquiry from EFIC’s clients and various 
financial institutions. 
A drawback of such export promotion policies is that, even if successful, gains to 
exporters in one country come at the expense of losses imposed on producers 
elsewhere. This could lead to a situation where subsidised exports from developed 
countries compete against exports from developing countries. 
The final drawback, if such a policy could be implemented successfully, would be 
an adverse effect on domestic producers, including Australian exporters, through a 
reduction in their competiveness as a result of a higher Australian dollar.  
Alleviating cost and competition pressures 
Several participants have argued that the provision of export finance and insurance 
can help alleviate cost and competition pressures. For example: 
Australian exporters are faced with unprecedented strength in the Australian dollar, 
high labour costs (particularly affecting manufacturing industries) and severely 
curtailed finance availability for potential overseas customers. (Austal, sub. DR110, 
p. 16) 
[Manufacturers] are seeking to develop their export business … They are doing so 
against a very difficult set of circumstances including the high Australian dollar fuelled 
by the resources boom, global supply chains extracting the cost savings of mass 
production by cheap and exploited labour, trade barriers and other inequalities in the 
global environment. (Australian Manufacturers Workers Union, sub. DR111, p. 1) 
All businesses must deal with fluctuations in the price of inputs and changes in 
relative prices that may advantage their competitors. However, this does not suggest 
that government intervention is warranted on efficiency or equity grounds. 
Government intervention to alleviate the pressures felt by exporters would benefit 
those receiving the assistance, however the cost of doing so is borne by others in the 
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economy. Furthermore, the distortionary effects of transfers of this type, result in 
resources being used in lower value activities and a loss to the broader economy. 
In addition, firms have various mechanisms for dealing with the price changes that 
affect their industry. For example, those that are exposed to foreign exchange 
fluctuations have a number of options available to hedge against movements in that 
price (chapter 3). In some cases, firms may be able to enter into long-term contracts 
with suppliers to set a price in advance to mitigate these risks. They will also 
substitute between inputs or alter their production processes to reflect the prices 
they face. Government is unlikely to have the knowledge required to assist in those 
strategies. 
Some participants noted that the manufacturing sector in particular faced challenges 
that EFIC may be able to help overcome (see, for example, CFMEU, sub. 10; GP 
Graders, sub. DR35; Mono Pumps (Australia) Pty Ltd, sub. DR54). As the 
Chairman of the Commission noted: 
 … relative to other industries, manufacturing already gets a lot of government 
assistance. Net tariff assistance alone was estimated to be around some $6.5 billion in 
2009-10, with another $2 billion or so in various subsidies. Rather than providing more 
assistance, our current fiscal settings suggest that the bigger priority is to determine 
what this assistance is achieving for the country and whether it could be better spent. 
(Banks 2011, p.12) 
Assistance to one sector, in the absence of a market failure, ultimately comes at a 
cost to other sectors in the economy.  
Correcting externalities  
It has been claimed that certain types of exporting activity create positive 
externalities and the amount of exporting activity will be lower than is optimal 
without public sector support (Medina-Smith 2001). Two potential sources of 
externalities can be identified: research and development; and creation of new 
export markets. 
New technology and research and development 
A particular exporting activity may involve the development of a new kind of 
technology from which other firms not party to the transaction may benefit 
(spillover benefits). It may also result in research and development that has wide 
applications, and can benefit other firms not directly undertaking the research 
activity.  
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Quickstep argued: 
SMEs are the core of innovation in Australia as well as worldwide. It is where most 
ground breaking technologies are being invented and developed. The domestic 
Australian market is very small and in our globalised economy, it is essential for SMEs 
to be able to export to be successful. (sub. DR41, p. 1) 
Although positive externalities from technology development may provide a 
rationale for some form of government intervention, it is unlikely that intervention 
through the export finance and insurance market will be efficient (Tybout 1999). 
For example, if production leads to innovations that will provide wider benefits not 
captured by the producing firm, it would be more efficient to directly subsidise the 
source of the externality — the production of the good or service — particularly as 
it makes no difference whether the good or service is exported or consumed 
domestically. 
Creating new export markets  
Positive spillovers may arise from ‘pioneer’ exporting firms that are the first to 
export to a particular market. For example, a firm that is the first to break into a 
particular overseas market could establish a good reputation for other exports from 
the country of origin. Wellard gave one such example, stating: 
[Because of EFIC support] we are now in the process of delivering a turnkey dairy 
project to the Sri Lankan government that will have every chance of opening a much 
larger and longer term market for Australian livestock producers and equipment 
manufacturers. (sub. DR34, p. 1) 
However, it is doubtful that government provision of export finance and insurance 
on such grounds constitutes good policy. First, it imposes a considerable 
informational burden on the public agencies to ascertain which exporting companies 
to support for the purpose of creating positive reputational effects.  
Second, much of the reputational benefit is likely to be specific to the exporting 
firm rather than other potential exporters, giving the firm sufficient private incentive 
to promote its reputation. In addition, while a pioneer firm may initially face 
additional costs from the lack of established reputation, it may also capture 
significant private benefits in the long run, for example, from being the first mover 
into a new market. A firm with sufficient retained earnings or access to capital 
markets can absorb the losses that occur with initial exports and eventually make 
profits once country reputation has been established — making any case for 
government support correspondingly weaker (Panagariya 2000). 
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If it were the case that government determined a need to support pioneering firms to 
enter new export markets, it is likely that a more appropriate policy would be one 
that targeted information directly to likely buyers (Corden 1984). For example, a 
more direct approach would be to organise trade missions and exhibitions for 
exporters. Most state and territory governments maintain such programs (chapter 2). 
The Commission is not referring in this section to a situation where a firm cannot 
obtain private sector support in a particular emerging market because of information 
failures relating to that market. That scenario could justify government intervention 
through EFIC and is discussed later in the chapter. 
Offsetting domestic distortions that hinder exports 
It has been argued that assistance to exporters is needed to offset existing distortions 
within the economy that hinder exports, such as tariffs (IC 1992). The idea is that by 
offsetting such distortions, an economy can specialise in producing goods and 
services according to its comparative advantage. 
The optimal policy to address such concerns is to remove the source of domestic 
distortions directly rather than counter one distortion with another. Removing 
domestic distortions, such as tariffs, is desirable on efficiency grounds alone, 
regardless of their effect on exporting industries (Elbehri and Leetmaa 2001). 
Australia has benefited substantially from such reforms in the past: 
Reducing tariffs and eliminating quotas were tools of trade in fashioning the open, 
competitive economy, essential in exposing Australian business to international 
competition. (Emerson 2010) 
There are also risks involved in enacting export policies to offset existing 
distortions within the economy. For example, in its review of export enhancement 
schemes, the Industry Commission (IC 1992) pointed out that export enhancement 
measures aimed at offsetting tariffs would create a group of exporters whose 
viability may depend on the maintenance of tariffs. Furthermore, ECAs and other 
export enhancing policies have the potential to introduce their own source of bias 
against the production of non-traded goods and services (Fitzgerald and 
Monson 1989). 
Infant industry arguments 
In international trade, the infant industry argument rests on the idea that a country 
may have a potential comparative advantage in a particular industry and that this 
comparative advantage cannot be realised without initial government assistance. 
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This may be because production involves learning by doing, which can lower costs 
and improve quality in the long run, or because a large volume of output is needed 
to achieve economies of scale. After an initial period of receiving assistance, the 
supporting industries should receive gains that more than offset their initial costs. 
NOJA Power has submitted that support of this nature is important: 
NOJA Power was the Australian Prime Minister’s Exporter of the Year in 2009 as well 
as the Large Manufacturer of the Year, our company has created hundreds of millions 
of dollars in export revenue for Australia together with hundreds of jobs for Australians 
and we did this from our SME beginnings so it is important that more companies like 
NOJA Power are created and with EFIC’s support for the SME sector that can be 
achieved. (sub. DR32, p. 1) 
However, establishing the case for government intervention along these lines is 
problematic. First, it is unclear what market failure justifies the provision of 
assistance on infant industry grounds. If an industry would become viable after an 
initial establishment period and could communicate that to the market, private 
financial institutions should be willing to extend long-term finance that takes into 
account the expected stream of future revenue. If private financial institutions are 
not willing to lend due to a failure in the financial market, the appropriate policy is 
to correct those failures rather than provide assistance to specific export activities or 
particular exporters (Corden 1984). 
Second, there are practical challenges including that government may not have the 
necessary information to judge that an industry will be able to export without 
assistance in the future after a period of initial support. Third, any such assistance 
needs to be temporary, requiring a determination by government of when the 
industry is no longer ‘infant’. Australian experience with subsidies and tariffs has 
shown that withdrawing government support once it is provided is difficult as firms 
become dependent on it. Empirical evidence on the use of infant industry policies in 
Australia raises questions about the ability of government to successfully ‘pick 
winners’ or to terminate support after particular industries have demonstrated 
whether they are viable or not. For example, the textile, clothing and footwear and 
automotive industries in Australia still rely on government assistance to support 
production volumes after many decades of assistance (Banks 2008). 
Export diversification 
Quickstep argued that EFIC was needed to ensure a diverse domestic economy: 
Australia being a resource dominated economy in a country where the enormous 
majority of jobs are in the manufacturing and service industry creates a market 
imbalance that have wrecked a number of oil based third world economies and that can 
only be addressed by government policies that can insulate our industry from the 
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vagaries of the resource markets. The lack of such policies will lead to a gradual 
disappearance of whole sectors of the economy that will lead to Australia being 
unprepared for when the resource boom starts to dwindle and will leave high levels of 
unemployment now and thereafter. (sub. DR41, p. 1) 
Agriculture and mining have historically played a prominent role in the composition 
of Australia’s exports, with agriculture becoming less important since the 1970s. 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, concerns developed that the scope of exports was 
too narrow, especially given the burgeoning global information and 
communications technology industries. Australia was also perceived as representing 
an ‘old economy’, which could expect a long-term decline in its terms of trade (The 
Economist 2000). However, Australia’s terms of trade are currently at their highest 
recorded level, driven by growth in China and India (Kearns and Lowe 2011). 
Advocates of government intervention prior to the sustained recent recession in 
Ireland, once pointed to Ireland — the ‘Celtic Tiger’ — and the activist strategies 
followed by its government to shape industry and exports, as policies the Australian 
government should follow.  
The appropriate role for government is to ensure that resources move freely across 
sectors of the economy to the areas where they are most highly valued. Policy 
measures taken may involve for example, removing impediments to the mobility of 
labour. As noted by the Chairman of the Commission: 
Ultimately, a dollar is a dollar, regardless of where it is earned or spent. All output uses 
scarce resources and a well-functioning, productive economy allocates those resources 
to where they can yield the biggest payoff. (Banks, 2011, p.11) 
Exporting and multiplier effects 
Some submissions to this inquiry have raised the issue of potential multiplier effects 
that arise from the promotion of export activity, and that their existence implies a 
rationale for government supported export finance and insurance by ECAs. For 
example, Santos submitted that as a result of EFIC’s support for its Gladstone LNG 
project: 
Santos has been able to make investments here in Australia which will directly create 
5000 new jobs during construction and 1000 new jobs for the expected 30 year 
operation of Santos’ GLNG project. The multiplier benefit for the local, state and 
national economies is significant in terms of additional jobs and investment, tax 
revenues and stronger communities. (sub. DR64, p. 2) 
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With reference to the Lumwana Copper Mine project in Zambia, Orpheus 
Geoscience submitted: 
 … most of the contractors engaged for the construction of Lumwana were Australian 
companies … A significant proportion of the equipment and hardware at Lumwana 
have been sourced directly from Australia … benefits have been passed through to 
Australian superannuation funds by our many institutional investors, with flow on tax 
benefits to the Australian Government. (sub. DR62, pp. 1-2) 
However, claims of the benefits of multiplier effects often overlook the opportunity 
cost of resources used — that is, the alternative uses to which those resources may 
have been put. As the Chairman of the Commission has argued: 
Just as the spending created in and by the recipient firm [of assistance] has multiplier 
effects, so too does the spending that is displaced from other firms and industries. 
Looked at another way, while public funds devoted to a project will have multiplier 
effects, those public funds would also have had multiplier effects if spent on other 
purposes, or left in the hands of taxpayers to be spent on the things that they value. 
(Banks 2002, pp. 8-9) 
In short, there are multiplier effects associated with economic activity of any kind, 
be it export-orientated or otherwise. It does not follow that government resources, 
that could be used elsewhere, should be allocated to EFIC on the basis that its 
activity generates multiplier effects. Government investment in education, for 
example, also generates multiplier effects in the economy.  
In the case of resource projects, such as the Santos project mentioned above, 
government assistance may simply bring forward activity that would have occurred 
at a later date, rather than lead to activity that would not have occurred at all. There 
will be circumstances where artificially accelerating a project is not efficient, 
particularly where resources are diverted from other productive activities. Multiplier 
analysis in such cases is likely to be of little value. 
At any rate, as discussed in chapter 4, it is best to target any policy problems at the 
source rather than attempt to calibrate policy to achieve indirect flow-on effects. 
Offsetting export assistance by foreigners 
Many participants to this inquiry argued in favour of general assistance to export 
industries on the grounds that other countries subsidise their exports, and therefore, 
Australia should do the same. Two variations on this argument are that every 
developed country has an ECA and, therefore, Australia needs one to be 
competitive; and linked to that, export assistance for a particular project is 
warranted because, in its absence, another ECA would step in and fill that role. The 
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basis for this argument is that a failure to match export enhancement offered by 
other countries unfairly disadvantages exporters and may lead to the dislocation of 
industry (Fitzgerald and Monson 1989).1  
Codan Ltd, for example, stated: 
If Australia does not have an Export Credit Agency (ECA) with the capacity and 
competency to support Australian companies competing against foreign companies 
who do have support of their own ECAs then Australian companies will be placed at a 
severe disadvantage. (sub. DR65, p. 1) 
This proposition seems to run contrary to the fact that the vast majority of 
Australia’s exporters are able to trade in international markets without EFIC’s 
assistance. 
It is not clear that any government response to foreign ECA activity is needed. 
Where the assistance offered in other countries is necessary to address a market 
failure in that country, the assistance is efficiency enhancing and requires no 
response by the Australian Government. Even where foreign assistance does not 
address a market failure, and constitutes a subsidy to foreign exporters, it is the 
importing nation that is usually the beneficiary of such assistance. As NERA 
pointed out in a review of the UK’s ECA: 
In the context of maximising national welfare, economic trade theory gives some clear 
prescriptions about the effectiveness of export subsidies. If two countries are trading 
with each other in competitive markets, and one decides to subsidise its exports, this 
reduces welfare in the subsidising country and increases welfare in the other country. 
The reasoning is simple: through using tax revenues to provide the importing country 
with subsidised imports, the export subsidiser is simply transferring resources to the 
other country. The appropriate response from the other country is not to retaliate, but 
simply to enjoy the welfare gains provided by the export subsidies. (2000, p. 71) 
Taking the export subsidies of foreign governments as given, a subsidy to 
Australian exporters in the absence of a market failure would result in a net loss of 
welfare in Australia. Although the subsidy would provide a benefit to exporters 
disadvantaged by foreign subsidies, this would be outweighed by the cost of the 
subsidy.2 There is also the additional risk that retaliatory subsidies may lead to a 
further escalation of subsidy provision by foreign governments. This has the 
potential to lead to a spiral of distortion or misguided investment in seemingly 
promising areas (IC 1992). A more efficient policy response is for all countries to 
                                                 
1  Where Australia is a net exporter of the commodities in question. 
2  In a perfectly competitive export market, assuming Australia is unable to alter the world price of 
exports (the ‘small’ country assumption), the gains in producer surplus arising from a subsidy 
are less than the cost of providing it, leading to a deadweight loss. 
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remove assistance to their exporters. Doing so ensures that world trade flows are 
guided by comparative advantage, increasing the welfare of all nations involved.  
What implications do the policy goals of foreign ECAs have? 
EFIC has also pointed out that other ECAs often have explicit mandates to pursue 
policy objectives such as resource security, or ensuring that regional infrastructure 
is not a brake on domestic growth (EFIC 2012e). It stated that: 
Such activities are feeding concerns that non-OECD ECA offshore investment 
financing, both tied and untied to exports, may be distorting international purchasing 
and investment decisions as firms from these countries are receiving subsidised 
financing and buyers are attracted by the absence of the ‘conditionality’ associated with 
other financing sources. (EFIC 2012e, p. 11) 
It further noted:  
The activity of Non-OECD ECAs which are not subject to the pricing and condition 
guidelines enshrined in the OECD [Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits] may prompt OECD nations to engage in ‘matching.’ (EFIC 2012e, p. 11) 
The Commission considers that the policy ramifications of such concerns are 
broadly analogous to the case of responding to other countries’ tariffs by imposing 
tariffs domestically. The adoption of such a policy (even without retaliation) will 
disadvantage Australia by increasing domestic costs. Using EFIC to match other 
countries’ subsidies would be counter-productive.  
Facilitating participation by other ECAs 
Several participants (EFIC, sub. DR90; Macquarie Group, sub. DR45; King & 
Wood Mallesons, sub. DR84) argued that EFIC’s participation acted as a catalyst 
for other ECAs to become involved in the project. NAB observed: 
For projects in Australia, EFIC serves as a catalyst for participation of other ECAs 
which are not as familiar with the country. (sub. DR92, p. 3) 
Latham and Watkins claimed: 
In our experience, EFIC’s participation in a project often is able to be used to attract 
other ECAs to participate in providing financial support to that project. We experienced 
this in the PNG LNG transaction and we are seeing it in the liquefied natural gas 
project in Australia on which we are working presently. EFIC is seen as a leader within 
the ECA community and is viewed by other ECAs as technically proficient in assessing 
the risks associated with such complex projects. (sub. DR51, p. 2) 
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The Commission considers this argument is unsound. It is unclear what the 
counterfactual level of foreign ECA participation would be in EFIC’s absence. As 
noted by EFIC in its submission to the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, 
several foreign ECAs have increased their activity in Australia, driven largely by 
domestic policies of their respective governments: 
EFIC notes the increasing presence of Japanese, Korean and Chinese ECAs in 
Australia, most notably in sectors such as LNG, mineral resources extraction and 
associated infrastructure upgrades (port and rail) and loan support to their national 
companies’ investment in Australia reflecting the broad ‘national interest’ objectives 
outlined above. (EFIC 2012e, p. 7)  
More importantly, the Commission does not consider that facilitating participation 
by foreign ECAs is an appropriate objective for policy. There is no intrinsic benefit 
arising from increased presence of foreign ECAs and no evidence of a market 
failure preventing the support of Australian exporters by foreign ECAs has been 
presented to the Commission. 
The Commission also notes that EFIC has made several observations about foreign 
ECA activity in Australia — some indicating that foreign ECA investment is 
beneficial to the Australian economy and should be facilitated, others that they are a 
potentially negative influence (box 5.1).  
 
Box 5.1 EFIC’s views on foreign ECA activity in Australia  
The Commission has found it difficult to determine EFIC’s views on foreign export 
credit agency (ECA) activity in Australia. In some cases EFIC has indicated that it 
viewed it positively, while in others it cautioned about the potential downsides to 
foreign ECA activity.  
EFIC stated that foreign ECA investment in Australia is an important source of capital: 
... ECAs are a vital channel through which Australia imports the capital it needs to 
supplement its limited domestic savings capacity. (sub. DR90, p. 69) 
EFIC also claimed that it encouraged foreign ECA investment in Australia: 
Offshore ECAs, including from Asia, Europe and North America, are increasing their 
commitment to the Australian market to support many of these [onshore resource] 
projects. EFIC plays an important role in facilitating foreign ECA involvement and 
ensuring that commercially viable projects are successfully financed. (sub. DR90, pp. 
69–70) 
(Continued next page)   
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Box 5.1 (continued) 
On the other hand, EFIC’s Managing Director and CEO, Mr Angus Armour was 
reported to have expressed misgivings that this investment may come with ‘strings 
attached’ and may disadvantage some Australian firms: 
Having them [foreign ECAs] fund the development of our resource economy from the 
perspective of GDP growth is a good thing, but obviously there are strings attached ... The 
string that we look at most closely at EFIC is they’re funding in order to create jobs for their 
exporters ... Australian companies are competing against foreign companies backed by their 
[export credit agencies]. (Sydney Morning Herald,15 March, C. Yeates) 
EFIC also told the Commission that, without its participation, foreign ECAs investing in 
Australia may take actions that are not in Australia’s national interest. For instance: 
... in the event of a loan default, the creditor i.e. the foreign ECAs are able to make decisions 
without need for Australian government approval to maximise their recovery, in doing so the 
action taken may not be in Australia’s interest. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 46) 
But despite these misgivings, EFIC informed the Commission it was comfortable with 
foreign ECAs investing in Australia without its involvement: 
And if the [foreign] export credit agencies who may be involved in a particular project are 
equally comfortable to go ahead without us, then there is no need for us. (trans., p. 301) 
Finally, despite claiming that much of the foreign ECA activity in Australia was a direct 
result of EFIC’s facilitation activities, EFIC has argued that foreign ECA investment in 
Australia was a natural consequence of the ‘market gap’: 
The ‘market gap’ rationale that underpinned EFIC’s establishment has never been more 
evident. The level of ECA activity in Australia and overseas demonstrates that the 
implications from the GFC and Euro-zone crises continue to play out in credit markets. 
(sub. DR90, p. 10)  
 
5.3 Specific problems in export finance and insurance 
markets 
Government provision of export finance and insurance is sometimes suggested on 
the basis that there are impediments in finance and insurance markets that result in 
inefficient outcomes. These impediments include: government’s superior capacity 
in managing and bearing risk; lack of effective competition among providers; 
regulatory distortions; systemic problems in financial markets; international 
financial crises; and information problems. 
Sovereign risk 
Sovereign risk can affect both importers and exporters (chapter 3 contains a 
discussion of risk, including the distinction between sovereign risk and country 
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risk). For example, an exporter faces the risk that the government of the importing 
country might pass laws unfavourable to the firm, damaging its business prospects 
or its ability to repatriate funds. 
In other cases, governments may be a party to an export transaction through, for 
example, the provision of a performance bond on behalf of an exporter or a 
sovereign (a guarantee if the foreign borrower cannot provide the lender with an 
appropriate asset to use as security). In the latter case, the lender must rely on the 
incentive of the foreign borrower’s government to honour the guarantee if it is 
called. If this incentive is weak, private sector providers may be unwilling to lend 
against a sovereign guarantee, particularly as the lender has little recourse due to the 
absence of legal mechanisms to enforce the guarantee contract (Eaton 1986). 
Similarly, buyers will discount the value of a performance bond provided by a 
foreign government if they do not consider it likely the contract will be honoured. 
Some have argued that the involvement of ECAs should be used to overcome such 
risks. For example Latham and Watkins argued: 
 … where an ECA is providing credit support, the host government may be less likely 
to take action that would be objectionable to the government of the ECA’s home 
country, such as expropriating assets or nationalising industries. In addition, ECAs may 
be able to facilitate more effective government-to-government solutions via channels 
not available to the private sector. (sub. DR51, p. 3) 
In the case of sovereign loans, private sector refusal to support transactions with 
particular countries may be a rational response to past default. One mechanism used 
to encourage governments to repay their loans is to exclude them from access to 
capital markets in the event of non-payment: 
A default against one borrower is treated as a default against other borrowers, and all 
are required to impose an embargo … Lenders perceive borrowers who have defaulted 
in the past as more likely to default on subsequent loans. (Eaton 1986, p. 131–132) 
This course of action has been undertaken in the past. Feinberg (1982), for example, 
reports that in the mid-1970s several members of the Berne Union declared Pakistan 
ineligible for long-term loans. 
Cross-border contractual or regulatory problems 
EFIC also claimed that its status as a government agency brings advantages in 
averting or resolving cross-border disputes arising from poorly developed legal and 
regulatory systems in other countries: 
Companies are willing to do business with an ECA even if a contract can’t be made 
watertight, because it perceives that the ‘Australian Government crest’ brings with it a 
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reputation to uphold, that it will follow due process and will not make arbitrary 
decisions or reject claims on unsubstantiated grounds. It is often reported that EFIC’s 
presence in a transaction provides comfort to exporters, investors and even co-lenders. 
This can be the case, particularly in frontier or emerging markets where legal systems, 
or the application of the legal framework may not be as developed. (sub. 18, 
appendix A, p. 9) 
EFIC may not be the most effective mechanism for addressing regulatory barriers that 
exist in the banking system generally, but can be the best mechanism to address 
regulatory distortions overseas in the provision of export and trade finance. (sub. DR90, 
p. 19) 
Similarly, the ANZ claimed: 
EFIC is at times able to resolve issues in a more timely manner through government to 
government contact. (sub. 20, p. 4) 
The Commission does not consider that this is a strong argument for government 
provision of export finance and insurance, in part because it is not clear that EFIC 
has particular advantages over its private sector counterparts in enforcing contract 
terms. Further, it is not clear that in the event of non-payment, EFIC’s ability to 
secure repayment is superior to other agencies of the Australian Government, such 
as its diplomatic representatives in the country concerned.  
Furthermore, as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) noted, about 
30 per cent of EFIC’s transactions were outside of emerging, frontier, and 
transitional economies (sub. 19). 
If it is the case that the Australian Government’s reputation is being used to support 
transactions associated with poorly specified contracts or in countries with less 
developed regulatory systems, the risk of those transactions is being transferred 
from EFIC’s clients onto the Australian Government. Drawing on the political and 
diplomatic capital of government is not costless and such actions may not always be 
aligned with foreign policy objectives. It is not clear that EFIC is able to recoup the 
cost of providing any intangible benefit of reputation and ‘government to 
government’ contact from its private sector partners in those transactions. 
Government as the bearer of risk 
Government provision of export finance and insurance is sometimes defended on 
the grounds that the time horizon of private sector providers is too short and that 
long-term projects deserving of finance and insurance cannot obtain it. EFIC 
(sub. 18) argued that the private sector has an insufficient risk appetite, and fails to 
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finance and insure many profitable, but risky projects. EFIC also noted in its 
submission to the draft report: 
The critical difference in EFIC’s coverage relates to the risks that EFIC is prepared to 
assume on behalf of exporters due to an absence of private sector risk appetite and/or 
capacity availability. (sub. DR90, p. 14) 
EFIC further argued: 
Thanks to the government's superior capacity to bear and pool these risks, it is also 
legitimate for government to earn a lower return on the equity it has invested in EFIC 
on behalf of taxpayers than private shareholders are entitled to demand of private 
companies. (sub. DR90, pp. 87-8) 
However, private sector providers will base their decision on whether to finance a 
given project based on the risk of the project, the expected return, and the risk 
preferences of the institution. The fact that the private sector is more willing to 
extend finance and insurance to some projects rather than others based on 
considerations of risk, does not constitute market failure. As noted by NERA 
(2000), risk aversion simply reflects the preferences of economic agents between 
more certain outcomes and riskier outcomes. It is unclear why the public sector 
should override the preferences of financiers and insurers if they prefer less risky 
projects to riskier ones, especially when the risk concerned is not the result of 
market failure. 
Government as the bearer of risk — the flaws in the argument 
EFIC has claimed that government provision of export finance and insurance may 
be justified, because governments are better able to bear the relevant risk: 
First, those risks are often large, long-term and positively correlated. Second, the 
government can spread and pool risks more widely than the market can, because it has 
the government balance sheet, faces limited threat of bankruptcy, and has a first-mover 
advantage. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 12) 
EFIC cited four studies to support this claim — Stephens (1999); Moser, Nestmann 
and Wedow (2006); NERA (2000); and Ragan (2008). The Commission examined 
those studies and did not find compelling evidence to support EFIC’s argument 
(box 5.2). 
First, intervening on this basis would distort the allocation of resources away from 
activities offering greater returns to the Australian economy. Second, as the events 
following the European debt crisis demonstrate, even governments in large 
economies are not immune from the threat of bankruptcy. More importantly, a low 
threat of government bankruptcy is more likely to dull governments into 
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understating the risk of intervening and the consequences of commercial failure. 
Direct intervention in financial markets without a strong market failure rationale 
and in the absence of strong governance controls can be expected to impose 
significant costs on taxpayers. 
 
Box 5.2 Government as the risk bearer — research presented by EFIC 
In looking at the export promotion effect of the German export credit agency (ECA), 
Moser, Nestmann and Wedow (2006) listed the potential reasons for the private sector 
not supplying trade finance, but did not discuss how governments could resolve this at 
a lower cost than the private sector. They also noted: 
It is important to bear in mind that we only tackled one of the issues central to an overall 
assessment, encompassing benefits and costs of an export credit agency. With respect to 
the latter, questions about the costs of public export intervention (e.g. the considerable 
losses accumulated by Hermes in the 1980s and early 1990s, which consequently had to be 
covered by the state budget) and possible market distortion stemming from the state 
interference are beyond the scope of this paper. (p. 18) 
Similarly, Stephens (1999) listed the various reasons for the private sector not covering 
some political risks, but did not provide any evidence that governments were better 
able to perform that role.  
In contrast, NERA (2000) explicitly argued that governments had an advantage over 
private sector participants in bearing risk. However, its argument rested on two 
questionable assumptions. First, it argued that the ability of a private provider to spread 
and pool risks was limited to the size of its trade finance arm, thereby ignoring the 
scope to spread and pool risks across the entire firm or to enter into syndicates with 
other providers — a common practice for large trade finance and insurance 
transactions. In contrast, NERA argued that the risk spreading and pooling ability of an 
ECA was not limited to the ECA but spanned the entire pool of government assets and 
the entire population of taxpayers. Second, it assumed that governments faced no risk 
of bankruptcy — a claim not supported by recent events in Europe. 
Finally, in a paper prepared for the Canadian ECA, Ragan (2008) claimed that 
governments had a higher tolerance for risk than the private sector because of their 
longer-term perspective on profits and being better able to stay ‘on risk’ during 
temporary disruptions. However, the paper provided no evidence to support this claim.   
 
Ultimately, the Commission disagrees with the argument that government should 
provide export finance and insurance because it is better able to bear the risks by 
virtue of its size and scope of operations, or because it can absorb sub-commercial 
returns on its investments. In the absence of a clear explanation of the boundaries 
for government involvement on these grounds (and the rationale for those 
boundaries), this logic would suggest that all risk in the economy should be borne 
by government. 
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Effective competition in financial markets 
The banking sector in Australia is dominated by the ‘big four’ commercial banks — 
the ANZ, Commonwealth Bank of Australia, NAB and Westpac. The oligopolistic 
structure of Australia’s banking sector is sometimes argued to lead to a lack of 
effective competition, a socially suboptimal quantity (and quality) of banking 
services, highly profitable banks and a relatively high level of concentration in the 
banking sector (Davis 2011; SERC 2011).  
International comparisons using a number of measures show concentration in the 
Australian banking system (pre-global financial crisis (GFC)) to be similar to those 
overseas (Stevens 2009a; RBA 2010a), although it is unclear what the current 
position is. In any case, aggregate measures of banking activities used for analysis 
disguise the degree of competition in different market segments, making it difficult 
to ascertain whether markets for export finance and insurance are affected by any 
lack of competition. 
The concerns about lack of effective competition in the financial sector often relate 
to the access to finance by SMEs. The Senate Economic References Committee 
reported: 
The increase in margins on small business lending, and some complaints about lack of 
finance, suggest that competition may not be as intense as it should be in the market for 
lending to small businesses. (SERC 2010, p. 37) 
This echoes some comments heard by the Commission in consultations — that 
private financial institutions have little interest in some segments of the market. For 
example, Australian Services Roundtable reflected: 
The policy framework that has locked in place four strong domestic banks has not been 
helpful in building the international linkages and credit assessment capabilities needed 
by Australian exporters; however reform of Australian banking involves issues beyond 
export credit. (sub. DR114, p. 2) 
In its submission to the inquiry into competition within the Australian banking 
sector, the Reserve Bank of Australia noted that, in recent years, some lessening of 
the degree of competition in lending has occurred, although competition to attract 
deposits has increased. At the same time, with the exception of a brief spike in 
2010, in the past few years bank margins have fluctuated in a narrow range of 
about 2.25 per cent to 2.5 per cent (RBA 2012c).3 Although the stability of the 
                                                 
3  In the same publication, the Reserve Bank of Australia noted that underlying profits have 
generally increased in the first half of 2011-12. 
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financial system is crucial, protecting and promoting competition should also be 
central to considerations regarding regulation of the industry. 
A review of the competition provisions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwlth) 
(known as the Dawson Review) was undertaken in 2003 and considered issues of 
potential anti-competitive conduct. However, a wide ranging review of the 
structural characteristics of the financial sector in Australia has not been undertaken 
since the Wallis Committee’s ‘Financial System Inquiry’ of 1997 (Wallis 
et al. 1997).  
A number of recent parliamentary inquiries have reported on topics related to 
competition in the finance sector (HRSCE 2008; SERC 2009, 2011). These 
inquiries generally note that evidence is mixed on whether the Australian banking 
sector lacks effective competition. The Australian Government Treasury, however, 
considers there is a need for a broad ranging review of the finance sector to ensure 
there is competitive pressure. In its Red Book submission to the incumbent 
Government, released under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cwlth), the 
Australian Government Treasury recommended: 
 ... initiating a comprehensive financial sector review in order to take stock of the 
lessons of the financial crisis and draw together the work currently being undertaken 
both here and internationally (Department of the Treasury 2010, p. 3). 
It also stated: 
Australia has not undertaken a comparable review since 1997 and we strongly urge you 
to make this a key priority in your second term ... (p. 36) 
The most appropriate mechanism for increasing competition in finance markets 
Competition issues in financial markets affect all sectors of the economy (not just 
exporters) and the appropriate intervention by government should apply to the 
finance industry as a whole, rather than just exporters. The Commission also notes 
that frameworks are in place to deal with some of the most serious concerns that 
arise from a lack of effective competition. At present, in addition to bank merger 
powers vested in the Treasurer under the Banking Act 1959 (Cwlth), the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission has regulatory responsibility for financial 
institutions that includes: 
• consumer protection 
• prevention of abuse of market power in certain circumstances 
• reviewing corporate mergers to ensure they do not result in anti-competitive 
outcomes. 
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However, these policy tools alone could not be used to deliver structural reforms 
similar to those that shaped Australian financial markets in the 1980s. 
Regulatory distortions in export finance and insurance markets 
The regulation of financial markets may adversely affect the supply of export 
finance and insurance. For example, regulation can cause frictions that limit the 
banks’ or insurers’ ability to adjust to changing business circumstances (Chauffour 
and Farole 2011).  
Reviews of Australia’s financial sector undertaken in 1981 (the ‘Campbell inquiry’) 
and 1996-97 (Wallis et al. 1997), report that, on balance, the system has performed 
well and appears to be well respected. Australia’s regulatory system has a 
favourable international reputation with aspects often used as a model for reform in 
other economies (Davis 2004). For example, a review by the Regulation Taskforce 
noted: 
 … several challenges need to be addressed to further promote a balanced and efficient 
regulatory environment in the financial and corporate sectors. However, it is important 
to keep these in perspective. Australia’s financial and corporate sectors, and the 
associated regulatory structures, are highly regarded internationally. Moreover, the 
broad policy framework has widespread support within business and the wider 
community in Australia. (Regulation Taskforce 2006, p. 88) 
In any case, the Commission considers that EFIC is unlikely to be the most effective 
mechanism to deal with any distortions created by regulation. Offsetting a distortion 
created by regulation faces a number of implementation problems. Often it is 
difficult to measure the exact size and distribution of the distortion created by the 
regulation, and the same difficulties arise when designing policy to counter those 
effects. In the case of export markets, doing so may create further distortions that 
undermine the principle of comparative advantage, and lead to an inefficient 
allocation of resources, domestically and internationally.  
In light of these problems and costs, the Commission considers that more direct 
ways to address any distortions created by regulation would be preferable. Ideally, 
policies to reduce these burdens would examine and redesign the regulations 
themselves with the aim of minimising cost.  
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Systemic failures in global financial markets — imbalances in supply 
and demand? 
It is sometimes claimed that the global supply of financial services is either 
insufficient or misallocated due to failures in international financial markets and 
that ECAs can play a role in addressing these failures. The ANZ noted: 
In ANZ’s experience the issues regarding access to finance are primarily related to the 
imbalance in supply and demand. (sub. DR101, p. 5)  
In Australia’s case, the argument has been advanced in the context of the 
availability of finance for large resources projects. The ANZ further stated: 
This contraction in participants supplying credit and liquidity capacity is occurring at a 
time when demand is expected to increase exponentially. ANZ research shows the 
project finance market in Australia was A$10.4bln in 2010 and A$15.2bln in 2011. 
ANZ expects the Project finance debt requirement to be A$109bln in 2012 … and 
A$120bln in 2013. (sub. DR101, p. 5) 
EFIC argued: 
It is true that the commercial market for financing such assets is highly developed with 
financing structures, terms and conditions including credit costs and equity returns 
being appropriate and widely accepted. Yet the issue is volume; the private sector debt 
market has failed to deliver the quantity of debt necessary to finance these viable 
projects. There will be an even greater demand for ECA financing of onshore resources 
projects going forward, with large-scale investment required to meet the continued 
demand for resources largely from Asia ... the size of the projects currently in planning 
or under development far exceed the capacity of global financial markets, even in 
normal (pre-GFC) market conditions. (sub. DR90, pp. 69-70) 
EFIC further stated: 
 … a case can be made for an ECA such as EFIC to address shortfalls of external 
financing caused by [overseas market] failures. This argument has special force in a 
country like Australia, which has a structural surplus of investment opportunities over 
domestic savings capacity, and therefore needs to import large sums of foreign capital. 
(sub. DR90, p.88) 
The Commission has previously noted that ‘massive flows’ of new capital have 
come to Australia to support projects in the resources sector (Banks 2011). 
However, the market failure basis for government intervention to overcome 
imbalances in the supply of, and demand for, capital needs to be established and 
supported by evidence. Imbalances in supply and demand are not in and of 
themselves a market failure — changes in supply and demand happen in all markets 
and the balance is restored over time through a change in the market price. 
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For example, the fact that a project that may become viable in the future is not 
supported today, may simply reflect the opportunity cost of the resources involved 
at the time and the decision by the private provider on how to maximise the value of 
its resources across time. There is no intrinsic value in accelerating the completion 
of an export project (or infrastructure-related project) that is non-commercial now, 
over waiting until market conditions are sufficient to ensure commercial supply. It 
is prudent to use Australia’s resources when demand warrants it and not before 
(otherwise the outcome is a subsidy to overseas consumers and a distortion in the 
Australian economy). 
The Commission considers the evidence on the availability of capital for large 
resource projects in chapter 7. Further, as discussed in chapter 4, even if a failure in 
financial markets is established, the appropriate response typically involves more 
targeted policies such as reforming prudential regulation and removing the policy 
distortions affecting markets. 
The following arguments are not sound policy rationales for government 
involvement in export finance and insurance through EFIC: 
•  EFIC can assume more risk than the private sector is willing to accept because 
it is government owned. 
• EFIC is necessary to address cross-border regulatory problems faced by 
exporters.  
• EFIC can be used to address problems arising from insufficient competition in 
Australian financial markets. 
• EFIC can address imbalances in the supply of, and demand for, capital.  
International financial crises 
The GFC in 2008 and 2009 saw a significant fall in the global demand for goods 
and services, falling asset prices, and a general increase in perceived systemic risk 
in financial markets and financial systems (Stevens 2009b). Submissions showed 
widespread support for the proposition that significant market disruptions of this 
kind may justify government intervention through EFIC. For example, the ANZ 
argued that it is important that EFIC is able to operate when markets are unstable as 
‘EFIC involvement reduces risk for commercial banks and can be a catalyst for 
private sector participation’ (ANZ, sub. 20, p. 4). 
FINDING 5.1 
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Many of EFIC’s customers were also supportive of this position. For example: 
The GFC was a devastating example of market failure. Banks throughout the world 
withdrew credit to companies having little regard to the consequences and without 
taking into account their credit worthiness. Australian exporters who had assistance 
from EFIC during this time (whether they were large or small) were able to continue to 
operate. (McConnell Dowell, sub. DR29, p. 1) 
We would judge the requirement for significant amounts of cash backing as a market 
failure, since it reflects an anomalous situation stemming from the GFC credit crisis 
from which financial markets have yet to fully recover. (Greyhound Australia, 
sub. DR 59, p. 3) 
In addition, EFIC stated: 
An ECA can perform a particularly important service during a financial crisis. It can 
step forward with support of exports as the private sector steps back, thereby 
cushioning a slump of exports … Most recently in response to the GFC, EFIC 
increased its support for exporters in response to a number of market gaps that arose 
during and following the GFC. It also modified its existing products to reflect the 
private sector’s reduced risk appetite and constraints on exporter credit. (sub. 18, p. 7)  
World Bank researchers conducted a survey to investigate the anecdotal claims that 
trade finance dried up in some developing countries during the GFC. Malouche 
(2009) details the results of this survey of 425 firms and 78 banks in 14 developing 
countries4 in 2009 and, despite finding some evidence of tighter conditions for trade 
credit, concluded: 
 ... the drop in volume [of trade credit] seems to reflect lack of demand due to the 
global recession rather than a consequence of the increase in pricing. (p. 6) 
Similarly, OECD researchers Cheung and Guichard (2009) concluded that ‘most of 
the trade collapse can be explained by world demand’ and that ‘tight credit 
conditions have likely amplified the short-term trade response’ (p. 24). 
A study conducted by researchers at the International Monetary Fund 
(Asmundson et al. 2011) looked at the changes in and interrelationship between 
trade finance and trade volumes during the GFC for a wider range of countries. Four 
surveys of commercial banks were undertaken between December 2008 and 
January 2010 to obtain information on the changing nature of market conditions for 
trade finance. Even though the value of trade finance was lower at the height of the 
GFC than before it, it fell by less than the value of merchandise trade in most 
regions of the world. By the final quarter of 2009, both trade and trade finance 
volumes were beginning to recover. The study also found that the share of world 
                                                 
4  The 14 countries were: Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, the 
Philippines, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Ukraine. 
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trade supported by bank-intermediates actually increased during the GFC. The 
study’s authors attributed this to increased risk aversion by exporters, seeking 
protection from risk. Accordingly, Asmundson et al. (2011) concluded that the 
causes of the increased price and decreased value of trade finance were mainly 
spillovers from financial markets and the decline in international trade associated 
with recessionary conditions. 
In their discussions with the surveyed banks, Asmundson et al. (2011) found that 
the banks attributed most of the changes in the consumption and provision of trade 
finance to changes in the demand for traded activities (table 5.1). The behaviour of 
financial intermediaries providing trade finance services (including ECAs) was less 
important relative to changes in demand. 
Table 5.1 Reasons cited for changes in the aggregate value of trade 
finance 
Increases in the value of trade financea Decreases in the value of trade financeb 
Reason Per cent Reason Per cent 
Increased demand for trade 
activities 
72 Decreased demand for trade 
activities 
85 
Increased price of transactions  34 Decreased price of 
transactions  
38 
Increased credit availability at 
own institution 
30 Lower credit availability at own 
institution 
30 
Increased credit availability at 
counterparty banks 
12 Lower credit availability at 
counterparty banks 
30 
Shift away from open account 
transactions 
28 Shift towards open account 
transactions 
23 
Shift away from cash-in-advance 
transactions 
22 Shift toward cash-in-advance 
transactions 
21 
Increase in support from ECAs 14 Decline in support from ECAs 8 
Increase in credit from 
multilateral institutions 
14 Decline in credit from 
multilateral institutions 
0 
Other reasons 13 Other reasons 18 
a Based on 76 respondents that reported an increase in the value of trade finance in at least one geographic 
region in the IMF/Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade-International Financial Services Association 
March 2010 survey.  b Based on 61 respondents that reported a decrease in the value of trade finance in at 
least one geographic region in the IMF/Bankers’ Association for Finance and Trade-International Financial 
Services Association March 2010 survey. 
Source: Asmundson et al. (2011). 
Another group of OECD researchers (Korinek, Le Cocguic and Sourdin 2010) 
similarly concluded that the quantity of short-term trade finance ‘put into motion’ 
through insurers fell later, and by less, than flows of general short-term finance. 
One potential reason the authors advanced for this result is the possibility that trade 
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finance may be less risky to banks and insurance companies than some other types 
of transactions.  
Recent research affirms these general results. For example, Eaton et al. (2011) 
concluded that the majority of the decline in international trade during the GFC was 
caused by changes in the demand for traded goods. Indeed, their model suggests 
that the decline in total manufacturing demand that occurred in 2008 and 2009 
accounted for about 80 per cent of the decline in the ratio of global trade to GDP. 
Likewise, the IMF (2010) found that the decline in final demand accounted for 
more than 70 per cent of the observed trade collapse. 
At the time, EFIC’s Managing Director and CEO Angus Armour noted: 
 … there are anecdotes of people having difficulties in obtaining trade finance, but 
EFIC ‘is struggling’ to find data to confirm these reports. At this point, trade is falling 
because the global economy is slowing, and trade finance is reflecting the slowing 
economy. (Asia Today Online 2009) 
Hence, the evidence suggests that constrained supply of trade finance was not the 
major cause of the decline in the value of international trade that occurred during 
the GFC. Rather, the primary cause appears to have been lower demand for traded 
products. Furthermore, the decline in the availability of credit was likely to have 
been, at least partially, an efficient response to prevailing conditions. In that light, 
attempts to artificially restore credit, through ECA provision or otherwise, run the 
risk of creating further inefficiencies in financial markets. 
EFIC has acknowledged that the Commission’s finding that constrained supply of 
trade finance was not the major cause of the decline in world trade is ‘consistent 
with EFIC’s advice to Government in 2009’ and that: 
EFIC consistently recommended to the Minister for Trade not to intervene in short-
term trade finance during the depths of the GFC. This was also EFIC’s advice to senior 
officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Department of the 
Treasury (Treasury) and the Department of Finance (Finance). (sub. DR90, p.20) 
However, EFIC further stated that ‘it is still the view of some researchers that a 
shortfall in trade finance was, at least, a moderate factor in the 2008-09 world trade 
slump’ (sub. DR90, p. 20). The Commission considers that the weight of evidence 
indicates that a decline in demand was the primary cause of the decline in world 
trade flows. 
EFIC also claimed that ECAs can play a signalling role in financial crises, such as 
the GFC and the 1997 Asian financial crisis, by reassuring the private sector that 
official institutions stand ready to provide backup during times of financial 
difficulty (sub. DR90). EFIC cited the example of the Asian financial crisis and its 
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provision of short-term insurance services because exports from Australia to Korea 
and other Asian countries ‘came under severe threat’ as an appropriate government 
response until support could be considered on the national interest account 
(sub. DR90, p. 21). 
Further examination of the appropriate basis for government to intervene in 
financial markets during times of market disruption is presented later in this chapter. 
However, the Commission does not consider that intervention for the purpose of 
ameliorating falling demand for exported goods and services from Australia is an 
appropriate role of government. As noted by Mr Malcolm Stephens, a former 
secretary-general of the Berne Union, ECA support during the Asian financial crisis 
‘did not cause or prolong the problem, they did not contribute significantly to a 
solution’ (1998, p. 1). 
The decline in the provision of trade finance during the global financial crisis was 
primarily due to lower levels of international trade and resulting lower demand for 
trade finance products. As such, government policy aimed at ameliorating the 
decline in international trade through the provision of export finance and insurance 
through EFIC would not have been successful. 
Information as a public good 
Some information has public good characteristics that may warrant government 
intervention (Sandall, Kaine and Johnson 2009). Information by its nature is 
non-rivalrous — consumption by one person does not affect the amount available to 
others. In some cases, after it has been produced and disseminated or even used in a 
way that can be observed by others, it may become non-excludable — other people 
can take advantage of the knowledge without paying for it. Broader categories of 
information used in trade finance, such as country and market risk may fall into this 
category. 
EFIC argued that a lack of information on international markets can impede access 
for exporters (EFIC, sub. 18) and that: 
[it has an] advantage in assessing many of the risks that beset exporters, e.g. country 
risk. [This is a] reason for EFIC to provide information – and maybe even to ‘signal’ its 
attitudes by providing cover (sub. DR90, pp. 84–6).  
In some circumstances, governments may be naturally placed to generate and 
disseminate information that has public good characteristics and this can be an 
efficient means of overcoming associated market failures. EFIC and other 
FINDING 5.2 
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government agencies such as Austrade publicly release information, including 
country risk assessments, that assists exporters, importers and private sector 
providers to assess the risk of dealing in a particular country (chapter 3 and 
box 5.3). It should, however, be noted that much of this information is also 
available from the private sector (chapter 3). 
 
Box 5.3 Public information provided by EFIC 
EFIC provides some public information on the nature of finance and insurance markets 
for exporters and on the riskiness associated with exporting to some countries. EFIC’s 
economics team compiles a list of country profiles that contain economic background 
on the countries covered and highlight some of the risks exporters may face in sending 
goods or services to those countries.  
For example, in its country profile of Nigeria (published in November 2010), EFIC ranks 
a number of risks for exporters as being ‘very high’ (on a scale that ranges from 
‘negligible’ at the lower end to ‘extreme’ at the higher end). EFIC regards business 
cycle, currency, currency inconvertibility, systematic banking and sovereign default 
risks in Nigeria as ‘very high’. 
EFIC’s economics team also writes a monthly email newsletter ‘World Risk 
Developments’ aimed at exporters and overseas investors. It focuses on issues such 
as exchange controls, expropriation, and political violence, and is available for no 
charge. Also available is a chartpack, which provides a monthly summary of world 
economic conditions and an annual Global Readiness index (a study of Australian 
export and investment destinations, their motivations, and barriers faced by Australian 
businesses). 
The Export Finance Navigator — a website developed and sponsored by EFIC — 
provides information on commercial export products and government grants. This site 
contains information on products provided by commercial banks and also gives 
information on grants and tax concessions provided by all levels of government, broken 
down by stage of export activity (for example, winning contracts or financing 
production).  
 
Asymmetric information 
Asymmetric information in financial markets can potentially lead to market failure. 
The market failure and the resulting inefficiency arise when the asymmetry 
encourages the behaviours of adverse selection and moral hazard. A related problem 
is that of credit rationing which can also arise in financial markets where this 
asymmetry is present.  
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Adverse selection and moral hazard 
If one party to a transaction cannot observe all of the relevant characteristics of the 
other party, or the quality of the good or service provided by the other party, this 
may result in adverse selection (box 5.4). If severe enough, to the point where a 
service provider such as an insurance company, cannot distinguish between 
different types of consumers (for example, whether consumers are high or low-risk 
types) markets may break down entirely. 
The presence of asymmetric information in export finance and insurance markets 
may lead to adverse selection, such that certain types of exports do not receive 
financing, or particular risks go uninsured by the private sector. This situation may 
potentially be remedied through government provision of information or, where 
more efficient, the provision of export finance and insurance.  
 
Box 5.4 Adverse selection: a simple example 
Consider an insurance market that consists of two types of potential purchasers of 
insurance: high-risk and low-risk and that the insurance company cannot distinguish 
between high and low-risk purchasers. 
An insurance company could simply charge a separate premium to each group 
reflecting their relative risk where it is able to distinguish between the two purchasers. 
Where it is not possible to distinguish between them, the insurer may instead charge a 
premium based on generic or common risk characteristics of the purchasers or a 
relatively well defined class of relevant purchasers. 
In this case, low-risk purchasers will not be willing to purchase insurance since the 
premium charged exceeds their expected loss. The only customers willing to purchase 
insurance at this price would be the high-risk ones. Low-risk purchasers would exit the 
market and self-insure, leaving only high-risk ones remaining, resulting in adverse 
selection.   
 
Moral hazard arises when one party to a transaction does not bear the full cost of its 
actions and, therefore, has a tendency to act less carefully, at the cost of the other 
party to the transaction. For example, a firm may reduce its effort in lowering the 
commercial risks covered by an export insurance policy after it is issued, thereby 
increasing the likely costs for the insurance provider.  
Credit rationing 
There is economic literature discussing the link between suboptimal credit rationing 
and imperfect information (for example, Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Rothschild and 
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Stiglitz 1976; Wilson 1977; Clemenz and Ritthaler 1992). Stiglitz and Weiss 
described this link: 
 … the interest rate a bank charges may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of loans by 
either: 1) sorting potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect); or 2) affecting the 
actions of borrowers (the incentive effect). Both effects derive directly from the 
residual imperfect information which is present in loan markets after banks have 
evaluated loan applications. When the price (interest rate) affects the nature of the 
transaction, it may not also clear the market. (1981, p. 393) 
This could arise because of information asymmetries between the parties to a 
transaction, where one party has more information about the transaction than the 
other. For example, the interest rate may act as a screening device — those who are 
willing to pay a higher price may, on average, be riskier agents (that is, they have a 
higher probability of default). As the interest rate rises, the average riskiness of 
those who borrow increases, possibly lowering the lender’s profits (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981). 
EFIC has submitted that Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) made the point that ‘credit 
rationing exists and is a market failure’ (sub. DR90, p. 85). However, Stiglitz and 
Weiss further stated that rationing is not always present: 
It is not our argument that credit rationing will always characterise capital markets, but 
rather that it may occur under not implausible assumptions concerning borrower and 
lender behaviour. (1981, p. 394) 
Considerations of export credit and insurance aside, this raises the broader point that 
the presence of a market failure should not simply be assumed. If intervention is to 
be welfare-enhancing, there should be clear evidence of the existence of a market 
failure.  
The Commission has not found any compelling evidence of credit rationing relevant 
to the export credit market for Australian exporters, nor has any been provided by 
EFIC. The empirical study cited by EFIC in its submission (Minetti and Zhu 2011), 
had significant methodological flaws,5 was related to Italian manufacturers, not 
Australian exporters, found only limited evidence of credit rationing, and did not 
                                                 
5  The paper inferred the outcome of credit rationing from firms’ responses to two survey 
questions: 
  (i) In 2000, would the firm have liked to obtain more credit at the market interest rate?  
 (ii) In 2000, did the firm demand more credit than it actually obtained? 
 It did not test the reasons for these outcomes, which could include that credit was available at a 
higher price or on different terms for valid commercial reasons. Indeed, the paper considered 
that credit being offered at a higher than requested price was an example of ‘weak credit 
rationing’.  
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offer policy-relevant conclusions. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) themselves do not 
mention what role government might play, or ought to play, in addressing credit 
rationing. 
The case for government intervention to address information asymmetry  
EFIC argued: 
 … numerous profitable and welfare-enhancing export transactions are left ‘unserved’ 
by the private sector because of market failures such as credit rationing [and] 
artificially scarce information … (sub. DR90, p. 15) 
However, there are qualifiers on the case for government intervention to address 
adverse selection and moral hazard. First, the fact that banks or insurance 
companies do not have full information regarding their clients’ risk is not 
necessarily inefficient. Acquiring and assessing information is not costless, and 
these costs need to be considered when deciding whether to undertake a transaction. 
Banks and insurance companies consider the costs of screening applicants in 
deciding whether it is commercially viable to enter into the transaction. As Demsetz 
noted: 
The moral hazard problem is no different than the problem posed by any 
cost … Payment through insurance premiums for the moral hazard cost imposed on 
insurance sellers brings in to play the usual price mechanism for economizing. The fact 
that not everything is insured is irrelevant to the question of efficiency. The absence of 
insurance, especially when moral hazard is important, merely is evidence of the 
unwillingness to shift all risk to others at premium levels that cover the cost imposed on 
sellers of insurance by these moral hazards. (1969, pp. 7-8) 
Second, the information asymmetries need to be significant enough to materially 
affect the supply of export finance and insurance. Although the theory behind credit 
rationing is well developed, there is limited empirical evidence of its presence in 
particular markets. To justify the policy focus on export finance and insurance on 
these grounds, it needs to be demonstrated that this market is more vulnerable to 
information asymmetry problems than finance and insurance markets more 
generally. 
Third, there is also a need to demonstrate that governments have a clear advantage 
over the private sector in resolving the information asymmetry problems. Finally, 
even if the government has some advantages over private sector providers, the 
intervention needs to target the problem at its source. In this case, the problem is not 
the outcome of credit rationing, but the information asymmetries that may have 
given rise to it. The intervention needs to be the minimum necessary to address this. 
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Imperfect information 
When parties enter into a transaction based on incomplete or incorrect information 
sub-optimal outcomes may occur. EFIC noted that one of the largest impediments to 
providing insurance for medium- to long-term export credit is the uncertainty 
associated with quantifying the probability of loss in the future. EFIC argued that 
this difficulty could cause a bank or an insurance company to deny an export 
transaction that it would actually assess as commercially viable if it knew the ‘true’ 
risk (EFIC, sub. 18). 
As stated previously, the fact that market participants do not have full information is 
not necessarily inefficient, because the process of acquiring information is not 
costless. Information should only be acquired up to the point where the additional 
benefits of having more information are equal to the additional costs of acquiring it 
— moving beyond this point would be inefficient. Stigler (1967) noted: 
 … information costs are the cost of transportation from ignorance to omniscience, and 
seldom can a trader afford to take the entire trip … The acquisition of complete 
information would in general be as wasteful as the transportation of a house valued at 
$30 000 in New York to California where it would be valued at $30 200. (p. 291) 
DFAT observed: 
The costs (borne by banks) in undertaking a risk assessment for an SME export 
transaction can often be quite high when compared against the return from providing 
finance. (sub. 19, p. 6) 
It may be argued that a lack of information in the market for export finance and 
insurance requires the establishment of a public agency to collect additional 
information, or act as an intermediary between parties to a transaction (or both). As 
with all forms of government intervention, it is important to assess whether the 
economy-wide benefits outweigh the costs. The efficiency of an intervention of this 
type will be enhanced if it is targeted to where the benefits are greatest. 
Are information-related failures impeding commercially viable transactions? 
Problems may arise in financial markets where missing or imperfect information 
impedes or prevents commercially viable transactions. For instance, newly 
exporting SMEs may not have a credit history with a bank or have successfully 
fulfilled an export contract. There is a possibility that this may lead to inefficient 
outcomes, if the information-related market failures prevent commercially viable 
export transactions from proceeding.  
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At times, private sector providers adopt simplified decision rules to lower the costs 
of acquiring information to assess the riskiness of an export transaction (the 
transaction costs), rather than attempting to obtain complete information on every 
transaction (Ramskogler 2007; Ragan 2008). For example, Lean Field 
Developments submitted that some bonds are provided by a small number of issuers 
and require firms to have ‘(a) minimum of 3 years trading in Australia and (b) a 
minimum annual turnover of $20 million for those 3 years’ (sub. DR78, p. 1). 
Similarly, the private sector may have adopted generalised rules that restrict the 
provision of export finance or insurance to some countries. Several participants 
noted the reluctance of private sector providers to cover transactions relating to 
emerging or difficult markets (for example, Wellard, sub. DR34; Mono Pumps 
(Australia) Pty Ltd, sub. DR54). Wagner Group Holdings (sub. DR31, p. 1) argued 
that its lack of success in securing export finance was ‘driven by financier policy 
that has a very Australian-centric view of the world’. 
Such decision rules may be accurate on average, but may also lead to the rejection 
of some commercially viable transactions. The ANZ submission to this inquiry 
noted: 
In the Trade Finance/SME [business], where banks generally take a relatively rigid 
“scorecard” approach to risk and credit controls, EFIC may sometimes be able to take a 
more pragmatic view. This is primarily due to EFIC’s ability to undertake a high level 
of due diligence, especially around historical performances, contract terms and 
management ability. They are able to consider factors other than pure financial 
matrices, for example, growth prospects and strategic positioning of the industry. 
(sub. 20, p. 6). 
EFIC also noted: 
In EFIC’s experience, small firms with limited credit history and no export experience 
represent a very high risk for credit providers. Small firms also represent a limited 
premium pool; that’s why banks target them with homogenous credit scoring products. 
(sub. DR90, p. 11) 
However, the ANZ previously submitted to a Parliamentary Inquiry on Access of 
Small and Medium Business to Finance: 
When looking at a specific lending decision we also consider the individual risk of the 
transaction and/or the customer. As a result, businesses with different risk profiles may 
receive different interest rates for similar lending. (PJCCFS 2011, sub. 14, p. 10) 
Where markets are working well, there is an incentive for private sector providers 
of export finance and insurance to review and refine decision rules to ensure they 
are yielding the most profitable outcomes. There will also be an incentive for new 
entrants to take advantage of any uncaptured rents. The ANZ observed that it is 
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continually reviewing its lending criteria to reflect market conditions 
(PJCCFS 2011, sub. 14). This is one of the reasons why it is important that private 
sector finance and insurance providers are subject to demands from their customers 
to provide innovative services under competitive terms and conditions. 
Potential information-related failures are likely to be limited to newly exporting 
small and medium-sized enterprises 
To the extent that information-related market failures exist, they are unlikely to be a 
significant issue for large firms or for SMEs that have a history of exporting into 
established export markets. Banks and insurance companies have a variety of 
screening and assessment mechanisms to ameliorate the problem of asymmetric or 
imperfect information about the risks of the transaction. These include requiring 
security for the loan, asking for documented proof of income and liabilities, and 
assessing the commercial history of the prospective client.  
Large firms, particularly public companies, are required to publish financial and 
other information, which banks and insurance companies can access to profile a 
firm based on past activity. Listed companies are subject to periodic published 
analysis by financial industry participants and many large companies, both listed 
and unlisted, are periodically rated by analytical services such as Standard & 
Poor’s. Furthermore, by virtue of their size and history, such firms have a large 
stock of information to draw on to support individual applications for finance or 
insurance. 
Similarly, SMEs that have exported before and are exporting into established 
markets can draw on their commercial record to support their application.  
In contrast, for SMEs with a limited commercial track record, information could be 
less accessible. The OECD noted: 
Asymmetric information is a more serious problem with respect to SMEs than for large 
firms, reflecting the lack of audited financial statements or other public sources of 
information … information may be of a subjective nature and may not be easily 
observed or verified by others within the same lending institution, let alone by 
outsiders. (2006b, p. 44) 
Malhotra et al. (2006) identified a number of potential reasons for restricted 
availability of finance to SMEs, both for export and for domestic operation, 
including, among others: 
• a lack of knowledge within banks on how to reach the SME market segment 
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• information asymmetries that increase the cost for banks to transact with SMEs. 
For example, some potential SME borrowers have no financial track record and 
are unable to provide reliable information. 
In looking at the Canadian export finance and insurance market, Ragan (2008) 
noted that private sector providers imposed minimum volume thresholds for export 
insurance. The paper found that Can$5000 was typically the minimum premium, 
which translated to annual export sales of around Can$500 000 – 650 000. 
Business SA also noted that Australian SMEs face particular problems accessing 
export markets: 
Most of the businesses that need assistance with exporting — from information about 
markets, to export stamping, to guarantees and insurance — are small and medium 
sized businesses that do not have the resources to investigate many of these things 
without external help. EFIC should target its services to small and medium sized 
businesses that are more likely to require guarantees and insurance. (BusinessSA, 
sub. 6, p. 1) 
Some private sector providers stated that this is a segment of the market in which 
they have little interest (although this may simply reflect the fact that there are more 
profitable transactions elsewhere). Other participants in this inquiry noted that the 
impact of the rigid scorecard approach may result in some potentially commercially 
viable SME export transactions not proceeding. 
SMEs are also less likely to possess the extent and types of assets required by banks 
for use as collateral, which may compound these sorts of challenges. EFIC 
observed: 
Collateral quality and levels are essential hurdles for any given credit in the SME 
sector, and price (interest rate) is used as a subsidiary rationing device. Credit is 
rationed towards applicants with an established credit and export performance, with 
newly established and growing businesses often experiencing even greater hurdles. 
(sub. 18, p. 4) 
Some submissions argued that the SME sector requires EFIC’s continued support 
(for example, E.W. Cox International, sub. DR69; Eco-Kinetics, sub. DR61). 
Whittle Consulting submitted that this was due to ongoing market conditions: 
If there is an information gap for 3 transactions, there is likely to be the same gap for 
10, 20 or 103 transactions. Such a gap does not suddenly disappear after 3 transactions. 
If the information gap remains then EFIC has ‘temporarily’ assisted the SME, then left 
it to deal with the market. (sub. DR60, p. 3)  
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Does EFIC have advantages in addressing information-related market 
failures? 
Export credit agencies often argue that they have advantages over the private sector 
in addressing information-related market failures, where they exist. For example, 
EFIC noted: 
EFIC has made a point of developing a comparative advantage in assessing many of the 
risks that beset exporters, e.g. country risk. EFIC’s views are frequently sought on 
emerging and frontier markets — including by the media, conference organisers, 
accounting and law firms, financial institutions and exporters … EFIC is unsure why 
the private market hasn't taken the pains to develop such skills. But the fact is, they 
haven't. (sub. DR90, pp. 86-7) 
To the extent that advantages exist, it does not imply that government provision of 
export finance and insurance is required. A more direct way of capitalising on such 
advantages is by disseminating the information to which EFIC has access (box 5.3). 
This would not extend to certain politically sensitive information provided by 
governments on the understanding that it will not be widely disseminated. 
Furthermore, governments should only collect and distribute information provided 
the costs of doing so do not exceed the benefits. 
EFIC may also be able to help overcome information-related market failures, where 
they occur, through a demonstration effect for private sector providers. To achieve 
this, the Commission proposes that, after a facility that supports an export 
transaction has been approved, EFIC releases information on that facility to the 
market to enable private sector participants to judge, over time, the viability of 
servicing these and similar clients. This approach may have advantages over mere 
information dissemination, as the credibility of the generated information may be 
higher, because of the greater financial consequences to EFIC of making a mistake. 
An example of such a role was presented by Almondco Australia: 
We sought EFIC’s help in the initial stages of our programme because of the complete 
lack of confidence shown by the major lending institutions. EFIC has a vital role to 
play in providing a short term level of backing during the early stages, until a financier 
becomes more comfortable. (sub. DR36, p. 1) 
EFIC submitted that an ECA can engage in ‘signalling’ to the market where 
disseminating the information is not possible. 
[An ECA] can signal to the market through its cover policy on a country, information 
which it cannot directly supply to the market. It can also send out two other types of 
signals. First, by putting its money behind a project, an ECA can convince exporters 
that it has done a thorough and objective country risk assessment. If it simply supplied 
country risk assessments, it could be dismissed as too academic, or too superficial. 
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Secondly, an ECA can, through its financial support, signal to a foreign buyer or 
government the performance-worthiness of its exporter. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 12) 
This is not, in the Commission’s view, sufficient to conclude that EFIC currently 
performs an effective demonstration role. An effective demonstration role would 
reveal to financial market participants (potential buyers and sellers) the relevant 
information to correct the identified information-related market failure. Market 
participants can then use this information to make commercial decisions on whether 
to supply (or consume) privately provided export finance. In effect, this means that 
where information-related market failures are present, EFIC’s role is to demonstrate 
to the private sector that providing export finance to newly exporting SMEs can be 
commercially viable and the information they need to form that view over time. 
However, for EFIC to efficiently address any potential information-related market 
failures affecting the access of newly exporting SMEs to export finance, it must 
either acquire sufficient information on a possible transaction at a cost no greater 
than private sector providers, or charge accordingly based on the costs of acquiring 
that information.  
EFIC claims that it has been able to lower transaction costs of dealing with SMEs 
by entering into partnership agreements with private sector providers (EFIC, 
pers. comm., 3 February 2012). For example, EFIC has partnered with the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) to streamline approval processes for documentary credit 
guarantees. Under the arrangement, EFIC assumes up to 50 per cent of the risk 
when the ADB guarantees a letter of credit from an agreed list of eligible banks. 
EFIC argues transaction costs are lowered because it is able to draw on the ADB’s 
risk assessment processes, networks and expertise in three Asian markets 
(EFIC 2011a; pers. comm., 3 February 2012). 
EFIC has similar arrangements with foreign exchange providers that EFIC claims 
enables it to draw on the providers’ due diligence processes, again lowering 
transaction costs of dealing with SMEs (EFIC, pers. comm., 3 February 2012). 
Even if it is the case that EFIC has cost advantages over the private sector, lower 
transaction costs is not sufficient for EFIC to effectively undertake a demonstration 
role — its business model must also be consistent with that objective.  
Redefining small and medium-sized enterprises 
The Commission has concluded that there may be some instances of market failure 
arising from information-related problems in financial markets. These market 
failures may affect access to export finance and insurance — but are likely to be 
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limited to newly exporting SMEs. EFIC’s operations on the commercial account 
should be refocused to address these potential failures by demonstrating to the 
private sector that providing financial services to newly exporting SMEs can be 
commercially viable. The Commission proposes that, after a facility that supports an 
export transaction has been approved, EFIC releases information on that facility to 
the market to enable participants to make commercial decisions about providing 
financial services to these exporters. This will require significant changes to EFIC’s 
mandate and operations. Recommendations are made in later chapters of this report 
to underpin these changes. 
Importantly, EFIC’s operations will need to focus solely on those firms most likely 
to be affected by information-related market failures — newly exporting SMEs. 
This raises the challenge of selecting criteria to define an SME in a manner that is 
suited to this policy purpose. The Commission has previously discussed the range of 
definitions and the difficulty in selecting a single definition for an SME. It can be 
one or more criteria, including the number of employees, annual turnover, 
capitalisation or legal status (Lattimore et al. 1998). The criteria used by a range of 
Australian Government and private sector agencies to define an SME are presented 
in chapter 2. 
However, the Commission considers EFIC’s criterion for its SME and Mid-Market 
business unit (firms with annual turnover of up to $150 million) is likely to 
encompass substantial firms whose challenges in securing the financial services 
they require are not the result of market failures that should be corrected by 
government intervention through EFIC. EFIC noted that segmenting its operations 
into two units (the other being structured trade and project finance) was for the 
purpose of grouping risks and clients into a practical structure for client service and 
risk management, rather than identifying those firms most likely to be exposed to 
any information-related market failures (sub. DR90). 
In its draft report, the Commission suggested changing EFIC’s definition of SME to 
a business with annual turnover of less than $25 million. However, a number of 
firms submitted that, while they consider themselves SMEs, they have annual 
turnover in excess of $25 million due to the nature of their industry:  
 … ASI is a small company employing only 16 people in Australia but due to the nature 
of construction business the revenue can potentially be larger than the prescribed [$25 
million] ceiling. This does not change the fact that ASI is a small company with limited 
profits and resources … (Aircraft Support Industries, sub. DR28, p. 1) 
LFD submits that the draft recommendation to define SME’s as entities with a turnover 
of $25m or less is not appropriate for all industries. (Lean Field Developments, 
sub. DR78, p.3) 
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The Commission agrees that for this policy purpose a criterion based on annual 
turnover will not adequately capture SMEs in some industries that may be affected 
by information-related market failures. Accordingly, the Commission has amended 
its definition of SME to include an additional criterion — ‘number of full-time 
employees’. 
EFIC was also critical of the Commission’s draft recommendation to restrict EFIC’s 
support to those firms with annual turnover of less than $25 million but did not 
propose an alternative definition of an SME. EFIC indicated in hearings that a target 
range for annual turnover somewhere between $20 million and $80 million would 
not necessarily be a loss-making segment of the market. However, it did not provide 
sufficient evidence to the Commission to suggest that using this range to define an 
SME would capture those firms most likely affected by information-related failures 
in financial markets. 
EFIC considered that the Commission’s draft recommendation was inconsistent 
with other Australian Government programs designed to assist exporters, including 
the Export Market Development Grant scheme (EMDG). For the purposes of that 
scheme, an SME exporter is defined as having annual revenue (or turnover) of less 
than $50 million. To be eligible for support under the Enterprise Connect program, 
a firm’s annual revenue must be between $2 million and $100 million to be 
considered an SME (box 2.4). EFIC’s submission highlights the challenge — the 
definition of an SME is an arbitrary decision and there is considerable variation in 
the selected definitions even within Australian Government agencies and programs. 
The Commission agrees with EFIC, and considers there is value in having a 
definition for SMEs that is consistent with other Australian Government programs 
designed to assist exporters. However, EFIC did not provide evidence that would 
lead the Commission to conclude a definition of annual turnover of $100 million or 
more was suited to the policy purpose proposed by the Commission for EFIC. For 
the reasons outlined earlier in this chapter, it is the Commission’s view that smaller 
firms are more likely to be affected by information-related market failures than 
larger ones.  
The Commission has revised the recommended definition of an SME to be an 
entity, including any related entities, that has fewer than 100 full-time equivalent 
employees or annual turnover of less than $50 million. This would improve the 
alignment of EFIC’s operations with any SME related barriers to private sector 
finance, and accommodate firms in different industries. 
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The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
define a small and medium-sized enterprise as an entity, including any related 
entities, with fewer than 100 full-time equivalent employees or annual turnover of 
less than $50 million.  
What are ‘newly’ exporting small and medium-sized enterprises? 
As discussed earlier, the Commission considers that any information-related market 
failures are more likely to affect SMEs that have either had limited experience with 
exporting in general or are attempting to export to an emerging export market. 
Consequently, the Commission considers the SMEs served by EFIC in the future 
should satisfy at least one of these criteria. 
A range of measures to align EFIC’s operations with a rigorous objective that is 
based on information-related market failures is discussed in chapter 10. 
Is EFIC destined to become a loss making entity under the Commission’s 
proposal? 
EFIC is of the view that the business model proposed in the draft report is not a 
commercially viable proposition (sub. DR90, p. 10). King & Wood Mallesons 
(sub. DR84, p. 4) agreed: 
We believe the Report’s draft recommendations put EFIC’s continued existence at risk. 
We question whether EFIC would be viable as a self-funding organisation operating 
under the restricted mandate the Report proposes (and we would urge that this question 
be fully explored before any such recommendations are finalised or implemented). 
EFIC considered that smaller SMEs (annual turnover of less than $5 million) 
represented a credit risk, especially first time exporters without a track record, and 
that servicing these smaller SMEs would not be commercially viable ‘both in terms 
of transaction costs and potential credit losses’ (sub. DR90, pp.18-19). 
While the Commission considers that EFIC’s assistance should be limited to newly 
exporting SMEs, the Commission is not suggesting that EFIC be limited to those 
firms with no export experience or that it be restricted to a ‘likely loss making pool 
of very small firms’ (sub. DR90, p. 11). On the contrary, the Commission’s view is 
that EFIC should only provide facilities on the commercial account that are 
commercially viable. 
RECOMMENDATION 5.1 
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EFIC was also critical of the draft recommendation that EFIC’s role should be 
reoriented to one of demonstrating that providing financial services to newly 
exporting SMEs can be commercially viable. EFIC noted ‘The Commission does 
not demonstrate that this proposition is true’ (sub. DR90, p. 10). 
As discussed in detail in the draft report and in earlier chapters, the Commission’s 
view is that government intervention should be targeted at solving a policy problem. 
In this case, the policy problem is potential failures in financial markets that affect 
newly exporting SMEs, and the Commission’s proposed intervention is the 
provision of export finance through EFIC to demonstrate that servicing these SMEs 
can be commercially viable. 
Both in the media and in submissions, there have been suggestions that EFIC needs 
to operate over a wide range of firm sizes in order to be commercially viable: 
Mr Armour argues that EFIC's current approach, which involves helping a broad range 
of companies, lets it operate at a profit and pay dividends to the federal government. He 
warns that a focus solely on helping small, inexperienced companies into export 
markets would turn EFIC into a much narrower, loss-making concern. (The Australian, 
15 March 2012, p.21)  
EFIC’s Managing Director and CEO has stated that EFIC does not cross-subsidise 
from its large clients to its smaller clients (sub. DR90, p. 34; trans., p. 167). The 
Commission considers this is appropriate as there is no policy reason for EFIC to do 
so. 
The reforms suggested will be a major test for EFIC to alter its cost structures and 
operations. However, the Commission considers that EFIC has the capability to 
undertake the change to a focus on SMEs as it has: 
• experience in providing assistance to SMEs including those seeking support to 
access emerging export markets (box 5.5) and a capacity to adapt its services to 
the needs of the SME clientele — several SME participants commented that 
EFIC provided them with guarantees and bonds that could not be sourced from 
the private sector 
• skilled staff (a point noted by several participants in this inquiry)  
• well-established relationships with private sector providers (that would reduce 
its transaction costs in performing a demonstration role)  
• a well-regarded brand. 
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Box 5.5 EFIC’s assistance to a small to medium-sized enterprise  
EFIC’s assistance enabled Environment Systems & Services (ES&S) to access 
additional working capital to fulfil export contracts for the provision of meteorological 
and geotechnical equipment in Asia and the Pacific region. EFIC provided an export 
working capital guarantee to the company’s bank, the ANZ, enabling the bank to lend 
the same amount to ES&S. The additional working capital helped ES&S bridge the 
time difference between incurring costs and receiving payment from their clients. In a 
submission to this inquiry, ES&S indicated that the exports concerned would not have 
gone ahead without EFIC’s assistance.  
Sources: EFIC (2012b; sub. 18).  
 
If the private sector increasingly recognises opportunities in this segment of the 
market and the demand for EFIC’s services gradually declines over time, this 
should be considered a policy success as the market failures of concern are being 
addressed. If on the other hand, EFIC struggles to develop a sustainable business, 
this would be evidence that either the market failures of concern are not extensive 
or they are not amenable to being addressed by the direct provision of financial 
services by EFIC. These matters would need to be considered in an independent 
review. 
Information problems due to temporary disruption in the importing 
country  
One of the situations in which intervention may be argued for is the case of ‘missing 
markets’ due to temporary information failure relating to country or sovereign risks. 
This may occur, for example, where the importing country experiences a severe 
disruption due to civil unrest, resulting in uncertainty and a temporary inability by 
private providers to properly calculate risk.6  
Neither country risk (arising from the political situation in the exporting or 
importing country), nor sovereign risk (arising from policy changes by a foreign 
government), constitute types of risk related to the profile of individual exporters, 
even though they clearly may affect the risk of particular export transactions. This 
may impede commercially viable export transactions, potentially warranting EFIC’s 
involvement. In this case, private sector providers could be encouraged to support 
exporter firms by the transfer of country or sovereign risk to EFIC through 
reinsurance services. 
                                                 
6  The Commission is not referring here to a disruption in global financial markets. 
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Despite the possibility of potential market failures during times of such disruptions, 
and a potential case for government intervention, Chauffour and Farole (2009) 
stress that government action should not come at the cost of creating significant 
moral hazard or subsidising those who are not in need of greater liquidity. They 
state that two practices in particular have been shown to be effective in reducing 
moral hazard and avoiding the provision of wasteful subsidies: 
1. Programs should only be provided for as long as needed and should avoid 
crowding out commercial financial institutions — an ‘exit plan’ is necessary. 
2. Risks should be shared rather than fully underwritten (to avoid moral hazard), 
and provision should be at market rates (to avoid adverse selection). 
The Commission considers that, although there may be some potential rationales for 
public sector intervention in export finance and insurance markets during temporary 
market disruptions, any support provided should be carefully targeted and 
temporary in nature. This means having in place ‘exit plans’ for policy measures 
provided during times of market disruption. Moreover, the economy-wide benefits 
of any form of intervention must exceed the costs. 
EFIC’s involvement should be on the basis of a direction from the Minister, priced 
on commercial terms, limited to reinsurance to provide an incentive for private 
sector participation, available for a defined period and include an exit plan. These 
conditions would lower the risk of crowding out private sector provision when 
financial markets begin to re-establish. The Commission does not consider that 
EFIC’s service offer should extend beyond newly exporting SMEs, as large 
companies have access to risk mitigation and management tools, including 
self-insurance. 
The only potential rationale for government involvement in export finance and 
insurance through EFIC relates to information problems affecting access to export 
finance and insurance by newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
possible sources of those problems are: 
• inadequate information about the credit history and standing of the exporter, 
which could result in private sector providers employing rigid generalised rules 
and not forming an assessment on the merits of the transaction 
• inadequate information about the risk associated with some emerging markets, 
which could result in private sector providers refusing to provide services for 
transactions in those markets 
• temporarily missing markets due to severe disruption in the importing country. 
FINDING 5.3 
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6 Pricing of export credit 
 
Key points 
• A positive accounting profit does not mean that EFIC imposes no cost on taxpayers. 
A net benefit to taxpayers is achieved if EFIC earns an economic profit on its 
portfolio. 
• EFIC derives financial advantages from its exemption from competitive neutrality 
arrangements including some tax exemptions and a government guarantee over its 
financial obligations, which lowers its borrowing costs. These advantages are likely 
to discourage market entry by potential competitors. 
• An export credit subsidy arises when an export credit agency provides financial 
services below their expected full economic costs, including the opportunity cost of 
capital. This can occur if the advantages of government ownership are passed on to 
clients and commercial partners as lower prices. 
• The removal of EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements will 
ensure that the price of EFIC’s financial services reflects the expected full economic 
costs of provision, and provide an enhanced governance framework and discipline 
to operate on a commercial basis. 
• EFIC’s pricing techniques do not ensure the prices for its financial products are 
efficient –– even if pricing is compliant with the OECD Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits. 
• Not all of EFIC’s facilities are priced to earn a commercial rate of return on equity as 
the expected income from some facilities does not offset the expected full economic 
costs of provision. These facilities are effectively being subsidised in advance by 
taxpayers. 
• The beneficiaries of any subsidy are likely to extend beyond EFIC’s clients and may 
include private sector providers, other export credit agencies, and the buyer of the 
exports. 
• An independent review of EFIC’s process in allocating a risk score to each facility 
should be undertaken to help ensure EFIC prices risk appropriately.  
 
The previous chapter examined the rationales for government intervention in export 
credit. Even if a market failure rationale for government intervention in the form of 
an export credit agency (ECA) can be established, economic distortions will occur 
unless the price for financial services is set efficiently. 
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To the extent that an ECA provides financial services at a price below the expected 
full economic costs of provision, it can be regarded as providing a government 
subsidy. This chapter examines whether EFIC’s pricing techniques lead to efficient 
prices or if EFIC provides a subsidy. 
Two possible pricing outcomes are illustrated in the middle tier of figure 6.1. When 
there is a market failure, welfare is enhanced if the ECA prices financial services at 
a level that reflects their expected full economic cost.  
In the absence of market failure, for an ECA to provide finance for a project (or 
export transaction) the price it charges must be below the market clearing price that 
private sector providers would have offered. This creates distortions in markets. As 
discussed in chapter 7, the distortion could constitute the ECA being a catalyst for 
projects that are unable to attract private sector support and cause resources to be 
misallocated within the economy. It could also result in the ECA supporting 
projects that would have proceeded without its involvement. If the latter occurs, the 
ECA may crowd out other providers of export finance and insurance, other sources 
of finance available to EFIC’s client, or other firms competing with the assisted 
firm. 
Figure 6.1 Economic outcomes from ECA pricing 
Market failure No market failure
Pricing to cover 
expected full 
economic cost
Subsidised pricing Subsidised pricing
Pricing to cover 
expected full 
economic cost
Welfare-enhancing 
outcome Distortionary outcomes
 
The distortionary effects arising from EFIC’s participation in financial markets are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 7. A discussion of EFIC’s financial performance, 
including an analysis of its overall returns and cost structure is undertaken in 
chapter 8. 
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6.1 What is a subsidy and how could it arise? 
An ECA reports an accounting profit when net income (revenue less expenses) is 
positive. A positive accounting profit does not always mean that an ECA imposes 
no cost on taxpayers. This is achieved when the ECA earns an economic profit on 
its portfolio. At a transaction level, this means the income generated from a facility 
must exceed all of its economic costs, including any taxes, plus the opportunity cost 
of risk-weighted capital. The opportunity cost of capital reflects the benefits forgone 
by taxpayers from having their funds utilised by an ECA compared to other public 
sector programs (Boyd 1982). 
The capital resources EFIC uses to provide export finance and insurance products 
have opportunity costs. As EFIC is wholly owned by the Australian Government, 
these opportunity costs are borne by taxpayer. There may be a higher return (and 
lower risks) to taxpayers from having those funds invested elsewhere. The 
difference between the return earned by EFIC and returns that could be earned in 
alternative activities represents the hidden cost of EFIC’s operations on the 
commercial account (CA). If such a cost exists, EFIC can be regarded as providing 
a subsidy. 
Empirical research has shown that many ECAs have provided subsidies in the past. 
Appendix B contains a review of the literature. 
There are two sources of potential subsidisation from EFIC’s operations: 
1. EFIC’s government ownership leads to lower borrowing costs and tax 
exemptions compared to private sector providers. This could allow EFIC to pass 
on the benefits of these lower costs to its clients and private sector partners as 
lower prices and still earn an accounting profit. 
2. Alternatively, EFIC could be offering services at a price that does not reflect the 
expected full costs of provision, given their risk. In this case, although EFIC 
could still earn a positive return (an accounting profit), it would be less than 
what it would earn if the price of its facilities fully accounted for their risk and 
an appropriate rate of return on capital. 
EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements 
EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality (CN) arrangements may enable EFIC 
to provide services on more favourable terms than the private sector (box 6.1). An 
exemption from CN arrangements means EFIC is exempt from paying income tax 
and does not pay for its government guarantee. Furthermore, it is not required to 
earn a particular rate of return.  
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The exemption from CN arrangements lowers EFIC’s cost of providing its financial 
products, including borrowing costs, that are largely determined by the riskiness of 
the borrower. Standard & Poor’s credit rating for EFIC is based on the statutory 
government guarantee (S&P 2010). EFIC is rated AAA –– the same as the 
Australian Government. In comparison, Standard & Poor’s has assigned an AA- 
rating to the largest four banks in Australia (CBA, NAB, ANZ and Westpac). This 
means the government guarantee enables EFIC to borrow funds at a lower cost than 
its potential competitors –– commercial banks and other financial institutions.1  
 
Box 6.1 Competitive neutrality 
Competitive neutrality is an arrangement that aims to promote efficient competition 
between public and private businesses. The Australian Government’s approach is set 
out in its Competitive Neutrality Policy Statement: 
Competitive neutrality requires that government business activities should not enjoy net 
competitive advantages over their private sector competitors simply by virtue of public sector 
ownership. (Australian Government 1996, p. 4) 
The policy recognises that there are a number of advantages and disadvantages of 
government ownership but does not seek to ameliorate all of these. Instead, it focuses 
on those competitive advantages enjoyed by government businesses that are 
widespread and relatively easy to observe and correct, including: 
• exemptions from various taxes (taxation neutrality) 
• access to borrowings at concessional interest rates (debt neutrality) 
• exemptions from complying with regulatory arrangements imposed on private sector 
competitors (regulatory neutrality) 
• other benefits associated with not having to achieve a commercial rate of return. 
Competitive neutrality policy applies to significant government businesses, but not to 
non-profit, non-business activities. 
Source: Australian Government (1996).  
 
EFIC’s exemption from CN arrangements is based on the premise that it operates in 
the market gap and does not compete with the private sector (chapter 2). EFIC is 
notionally subject to some discipline on its ability to compete on favourable terms 
through the Minister’s Statement of Expectations (SoE). The SoE stipulates that 
EFIC is ‘not to undercut the private sector’ (Emerson 2011, p. 2). 
                                                     
1 The spread on AA and A rated corporate bonds over bonds issued by the Australian Government 
was 198 and 263 basis points, respectively in April 2012 (RBA 2012a). That is, the extra yield 
investors demand to own bonds issued by AA or A rated corporate entities instead of the 
Government is about 2.0 or 2.6 percentage points per annum, respectively. 
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EFIC stated that: 
EFIC provides funding to clients at or above market pricing to reflect risk and subject 
to terms and conditions that are comparable to commercial banks. (sub. 18, appendix A, 
p. 27) 
EFIC’s exemption from CN arrangements does not necessarily mean that EFIC 
prices at an inefficient level. However, it does lower EFIC’s costs compared to 
private sector providers and could enable it to provide subsidised finance and 
insurance while still generating an accounting profit. This may discourage market 
entry by potential competitors. 
EFIC does not pay income tax, is not required to earn a particular rate of return on 
equity and the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 provides for its 
liabilities to be explicitly guaranteed by the Commonwealth. This lowers its 
borrowing costs relative to private sector providers, giving it a commercial 
advantage that may discourage market entry by potential competitors. 
Removing EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements 
The Commission’s assessment is that there may be some instances of market failure 
that may warrant government provision of export finance through EFIC (chapter 5). 
Accordingly, the Commission has recommended that EFIC’s operations be confined 
to those areas where there may be market failures –– in which case there are no 
competitors or competitors are under-providing. The removal of EFIC’s exemption 
from CN arrangements would provide an improved governance framework and 
allow EFIC to transparently demonstrate that providing export finance to newly 
exporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) can be commercially viable.  
Where governments direct their businesses to undertake non-commercial activities 
(for example, some transactions on the national interest account (NIA)), the 
business can still adopt a commercial focus to its operations by being fully and 
transparently funded for the non-commercial activity through a community service 
obligation (CSO) payment. 
Australian governments have generally based their definitions of CSOs on the 
formulation proposed by the Steering Committee on National Performance 
Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises: 
A Community Service Obligation arises when a government specifically requires a 
public enterprise to carry out activities relating to outputs or inputs which it would not 
elect to do on a commercial basis, and which the government does not require other 
FINDING 6.1 
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businesses in the public or private sectors to generally undertake, or which it would 
only do commercially at higher prices. (SCNPMGTE 1994, p. xi) 
As discussed in chapter 2, EFIC is reimbursed by the Australian Government for 
losses on NIA transactions and returns revenue from NIA transactions to the 
Government. EFIC also charges a fee for managing the NIA. The payment for 
losses represents a CSO payment to EFIC and its charging of a management fee 
provides further transparency of the cost to government of transactions on the NIA. 
The Australian Government uses a business test to determine whether government 
businesses enterprises may be subject to CN arrangements (DOFA 2004) (box 6.2). 
The benefits of applying competitive neutrality arrangements to EFIC 
The Commission anticipates that the benefits from the application of CN 
arrangements to EFIC include: 
• improved transparency of EFIC’s performance as the costs to government from 
the provision of the statutory guarantee and forgone tax revenue will be returned 
to government rather than reported by EFIC as an accounting profit 
• assurance that EFIC is not operating at an advantage to its private sector 
counterparts or crowding them out 
• a more credible demonstration effect as private sector providers will have more 
confidence that the provision of export finance to newly exporting SMEs can be 
commercially viable without the advantages of government ownership 
(discussed further in chapter 10) 
• improved commercial discipline for EFIC to maximise value for the shareholder 
through the requirement for it to earn an appropriately benchmarked rate of 
return on equity. However, unless all aspects of CN arrangements are applied, 
the requirement to earn an appropriately benchmarked rate of return could 
instead provide an incentive for EFIC to use more resources in delivering its 
financial services than that of a private sector provider 
• providing commercial discipline to EFIC’s treasury function as it will have an 
incentive to hold capital having regard to its cost 
• ensuring that EFIC takes into account all costs when pursuing its objective of 
minimising borrowing costs. 
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Box 6.2 Using the business test to confirm application of competitive 
neutrality arrangements 
There are two questions that determine the applicability of competitive neutrality (CN) 
arrangements to a government agency: 
• Is a business being conducted? 
• Is that business significant? 
For the purpose of CN arrangements, a business activity is defined as one where: 
• There is user charging. 
• There is an actual or potential competitor (that is, users are not restricted by law or 
policy from choosing alternative sources of supply). 
• Managers of the activity have a degree of independence in relation to the production 
or supply of the good or service and the price at which it is provided.  
EFIC’s activities on the commercial account appear to pass the business test: 
• The Statement of Expectations requires that ‘EFIC’s Commercial Account 
operations are to be conducted on a commercial basis, obtaining a return reflecting 
risks, and National Interest Account (NIA) operations should normally be conducted 
on this basis’ (Emerson 2011, p. 2). EFIC also charges a fee to the Government for 
managing the NIA. 
• There is no law or government policy that restricts users from choosing alternative 
sources of supply and there are no legal or policy barriers to the Australian 
Government choosing alternative sources of supply. 
• EFIC’s management has independence to set prices and the level of production. 
Although NIA transactions are subject to user charging, the Minister must approve, or 
direct, transactions in the national interest. Therefore NIA activity appears to fail the 
business test on the grounds of a lack of independence in relation to the production or 
supply of the good or service.  
Business activities are considered significant if they are undertaken by a body subject 
to the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 with a commercial turnover 
of at least $10 million per year (DOFA 2004). EFIC’s profit in 2010-11 was $30.2 million 
and EFIC’s turnover will be higher than profit. The benefits from applying CN 
arrangements must exceed the costs, which is likely to be the case: 
Costs may include changes to accounting systems, asset valuations, reviews of activities 
and general administration. The AGCNCO [Australian Government Competitive Neutrality 
Complaints Office] has recognised that the costs of applying CN principles are generally not 
significant and build naturally on agencies’ existing costing systems. Consequently, very few 
businesses that pass the business test will be able to demonstrate that the costs outweigh 
the benefits (DOFA 2004, p. 14). 
Sources: DOFA (2004); Emerson (2011).  
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EFIC raised issues in relation to applying CN arrangements to its business (sub. 18; 
sub. DR90) including: 
• the tax treatment of financial instruments and borrowings 
• implications for cash flow arising from tax-equivalent payments 
• potential distortions where transactions are shared between the CA and NIA.  
The Commission considers that any administrative issues relating to the 
implementation of CN arrangements would not be significant. As noted in box 6.2 
the Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office has stated 
that the costs of applying CN arrangements to government agencies are generally 
not significant (DOFA 2004) and the Commission is not aware of any complaints 
regarding implementation of CN arrangements by other government agencies. 
Pricing does not reflect expected full economic costs 
EFIC would be providing subsidised finance and insurance if it offers finance and 
insurance on terms that do not cover the expected full economic cost of provision. 
These costs include costs associated with tailored terms and conditions such as 
flexible timing of repayments. The OECD illustrates the consequence of not 
covering these costs with the example of a loan: 
The consequence may be that an importer receives a loan at an interest rate below the 
normal market rate, for a length of time which exceeds what the market would offer or 
a repayment schedule which is abnormal in timing, yet not face a fee which is adequate 
to offset these special conditions. In this case, the total costs for financing the purchase 
of that exporter’s goods would be lower than would otherwise occur, so the programme 
would effectively subsidise the importer. (2000, p. 8) 
The loan in the example above can still generate an accounting profit for the ECA, 
but to the extent that the price charged did not cover the expected full costs of 
provision then this reflects a subsidy that benefits the importer. 
Dahl et al. (1995) estimated that there was an implicit subsidy for export credit 
guarantees because they were under-priced and that this can be expected when the 
goal of a government or ECA is to enhance exports: 
 … governments are not charging an actuarially fair rate for credit guarantees and in 
fact an implicit subsidy would be embedded in exports in this case. This is not 
surprising. In fact, Funatsu, who examined extending insurance guarantees for 
Eximbank loans, indicated that underpricing or charging very low premiums for 
insurance coverage may be optimal behaviour if the objective is to maximize exports. 
(Dahl et al. 1995, p. 25) 
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6.2 How does EFIC price its products? 
The Minister’s SoE provides guidance on EFIC’s pricing: 
EFIC’s pricing is not to undercut the private sector when private support is present, nor 
undercut pricing for comparable risks when private support is absent. By charging a 
premium for the additional risk or quality of service it is providing, EFIC would also be 
encouraging the private sector to fill the gap. (Emerson 2011, p. 2) 
Consistent with this expectation, EFIC has stated that it has four aims when pricing 
its financial products. These are to: 
• achieve an appropriate return for risk 
• offer pricing that will encourage a borrower to seek private market support 
• achieve a return sufficient to attract private market risk-sharing partners 
• encourage the borrower to refinance the transaction. (EFIC, sub. 18, p. 11) 
The price for EFIC’s products can include a number of components depending on 
the facility and the specific transaction (box 6.3). 
 
Box 6.3 EFIC fees and charges 
Depending on the type of product and individual characteristics of a transaction, the 
price for EFIC’s products may include the following components: 
• establishment fee — a fee for the cost of establishing the facility. This is typically a 
percentage of the facility amount 
• commitment fee — a charge for the undrawn portion of a facility or for holding a 
credit line for the borrower 
• interest rate — the price of credit. This may include a reference rate such as LIBOR 
(London Interbank Offered Rate) plus a margin to compensate for credit and 
liquidity risk 
• guarantee fee — a fee for the credit risk of a guarantee. It may comprise either an 
up-front fee or an interest rate for the amount of the guarantee 
• insurance premium — a payment for insurance cover provided over a specified 
period 
• stand-by fee — a payment for the difference between the nominated cover of a 
political risk insurance policy and the maximum limit of the insurance policy 
• bond premium — a payment for the provision of a bond. 
Source: EFIC (pers. comm., 16 January 2012).  
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EFIC has stated that it uses a number of different techniques to price its products, 
including reference to the OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export 
Credits (the OECD Arrangement), an in-house pricing model, market data, EFIC’s 
own assessment of the possible impact of future events, and accepting the pricing of 
other financial service providers and ECAs in risk sharing arrangements (EFIC, 
sub. 18; sub. DR90) (table 6.1). 
The Commission has examined these pricing techniques and considers they are not 
sufficient to ensure that EFIC sets the price for its financial services at an efficient 
level. 
Table 6.1 EFIC’s pricing techniques  
Product Pricing approach 
Buyer finance/export finance guarantee OECD benchmark 
Bonds Based on market information 
Export working capital guarantee Internal policy — an annual percentage of the 
value of the guarantee 
Producer offset loan Internal policy — an annual percentage of 
amount of the loan 
Foreign exchange guarantee Revenue sharing — a percentage of revenue 
collected by the foreign exchange specialist 
Asian Development Bank risk participation 
agreement 
Revenue sharing 
Headwaya (working capital guarantee) Internal policy — an annual percentage of the 
value of the guarantee 
Documentary credit guarantee Based on market information 
Risk participation agreement Based on market information 
Structured trade and project finance 
(loans and guarantees) 
Based on market information 
a  EFIC’s headway working capital guarantee was discontinued in December 2011. 
Sources: EFIC (pers. comm., 25 October 2011; 9 November 2011). 
The OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits 
The OECD Arrangement outlines minimum prices and maximum terms and 
conditions for official export credits. It aims to encourage competitive trade on the 
basis of price and quality of the financial product rather than on the basis of 
government subsidised finance and insurance. Although the OECD Arrangement is 
a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ and not binding on OECD members, compliance with 
the OECD Arrangement is a specific requirement of the SoE. 
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The conditions for compliant transactions under the OECD Arrangement include: 
• official support is to be limited to 85 per cent of the export contract value 
• maximum repayment terms are five years for high income OECD contract 
destination countries and 10 years for all other countries 
• the principal is to be repaid evenly over the life of a loan 
• minimum premium rates for credit risk for transactions with counterparties in 
non-OECD countries (designed to recover long-term operating costs and losses) 
• premium rates for transactions with counterparties in OECD countries are to be 
consistent with market rates (OECD 2011a). 
Competitive behaviour among ECAs is still reported although the OECD 
Arrangement is intended to underline minimum prices and maximum terms and 
conditions and prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ (box 6.4). 
 
Box 6.4 Does the OECD Arrangement prevent a race to the bottom? 
In its 2010 Competitiveness Report, the Export-Import Bank of the United States  
(Ex-Im Bank) forecast that two-thirds of export finance and insurance by export credit 
agencies (ECAs) would occur outside the OECD Arrangement by 2011 (up from 
approximately one-fifth in 2001). The Ex-Im Bank considered that this would be the 
result of expansion by non-OECD ECAs and developments in OECD ECAs’ products. 
The following examples highlight the limitations of the OECD Arrangement in 
preventing competition between governments on the terms of export credits. 
Market windows 
Market windows are government-owned agencies or programs where it is claimed 
finance is provided on market terms but agencies or programs benefit from government 
ownership through lower borrowing costs, tax exemptions and low or no dividends. The 
OECD Arrangement only applies to ‘official support’ and some participants to the 
OECD Arrangement have argued that lending at rates equal to or higher than their 
borrowing costs reflects a market outcome and not official support, regardless of 
whether the rates are below those allowed by the OECD Arrangement. Ex-Im Bank has 
identified the ECAs of Canada, Germany, Italy and Belgium as market window 
providers. According to the Ex-Im Bank, there is anecdotal evidence that market 
window financing has been instrumental in purchase decisions and it ‘can pose a 
competitive threat in the export credit world’ (Ex-Im Bank 2011b, p. 99). 
(Continued next page)   
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Box 6.4 (continued) 
Untied lending support 
Untied loans are provided by some ECAs for strategic reasons and are not linked to, or 
conditional on, exports from the ECA’s country and as such are not covered by the 
OECD Arrangement. Untied loans are commonly provided by ECAs to secure 
resources such as energy and raw materials. The Ex-Im Bank considers untied lending 
to be indirectly linked to exports and estimates that the volume of untied lending by G7 
countries has risen from $3–4 billion a year in 2005-06 to more than $30 billion in 
2009-10. 
Foreign direct investment support 
Foreign direct investment support can include loans, guarantees and insurance 
provided in support of investment in overseas countries and is not subject to the OECD 
Arrangement. Ex-Im Bank has identified the policies of Japan and Italy as potentially 
linking investment support to exports but notes that there are no quantifiable data to 
indicate the volume of this activity. 
Matching non-compliant pricing 
Non-OECD ECAs are not obliged to comply with the OECD Arrangement. The Ex-Im 
Bank monitors the performance of non-OECD countries with significant ECA activities 
including China, Brazil and India. The Ex-Im Bank has only identified China as 
consistently operating outside the OECD Arrangement. Examples include: 
• In 2010 the Ex-Im Bank made the decision to match the sub-OECD terms offered by 
the Export-Import Bank of China on finance for the Pakistan Government to 
purchase 150 US-made locomotives. 
• In 2011 the China Development Bank offered buyer finance to Brazilian telephone 
company Tele Norte Leste Participacoes SA (TNLP3) to purchase equipment from a 
Chinese exporter. Terms included an interest rate 2 percentage points below the 
average market rate for Brazilian companies. TPLNP3 was quoted in a media report 
indicating the attractive finance provided by the China Development Bank was 
critical in the company’s decision to purchase Chinese equipment over competitors’ 
equipment. 
Sources: Ex-Im Bank (2011b); Sudeep (2011); Bloomberg (2011).  
 
Limitations to the effectiveness of the OECD Arrangement 
Some limitations of the OECD Arrangement include: 
• only OECD ECAs are covered 
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• it does not cover financial products of less than two years maturity, agricultural 
and military goods, untied support to secure energy and raw materials, and 
domestic projects  
• more generous arrangements for specific industries such as shipping and aircraft 
• the ability to negotiate more generous terms and conditions following 
notification to other OECD Arrangement members. For example, the OECD 
Arrangement allows the provision of finance on more relaxed terms where it can 
be shown there is ‘an imbalance in the timing of the funds available to the 
obligor and the debt service profile available under an equal, semi-annual 
repayment schedule’ (OECD 2011a, p. 43) 
• it is not a binding agreement. 
Further, minimum terms and conditions are not sufficient to ensure the price of 
financial services offered by the ECA reflect their expected full cost of provision. 
EFIC has identified aggressive pricing by other ECAs as a key risk in its 2011-12 
corporate plan and has stated that the activity of ECAs may undermine its ability to 
price its products to reflect risk: 
A substantial part of EFIC’s role is delivering services which the private sector would 
not generally undertake on the basis of risk, inadequate commercial returns or 
insufficient capacity. This may arise because of the high costs involved, or because of 
pricing constraints; such as the need to match the prices offered by overseas export 
credit agencies, precluding pricing to fully reflect risk. (EFIC 2011c, p. 51)  
EFIC also stated: 
EFIC is a relatively small ECA operating at the commercial end of the spectrum of 
ECAs internationally. ECAs are significant players in export credit markets and other 
ECAs including those outside the OECD Consensus, are growing and becoming more 
active in Australia and in the region. (sub. 18, p. 3) 
EFIC’s credit manual states that, at times, terms outside the OECD Arrangement 
may be considered if required to match terms offered by an ECA from a non-OECD 
country. However, matching the terms and conditions offered by other ECAs that 
are more generous than those of private providers could generate a subsidy to 
EFIC’s clients and commercial partners.  
The Commission is not aware of any instance in which EFIC has entered into a 
facility outside the terms and conditions agreed in the OECD Arrangement. EFIC 
has, however, advised the Commission that it has four loans with repayment 
schedules aligned to match the projected cash flows of the project (pers. comm., 
26 October 2011). That is, the loans do not meet the requirement that principal be 
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repaid evenly over the life of the loan –– this is permissible if members of the 
OECD Arrangement are notified. 
EFIC’s compliance with the OECD Arrangement has not been the subject of 
internal audit or independent review. Establishing that export finance or insurance 
has been provided outside the OECD Arrangement would be difficult given the 
incentives for exporters and buyers to agree to favourable terms and the relationship 
between some private sector providers and ECAs. The auditing of EFIC’s 
compliance with its mandate is discussed in chapter 9. 
Market comparison 
The SoE requires EFIC to ensure its prices do not undercut the private sector. 
For large structured trade and project finance (STPF) transactions EFIC has 
identified a number of sources of pricing information it uses for comparable 
transactions, including: 
• pricing by private providers in a syndicated financing transaction or where a 
bank is co-financing with EFIC  
• recent transactions with commercial banks by prospective borrowers or in debt 
markets of similar tenor and amortisation profile 
• the price of debt instruments previously issued by the prospective borrower, 
trading in secondary markets 
• recent transactions by other comparable borrowers, for example, with the same 
credit risk or operating in the same industry (pers. comm., 9 November 2011; 
sub. 18, appendix A). 
However, because STPF product offerings are tailored to the needs of a relatively 
small number of clients, benchmarks may not always be available. Each STPF 
facility may have a different disbursement schedule, tenor and quality of security, 
all of which can significantly affect the risk, and therefore the appropriate price for 
the product. 
When considering their pricing of credit, private sector providers also factor in 
income from other services related to a transaction (such as management and 
accounting fees), in addition to the yield of the facility (S&P 2011a). The interest 
rate received by a private provider may not be a true reflection of the total cost of 
the credit. 
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For its Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise and Mid-Market Division, EFIC has 
advised the Commission that it follows the pricing of its partner banks in risk 
participation agreements as this reflects the market price. EFIC has also said that it 
uses market comparisons to price its documentary credit guarantees and bonds 
(pers. comm., 25 October 2011; sub. 18, appendix A). 
Risk sharing arrangements  
EFIC engages in risk sharing arrangements with private sector providers and other 
ECAs. EFIC says that under these arrangements, the share of the revenue EFIC 
receives is commensurate with its level of exposure. Risk sharing arrangements 
include: 
• the documentary letter of credit guarantee arrangement EFIC has developed with 
the Asian Development Bank. EFIC and the Asian Development Bank share the 
risk and revenues from guarantees provided by the bank on documentary letters 
of credit issued by banks in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Vietnam 
(EFIC, pers. comm., 25 October 2011; 2012a) 
• risk participation agreements. These have been established with a number of 
Australian banks in which EFIC partially guarantees the bank in the event of 
non-payment. 
EFIC has also established reciprocal risk participation agreements with a number of 
other ECAs. These agreements provide a formal process for co-financing 
international projects that involve exporters in more than one country. 
Under reciprocal risk participation agreements the principal exporter negotiates 
credit coverage and pricing with its country’s ECA (the lead ECA). The lead ECA 
then arranges for support from other contributing ECAs (follower ECAs). 
The lead ECA negotiates with the principal exporter according to its usual terms 
and cedes a proportion of the revenue to the follower ECAs based on the proportion 
of the risk they accept. For transactions involving other AAA-rated ECAs, the 
ceded amount is normally 90 per cent of the risk premium revenue for the follower 
ECA’s share of exposure, with the other 10 per cent retained by the lead ECA to 
cover administrative costs (EFIC, pers. comm., 7 December 2011; 23 January 
2012). 
EFIC’s independence in setting the price under these arrangements is limited where 
it is not the lead ECA. When the lead ECA sets the price, EFIC’s support may be 
provided on a subsidised basis if the price received does not cover EFIC’s expected 
full costs of provision. 
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EFIC’s in-house pricing model 
EFIC uses an in-house pricing model to forecast the economic profit and return on 
equity (also referred to as the gross rate of return on capital) for each facility. This 
section describes how that model is used to price its facilities and the challenges of 
setting prices at a level that reflects the expected full economic costs of provision. 
For each facility,2 EFIC’s pricing model forecasts an economic profit or loss. This 
is defined as: 
Economic profit = total fee income – (provision for expected loss + cost of  
    capital + overhead costs) 
Economic profit is different to accounting profit. Consider a loan that is drawn and 
repaid over time. An accounting profit merely indicates that the income –– principal 
and interest payments discounted to reflect their net present value –– exceed the 
expenses, including the initial loan amount, administrative expenses and provision 
for expected loss. Economic profit also accounts for the opportunity cost of holding 
capital.  
The income and cost components are described below to show how these factors 
influence economic profit. The discussion uses the example of a loan facility, 
although the pricing model is also used for other financial products. 
Fee income 
EFIC, as do private sector providers, typically calculates the interest rate for loan 
facilities using a floating reference rate based on the Australian 90 day Bank Bill 
Swap rate for facilities denominated in Australian currency, or the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)3 for facilities denominated in foreign currencies. 
Nominal reference rates vary depending on the currency in which the facility is 
issued reflecting the lower cost of borrowing in US or European currency compared 
to borrowing in Australian dollars. Some reference rates also have an additional 
interest rate premium to reflect higher funding costs. 
                                                     
2 A facility is made available for each transaction that EFIC enters into. A facility includes the type 
of product (for example, loan or guarantee) and the terms of repayment (interest rate, frequency). 
3 LIBOR is the average interest rate at which a selection of banks on the London money market are 
prepared to lend to one another. LIBOR is provided in 15 maturities (ranging from overnight to 
12 months) and in 10 currencies. EFIC uses LIBOR rates with 6 month maturities as floating 
reference rates. 
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The reference interest rate4 has a ‘margin’ added to it. The margin is required to 
compensate for the risk of the facility and is applied to the drawn balance of the 
facility. The way it is determined is explained below. 
A loan facility can also have a commitment fee applied to the undrawn component 
of the facility and an establishment fee (box 6.3). 
Costs 
There are three types of costs incurred when providing a loan: 
• general provision for expected loss 
• cost of capital 
• overhead expenses. 
Costs and fee income are discounted into present value terms using the same 
discount factor. Overhead expenses represent administration and other costs 
associated with administering the loan. The general provision for expected loss and 
cost of capital are described below. These costs are influenced by the credit risk of a 
facility.  
EFIC risk score 
EFIC considers the riskiness of a facility and allocates it an EFIC risk score (ERS). 
There are nine risk scores ranked from those with minimal risk (1) to higher risk 
(9). Relevant available information regarding the facility is considered when 
assigning an ERS (for example, the credit rating of the company seeking finance). 
Ultimately EFIC uses its own judgement to determine the ERS. Although different 
financial institutions will have different protocols and risk preferences, the 
assignment of risk scores to facilities is standard practice. 
Each ERS corresponds to a credit rating published by credit rating agencies. For 
example, Standard & Poor’s AAA rating (for high grade investments) corresponds 
with ERS 1, and CCC (extremely speculative investments) equates to ERS 7. 
Box 6.5 shows a mapping of credit ratings to their equivalent ERS. 
Rating agencies publish corporate rates of default for each credit rating and these 
are used by EFIC to estimate the probability of default for a given ERS. Default 
                                                     
4 The reference interest rate is determined outside of EFIC’s pricing model. The pricing model 
only sets (or estimates) the margin. Therefore, it is implicit that the cost of borrowing is equal to 
the reference rate. 
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data are based on corporate rates of default for the past 20 years from Standard & 
Poor’s and Moody’s (EFIC, sub. DR90). An average of both indices is used. 
Figure 6.2 shows Standard & Poor’s default rates according to credit rating and 
corresponding ERS. 
 
Box 6.5 Credit ratings and the EFIC risk rating system 
A credit rating evaluates the credit worthiness of an issuer of specific types of debt 
(such as bonds) issued by a government or corporation. It is a measure of the relative 
likelihood that a counterparty will fulfil its financial commitments. A higher credit rating 
indicates that a counterparty is more likely to meet its obligations (a higher investment 
grade) than a counterparty with a low credit rating (a lower investment grade). 
EFIC maintains a credit risk rating system that is broadly comparable to that provided 
by two commercial credit rating agencies, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. 
A comparison of EFIC’s rating system with credit ratings 
Moody’s Standard & Poor’s Rating agency investment grade EFIC risk score 
Aaa AAA 
High grade 1 
Aa1 AA+ 
Aa2 AA 
Aa3 AA- 
A1 A+ 
Upper medium grade 2 A2 A 
A3 A- 
Baa1 BBB+ 
Lower medium grade 3 Baa2 BBB 
Baa3 BBB- 
Ba1 BB+ 
Non-investment grade 
Speculative 4 Ba2 BB 
Ba3 BB- 
B1 B+ 
Highly speculative 5 B2 B 
B3 B- 
Caa1 CCC+ Substantial risks 6 
Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative 
7 
Caa3 CCC- 
Likely to be in default 
with little prospect for recovery Ca CC 
C C 
 D In default 8,9 
 
Sources: EFIC (2011j); Moody’s (2012); S&P (2011f).  
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Figure 6.2 Global corporate average cumulative default rates 
1981–2010 
 
Source: S&P (2011b). 
Provision for expected loss 
The default probability for a given ERS is multiplied by the expected loss given 
default and the facility limit to calculate the provision for expected loss: 
Provision for expected loss = default probability × expected loss given default × 
facility limit 
The expected loss given default is set by EFIC at a constant rate — usually 
45 per cent of the value of the facility (EFIC, pers. comm., 18 November 2011). 
The rate varies depending on whether the facility has sovereign or commercial risk 
and whether there is asset security (collateral). EFIC’s approach here differs to that 
used to estimate the probability of default. EFIC claims to have an information 
advantage when determining an ERS (for example, information on country risk), 
but it does not use this knowledge to apply different loss given default rates as the 
ERS changes. 
Cost of capital 
Credit risk comprises both expected and unexpected losses. Capital is set aside for 
unexpected losses and general provisioning (described above) covers expected 
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losses. The calculation to derive the amount of capital (or capital adequacy 
requirement) for unexpected losses is based on Australian Prudential Regulation 
Authority guidelines (box 8.2) and the Basel II framework (box 8.4). The capital 
adequacy requirement increases as the risk of an unexpected loss on the facility 
increases. 
Once the required amount of capital for a facility is determined, the cost of capital is 
determined using the following formula: 
Cost of capital = capital adequacy requirement × cost of capital rate 
The cost of capital rate is 10 per cent for each facility in EFIC’s pricing model. 
Determinants of economic profit and return on equity 
For a loan to have a positive economic profit, the income received from the margin 
(and other fee income) must more than offset its economic costs, including the cost 
of capital.  
Terms and conditions of the facility will influence the required margin. Under the 
OECD Arrangement, principal and interest repayments can be paid in uneven 
amounts in some instances. It was noted above that some loans provided by EFIC 
have repayment schedules aligned to match projected cash flows of the project. 
Other features of EFIC’s loans include: 
• drawdown — instalments of a total facility amount can be drawn down at the 
start of the term of the facility. This delays the time at which the total principal 
amount of the facility is drawn. 
• grace period — a period of time between when the facility is fully drawn down 
and when principal repayments commence. 
A ‘standard’ loan has semi-annual principal and interest repayments commencing 
immediately. Where a loan has a grace period that delays principal and interest 
repayments, the required margin (or fees) must be higher to compensate for the 
delayed timing of these repayments compared to if the loan had principal and 
interest repayments commencing immediately. 
The costs of the facility are sensitive to various assumptions in the pricing model 
which also influence the required margin. These are discussed below. 
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Cost of capital rate 
The cost of capital rate reflects the opportunity cost of the capital used to finance a 
transaction. It should reflect the rate of return that the government would earn if it 
chose to invest the capital in an alternative investment with equivalent risk. 
NERA (2003) found that the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD), which 
is the ECA in the United Kingdom, would have a cost of capital rate (or weighted 
average cost of capital) of 11 per cent if it was operating as an insurance company 
in the private sector. The required cost of capital rate may have increased since this 
time especially as a result of the global financial crisis. 
If the cost of capital rate that EFIC applies to its facilities (10 per cent) is too low, 
then the cost of capital will be underestimated. The cost of capital changes in 
proportion to the cost of capital rate. That is, if the cost of capital rate is estimated to 
be 15 per cent rather than 10 per cent, then the cost of capital will increase by 
50 per cent. 
Sensitivity of economic profit to the EFIC risk score and the default probability 
The ERS EFIC attaches to a facility and the probability of default it subsequently 
applies have a significant bearing on the required margin. The ERS affects both the 
cost of capital and the general provision for expected loss. 
The cost of capital could be too low if the capital amount (provision for unexpected 
losses) is too low. As the ERS increases, the amount of capital to meet capital 
adequacy requirements will also rise. 
The ERS has an even stronger impact on the general provision for expected loss. As 
noted above, EFIC uses the ERS to assign the probability of default to the facility. 
The probability of default increases at an increasing rate as the ERS increases 
(figure 6.2). The difference in probability of default between two assets with high 
risk (for example, ERS 5 and ERS 6) is much greater than for two lower risk assets 
(ERS 2 and ERS 3). 
Consequently, the expected loss of a facility increases at a much higher rate as the 
ERS increases. The margin required to generate an equivalent profit also increases 
at an increasing rate. 
Table 6.2 shows how the required margin to generate an economic profit of zero (so 
that income exactly offsets all costs) changes as the ERS increases. For a loan with 
a tenor of four years in this example, the required margin would increase by 
1.2 percentage points for a facility assigned an ERS 4 instead of ERS 3. In contrast, 
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the required margin would increase by 2.3 percentage points for a facility assigned 
with an ERS 5 instead of ERS 4. 
Table 6.2 Sensitivity of economic profit to ERS and tenor 
Example of $100 million loana 
ERS 
Tenor 
(years) 
Gross margin for 
zero economic 
profit (%) 
Expected 
 loss 
($ mil) 
Cost of 
capital 
($ mil) 
Overhead 
($ mil) 
Total costs or  
income 
($ mil) 
3 4 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.7 2.2 
4 4 1.7 2.1 2.2 0.7 4.9 
5 4 4.0 6.2 3.6 0.7 10.5 
6 4 8.6 14.5 6.5 0.7 21.7 
3 8 0.9 0.9 2.5 1.2 4.6 
4 8 2.2 4.0 4.5 1.2 9.7 
5 8 4.2 9.7 7.0 1.2 17.9 
6 8 7.6 19.1 11.9 1.2 32.3 
a Income is equal to total costs in all examples (economic profit is zero). All amounts are discounted into net 
present value. Assumptions regarding drawdown periods, grace periods, repayment frequency, sovereign 
obligor, country risk grade and other fee income and overhead fees were held constant in each scenario and 
are not reported to maintain the confidentiality of the parameters in EFIC’s in-house pricing model. 
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on EFIC’s pricing model (accessed 12 December, 2011). 
Others have examined the sensitivity of the relationship between the efficient price 
at which credit is provided and the default probability. Dahl et al. (1995), for 
example, modelled the value of credit guarantees. They stated ‘Importers with 
greater default risk would have larger volatilities in the value of the letter of credit 
and/or lower price levels’ (Dahl et al. 1995, p. 12). The authors modelled the effect 
of lower prices (greater default risk) and found ‘as the price level for the underlying 
asset decreases, the value of the credit guarantee increases at an increasing rate’ 
(Dahl et al. 1995, p. 12). 
EFIC uses corporate data for rates of default but these rates could be different to 
actual rates of default for EFIC’s facilities. If the rate of default of EFIC’s loans and 
other facilities is higher than the historical data it draws on then EFIC’s margin (or 
other fee income) will be too low to generate an economic profit. This will result in 
an expected economic loss for facilities that are profitable at the margin because 
economic profit is very sensitive to the ERS. 
The determination of credit risk and allocation of an ERS is based on judgement. 
Given the sensitivity of economic profit to the ERS (and therefore the potential for a 
subsidy to arise), EFIC should benchmark how actual rates of default for its 
facilities compare to their expected losses. EFIC stated its portfolio is small and 
volatility makes benchmarking difficult (EFIC, sub. 18), meaning a comparison 
could not be made robustly at an individual transaction level. However, the 
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expectation EFIC should price its risk appropriately suggests some analysis be 
undertaken. If provisions for expected losses are systematically less than actual 
losses it indicates that EFIC is underestimating (and under-pricing) the risk of its 
facilities. Alternatively, EFIC may be too cautious when evaluating risk if its 
provisions for expected losses are more than actual losses and this will also 
contribute to inefficient pricing. 
An independent review to determine whether the ERS assigned to a facility is 
appropriate at the time a facility is signed will provide assurance that EFIC is 
evaluating risk appropriately. This has been done for at least one other ECA. Ernst 
& Young carried out a ‘Technical Quality Assurance Review of ECGD’s credit risk 
model, [that] suggested that the default probabilities used … were overly prudent.’ 
(NERA 2003, p. 21). 
EFIC stated in its submission to the draft report that a similar review would be 
unnecessary as its financial statements for allowance for credit loss in its annual 
reports are verified by an external auditor and are not misstated: 
In the December 2011 review of EFIC’s interim financial statements the external 
auditors stated, ‘We have performed analytical review procedures and updated our 
understanding of EFIC’s valuation process and methodology … Nothing has come to 
our attention to suggest that EFIC’s fair value adjustments of loans and guarantees are 
materially misstated at 31 December 2011’. (sub. DR90, p. 32) 
The Commission does not claim that EFIC has misstated the allowance for credit 
risk (which is estimated by accumulating the expected loss of each facility) in its 
financial statements. However, the allowance for credit risk may be revised upwards 
or downwards for a range of reasons, including a change in the ERS. If expected 
losses of facilities are systematically revised (due to changes in the ERS) then this 
will lead to inaccurate estimates of expected economic profit in the pricing model. 
Evaluating whether EFIC’s allocation of an ERS to a facility is accurate over time 
will help ensure that EFIC is pricing risk appropriately. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
commission an independent review of the process it follows to allocate an EFIC 
risk score (ERS) to a facility. This review should include a comparison of the 
ERS of each facility at signing and at maturity to examine any changes over time. 
Evaluating the forecasting accuracy of expected losses compared to actual losses 
will help ensure that EFIC prices risk appropriately. EFIC should report the 
results of this review to the Minister. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.1 
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In sum 
This section has examined the factors affecting EFIC and the techniques it employs 
to price its financial services. The Commission has concluded that the current 
arrangements do not ensure that the prices of EFIC’s products are efficient, 
particularly given its exemption from CN arrangements. 
In particular: 
• Competition from other ECAs could affect EFIC’s pricing. The OECD 
Arrangement provides only limited protection against this. 
• The risk sharing arrangements in which EFIC is not the lead ECA compromise 
its autonomy in setting prices and make it vulnerable to following another ECA 
into accepting a price that does not reflect EFIC’s expected full costs of 
provision. 
• Market comparisons may be of limited use due to the bespoke nature of EFIC’s 
facilities and the non-comprehensive nature of the information available from 
the private sector. 
• The in-house pricing model used by EFIC is very sensitive to assumptions, 
particularly the ERS assigned to the facilities. 
In section 6.1 it was also shown that EFIC has cost advantages over its private 
sector competitors due to its exemption from CN arrangements. This exemption 
reduces EFIC’s incentive to price its financial services efficiently. The next section 
evaluates whether EFIC has provided subsidised facilities. 
6.3 Analysis of whether EFIC’s products are priced 
efficiently 
The Commission has used three approaches to examine whether EFIC’s products 
are priced efficiently. It has considered client views on EFIC’s pricing, conducted 
an analysis of EFIC’s portfolio of loans and export finance guarantees, and 
examined EFIC’s financial performance. More detail on EFIC’s financial 
performance is presented in chapter 8. 
Client views on EFIC’s pricing 
The Commission received several submissions from EFIC’s clients commenting 
that its prices were similar, or higher, than those charged by private sector 
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providers. TTG Transport Technology Pty Limited (sub. 1, p. 2) stated: ‘the EFIC 
[working capital guarantee] is expensive and leaves all the risk with the exporter’. 
Ferra Engineering Pty Ltd submitted: 
The establishment and guarantee fees place a very high burden on SME’s. I think that 
Australian SME’s will be able to benefit significantly and be more competitive if 
Establishment and guarantee fees are reviewed and set at a level that is more in line 
with global benchmarks of the developed world. (sub. 8, p. 1) 
Participants made similar comments on EFIC’s prices following the release of the 
draft report: 
For Bank Guarantees / Performance Guarantees, the private banking sector is charging 
commonly 1.5% to 2% whilst EFIC equivalent cost is 3% to 4%, around double. 
(Gasco, sub. DR82, p. 2) 
Another postulation [in the Draft Report] is that EFIC has priced its products below 
true market price. Our experience has not borne this out –– recently secured 
performance bonds were at twice the rate we would normally secure for comparable 
Australian project work. (Wagner Group Holdings, sub. DR31, p. 1) 
EFIC prices their risks adequately, in line with market norms. (Zurich, sub. DR58, p. 1) 
EFIC’s charges were market rate commensurate with the high quality of evaluation. 
(Lean Field Developments, sub. DR78, p. 3). 
In Austal’s experience, when compared on a like-for-like basis the rates offered by 
EFIC are no lower than those offered by commercial banks. (Austal, sub. DR110, 
p. 13) 
However, given EFIC is to operate in the market gap, some of its facilities are for 
facilities have relatively higher risk than those accepted by private sector providers. 
In these cases, EFIC’s prices should be higher than private sector providers to 
compensate for higher expected losses. 
In addition, because EFIC is small and enters few transactions relative to private 
sector providers, it may not benefit from economies of scale in operating expenses 
and has fewer transactions over which to spread these costs. Even if EFIC’s prices 
are the same, or higher, than the private sector for a similar level of risk, EFIC may 
still be subsidising the provision of financial services. For example, EFIC’s 
operating costs may be higher and it may not be as efficient at providing financial 
services as the private sector (discussed further in chapter 8). 
Being a price taker does not ensure efficient outcomes 
Some participants, including EFIC, asserted that EFIC is a price taker and is 
therefore pricing at the market rate. This was supported by a claim that EFIC’s 
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prices were at least the same, if not higher, than other private sector participants in 
the same project. NAB, for example, stated:  
In our experience in co-financing projects with ECAs, including EFIC, we have not 
found that the ECAs “crowd out” the private market through below market pricing. 
Rather, we have found that EFIC in particular has been quite careful to become 
involved in financings only where a “market gap” is apparent and to be a “price taker” 
in that they accept pricing already determined by the private lending syndicate. 
(sub. DR92, p. 3) 
Similarly, WICET noted: 
The price at which the EFIC guaranteed portion of senior debt is provided to WICET is 
on exactly the same terms and conditions as all other senior debt lenders. This was 
determined as part of the extensive capital raising process for the transaction. As EFIC 
is providing a guarantee of a portion of senior debt, rather than directly lending, EFIC 
only retains a portion of that return and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, the 
lender of record, earns a margin within that return.  
The other export credit agencies or government supported financiers earn the full 
market return being paid by WICET as they are providing direct funding and not 
guarantees to other financiers. (sub. 37, p. 5) 
EFIC stated: 
As a price taker EFIC has consistently demonstrated the capacity to crowd in private 
capital (trans., p. 110). 
EFIC’s price can be the same, or even higher, than other providers when jointly 
financing a project but EFIC could still be providing finance below the market 
price –– the price at which the market would have offered finance had EFIC not 
been involved. 
The observed price when EFIC provides joint finance to a project can be different to 
the ‘market’ price of finance. When markets function well, the true market price is 
the price which would have been generated by market participants in the absence of 
EFIC’s involvement. Figure 6.3 illustrates how the pricing of a project that is co-
financed would occur with and without the support of EFIC. In panel A, the price at 
which finance is offered is shown for lenders A, B, C and D. The market price will 
be set at the price offered by the marginal lender (in this example, lender D). 
Without EFIC’s involvement, the market price at which the marginal lender will 
supply finance is higher than the project’s return (shown by the dark shaded area). 
The project cannot earn a positive return for lender D (the price of finance offered is 
greater than the project’s return) and the project would not go ahead. 
In panel B, EFIC offers finance at a price that matches other co-financiers’ price, 
but is below what would have been offered by the marginal lender D in EFIC’s 
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absence — the true market price for the transaction. In this case EFIC sets the price 
at a level sufficient to generate a positive return for all financiers involved in the 
project and the project will proceed. However, the project would not have 
proceeded if the price of the required finance was determined in the market. 
Figure 6.3 Market price for finance with and without EFIC’s participation 
 
  
 
Price Required finance 
Project return 
Panel A: Structured trade and project finance transaction without EFIC 
A B C D 
Market price 
  
Quantity 
Therefore, although participants to this inquiry, including EFIC, noted that EFIC 
prices at rates similar to other providers in a structured finance project, this is not a 
valid comparison for the purpose of ascertaining the price if EFIC was not involved 
in the transaction. This could mask inefficient transactions. EFIC is providing 
finance ‘at the margin’, that is, at a quantum where the private sector cannot earn a 
commercial return. Therefore, it is to be expected that EFIC charge a higher price 
than the only other (private sector) participants willing to finance the transaction. 
  
 
Price 
Quantity 
Required finance 
Panel B: Structured trade and project finance transaction with EFIC 
 
EFIC A B C D 
Market price 
Project return 
Actual price 
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Analysis of EFIC’s portfolio of loans and export finance guarantees  
The Commission has conducted an analysis of some of EFIC’s loans and export 
finance guarantees to assess whether facilities are under-priced, given the risk 
incurred. 
EFIC provided the Commission with access to information on loans and export 
finance guarantees written since 2005-06, and for those written prior to 2005-06, 
but are still outstanding (that is, those that have not reached maturity). 
The information included: 
• agreement and maturity dates of the loan or export finance guarantee 
• exporting firm 
• borrower type –– private or sovereign 
• contract value details 
– the facility amount 
– currency of loan 
• performance of the loan (for example, whether it is being repaid, still being 
drawn or is high risk (impaired)) 
• interest rate –– the reference rate and margin 
• repayment frequency (for example, semi-annual, monthly instalments) 
• the ERS (current, and at the time the loan was established) 
• commitment and establishment fees. 
In total, 13 loans were written on the CA between 2005-06 and 2010-11 (table 3.3). 
One of those loans was jointly financed on the CA and NIA. A small number of 
loans contributed to the majority of the value of all loans over the period. The 
resource sector and ship building industries represented the largest share of loans by 
value. 
Estimation methods used in past studies of export credit agencies 
The Commission considered past research on estimating export credit subsidies and 
examined the estimation methods used in studies of other ECAs (discussed further 
in appendix B). There are insufficient data to enable the Commission to estimate the 
level of subsidy for all of EFIC’s facilities using the methods cited in the literature. 
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Reasons for this include: 
• There are few data points to draw on –– three loans contributed to two-thirds of 
the total value of loans over the five years to 2010-11. Although there is a larger 
sample if a longer time period is used (up to 20 years), these data are not directly 
comparable because: 
– The pricing method used by EFIC has changed since the 1990s, particularly 
in the past few years. 
– Corporate rates of default are updated each year. It is difficult to estimate and 
compare what the general provision for expected loss and the cost of capital 
should be for transactions entered into at different points in time. The 
parameters are influenced by default probability rates that vary significantly, 
especially during periods of financial crisis. For example, the global 
corporate default rate for B-rated assets was 4 per cent in 2008, 10 per cent in 
2009 and 1 per cent in 2010 (S&P 2011b). 
• Results are sensitive to a ‘market’ rate of interest and there is no readily 
obtainable comparable rate. Research undertaken by others typically infers or 
estimates a market rate, which requires several assumptions to be made. 
Appendix B describes the limitations in accurately estimating market interest 
rates required for calculating the subsidy for loans. 
• Results are sensitive to some data, such as grace and drawdown periods, that 
were not available to the Commission for all facilities. 
– A loan may have a relatively low margin because it has a shorter grace period 
compared to a loan with similar risk that has a higher margin. 
– Low margin income can be offset by higher income from establishment fees 
or commitment fees. Commitment fees are applied to the undrawn amount of 
a facility and the Commission did not have access to the drawdown profile. 
– Although assumptions regarding these data can be made, the accuracy of any 
subsidy will be influenced by these assumptions, meaning a precise estimate 
of the subsidy cannot be inferred. 
Assessing economic profit using EFIC’s in-house pricing model 
EFIC’s pricing model can be used to forecast the economic profit and return on 
equity for a facility. The return on equity and economic profit are indicators of 
whether a facility is commercially viable. 
EFIC has not clearly indicated whether there is a minimum expected return on 
equity for a facility to be approved. During the public hearings, EFIC’s Managing 
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Director and CEO indicated that, on an individual transaction basis, if a ‘high-risk’ 
transaction was expected to earn less than 8 per cent return then it would be queried 
as to whether it should be approved but not necessarily rejected (trans., pp. 282–3). 
EFIC has previously advised the Commission that the risk free rate of return (which 
EFIC considers to be the 10 year government bond rate) is the minimum return on 
equity required to approve a transaction (pers. comm., January 16, 2012). 
The Commission has analysed the economic profit of some loan and export finance 
guarantee facilities in EFIC’s portfolio using EFIC’s in-house pricing model. The 
Commission found that some loans and export finance guarantees were not forecast 
to earn an economic profit. A facility that is not expected to earn an economic profit 
is effectively being subsidised in advance by taxpayers. 
EFIC’s response to the draft report 
EFIC stated that the expected default probabilities in its pricing model are only 
useful ‘to the extent that past performance is helpful in predicting the future’ 
(sub. DR90, p. 32). Put another way, because the pricing model is a hypothetical 
model, the actual economic profit of a facility can be different to its expected 
economic profit. Thus even though a loan may have an expected (ex ante) economic 
loss, the actual profit would be positive, ex post, if that loan did not become 
impaired. Nevertheless, across a portfolio, the forecast provision for expected loss 
should be similar to its actual loss over time, even though the realised economic 
profit of an individual facility may be different to its forecast economic profit. If the 
pricing model is not accurate in forecasting expected loss then there is a risk of over 
or under-estimating the expected loss of a facility which will in turn lead to 
inefficient pricing (this is what recommendation 6.1 aims to determine). 
EFIC also stated during the public hearings that the Commission used its own 
assumptions in the pricing model and disagreed that individual transactions were 
being subsidised (trans., p. 287). The Commission acknowledges that some 
assumptions were required because data on drawdown and grace periods were not 
provided by EFIC for all facilities, but this does not detract from the fact that some 
facilities were expected to be subsidised in advance. EFIC did not dispute that these 
data were not available to the Commission. 
However, the Commission undertook sensitivity analysis on individual facilities by 
using a feasible range of assumptions (given the minimum guidelines under the 
OECD Arrangement) when data on drawdown and grace periods were not available. 
The Commission found that some facilities were still not expected to earn an 
economic profit and are therefore being subsidised in advance. 
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Importantly, EFIC did provide the Commission with all the required data to model 
the return on equity and economic profit for two recent CA facilities. Using EFIC’s 
in-house pricing model, the Commission estimated that one of those facilities was 
expected to earn an economic loss of about $20 million. EFIC has confirmed that it 
obtained the same result5 for this facility as the Commission (pers. comm., 16 
January 2012) and has not stated that the Commission used the pricing model 
incorrectly to estimate the expected economic profit for this facility. 
In response to the draft report, EFIC stated that the Commission should clarify the 
portion of EFIC’s portfolio that it claims is subsidised (sub. DR90). For the reasons 
outlined above (and noted in the draft report) there is insufficient data to accurately 
quantify the subsidy rate on a portfolio basis. EFIC did not dispute this, although it 
did raise concerns as to how the Commission could then conclude there was a 
subsidy. In response, the Commission is of the view that EFIC has approved some 
facilities that were not expected to earn an economic profit based on analysis of 
facilities for which there was sufficient data. 
A discussion of EFIC’s financial performance at the portfolio level is presented in 
chapter 8. The Commission notes that EFIC has generated only modest accounting 
profits and has earned a low rate of return on equity compared to the government 
bond rate and other benchmarks. This is despite its exemption from competitive 
neutrality arrangements and consequent lower borrowing costs and tax expenses, 
compared to private sector providers. 
When a facility is subsidised this subsidy is effectively borne by taxpayers as EFIC 
is owned by the Australian Government. The beneficiaries of any subsidy can 
extend beyond EFIC’s immediate clients because, as mentioned above, EFIC enters 
into risk sharing arrangements with other financiers. This is discussed in more detail 
in chapter 7. 
FINDING 6.2 
Not all of EFIC’s facilities are priced to earn a commercial rate of return on equity 
and hence, do not cover their expected full costs, including the opportunity cost of 
capital. These facilities are effectively being subsidised by taxpayers. The 
beneficiaries of these subsidies likely extend beyond EFIC’s clients and may include 
private sector providers, other export credit agencies and the buyer of the exports. 
                                                     
5 The pricing model produces slightly different results depending on the date that it is run as 
discount rates are regularly updated and default probabilities may have changed. EFIC 
acknowledged that there was a slight discrepancy between the current results and those that EFIC 
obtained when the facility was approved. Importantly, EFIC verified that the model forecast an 
economic loss of about $20 million at the time the facility was approved. 
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The Commission is of the view that EFIC should not have any cost advantages over 
private sector providers resulting from its exemption from CN arrangements. EFIC 
should price all of its facilities such that the expected full costs of provision are 
recovered. Both of these measures will ensure EFIC does not provide subsidised 
finance on that CA. 
The Commission considers that the Export Finance and Insurance Act 1991 (Cwlth) 
(EFIC Act) should be amended to ensure EFIC’s activities on the CA are compliant 
with CN arrangements, including paying a tax-equivalent charge and a debt 
neutrality fee. Interim arrangements should be put in place until such time as 
changes to the EFIC Act are passed by Parliament. The SoE should be amended to 
require EFIC to publicly report that part of its revenues that relate to these pricing 
principles until the EFIC Act is amended. 
EFIC should also be required to earn an appropriately benchmarked rate of return 
on equity to allow EFIC to transparently demonstrate that providing financial 
services to newly exporting SMEs can be commercially viable. 
The Australian Government should amend the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC Act) to ensure EFIC’s activity on the commercial 
account complies with competitive neutrality arrangements. This will require 
EFIC to pay a tax-equivalent charge and a debt neutrality fee. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to: 
• require the pricing of EFIC’s commercial account facilities to reflect the 
expected full economic cost of provision, including the opportunity cost of 
capital, taxes paid by private sector participants and the benefit that EFIC 
obtains from the government guarantee 
• set an appropriately benchmarked rate of return on equity following 
consultation with the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance 
• require EFIC to identify in its annual report and corporate plan that part of its 
revenue that relates to not having to pay a tax-equivalent charge and debt 
neutrality fee, until the EFIC Act is amended to apply competitive neutrality 
arrangements. 
RECOMMENDATION 6.2 
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7 Economic impacts of current 
arrangements 
 
Key points 
• EFIC is expected to perform its functions only in circumstances where private sector 
providers are not able or willing to provide services for financially viable transactions 
and projects. This is referred to as the ‘market gap’ mandate. 
• The market gap can cover circumstances where there is no market failure that 
warrants EFIC’s intervention in financial markets. 
– EFIC is unnecessarily changing the allocation of resources in the economy if its 
involvement in financial markets is not addressing a market failure. 
– The greater the flow on or multiplier effects of EFIC’s intervention, the larger the 
economy-wide distortion if the intervention occurs in the absence of a market 
failure. 
• Where EFIC engages in projects and transactions that would have gone ahead 
without its participation, it will be crowding out a private sector provider of finance, or 
removing the need for companies to call on other sources of finance, including 
equity. 
• There is no convincing evidence that there are problems relating to the provision of 
capital to resource-related projects in Australia, or suppliers to those projects, that 
require EFIC’s intervention in financial markets.  
• EFIC’s involvement generates a benefit for a small number of clients and parties to 
the transaction. However, the costs are borne by others in the economy, including 
the direct competitors of the assisted firms and the taxpayer. 
• EFIC’s relationship with private sector providers of finance and insurance, exporters 
and other export credit agencies alters incentives to efficiently provide and consume 
export finance and insurance. 
• Private sector providers of finance and insurance benefit from their relationship with 
EFIC in several ways including through the transfer of some of their risk to EFIC and 
achieving higher returns. 
• EFIC’s support may be becoming entrenched in some firms’ business strategies. 
This includes exporting firms and, to a smaller degree, some private sector 
providers of financial services.  
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Chapter 5 examined potential rationales for maintaining an export credit agency and 
concluded that, with the exception of some information-related market failures 
affecting newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the 
provision of financial services through the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation (EFIC) is not warranted on market failure grounds. Chapter 6 
considered how EFIC prices its financial products and concluded that some of its 
facilities were priced below the expected full economic cost of provision. 
This chapter examines the economic impacts of EFIC’s operation on the 
commercial account (CA) in the context of its market gap mandate, and the earlier 
finding that some of EFIC’s transactions are subsidised. It also considers EFIC’s 
relationship with private sector providers of finance and insurance, exporters and 
other export credit agencies (ECAs) to examine the effect EFIC has on their 
incentives to efficiently provide and consume export finance and insurance. 
7.1 The market gap 
EFIC’s capacity to support Australian exporters on its commercial account is 
qualified by its market gap mandate — it is only to operate where the private sector 
is not able or willing to service viable Australian export transactions or overseas 
projects. 
The purpose of the market gap mandate is to constrain EFIC’s activities to parts of 
the market that are not served by the private sector thereby seeking to ensure it 
complements, rather than competes with private sector providers. The market gap 
mandate is the basis for EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality 
arrangements (discussed in chapter 6). 
EFIC noted in its submission to the draft report that efforts to give greater certainty 
to Government and EFIC’s clients include developing criteria for the market gap 
(box 7.1) and the establishment of a ‘portfolio risk band’. The portfolio risk band 
is a: 
 … quantitative risk-based measure for EFIC’s activities (i.e a portfolio that was too 
risky could result in losses, or a portfolio of too high quality might suggest EFIC’s 
activities were intruding on the market. (sub. DR90, p. 23) 
The criteria and the process EFIC uses for assessing the presence and size of the 
market gap are vague. It is also not clear how an indicator of risk, in isolation from 
knowledge of the price a private sector provider would be willing to accept to 
compensate for that risk, provides further guidance on the presence or otherwise of 
a market gap. 
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EFIC argued that the ‘market gap recognises instances of market failure’ 
(sub. 18, p. 9). The four rationales for government intervention claimed by EFIC in 
its submission to the Commission’s Issues Paper were credit rationing, information, 
cross-border contracts and financial crises. The Commission’s assessment of these 
rationales is discussed in chapter 5. It was also noted that, even if a market failure is 
present, this does not necessarily mean governments should intervene or that the 
most efficient form of intervention is government provision of export finance and 
insurance through EFIC. 
 
Box 7.1 EFIC’s criteria for the market gap 
EFIC states that it assesses transactions on a case-by-case basis using six markers to 
determine whether the transaction meets the definition of ‘market gap’: 
• risk — such as country or project specific risk 
• size — whether the project’s size affects commercial market participation 
• term — a facility with a longer term will be more likely to be in the market gap than 
shorter term facilities 
• industry — higher risk industries, such as developing industries, are more likely to 
be in the market gap 
• firm size — whether the firm’s size or experience creates a barrier for commercial 
providers, or the firm’s experience heightens their perception of risk in a particular 
market 
• private market capacity — whether current country or project limits, term constraints 
or lack of relevant experience affect the extent or quality of coverage provided or the 
consistency or reliability of private sector support. 
Source: EFIC (sub. 18).  
 
Is there a market gap? 
EFIC’s market gap mandate may encourage it to take on some transactions that are 
riskier than private sector providers are usually willing to accept given the expected 
returns from the transaction. For example, long-term loans are more risky to finance 
than short-term loans, all other things being equal. Similarly, transactions involving 
firms with relatively little experience in exporting may be more risky than other 
transactions. So too, may transactions involving firms that operate in comparatively 
risky industries, or that export to nations with high sovereign risk or poorly 
functioning legal systems.  
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EFIC states that two of the reasons clients seek support are credit constraints within 
the private sector and EFIC’s ability to assist with long-term financing requirements 
beyond the capacity of the private market, for example, facilities with tenor of more 
than 10 years (sub. 18). 
Should EFIC take on more risk than private sector providers? 
Risk is most efficiently borne by those best able to manage it and not just those able 
to afford it, particularly where it comes to government providers that are not subject 
to the same commercial discipline and constraints that apply in the private sector. 
The fact that it is difficult to secure finance and insurance for high-risk export 
transactions is not surprising as it reflects the nature of financial markets and the 
fact that capital is scarce. Exporters must pay more to secure finance or insurance 
for high-risk transactions than for low-risk transactions. As a result, high-risk 
transactions will not go ahead where the cost of financing or insuring those 
transactions is such that the transaction would no longer be commercially viable. 
This is not a market failure but an essential feature of financial markets that is 
consistent with prudent financial management. 
Government attempts to interfere with the process of allocating capital through 
well-functioning markets potentially increases the number of bad loans made and 
may lead to inefficient market outcomes (Day and Liebowitz 1998). The examples 
of failed attempts by Government-run financial institutions to allocate capital to 
opportunities rejected by the private sector (discussed in chapter 4) lend support to 
this argument. Jubilee Australia observed: 
 … just because a project or transaction is beyond the risk appetite of private financiers, 
this does not alone signal the need for government intervention in the form of official 
export credit, whether on the Commercial Account or the National Interest Account. In 
this case, rather than facilitating and encouraging Australian exports to the benefit of 
the wider Australian community, EFIC is being used to shift the risk for global trade 
and investment from private banks and companies to the public-sector, taxpayer backed 
export credit accounts. EFIC is, in this case, the ‘lender of last resort’ for Australia’s 
riskiest export activities. (sub. 12, p. 7) 
The transaction based approach to the market gap — evidence from participants 
For the most part, it appears the private sector offers the same types of products as 
those offered by EFIC (although this does not mean they are offered in all markets, 
such as those with high sovereign risk) (chapter 3). This suggests that the issue may 
primarily be the price and other conditions on which individual transactions are not 
supported by the private sector. This is confirmed by EFIC’s board papers that 
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indicate the market gap is generally defined in the context of individual transactions 
that EFIC considers would otherwise not attract sufficient support from the private 
sector (discussed further in chapter 9). 
Evidence from participants shows that a number of transactions in which EFIC has 
become involved on the basis of the market gap do not have a sound market failure 
basis for intervention. 
Assisting the firm to meet its preferences for risk and sources of finance 
Brookfield Rail obtained debt financing from a syndicate of banks to fund a 
$565 million rail upgrade in Western Australia (box 7.3). Brookfield Australia’s 
submission states: 
Brookfield Rail was required to secure additional debt financing in order for the 
investment program to provide the return profile required to warrant the investment of 
equity by its parent. (sub. DR102, p. 1) 
Brookfield Australia also indicated that the construction facility was required to 
adhere to a framework for additional indebtedness provided under the existing 
syndicated loan facility. Among other conditions, the framework required that 
security associated with capital expenditures and increased indebtedness be 
provided. EFIC entered into an agreement with Brookfield Rail in 2011 to provide a 
US$270 million insurance policy to meet this requirement for additional security. 
In this example, it appears that the preferences of the parent company, Brookfield 
Asset Management, and Brookfield Rail’s lenders played an important role in the 
requirement for EFIC participation in the transaction. Additional debt was required 
to meet the company’s preferences for a particular investment return profile and 
additional security was required to meet the lender’s risk preferences. The 
company’s internal policy determined more debt was needed and, in turn, 
Brookfield Rail’s lenders determined that insurance was needed to enable the 
investment to go ahead — not a failure in financial markets. 
It may also be the case that the Australian Government’s or EFIC’s participation is 
explicitly cited by clients or private sector providers as a precondition for the 
transaction to go ahead. The ship building company Austal, for example, stated that 
EFIC support has often been made a precondition by clients to facilitate the sale of 
their vessels. This is typically the case when the commercial lender in the buyer’s 
country is unable to fund a transaction. The submission goes on to state that 
commercial lenders are withdrawing from the market due to turmoil in global 
financial markets, a situation compounded by upheaval in European capital markets 
(sub. 27). 
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At the public hearing Austal stated that, in relation to the sale of a particular vessel: 
The sovereign nation that we're dealing with has said that they do need funding support 
for the transaction. They have specifically asked for Australian government support. 
(trans., p. 50) 
As noted earlier, EFIC’s participation in export transactions lowers the risk borne 
by other parties to the transaction. A preference for EFIC or Australian Government 
participation is an explicit call to shift risk from the participants in the transaction to 
taxpayers — and does not constitute a market failure. 
EFIC’s involvement in a transaction may also allow a firm’s owners to avoid 
diluting their equity. 
When asked whether it would consider finding other equity partners, Bronx 
International stated: 
I think that will only happen if we wanted to diversify into a different sort of 
business … We don’t see any need really to get a lot of equity for the sort of business 
we’re doing now … (trans., p. 209) 
There are alternate sources of finance available to a firm’s owners when seeking to 
expand their operations. Owners may have preferences for certain types of finance 
over others, and even preferred times at which to access sources of finance 
including equity; nevertheless, a reluctance to issue new equity, and thus dilute the 
ownership of existing shareholders, does not represent a market failure or provide 
grounds for support by a government agency such as EFIC. 
Supporting clients because of transaction costs of switching to a private provider  
In justifying the grounds for repeat business with Shark Bay Salt, EFIC commented: 
EFIC provided support because the company’s Australian bank could not confirm the 
letters of credit due to its internal counterparty/country limits on Indonesia. The cost to 
the exporter of moving to another bank was prohibitive due to ‘switching costs’ and 
without switching, other banks would have little incentive to support a ‘one-off’ 
(relatively small) export transaction. (sub. DR90, pp. 80–1) 
Reluctance on the part of an exporter to incur the costs of finding a bank more 
supportive of their business activities is not an instance of market failure. It is in the 
interests of an exporter to investigate alternative financial providers and the costs of 
switching are part of that decision. Other firms and individuals within the economy 
regularly make these decisions without any government involvement. 
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A means of overcoming prudential limits of the client’s banks 
Another instance illustrating that the market gap concept is not equivalent to market 
failure occurred in relation to a direct loan provided to Leighton Holdings 
announced in 2009. Of this facility, EFIC (2009a) stated: 
Growth in its Indonesian operations meant the Leighton Group needed to expand its 
existing mining fleet and equipment. Leighton has strong business fundamentals, but 
approached EFIC for assistance as it had reached its approved offshore leasing limits 
with its banks. (p. 25) 
However, the fact that a company has reached the prudentially determined credit 
limit of their bank normally would not be a ground for intervention by a public 
agency. Financial institutions limit their exposures to risks as part of sound financial 
practice. As discussed throughout this chapter, there are alternative sources of 
finance available to businesses such as equity raising. 
Supporting clients unable to secure finance because of recent financial distress 
EFIC offered a bond facility in the 2011-12 financial year to Greyhound Australia 
for transport services in Western Australia (box 7.2). This is part of an initiative 
involving suppliers of goods and services that form an ‘integral’ part of an ultimate 
export (trans., pp. 117–9). In discussing this particular facility, EFIC remarked: 
 … Greyhound went through some difficulties and the company was turned around and 
is backed by a number of banks. None of them were prepared to issue the bond, or not 
under the circumstances. So therefore we negotiated with Greyhound … (trans., p. 122) 
This would also not provide grounds for intervention if, in this case, the banks 
concerned were not willing to issue the bond with less than full-cash cover due to 
the recent financial performance of the prospective client. Financial institutions 
examine the recent financial performance of prospective borrowers and unless their 
decisions are affected by information problems (discussed in chapter 5), the 
outcomes would not justify government intervention through EFIC. 
Assisting clients to meet project and financing deadlines 
Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal (WICET) Pty Ltd, for example, submitted to 
the Commission: 
EFIC’s involvement from April 2011 and final commitment in September 2011 was a 
critical component for WICET being able to complete the financing. WICET’s mandate 
could have been withdrawn by the Queensland Government had Financial Close not 
been achieved within the State’s timeframe. (sub. DR37, p. 5)  
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The failure by one party to the transaction to meet a commercially agreed deadline 
is not a market failure and would not form the basis for government assistance 
elsewhere in the economy. Delays in reaching financial close can be the result of 
private risk preferences. Delays may indicate, for example, that potential parties to 
the transaction regard the project’s financing structure as commercially unattractive, 
that one of the parties requires more information before confirming their 
participation, or that the firm was too ambitious in its ability to meet the timeframes 
set by it or the government. 
 
Box 7.2 Should EFIC have supported Greyhound Australia? 
In 2012, EFIC provided a $5 million performance bond on behalf of Greyhound 
Australia (EFIC 2012f) for it to meet the terms of a $105 million contract to provide 
coach services for a mining operation at Wheatstone in Western Australia. The facility 
is one of the first under a new initiative to serve suppliers contributing to the production 
of exports but who themselves do not export. Under the initiative, suppliers ‘must form 
an integral part of the overall resource export project’ to be eligible for EFIC’s support 
(EFIC ndd, p. 1). Eligible suppliers can apply to EFIC for bank guarantees, working 
capital support and longer-term finance. 
A market gap? 
The ‘market gap’ identified by EFIC was the unwillingness of Greyhound Australia’s 
bankers (including ANZ which is also the company’s former majority shareholder) to 
provide a bond with less than full-cash cover. This was despite Greyhound Australia’s 
long history in the coach industry, its financial restructure and its other contracts to 
service mining operations. At public hearings EFIC stated: 
The performance bond is for six years. There is no bank in Australia that is willing to take 
risk on Greyhound for six years. There is just not the slightest question about it. What EFIC 
has done is provide that bond to Greyhound to enable it to win business. (trans., p. 129) 
Greyhound Australia’s inability to source a performance bond with less than full-cash 
cover may in part stem from its financial situation — an insolvency and turnaround 
advisory firm was appointed by ANZ to restructure the company in 2006 and in recent 
times, Greyhound Australia has undertaken a review of its business strategy. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 7.2 (continued) 
An inability to source a financial product because of a firm’s particular financial 
situation does not constitute a market failure. A range of alternatives may have arisen if 
EFIC had not provided a performance bond. For example, Greyhound Australia may 
either have renegotiated the terms of service, provided a bond with full-cash cover or 
the contract may have been awarded to another firm. In fact, EFIC’s actions precluded 
those outcomes. It stated: 
We gave them the financial support they needed to ensure that they won that business and 
it couldn't go elsewhere. (trans., p. 130) 
Local content? 
Information provided to the Commission by EFIC indicates Greyhound Australia was 
the preferred tenderer over a number of Australian competing tenderers, and one with 
foreign ownership (EFIC pers. comm., 11 April 2012). When assessing Greyhound 
Australia’s application for the performance bond, EFIC did not seek to confirm which 
firm was the next preferred tenderer. This was despite stating at public hearings: ‘what 
is important is the Australian content component, and this is why this initiative has been 
started’ (trans., p. 124). EFIC’s focus was on Greyhound Australia’s ability to proceed 
with the contract, and less so on whether its support for Greyhound disadvantaged 
local competitors. 
Relationship to exports? 
At public hearings, EFIC was also unable to present a clear rationale as to why coach 
operators servicing domestic resource projects should be eligible for assistance when 
other suppliers, such as cleaners and caterers, are not (trans., p. 127). In assisting 
Greyhound Australia, EFIC has adopted a very broad definition of exports, a precedent 
bringing a significant risk that it will continue to extend its activities where no market 
failures are present.  
 
Market gaps per se do not warrant government intervention  
Given the discussion above, the Commission does not consider that the market gap 
concept is helpful in establishing whether government intervention may be 
warranted. The concept of the market gap is so broad it captures transactions that 
have no market failure rationale for government intervention. For these reasons, the 
Commission considers that the market gap concept is unsound and does not ensure 
that EFIC’s activities address a market failure. 
In the context of a well-functioning financial market, there will be sound reasons 
why private providers do not support particular transactions. The disconnect 
between market failure and the market gap means that EFIC’s decisions to support a 
transaction are not based on economic signals that would normally incentivise the 
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provision (and consumption) of export finance and insurance. This has the 
consequence that EFIC is involved in transactions that unnecessarily change the 
allocation of resources in the economy. Assurances by prospective clients that other 
sources of capital have been exhausted, a client’s preferences for risk or a particular 
business model, or a reluctance to bear the full costs of alternatives are not 
sufficient to determine that EFIC’s involvement in a transaction or project will 
enhance the economic welfare of the Australian community. 
The concept of the market gap can cover circumstances where there is no market 
failure that would warrant government intervention through EFIC. EFIC has 
provided assistance on the basis of the market gap in circumstances that are not a 
result of market failure including: 
• a reluctance by firms to dilute the equity of existing shareholders by taking on 
additional equity partners as a firm expands 
• firms exhausting other forms of debt or equity finance 
• meeting the credit preferences of the firm’s owners 
• participants making EFIC’s involvement a precondition of the transaction or 
project proceeding 
• reluctance by an exporter or buyer to incur the transaction costs of finding more 
supportive bankers 
• firms reaching the prudentially determined credit limits of their banks 
• private sector providers declining to supply services because of recent financial 
distress of the client 
• timeframes determined by approval processes, including government approval 
processes, not being met without EFIC’s assistance 
• private sector providers seeking to make a transaction or project more attractive 
through EFIC’s participation. 
The Minister should remove the ‘market gap’ mandate from the Statement of 
Expectations as it lacks rigour and does not ensure that EFIC’s activities 
generate a net benefit to the economy. 
FINDING 7.1 
RECOMMENDATION 7.1 
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Application of EFIC’s market gap mandate — domestic resource 
projects and large companies 
Further consideration of EFIC’s activities demonstrates how operating under a 
market gap mandate enables it to become involved in financing or supporting large 
projects that are not subject to market failures. This involvement distorts the 
allocation of resources in the economy and exposes the Commonwealth to 
non-trivial financial risk. 
EFIC’s support of large firms and resource-related projects 
The provision of facilities for large firms formed a significant proportion of EFIC’s 
2010-11 signings (table 7.1). In addition, EFIC has recently turned its focus to 
financing projects located in Australia related to the export of resources. EFIC has 
supported corporate clients in several projects: 
• EFIC provided a US$100 million export finance guarantee to the Wiggins Island 
coal export terminal consortium for a $3 billion project to increase coal export 
capacity at the Port of Gladstone (box 7.3) 
• EFIC provided a US$270 million insurance policy to Brookfield Australia for 
the upgrade of a rail line from Morawa to Geraldton (box 7.3) 
• EFIC provided a $248 million export finance guarantee to the Santos LNG 
project in Gladstone (box 7.7) 
• EFIC recently offered a bond facility worth $5.1 million to Greyhound Australia 
for the provision of transport services in Western Australia (box 7.2) 
• EFIC has also indicated an intention to participate in the Ichthys LNG project in 
northern Australia (trans., p. 144–5). 
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Table 7.1 EFIC support for large corporate firms 
Commercial account, 2010-11 
Underlying exporter Sector 
Facility 
typea 
Value 
(A$mil equiv) 
Leighton Asia (Northern) Construction Loan 76.7 
Austalb Ship building Loan 66.8 
Leighton Holdings Construction Bonding line 50.0 
UGL Limited Construction Bonding line 50.0 
Brookfield Australian Investments Construction Bonding line 48.0 
Incat Tasmania Ship building Loan 37.5 
Anglo Coal Australia Mining RPA 30.3 
Transfield Services Professional Bonding line 30.0 
Thornycroft Maritime & Associates Professional EFG 25.5 
McConnell Dowell Corporation Construction Bonding line 25.0 
Clough Groups Construction Bonding line 16.6 
a EFG denotes export finance guarantee.  RPA denotes risk participation agreement.  b Loan provided by 
EFIC to buyer of Austal vessel. 
Source: EFIC (2011a). 
 
Box 7.3 EFIC involvement in resource-related projects 
EFIC is participating in the financing of three resource-related projects. These include 
the Wiggins Island coal export terminal and the Brookfield Rail project. The third, the 
Gladstone LNG project, is discussed in box 7.7. 
Wiggins Island coal export terminal 
EFIC provided a US$100 million export finance guarantee to the $3 billion senior 
project finance debt facilities for the Wiggins Island coal export terminal (EFIC 2011e). 
Once fully operational the terminal will provide more than 80 million tonnes of 
additional export coal capacity through the Port of Gladstone each year (WICET nd). 
There are 19 financial institutions providing finance to the project, and EFIC’s 
involvement guarantees US$100 million of debt for Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation (EFIC 2011e). 
Brookfield rail upgrade 
In early 2011, Brookfield Rail commenced an upgrade of the rail infrastructure between 
Geraldton and an iron ore mine located in Karara, Western Australia. The mine is a 
joint venture between Gindalbie Metals and Chinese company, Ansteel. The rail 
infrastructure is part of the general rail system in the mid-west of Western Australia, 
formerly operated by the Western Australian Government. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box 7.3 (continued) 
EFIC disclosed its involvement in the upgrade in the second half of 2011. 
EFIC has provided a US$270 million insurance policy to Brookfield Australia Pty Ltd for 
the Brookfield rail upgrade project. The purpose of the facility is to insure the credit risk 
on a letter of credit issued by a AA- rated bank owned by the Chinese government 
(EFIC, pers. comm., 12 December 2011).  
More than half of the facility will be reinsured by another export credit agency. 
Brookfield Rail is a wholly owned subsidiary of Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P., a 
company with extensive worldwide operations. The company’s other interests include 
European ports, Canadian freehold timberlands and US electricity transmission 
(Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. 2011). The parent company, Brookfield Asset 
Management, is listed on the Toronto and New York Stock Exchanges, and in 2007 
acquired Australian construction firm Multiplex. 
In the year ending 31 December 2011, Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. reported 
a net income of US$440 million, and had more than US$13 billion in assets at 
31 December 2011 (Brookfield Infrastructure Partners L.P. 2012). 
Brookfield Australia Pty Ltd noted in its submission to the Commission ‘there was no 
obligation on Brookfield Rail, regulatory or otherwise, to invest in the track upgrade 
unless it determined the commercial rationale warranted the investment and the 
assumption of associated risks’ (sub. DR102, p. 1). That is, Brookfield Rail entered into 
the rail upgrade project based on commercial returns to the company. 
The submission further noted EFIC’s support was sought because ‘Brookfield Rail was 
required to secure additional debt financing in order for the investment program to 
provide the return profile required to warrant the investment of equity by its parent’ 
(sub. DR102, p. 1). EFIC’s submission to the draft report noted that Brookfield Rail and 
its lenders were unprepared to accept the risk of a government owned Chinese bank 
without risk mitigation in place. Rather than EFIC’s involvement being driven by a 
failure in financial markets, it was the company’s internal policy that determined more 
debt was needed and, in turn, Brookfield Rail’s lenders who determined that insurance 
was needed to enable the investment to go ahead.  
 
Evidence on the availability of finance  
Following its draft recommendation that EFIC cease to undertake this type of 
activity on the CA, the Commission received many submissions claiming a need for 
EFIC to participate in large resource projects located in Australia. One exception to 
the views expressed in these submissions came from the Australian Industry Group: 
We support the recommendation that EFIC should not continue to provide finance for 
domestic resource projects on the commercial account. Feedback from our membership 
indicates industries outside the mining sector, such as food processing, 
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pharmaceuticals, scientific equipment, transport equipment and cosmetics for example, 
that require substantial funds for capital investment to lift their ability to export, 
struggle to obtain funding. (sub. DR98, pp. 1-2) 
In contrast, several participants noted the long pipeline of resource and 
infrastructure projects in Australia and suggested that projected capital expenditure 
is more than the private sector is able to service. For example, EFIC stated that one 
product currently underprovided by the private sector is: 
Project financing for large export infrastructure projects due to the extremely large debt 
requirements and the current withdrawal of international banks, particularly European 
banks. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 18) 
A number of EFIC’s clients submitted to this inquiry that following the global 
financial crisis (GFC), there were shortfalls in private market capacity for project 
finance. 
For example, Santos argued: 
In this market environment, EFIC and offshore export credit agencies play an important 
role in providing funding (whether directly or through provision of guarantees) 
particularly during a period when access to financing has been difficult and a number 
of market participants have been withdrawing. (sub. DR64, p. 2)  
An imbalance between demand for, and supply of, capital is not a market failure — 
this happens in all markets. Balance is typically restored over time through changes 
in the market price (chapter 5). The Commission has found no convincing evidence 
to indicate there are regulatory or other barriers that impede access to debt or equity 
finance for large firms, or resource and infrastructure projects located in Australia, 
that would justify EFIC’s involvement. The Commission has found: 
• Following a dip during the GFC, lending by banks to non-financial corporations 
has returned to pre-GFC levels. While the amount of lending by European 
domiciled banks in Australia has declined by nearly 30 per cent since early 2009, 
this has been more than offset by increased lending by Australian and Asian 
domiciled banks (figure 7.1). In addition, Australian firms continue to access 
debt and equity in domestic and offshore markets, although finance may be more 
expensive than was the case prior to the GFC. 
• Private sector investment in infrastructure over the past 10 years has nearly 
doubled (ABS 2011a). Investment in the mining sector, although declining 
slightly in 2009-10 following the GFC, has recovered to be about 20 per cent 
higher than its 2008-09 value (ABS 2011b). 
• In recent years, many of EFIC’s large clients have successfully raised finance in 
debt and equity markets. Some of the private debt issued by those firms was for 
tenor of 10 years or longer (chapter 3). 
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• Shortages of finance that limits future investment in infrastructure is generally 
not raised as an issue in the annual reports of EFIC’s large corporate clients. 
Several of those clients have reported strong financial positions and were 
optimistic about their ability to finance future investments (box 7.4). 
Figure 7.1 Loans and advances to non-financial corporations, 2006–12a 
 
a Data relate to transactions conducted with residents (individuals, businesses, or other organisations 
domiciled in Australia), recorded on the domestic books of licensed banks. Data excludes transactions of 
overseas-based offshore banking units. 
Source: APRA (2012). 
 
Box 7.4 Some of EFIC’s large corporate clients report strong financial 
positions 
Leighton Holdings: 
The Group has total available guarantee facilities of $3.5 billion of which only $2.9 billion has 
been utilised. The $650 million of undrawn guarantee facilities provides capacity for the 
continued growth in our business disciplines requiring these undertakings. (Leighton 
Holdings 2010, p. 3) 
Santos: 
Through proactive management of our balance sheet, we have built a solid capital position 
and are well placed to fund planned projects ... At the end of 2010, Santos has $7.8 billion of 
funding capacity, including cash and undrawn committed corporate and project debt 
facilities. (Santos 2011a, pp. 6–9) 
McConnell Dowell: 
Our balance sheet remains strong with $326 million cash in hand. We continue to invest in 
capital expenditure reflecting our increased work in hand. (McConnell Dowell 2011, p. 1)  
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EFIC has commented: 
Business credit growth remains lacklustre … This could be more a demand than supply 
side phenomenon. Companies (particularly mining companies) are funding themselves 
through retained earnings. The RBA estimates that internal funding currently accounts 
for 70 per cent of business funding, compared with 35 per cent in the mid 2000s. 
(EFIC 2012c, p. 5) 
Furthermore, the head of institutional loan markets at the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (Salerno) stated: 
Deals of around A$500 million ($516.28 million) would continue to be aggressively 
bid by banks ... (Thomson Reuters 2012) 
Salerno also added that although it may be difficult for borrowers to raise more than 
A$2 billion in the loan market due to difficulties with lending appetite, this ‘will 
come down to pricing and structure’. Hence, in addition to volume, other features of 
transactions in the lending market are important determinants of participation by 
private providers. 
Temporal dimension — is there value in EFIC bringing projects forward? 
EFIC argued that its involvement helped bring projects forward that would have 
been unnecessarily postponed if left to private sector providers: 
 … EFIC’s retreat from onshore financing would imply slower resource investment and 
slower subsequent export growth. Contrary to the Commission’s view, such deferred 
investment and exporting would not be a case of the market denying resources to 
uncommercial projects in the interests of efficient resource allocation. It would rather 
represent a sacrifice of real economic opportunity in the real term. (sub. DR90, p. 68) 
The fact that some projects may be postponed because they are unable to secure 
financing arrangements is not necessarily indicative of a market failure. Inability to 
secure finance may indicate that the market requires more information about a 
project before it is willing to participate in it. There are many other potential reasons 
for the postponement of projects that could be accounted for entirely by commercial 
factors. In these instances there is no ‘sacrifice’ of economic opportunity — capital 
is not infinite and it may be the case that there are economic opportunities in other 
parts of the economy that generate greater commercial returns. It may be more 
efficient for resources to remain in the ground for future development. 
Further, the suggestion that real economic opportunity might be sacrificed unless 
government financing is supplied appears to imply that labour and capital are sitting 
idle. Were this the case, consideration of whether EFIC had the ability, and the most 
appropriate means by which to address such a problem, would arise. If resources 
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were not idle, bringing some projects forward would come at the expense of others 
and displace other forms of economic activity. 
Availability of capital for large firms and resource-related projects — implications 
for suppliers 
The Commission’s conclusions on the availability of capital for resource-related 
projects in Australia (and large companies that export) has implications for 
suppliers of goods and services to those projects. A commercially viable 
resource-related project that has secured private sector support provides a clear 
domestic source of demand for the output of the supplier that is backed by the 
financial resources, credit history and commercial track record of the main 
contractor. The Commission considers there is no convincing evidence of failures in 
financial markets that are impeding the provision of financial services to suppliers 
to resource-related projects by private sector providers. The decision by a private 
sector provider to supply financial services to suppliers will be based on a 
commercial judgement that considers, among other things, the firm’s capacity to 
deliver on the supply contract. An inability by a supplier to secure finance from a 
private sector provider may indicate that other firms are better placed to fulfil the 
contract or are more efficient suppliers. 
There is no convincing evidence that there are problems relating to the provision of 
capital to large Australian resource-related projects, or the suppliers to these 
projects, which require intervention by the Australian Government through EFIC. 
7.2 EFIC’s role in the allocation of resources in the 
economy 
EFIC disagreed with the Commission’s draft finding that there is no convincing 
evidence of market failures that affect access to capital for large firms, and for 
resource-related projects located in Australia. EFIC also considers that it improves 
efficiency in the economy by altering the allocation of resources. EFIC stated in its 
response to the Commission’s draft report: 
 … if market failure is present and an ECA such as EFIC is a fitting response to those 
failures, EFIC does not crowd out other more valuable projects, or private financiers. 
To the contrary, EFIC serves to crowd in finance and insurance to worthwhile projects 
that otherwise wouldn’t gain support, and is thereby improving the efficiency of 
resource allocation in the economy. (sub. DR90, p. 24) 
FINDING 7.2 
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As discussed above, the Commission does not consider that the market gap concept 
is sufficient to ensure that EFIC’s activities are restricted to addressing 
inefficiencies in financial markets caused by market failure. Participants to this 
inquiry have presented evidence to the Commission of EFIC assisting firms in 
circumstances that the Commission does not consider to constitute a market failure. 
In some instances, calls for EFIC’s assistance are based on private decisions about 
preferred business models and firms’ risk preferences rather than failures in 
financial markets. 
Further, chapter 6 highlighted the importance of EFIC pricing its products and 
services efficiently, the difficulty of achieving this outcome under the current 
arrangements including the exemption from competitive neutrality policy. It also 
included the finding that some of the facilities supported by EFIC are subsidised. 
Inefficient pricing, in combination with targeting situations that do not constitute 
market failures will generate distortions in the economy. 
In the absence of a market failure, EFIC’s support for a project (or transaction) on 
the basis it is ‘worthwhile’ but not supported by the private sector results in a 
misallocation of resources. There are two possible outcomes from EFIC’s 
involvement where no market failure is present, both of which reduce the efficiency 
of resource allocation: 
• EFIC’s support results in projects that would not have proceeded otherwise. This 
would occur if EFIC subsidised the facility that enabled the project to proceed  
• EFIC supports projects that would have proceeded without EFIC’s involvement. 
These outcomes are discussed below, followed by a discussion of the potential for 
EFIC to crowd out other providers of finance and insurance, other sources of 
finance, other projects, and domestic competitors to EFIC’s clients. 
EFIC as the catalyst for projects that cannot attract private sector 
support — distortions caused by the absence of market failure 
Private sector providers of export finance and insurance make decisions about the 
allocation of scarce resources between alternative projects. Where financial markets 
function well, the resulting allocation represents the highest valued use of the 
capital and would be efficient from the perspective of the Australian community. 
The market clearing price would reflect the economic cost and value of the 
resources to the community at the margin. 
As discussed in chapter 6, a private sector provider will not support a project if the 
cost of allocating capital is such that it cannot earn a commercial return on the 
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project. That is, the market clearing price is insufficient to attract private sector 
support for the project. Where there is no market failure EFIC must offer its 
financial services at a price lower than the market clearing price for the project to 
proceed1. EFIC could do this: 
• by offering its financial services at a price that does not reflect the expected full 
cost of provision, including the opportunity cost of capital. That is, if EFIC 
subsidised that transaction 
• on the basis it is a more efficient provider of financial services than the private 
sector. 
The Commission found in chapter 6 that some facilities provided by EFIC are 
subsidised and noted that benefits derived from its exemption from competitive 
neutrality arrangements mean EFIC does not face the same incentives as private 
sector providers to improve its operational efficiency (discussed further in 
chapter 8). 
If EFIC is the catalyst for otherwise uncommercial projects (see box 7.5 for 
evidence presented to this inquiry), this would have the dual effect of encouraging a 
greater level of investment than is efficient in areas that receive EFIC’s support and 
the drawing of resources away from more productive uses, including parts of the 
economy that are export-oriented. 
The resulting misallocation of resources imposes a cost on the Australian 
community by shifting resources from areas where consumers and firms would 
direct them, as determined by commercial returns, and instead directing those 
resources to the production of goods and services that would not be produced 
without assistance provided by EFIC. 
1  For simplicity, this considers the case where EFIC’s offer is identical to the private sector offer 
in all regards other than price. The same analysis would apply if EFIC’s offer in total was 
generally more attractive even if the price was slightly higher. 
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Box 7.5 EFIC’s activity presented as a catalyst for export transactions 
and projects  
Submissions to this inquiry by clients of EFIC have stated that transactions they have 
undertaken would not have proceeded without EFIC’s involvement. 
Emtivac Engineering submitted: 
We have recently obtained a major contract … in Saudi Arabia. It was only possible for us to 
accept this order with the assistance of EFIC. (sub. DR77, p. 1) 
Gasco stated: 
Without the support of EFIC, Gasco could not have financed and secured two major export 
projects in the Oil and Gas industry. (sub. DR82, p. 1) 
Similarly, Joan B Peters suggested: 
As the executive producer on the $11.2 million feature film ‘Drift’, I can say that this film, 
starring Hollywood’s number one action star, Sam Worthington, would not have been 
financed without EFIC’s assistance. (sub. DR44, p. 1) 
WorleyParsons submitted to this inquiry: 
The EFIC support received by WorleyParsons has complemented the facilities provided by 
the private sector and as a direct result of this support, WorleyParsons has secured 
overseas projects that it would not otherwise have secured. (sub. DR39, p. 1)  
 
EFIC’s relatively small size limits the economy-wide consequences of such 
distortions. However, some of EFIC’s facilities are of sufficient magnitude to pose 
non-trivial financial risks to the Commonwealth. These risks would be increased 
significantly if the Australian Government were to accept the proposition advocated 
by Citibank and the ANZ to increase EFIC’s maximum exposure limit per 
transaction. Citibank, for example, noted that other ECAs can have financial 
exposure to a single transaction of greater than $500 million (sub. DR108). 
EFIC’s support for projects that would have proceeded 
Some of the transactions entered into by EFIC may have proceeded without EFIC’s 
involvement — this would occur if EFIC was involved in a project or transaction 
that was regarded as commercially viable by the private sector. Accordingly, the 
Government would be needlessly involved in financing transactions that private 
sector providers would finance of their own accord (in the absence of market 
failure) without EFIC’s participation. 
As noted above the Commission found no convincing evidence of problems relating 
to the availability of capital for large resource-related projects located in Australia, 
including three supported by EFIC — the Brookfield rail upgrade, the Wiggins 
Island coal export terminal and the Santos LNG project at Gladstone. As the 
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availability of capital for these projects was not impeded by failures in capital 
markets, EFIC’s involvement is unnecessary because they would have proceeded 
anyway albeit maybe with different counterparties and less advantageous terms and 
conditions to EFIC’s client (or should not have proceeded if they were not 
commercially attractive to the private sector). In either case, the cost of EFIC’s 
involvement in these transactions is not insignificant. The capital employed has an 
opportunity cost and EFIC’s support has unnecessarily imposed costs and 
transferred risk on to taxpayers. 
Is EFIC crowding out? 
Submissions have noted it is important that EFIC did not crowd out private sources 
of finance and insurance: 
EFIC needs to be careful not to crowd out potential commercial providers, nor to 
compete directly with products offered by commercial providers. (ACCI, sub. 5, p. 2) 
It is vital that the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) operates only in 
those parts of the market, where private sector business and industry associations do 
not provide services, either because the level of demand is not high enough or the 
operating costs are too high. (Business SA, sub. 6, p. 1) 
Several private sector providers submitted that EFIC was not crowding out their 
services with some stakeholders noting that EFIC works in different markets to 
them. For example the Insurance Council of Australia noted: 
 … that EFIC focuses on riskier, longer term export credit businesses and does not 
compete with the activities of Australian private sector insurers. (sub. 3, p. 1) 
Westpac submitted: 
In no case have we seen evidence that EFIC is providing such support inappropriately, 
or in a way that ‘crowds out’ commercial institutions. Quite to the contrary, in our 
observation a number of transactions have proceeded only because of EFIC or other 
ECA support, due to commercial constraints in areas including total funding 
availability or lack of sufficient credit appetite. (sub. DR97, p. 1) 
Nevertheless, in the Commission’s assessment some of EFIC’s activities are 
creating a crowding out effect. This conclusion has been reached because, as noted 
previously, the market gap mandate is not sufficient to ensure that EFIC will only 
undertake welfare-enhancing projects or transactions that are impeded by failures in 
financial markets. 
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Where crowding out occurs, this will lead to the situation where EFIC may crowd 
out: 
• other providers of export finance and insurance 
• other sources of capital available to EFIC’s client 
• alternative projects that may have been undertaken by clients 
• domestic firms competing with the firm EFIC is assisting. 
EFIC’s participation in financial markets where market failure is not present will 
also entrench the status quo of EFIC’s support and prevent the development of 
private sector capacity to provide export finance and insurance. 
Crowding out other providers of export finance and insurance 
Where EFIC provides export finance or insurance to a project or transaction that 
would have proceeded without its support — EFIC will crowd out the private sector 
provider. In the absence of market failure, the marginal provider of finance or 
insurance required to make the project or transaction proceed will be displaced by 
EFIC. This will impose a cost on that firm as well as taxpayers. 
Crowding out other sources of capital or other projects 
As discussed in chapter 3 there are a number of alternative means by which a firm 
can raise funds to finance export transactions and projects. The fact that private 
sector providers may not be willing to extend some financial services to firms for 
certain projects does not necessarily preclude them from accessing finance 
altogether, particularly in the case of large or publicly owned firms. Large firms 
typically have equity to absorb losses, assets to provide security and collateral that 
can be used to secure finance. If EFIC is supporting firms that could secure finance 
from elsewhere, including shareholders and other investors, then public funds are 
crowding out private funds in the financing of a project and risk is unnecessarily 
transferred to taxpayers. Boxes 7.6 and 7.7 provide examples of large publicly listed 
firms that have received EFIC’s support. 
Alternatively, lack of access to other sources of finance may reflect the underlying 
business case of the project or transaction or that it is beyond the financial capacity 
of the firm to undertake that transaction. In this case, in the absence of support from 
EFIC, the firm may have elected to undertake an alternative project that would 
generate the highest expected returns to that firm. 
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Crowding out domestic firms that are competing with the firm EFIC is assisting 
Where there is no market failure, EFIC’s support will disadvantage domestic firms 
that are competing with the assisted firm. This is illustrated by EFIC’s support for 
Greyhound Australia (box 7.2) that was not based on a market failure. EFIC stated 
it stepped in to ensure Greyhound Australia was able to win the contract to supply 
transport services for mining staff when the firm’s banks were unwilling to provide 
a performance bond on terms acceptable to Greyhound Australia. It is possible a 
more efficient firm would have provided those services if EFIC had not intervened. 
This situation will arise even where EFIC’s support is provided directly to the buyer 
of an Australian export. Consider the example where EFIC provides buyer finance 
to purchase a ship from an Australian boat builder — had that buyer finance not 
been available from EFIC it may have been the case that another Australian boat 
builder would have made the export sale. 
 
Box 7.6 EFIC facilities provided to large companies 
EFIC typically extends a number of facilities to large companies involved in big projects 
each year. Table 7.1 provides examples of large companies assisted by EFIC in 
2010-11. 
Austal Limited, a ship builder, has benefitted from facilities provided by EFIC a number 
of times in the past several years. For example, in 2008-09 Austal received support 
from EFIC in the form of an export finance guarantee of $61 million (EFIC 2009a). 
Austal also received $58 million of export finance guarantees from EFIC in 2007-08 
(EFIC 2008a). For the year ended 30 June 2011, Austal Ships earned just over 
$500 million in revenue and made a profit after tax of almost $22 million. At 30 June 
2011, the company held assets worth almost $675 million and had a total equity of 
$274 million (Austal Limited 2011). 
WorleyParsons has also benefitted from EFIC’s assistance. In the 2009-10 financial 
year, EFIC signed a $100 million bonding line facility with the company (EFIC 2010a). 
At 30 June 2010, WorleyParsons had total assets of about $3.6 billion and total equity 
of more than $1.8 billion. For the 2009-10 financial year, the company received total 
revenues of almost $5 billion and earned a net profit after tax of $290 million 
(WorleyParsons 2010).  
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Box 7.7 Announcement by Santos of export credit agency support for 
the Gladstone LNG project 
In partnership with three other companies, Santos is constructing a LNG facility at 
Gladstone in Queensland (the GLNG project), for the processing of coal seam gas to 
be sold for export. On 23 December 2011 Santos announced that it has secured 
US$1.2 billion in export credit agency supported corporate debt facilities, including 
$248 million from EFIC (EFIC 2012f; Santos 2011c). The balance of Santos’ 
contribution is to be sourced from the proceeds of capital market issuance and a 
sell-down of Santos’ interest in the project to 30 per cent (EFIC pers. comm., 
9 December 2011).  
A media release issued by Santos stated: 
Santos Chief Financial Officer Andrew Seaton said the ECA facilities were part of Santos’ 
funding strategy announced in late-2010 and demonstrates the company’s ability to source 
capital from a diverse range of sources on attractive terms. (Santos 2011c, p. 1)  
The media release also quoted the Santos Chief Financial Officer: 
We continue to maintain a strong balance sheet. With these new debt facilities, Santos will 
have more than $7 billion of available funding capacity, including cash and committed 
corporate and project debt facilities. (Santos 2011c, p. 1) 
In its submission to the draft report, Santos commented: 
The scale of the Gladstone LNG project and the requirement that all participants share the 
risk also dictates that funding must be raised from multiple sources. In this market 
environment, EFIC and offshore export credit agencies play an important role in providing 
funding … particularly during a period when access to financing has been difficult and a 
number of market participants have been withdrawing. (sub. DR64, p. 2) 
The export credit agency facilities are summarised in the table below (Santos 2011c).  
 
Facility SACE facility EFIC facility Uncovered facility 
Facility limit US$280 million $248 million US$670 million 
ECA SACE, Italy EFIC, Australia EDC, Canada 
Maturity Amortises over 8.5 
years following GLNG 
project completion 
Amortises over 
8.5 years following 
GLNG project 
completion 
2019 
Joint coordinating 
arranger and mandated 
lead arranger 
ANZ 
HSBC 
ANZ 
HSBC 
ANZ 
EDC 
Mandated lead arranger Citi Citi - 
Lending parties ANZ 
HSBC 
Citi 
ANZ 
HSBC 
Citi 
EDC 
ANZ 
BTMU 
CBA 
NAB 
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Entrenching the status quo 
The preceding discussion on crowding out considers the situation where there are 
competitors in the economy — either other providers of export finance and 
insurance or other producers of goods and services that may be exported — that are 
being displaced by EFIC’s activities in financial markets. 
However, crowding out is not limited to these circumstances. For example, EFIC’s 
activities may be preventing private sector providers from developing the requisite 
capacity to support export transactions. This would occur if EFIC obtained and 
utilised first-mover advantages over the private sector in assisting a particular 
exporter or industry, or in providing financial services in a particular country. EFIC 
has claimed to have first mover advantages in some areas of its operation, 
considering this as one of the unique features of an ECA. EFIC stated in its 
submission to the Commission’s Issues Paper: 
 … if a government owned ECA has been in business for a long time, and has built up a 
large portfolio of assets, it will enjoy economies of scale that give it a first-mover 
advantage over private sector entrants to the market. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 13)  
The Commission has also found that some of EFIC’s clients receive support on a 
recurrent basis (chapter 2, box 7.8). 
Importantly, crowding out will occur even if EFIC provides some of its facilities at 
the market price. The costs of switching to an alternative provider may prevent its 
clients from moving even if EFIC’s price for those facilities is the same or slightly 
higher than in the private sector. The Commission considers that the outcome where 
EFIC becomes entrenched as a source of finance or insurance for some firms is 
inefficient in the long run. This is also inconsistent with the Minister’s Statement of 
Expectations (SOE) and the EFIC Act. EFIC is to encourage other providers to 
finance or assist in financing exports, rather than provide a long-term solution to an 
exporter’s finance and insurance needs. 
The multiplier effect — is it simply multiplying the distortions? 
Participants in this inquiry argued that EFIC generated benefits to the economy 
based on multiplier methodology. EFIC, for example, noted that there would be 
multiplier effects arising from ECA intervention to cushion the impacts of financial 
crises on the provision of trade finance (sub. DR90). The basic theory underlying 
multiplier effects has been outlined in chapter 5. 
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Inquiry participant Austal Limited stated: 
Over the course of the last decade, EFIC’s involvement has meant Austal’s export sales 
have been nearly 60 per cent higher than they would otherwise have been.  
The benefits of those EFIC-supported projects include: 
• Nearly $800 million in export revenue for Australia 
• Approximately 3400 person-years of direct full time employment at Austal — that 
is 340 jobs for 10 years …  
• At least $1.1 billion additional value to the local economy as a result of the 
multiplier effect 
• Additional employment and other multiplier effects into the local 
economy … (sub. DR110, p. 9) 
The use of multipliers to quantify the impact of an activity or government policy on 
the economy will likely overestimate its benefits for a number of reasons. First, the 
counterfactual outcome in EFIC’s absence is unknown. For example, it is possible 
that the buyers of Austal Limited vessels may have found alternative sources of 
finance or that Austal Limited may have found other buyers for its vessels where 
ECA intervention was not provided. Indeed, Austal Limited may have even entered 
into other export contracts where ECA support was not a factor. 
Second, leaving aside the empirics of estimation, domestic multiplier effects will 
tend to be muted where there are ‘leakages’ in expenditure and production to 
offshore sources. If it is the case that the 3400 person-years of direct employment at 
Austal Limited referred to in the submission are not located in Australia, the 
claimed multiplier effects may be overestimated. Austal Limited confirmed during 
the hearings that the majority of its workforce is based offshore. In addition to its 
operations in Western Australia, Austal Limited recently established a commercial 
ship-building operation in the Philippines and also has operations in the United 
States dedicated to manufacturing ships for the United States Navy. Roughly 
2700 people are employed in Austal Limited’s US operations in contrast to 400–500 
in Western Australia (trans., pp. 27–8).  
Although Austal Limited is majority Australian-owned and most of its profits are 
repatriated to Australia (trans., p. 28), the domestic multiplier effects of its 
production activities would be limited to the degree that any assistance provided 
generated activity in its overseas production facilities as opposed to its Australian 
production centre. This makes arguments for particular policy arrangements based 
on domestic multiplier effects even less relevant. 
Further, as discussed in chapter 5, the Commission disagrees with the premise of 
targeting government intervention on the basis of generating multiplier effects 
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because interventions of this sort ignore the opportunity cost of the resources 
involved and their associated multiplier effects. In addition, where the intervention 
does not address a market failure, any distortions in the allocation of resources 
would also be multiplied. Viewed in this context, the greater the claimed multiplier 
effect of an inappropriately targeted intervention, the greater the resulting distortion 
within the economy and the larger the net cost imposed on the broader community. 
Where EFIC’s activities are not addressing a market failure, EFIC will be 
distorting the allocation of resources within the economy. These distortions include 
potential crowding out of other sources of finance, other projects, or competitors of 
EFIC’s clients. 
At present, EFIC’s relatively small size limits the economy-wide consequences of 
this. However, some facilities are of sufficient magnitude to pose non-trivial 
financial risks to the Commonwealth. 
Equity effects and resource allocation 
EFIC’s activities in financial markets also have implications for the manner in 
which resources are distributed between exporting firms (and, more recently, 
suppliers to exporting firms) within the Australian economy. This, in turn, brings up 
considerations of the equity of these distributional effects. 
When EFIC intervenes and enables a project or transaction to proceed that would 
not have otherwise done so, the exporting company, its workers, and associated 
industries will benefit by being able to produce and sell more output for export. 
Where private sector providers of finance and insurance are involved in the 
transaction, they also share in the benefits of EFIC’s participation. 
The beneficiaries of EFIC’s assistance are relatively few — it services only a small 
number of Australia’s 45 000 exporting firms. Some of those firms are large, 
well-established and able to access other (albeit possibly more costly) sources of 
export finance and insurance. However, because EFIC is distorting the allocation of 
resources in the economy, the costs are widespread and include those borne by 
domestic competitors of EFIC’s clients and, more broadly, the taxpayer. 
 
FINDING 7.3 
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7.3 EFIC and the incentives of others 
The Commission has received many submissions from EFIC’s clients and financial 
sector partners indicating their support for EFIC’s services. It is not unusual that 
supported firms put forward arguments for continued government intervention that 
improves their returns or reduces their risks. Similar arguments were used against 
the dismantling of import tariffs. 
This section reviews the impacts of EFIC’s presence on the various parties involved 
in the transactions in which it participates. 
EFIC and private sector providers 
EFIC often conducts business with an exporter in conjunction with financial 
institutions (usually the exporter’s or buyer’s bank). EFIC notes:  
One of EFIC’s functions is to encourage banks, other financiers and insurers to support 
exports and overseas investments. Our participation in larger transactions can often 
encourage private financiers to share the risks involved. (EFIC 2011a, p. 39) 
In other words, EFIC — with the aim of supporting exports — undertakes 
transactions where it accepts some or all of the private provider’s risk in individual 
transactions. For example, after announcing its support for a water supply project in 
Sri Lanka, EFIC commented: 
This project is a good example of how EFIC can work with a commercial bank to 
support the financing of Australian exports on terms which may exceed the bank’s risk 
appetite. (EFIC 2010b) 
To this end, EFIC has products and arrangements in place that reduce risk for 
private sector providers. Some examples include: 
• documentary credit guarantees transfer the risk of default by a buyer’s bank on 
payments due under a documentary credit (also known as a documentary letter 
of credit), that the exporter’s bank has confirmed, from the exporter’s bank to 
EFIC 
• export working capital guarantees encourage banks to extend working capital to 
exporters by transferring the risk of default on the loan from the exporter’s bank 
to EFIC 
• risk sharing agreements have been established with some Australian banks in 
which EFIC shares a proportion of the risk of non-payment by an overseas buyer 
with the exporter’s bank. 
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After signing its Master Working Capital Agreement with EFIC, the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia commented: 
The benefit of this arrangement between Commonwealth Bank and EFIC is that 
exporters can access working capital finance, without having to provide as much 
security for the loan as we would require without EFIC’s guarantee. (CBA 2011) 
The law firm Latham and Watkins submitted: 
 … some commercial lenders are willing to participate in certain high-risk projects only 
to the extent that they benefit from ECA cover. (sub. DR51, p. 3) 
Similarly, the Australian Institute of Export stated: 
 … vanilla term trade deals into offshore markets is not where our banks wish to lend. 
Unless of course the international risk aspects have been wrapped up by an EFIC 
facility. (sub. DR107, p. 3) 
Thus, private sector providers can be significant beneficiaries of arrangements with 
ECAs. For example, a loan guarantee provided by EFIC transfers the risk of 
non-payment of the loan from the private sector provider to EFIC, and ultimately to 
taxpayers not involved in the export activity. While the guarantee is outstanding, 
taxpayers in effect are holding a contingent liability (and an opportunity cost is 
incurred as a result of this financial exposure). The price of the guarantee needs to 
reflect this opportunity cost and the risk of the transaction. If the price is not 
sufficiently high to do so, then uncompensated risk is transferred to the taxpayer to 
the benefit of the private sector provider — it is a subsidy. 
In the event that the borrower fails to repay their loan and the guarantee is called, 
the private sector provider will still receive repayment of the loan it extended, in 
full, or in part, but this payment will come from EFIC. As EFIC is wholly owned by 
the Australian Government, payment made from EFIC’s reserves is effectively the 
same as if it was made by the Australian Government itself. 
In some instances, the provision of support by EFIC induces private sector 
providers to carry out transactions that they otherwise would not have because 
EFIC’s involvement makes those transactions more commercially attractive. 
This is not to imply that such relationships are improper, as was EFIC’s 
interpretation of the Commission’s draft finding (sub. DR90, p. 29), just that this is 
a consequence of EFIC’s partnership arrangements where it assumes its partners’ 
transaction risks. 
In some cases, the relationship between banks and EFIC is built into a bank’s 
business model and appears to be almost symbiotic in its characteristics. The ANZ, 
for example, lists structured export finance in partnership with ECAs as part of its 
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products package and this partnership gives their clients ‘access to an additional 
source of competitively priced, long-term debt for major capital and infrastructure 
projects’ (ANZ 2011, pp. 23–4). The ANZ also noted in its submission: 
EFIC support can therefore be fundamental to ANZ’s preparedness to offer extended 
tenors for certain obligors that would not otherwise be available without EFIC support, 
or with support from private sector insurers. (sub. 20, p. 4) 
This indicates that there is an incentive for financial institutions to develop their 
business models based on the presence of ECA support, rather than developing their 
business models to replace ECA (or in this case EFIC) support. 
The Commission’s proposed model for EFIC’s future role would utilise its 
relationships with private sector providers in relation to newly exporting SMEs. 
EFIC has proven its capacity to work closely with private sector providers but its 
reformed role will be to demonstrate that providing financial services to newly 
exporting SMEs can be commercially viable.  
ECAs and syndicated lending 
Private sector providers are also likely to benefit from EFIC’s involvement in 
project finance or other forms of participatory loans as ECAs may also act as a 
source of gap financing or insurance to ensure projects go ahead. Several 
participants (for example, sub. DR42; sub. DR108; sub. DR51) suggested this was 
the case.  
The benefits of this arrangement for EFIC’s partners in a syndicate is illustrated 
stylistically in figure 7.2 building on the example used in chapter 6. In a syndicated 
loan transaction banks and institutional investors will place bids for debt in a 
transaction. The borrower or finance arranger will offer an interest rate they believe 
will attract the required finance or raise the interest rate offered until the required 
amount of funding is achieved. However, the borrower cannot pay more than their 
expected return on the project. For syndicated loans it is typical for all lenders to 
receive the same price for the funds they contribute (given the type of finance 
contributed, for example, subordinated debt), with the price set by the interest rate 
bid by the marginal lender. In panel A, lenders A, B and C are willing to provide 
funds below the maximum price the borrower can pay. But other lenders such as 
lender D require an interest rate above the maximum price and so the market price 
for funds exceeds the project return and the project does not go ahead. 
In these situations, the borrower may invite EFIC to participate in the financing of 
the project. In panel B, EFIC takes the place of lender D. In accordance with the 
SoE, EFIC is not to undercut the pricing of the private sector, but may match the 
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pricing of the co-financiers (in this case lender C). In this example, the offer price is 
still below what would have been offered by the marginal lender (D) in the absence 
of EFIC. In this case, the project achieves the required financing, as the price is set 
to generate a positive project return. If there had not been ECA involvement the 
project would not have gone ahead. 
For the other lenders EFIC’s involvement permits the project to go ahead and they 
are able to recoup super-normal profits (rent) (indicated by the shaded areas) from 
the transaction. In addition, the finance arranger will earn fees on the successful 
transaction and if it underwrote the debt, ECA involvement reduces its risk in 
addition to other potential ECA risk mitigation effects present for all lenders. 
It may also be the case that the involvement of ECAs creates an incentive for 
borrowers to understate their project return or willingness to pay a higher rate in the 
knowledge that an ECA may fill their financing gap without the need to raise the 
price they offer. In some cases, this ECA may step in for reasons other than 
commercial returns such as improving resource or energy security. Underpricing 
may not be transparent to lenders whose required interest rate was above the price 
offered by the borrower but below that which would have been offered had an ECA 
(or EFIC) not filled the supposed gap (for example, if the project return in figure 7.2 
was actually above the marginal price of lender D). As such, a lender may not be 
aware if an ECA has undercut its pricing, and if it were aware, ECA involvement in 
other transactions may reduce the lender’s incentives to report the underpricing. 
Some financial market participants have a partnership relationship with EFIC, 
being able to benefit directly from EFIC’s involvement in facilities, through both 
risk transfer and higher returns.  
EFIC and exporters 
The vast majority of exporting Australian firms neither need nor receive EFIC’s 
assistance. When EFIC provides a loan, guarantee, insurance or other product to an 
exporter, it confers an advantage on that exporter that is not shared by other firms 
servicing the same market — potentially more efficient firms. As Podbury et al. 
(2001) observed of agricultural export credit programs: 
 … just like an explicit export subsidy, such programs could be expected to penalise 
efficient agricultural producers who do not have access to concessional 
credits … (pp. 92–3)  
FINDING 7.4 
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Figure 7.2 The role of ECAs in structured trade and project finance 
 
  
 
Price 
Quantity 
Required finance 
Project return 
Panel A: Structured trade and project finance transaction without ECAs 
A B C D 
Market price 
In the absence of market failure, the most profitable export projects would be 
expected to receive finance and insurance and the private sector would be willing to 
undertake these transactions. It may be the case that firms seeking support from 
EFIC are more risky propositions (or less attractive commercially) than other firms 
in the industry. It is also possible that firms might adjust their behaviour if EFIC 
offers more favourable terms and conditions on products than those that could be 
obtained from private providers alone. On the latter point, the Chief Financial 
Officer of Whitehaven Coal listed a number of potential benefits of export credit 
financing facilities generally: 
• the potential for a longer tenor as compared with other bank debt 
• the flexibility to provide for full amortisation reduces refinance risk 
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Quantity 
Required finance 
Panel B: Structured trade and project finance transaction with ECAs 
 
ECAs A B C D 
Market price 
Project return 
Actual price 
   
 ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
OF CURRENT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
233 
 
• the reallocation of a lender’s exposure to the export credit agency frees future 
capacity of the lender to assist a borrower with more traditional financing needs, 
and 
• significantly lower overall cost on a like-for-like basis against a corporate bank debt 
equivalent (quoted in Freehills 2011). 
There may also be risks of suboptimal decision making leading to a less efficient 
allocation of financial and other resources. For instance, firms may enter into 
transactions that would not be profitable without EFIC support or firms may 
increase their exposure to politically unstable countries if they consider it likely a 
transaction will be supported by EFIC. 
Austal Limited remarked: 
Certainly EFIC has played a key role in facilitating the sale of many Austal 
vessels … EFIC’s participation has firstly helped the client to secure their total 
financing requirement … and typically has also helped to reduce the cost of the overall 
finance package. (sub. DR110, p. 8) 
This demonstrates how EFIC support may become an entrenched part of an 
exporter’s business strategy. For example, the provision of more than 
20 documentary credit guarantees to Shark Bay Salt since 2009-10 suggests there 
may be little incentive for some exporters (or the private sector) to change their 
business models (box 7.8).  
In reference to export credit facilities in general, a partner at the law firm Freehills 
stated: 
Export credit financing facilities are a viable and effective option for many Australian 
companies, particularly mining industry participants, and should be considered as part 
of a company’s broader financing strategy. (Freehills 2011) 
If the provision of export finance can be undertaken on a commercial basis and 
there are no market failures present, then the private sector should be willing to take 
on those transactions. If they are not provided by EFIC on a commercial basis, then 
the firms receiving EFIC’s support are being subsidised and the incentive to 
improve firm level efficiency is dulled. It also means that private providers cannot 
compete on the same terms. 
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Box 7.8 One salt producer’s multiple credit guarantees  
EFIC has provided a salt producer, Shark Bay Salt, with more than 20 documentary 
credit guarantees for salt exports to Indonesia since 2009-10 (EFIC 2011a, 2012f).  
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC stated it provided the support because Shark 
Bay Salt’s Australian bank could not confirm letters of credit due to its internal 
counterparty and country limits on Indonesia. Moreover, it stated that the cost to Shark 
Bay Salt of moving to another bank was prohibitive. 
EFIC has not provided any support to Shark Bay Salt’s Australian competitors, yet the 
majority of salt production is exported in bulk from northern Western Australia — a 
large share of this salt is exported to South East Asia, including Indonesia.  
Three points arise from this example: 
• There is no inherent need for EFIC to assist Shark Bay Salt, demonstrated by 
other salt producers being able to export without this assistance. 
• EFIC’s support allows Shark Bay Salt to avoid the business costs of switching 
banks — giving it an advantage against competing salt producers. 
• EFIC’s support lowers the cost to the bank of meeting its internal prudential 
policies.  
 
7.4 In sum 
In chapter 5, the Commission has considered the range of rationales that could 
justify government intervention to provide export finance and insurance services. It 
has found no grounds for the government provision of export finance and insurance 
services through EFIC — with the exception of the provision of limited assistance 
to newly exporting SMEs to overcome information-related failures in financial 
markets including, in some circumstances, to newly exporting SMEs for a limited 
time when financial markets are temporarily disrupted. Proposed reforms to reorient 
EFIC toward intervention to address these potential inefficiencies are presented in 
chapter 10. 
In chapter 6, the Commission outlined the importance of EFIC pricing its financial 
services to cover the expected full cost of provision and analysed how EFIC sets the 
prices for its facilities. It found that the techniques adopted by EFIC did not ensure 
economically efficient pricing. It was found that some of EFIC’s facilities are 
subsidised. 
In this chapter, the Commission has analysed the economic impacts of current 
arrangements, and in particular, the combined effect of EFIC acting outside of the 
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scope of market failure and of not recovering the expected full cost of providing its 
financial services. In particular, the Commission has found: 
• the concept of the market gap is not equivalent to market failure and EFIC has, 
at times, taken part in projects and transactions where no market failure was 
present 
• EFIC’s (relatively small) contribution to resource-related projects in Australia is 
likely to have crowded out another provider of finance or source of equity or 
alternatively, for those projects that would not have proceeded without EFIC’s 
assistance, it has diverted resources from other parts of the economy 
• EFIC’s involvement generates a benefit for a small number of clients and parties 
to the transaction. However, the costs are borne by others in the economy, 
including the direct competitors of the assisted firms and the taxpayer. 
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8 Financial management and 
performance 
Key points 
• A large proportion of EFIC’s income is earned through its treasury. EFIC’s 
origination business, responsible for supporting exports through loans, guarantees 
and insurance products, has generated less than half of EFIC’s income in each of 
the past five years. 
• Although EFIC has recorded modest accounting profits in 19 of the past 20 years, it 
is unlikely that it has covered the full economic cost of providing its financial 
services. 
• In the recent past, EFIC has had high exposures to certain industries, notably 
ship-related industries, indicating that some aspects of its credit risk management 
have not always been sufficiently robust. 
• EFIC maintains capital well above prudential minimums and EFIC’s internal limits. 
The capital held by EFIC has an opportunity cost that is borne by the taxpayer. 
• Over the past ten years, EFIC’s activities on the commercial account have earned a 
low rate of return on equity. This may reflect a number of factors, including that its 
transactions are sometimes not priced to reflect the expected full economic costs 
(given the risk incurred), a high level of retained capital, and possibly high operating 
expenses. 
• EFIC’s operating expenses have increased significantly over the past five years, 
particularly its staff costs. Although increased costs have been accompanied by an 
increase in some of EFIC’s reported output measures, there has not been a 
commensurate increase in its profitability. 
• Rigorous assessment of EFIC’s operational efficiency will not be possible until it is 
subject to competitive neutrality arrangements and operates on an equal footing 
with private sector providers.  
The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) earns income from two 
sources: its origination business, which derives fees and interest from loan, 
guarantee and insurance products, and a separate treasury which invests capital and 
surplus borrowing proceeds. The origination business is further separated into a 
structured trade and project finance (STPF) division, which supports large 
transactions often involving large Australian and foreign companies, and a small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and mid-market division. This chapter 
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examines the financial performance of EFIC as a corporation, the way in which it 
manages its credit and funding risks, its capital adequacy, and treasury functions. 
8.1 Risk management 
According to its policy documents, EFIC is required to manage the credit risks in its 
portfolio, that is, the risk of impairment for each facility, and risk concentrations 
across its portfolio. EFIC’s policies also require ongoing monitoring of facilities 
and portfolio exposures and for EFIC to set aside funds in case of losses. This is 
done through general provisions for expected losses, specific provisions for known 
losses and capital for unexpected losses. EFIC’s policies also state that it should set 
aside capital for operational risk and market risk, and additional capital, known as 
concentration capital, to manage concentration risk in its portfolio (EFIC 2008b). 
EFIC’s credit risk and portfolio concentration management policies 
EFIC’s risk management framework includes a credit manual (EFIC 2008b) and a 
risk appetite statement. According to EFIC policy, both of these documents must be 
approved by the Board and are subject to ongoing revision. 
EFIC’s credit manual sets out the policies and processes for credit risk assessment. 
Before providing a facility, EFIC is required to determine whether it meets the 
eligibility criteria specified in the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
Act 1991 (Cwlth) (EFIC Act) (chapter 2). If the transaction meets the eligibility 
criteria, EFIC assesses the risk of the proposed transaction using procedures 
specified in the credit manual. This process includes an assessment of the aggregate 
portfolio risks associated with the proposed transaction, with regard for other 
exposures in the portfolio, as well as the specific risks associated with the proposed 
facility (box 8.1). 
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Box 8.1 Risk profile of EFIC’s portfolio 
EFIC’s website notes: 
EFIC’s lending business is essentially similar to a wholesale corporate banking business, 
although the risk profile is different from that of a typical bank. We have a more concentrated 
portfolio of generally longer-dated and higher-risk exposures, consistent with our role of 
working beyond the limits of the commercial market. (EFIC ndk) 
Average risk across EFIC’s portfolio can be examined by looking at average risk 
scores and impairment: 
• At 30 June 2011, the weighted average risk grade of EFIC’s commercial 
account (CA) exposures, including political risk insurance policies and reinsurers, 
was an EFIC risk score of 3.6. This is equivalent to Standard & Poor’s BBB or 
investment grade rating (box 6.4). 
• EFIC’s weighted average risk grade for 2010-11 was between 3.7 and 3.9 across 
the CA and the national interest account, again equivalent to investment grade. 
EFIC’s weighted average risk grade has been falling in recent years. 
• The overall level of impairment on EFIC’s portfolio is low compared to that of other 
Australian banks (majors and regionals) (EFIC, sub. 18). Generally, the higher the 
level of risk undertaken, the higher the level of impairment.  
• In 2010, Standard & Poor’s estimated that EFIC’s CA exposures would be 
consistent with a counterparty credit risk of about BBB (for example, Bank of 
Queensland has a long-term BBB credit rating). This assessment factors in 
Standard & Poor’s observation of EFIC’s portfolio being concentrated in the 
shipping, mining and construction sectors. 
EFIC weighted average risk rating, commercial account 
  
 
Sources: EFIC (2011a); S&P (2010).  
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EFIC’s policies require assessment of a proposed transaction in light of the 
aggregate risks that EFIC is exposed to across the commercial account (CA). EFIC 
aggregates portfolio exposures according to the following categories: 
• risk party — the entity on which EFIC assumes credit risk 
• controlled risk party — any exposure EFIC may have to entities controlled by 
the risk party, such as subsidiaries or affiliates 
• segment of risk — includes sovereign risk assumed by governments, bank risk 
assumed on the financial institution accepting short-term deposits and 
commercial risk, or risks not covered by either sovereign or bank risk 
• country of risk 
• industry of risk (EFIC 2008b). 
Although EFIC is not subject to Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) oversight, EFIC states that its exposure management policies are modelled 
on APRA’s guidelines for the maximum level of exposure to a single counterparty 
or to groups of related counterparties, known as the large exposure policy guidelines 
(box 8.2). EFIC sets maximum limits on counterparty exposures (to risk party or 
controlled risk parties) and countries. It has target limits expressed as a percentage 
of capital (including callable capital) to particular countries, industries and risk 
parties that depend on risk grade. Exposures above these limits are considered to be 
high and require approval by the Board (EFIC 2008b; 2011a). 
Provided that aggregate risk levels are acceptable, EFIC will then assess the specific 
risks associated with the proposed facility. In order to manage its risk profile, EFIC 
sometimes shares risk through reinsurance and risk participation agreements with 
private insurers, other export credit agencies (ECAs) and multilateral agencies. 
EFIC reinsured 11.6 per cent of its exposures by value in 2010-11 (EFIC 2011a). 
EFIC’s policy requires board approval of all transactions of more than $50 million. 
The Managing Director has responsibility for all other transactions, but has 
delegated some powers to the chief credit officer or the head of the STPF or SME 
and mid-market divisions, who can co-approve transactions of up to $15 million 
(EFIC 2008b). 
EFIC’s aggregate exposures 
EFIC has procedures set out in its credit manual that suggest that EFIC’s board 
should be aware of exposure concentrations: 
[Aggregate risk exposure] tolerances have been devised so that decisions to incur large 
concentrations of industry or country risk in the portfolio will be taken at the highest 
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level of Management. Board control of material changes in such risk concentrations is 
exercised through any large individual transactions being referred to the Board for 
approval if the amount exceeds the delegation granted to the Managing Director. In 
addition, the Board monitors the spread of portfolio risk via regular reports. 
(EFIC 2008b, p. 1-4) 
 
Box 8.2 APRA’s large exposure guidelines 
Under the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) large exposures 
prudential standard (APS 221), an authorised deposit-taking institution’s (ADI) large 
exposures policy must, at a minimum, cover the following: 
1. exposure limits, commensurate with the ADI’s capital base and balance sheet, for: 
(a) various types of counterparties (for example, governments, ADI’s and foreign 
equivalents, corporate and individual borrowers) 
(b) a group of related counterparties 
(c) individual industry sectors (where applicable) 
(d) individual countries (where applicable) 
(e) various asset classes (for example, property holdings and other investments) 
2. the circumstances in which the above exposure limits may be exceeded and the 
authority required for approving such excesses 
3. the procedures for identifying, reviewing, controlling and reporting large exposures 
of the ADI. 
APRA considers a large exposure to be an exposure to a counterparty or a group of 
related counterparties which is greater than or equal to 10 per cent of an ADI’s capital 
base. The aggregate exposure of an ADI to a counterparty or group of related 
counterparties is subject to the following limits: 
1. external parties unrelated to the ADI (other than governments, central banks and 
ADIs or equivalent overseas deposit-taking institutions) — 25 per cent of capital 
base 
2. unrelated ADI (or equivalent overseas deposit-taking institution) and its 
subsidiaries — 50 per cent of capital base, with aggregate exposure to 
non-deposit-taking subsidiaries capped at 25 per cent of capital base 
3. foreign parents and their subsidiaries — 50 per cent of capital base, with aggregate 
exposure to non-deposit-taking subsidiaries capped at 25 per cent of capital base. 
APRA guidelines are not prescriptive about limits for individual industry sectors, 
countries or asset classes. 
Source: APRA (2008).  
 
EFIC’s policy allows for the Managing Director to set limits on maximum industry 
exposures. Industry exposures are to be reviewed quarterly. EFIC’s credit manual 
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states that ‘for the purposes of managing industry exposure, exposures to industries 
in excess of 15 per cent of EFIC’s capital are considered high’ (EFIC 2008b, 
p. 4-7). However, EFIC has advised the Commission that: 
We [EFIC] do not currently have any specific industry limits in place given that 
industry risks are viewed as well contained. (EFIC, pers. comm., 18 November 2011) 
In 2010, EFIC’s internal auditors observed some large exposures on the CA. These 
related to particular countries such as Zambia and Sri Lanka, and ship-related 
industries. The internal auditors recommended EFIC consider enhanced ‘stress 
testing’ and scenario analysis tailored toward country and industry specific risks. 
(EFIC, pers. comm., 25 November 2011). On the basis of the material presented by 
EFIC, the Commission understands that this internal audit recommendation was not 
adopted.  
Box 8.3 shows the extent of EFIC’s exposures to ship-related industries over time.  
EFIC stated in its submission to the draft report that exposure to ship building and 
operation is reported at every board meeting. EFIC also noted in its submission to 
the draft report that the internal auditors concluded in 2010 that EFIC was fully 
compliant with prudential limits set out in APRA’s large exposure guidelines 
(sub. DR90). However, as noted in box 8.2, APRA guidelines are not prescriptive 
about industry limits. 
The high exposure to ship building and operation drew the attention of the Board 
and EFIC’s internal auditors. This suggests that EFIC’s credit risk arrangements 
have not always been sufficient to prevent concentrated aggregate exposures. 
EFIC’s internal auditors observed that EFIC has had high exposure to certain 
industries, including ship building and operation, and to a few countries. 
The Commission considers that some aspects of EFIC’s credit risk management 
have not always been sufficiently robust. 
EFIC should revise its risk management policies to include a limit on exposures 
to particular industries. 
FINDING 8.1 
RECOMMENDATION 8.1 
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Box 8.3 EFIC’s exposure to ship building and operation 
A large share of EFIC’s commercial account (CA) credit exposure is (and has been) 
associated with ship builders and operators. In 2010-11, gross exposure on the CA was 
$294 million (31 per cent of total CA exposures, or 48 per cent of EFIC’s capital, 
including callable capital). In 2006-07, EFIC’s gross CA exposure to ship building was 
$365 million (56 per cent of total exposures, or 62 per cent of capital, including callable 
capital). Exposure excluding sovereign and semi-sovereign exposures and reinsurance 
was about 36 per cent of total exposures between 2005 and 2007. Such a high rate of 
exposure to one industry could expose EFIC to large losses if circumstances or events 
have an adverse impact on the facilities in the portfolio. 
EFIC’s exposure to ship building and operationa 
 
a Exposure at 30 June. Net exposures excludes exposure to sovereign and semi-sovereign risk parties, 
and reinsurance. 
The national interest account (NIA) also has some exposure to ships, accounting for 
1.6 per cent of total NIA exposures in 2010-11, although this is fully reinsured. Across 
the CA and the NIA, EFIC’s total gross exposure to ships was $305 million in 2010-11, 
or 19 per cent of total exposures.  
Even with a reduction in the level of exposure in recent years, in 2010, EFIC’s internal 
auditors observed ‘concentrations in countries such as Zambia and Sri Lanka and 
industries such as shipping’ (EFIC, pers. comm., 25 November 2011, p. 10) and called 
for enhanced stress testing and scenario analysis tailored towards country and 
industry-specific risks. On the basis of the material presented by EFIC, the Commission 
understands that this internal audit recommendation was not adopted.  
Sources: EFIC (2011a; pers. comm., 25 November 2011; 1 December 2011).   
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Capital adequacy 
When an insurance, guarantee or bond claim is made, EFIC may need to make a 
payment to counterparties, or in the case of a non-performing loan, will not receive 
repayments of interest and/or principal. Under the EFIC Act, the EFIC Board is 
required ‘to ensure, according to sound commercial principles, that the capital and 
reserves of EFIC at any time are sufficient’ (s. 56(1)). When making this 
assessment, the Board is required to include as capital the $200 million of callable 
capital that is available from the Australian Government. EFIC holds no capital 
against the national interest account (NIA) (EFIC, sub. 18), because the costs and 
risks are borne directly by the Commonwealth. Any losses or gains on NIA 
facilities impact the Commonwealth’s obligations to potentially fund business 
conducted on the NIA. In some cases, the Commonwealth may be required to 
provide funding to EFIC (via the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) through 
an appropriation from the Consolidated Revenue Fund to achieve the 
Commonwealth’s directives. 
To assist in ensuring all its payment obligations are met, EFIC’s policy requires 
funds to be set aside to cover impaired facilities on the CA. A general provision for 
expected losses and a specific provision for known losses, is made through EFIC’s 
profit and loss statement. These costs are explicitly recognised in profit results 
contained in the financial statements. 
Capital is set aside for unexpected losses (discussed in chapter 6), and is recognised 
in the financial statements as ‘total capital required’. EFIC calculates total capital 
required (broadly) according to APRA and Basel II standards. Liquid assets are held 
against required capital and provisions, including cash and its equivalents, and 
financial securities of varying maturities which are ‘available-for-sale’. EFIC also 
maintains credit lines to ensure that payment obligations can be met. 
EFIC holds more capital than it estimates is required to cover unexpected losses. At 
30 June 2011, EFIC’s capital was $419 million ($619 million including callable 
capital). This exceeds EFIC’s estimate of required capital of $286 million which 
includes concentration capital ($135 million) and estimated dividend payment 
($15 million) (EFIC 2011a). 
EFIC’s capital adequacy ratio was 34.6 per cent, including callable capital (or 
23.4 per cent without callable capital) (EFIC 2011a), well above both the 8 per cent 
minimum imposed by APRA on commercial banks and the minimum 16 per cent 
specified by the Board (EFIC, sub. 18) (box 8.4). By comparison, the weighted 
average capital adequacy ratio of Australian-incorporated banks in June 2010 was 
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11.7 per cent and the 90th percentile for capital adequacy ratios was 18.3 per cent 
(APRA 2011).  
 
Box 8.4 Capital adequacy 
EFIC bases its assessments of capital adequacy on the prudential standards and 
calculations used for regulating banks. The Board has endorsed a model that takes 
into account the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) guidelines and the 
framework issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (known as Basel II). 
The model covers credit risk, operational risk, market risk, credit concentration risk and 
counterparty risk.  
EFIC assigns probability of default statistics and loss given default ratios to each facility 
and calculates an amount of capital accordingly (discussed in chapter 6). Riskier, 
longer-dated facilities require more capital than the less risky, shorter-dated facilities. 
EFIC uses probability of default statistics published by the major ratings agencies and 
Berne Union statistics to assist in constructing the model.  
In addition, EFIC sets aside additional capital to reflect what it considers is a  
concentration of large exposures. The amount of concentration capital is based on the 
highest of: 
• 100 per cent of the largest individual maximum exposure 
• 50 per cent of the largest maximum country exposure (excluding internal credit 
rating 1 and 2), or 
• 50 per cent of the largest maximum industry exposure (except reinsurance and 
central or local government). 
The sum of the required capital for all facilities, the capital against treasury exposures 
on EFIC’s investments and derivative transactions, and operational capital are added 
to determine capital before concentration capital. Risk weighted assets (RWA) are 
calculated by dividing this amount by the minimum capital required by APRA 
(8 per cent).  
The capital adequacy ratio is calculated by dividing capital by RWA. APRA requires 
banks to hold capital of no less than 8 per cent of RWA. 
Source: EFIC (2011a).  
 
As a wholly owned government entity, EFIC does not face the same incentive to 
productively manage capital as a private sector firm. In publicly-listed companies, 
holdings of liquid assets by a firm in excess of prudential requirements can be 
interpreted as a signal that the firm lacks profitable investment projects. Firms with 
large cash holdings will usually seek to improve profitability by using liquid assets 
to make profitable investments, pay down debt or return the excess funds to 
shareholders through dividend and other payments. With the exception of 
publicly-listed companies with partially paid shares and some insurance markets, 
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there are few public or private organisations with capacity for management to call 
on owners to provide additional capital. EFIC’s dividend payment policy is 
discussed below. 
EFIC’s corporate plan notes EFIC’s intention to lower its capital adequacy ratio 
over the next three years by expanding its operations and increasing the level of its 
risk weighted assets (EFIC 2011c). The effect of EFIC’s high level of retained 
capital on its operating performance is discussed in section 8.4. 
EFIC’s capital adequacy ratio at 30 June 2011 was well above the minimum level 
specified by Australian Prudential Regulation Authority guidelines and EFIC’s 
internal benchmarks. The extra capital held by EFIC has an opportunity cost that is 
borne by the taxpayer. 
8.2 Dividends 
Under the EFIC Act, EFIC is required to pay a dividend to the Australian 
Government. Although the Board recommends the dividend to the Minister, the 
Minister may direct payment of a different specified dividend (s. 55), provided it is 
not more than EFIC’s profit for that year (s. 55(4)). The criteria for setting the 
specified dividend are not prescribed in the EFIC Act and the Minister is not 
required to provide an explanation for the specified level of dividend. In recent 
years, the dividend payment has been 50 per cent of profit on the CA, with EFIC 
retaining the remaining 50 per cent. The Minister directed EFIC to pay a dividend 
of 75 per cent for the 2009-10 financial year (EFIC 2011a).  
EFIC has used the retained portion of profits it has made over the past 10 years to 
build its equity from $238 million in 2002 to $408 million at 30 June 2011: 
EFIC is a profitable agency making an average profit of A$33 million a year and 
returning A$106 million in dividends to Government since the last Review [of EFIC in 
2006]. The balance of profits is retained to increase EFIC’s capital base to support 
more exports. (EFIC, sub. 18, p. 3) 
However, the Australian Government has indicated to Government Business 
Enterprises (GBEs) that it prefers dividends over capital gains and: 
The level of estimated dividends shall be driven by the desired capital structure, the 
profitability of the enterprise, and the level of agreed future capital expenditure. 
(Department of Finance and Deregulation 2011, p. 26). 
FINDING 8.2 
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More information on the dividend policies of other GBEs can be found in 
appendix D. 
8.3 EFIC’s treasury 
EFIC states that the objective of its treasury is to minimise the cost of funding loan 
assets and maximise the return on its investments (EFIC 2011a). Treasury 
operations are carried out within a framework agreed by the Australian Government 
and are subject to internal and external audits (box 8.5). 
EFIC’s treasury operations are also constrained through legislation and by EFIC’s 
Board. Under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) 
(CAC Act), the Minister for Finance requires EFIC’s treasury investments to be in 
entities (known as counterparties) rated AA- or better, or for authorised 
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs), a rating of BBB- or better. EFIC’s Board has 
also imposed maximum levels of exposure to individual counterparties according to 
their risk rating.  
EFIC’s chief credit officer and chief financial officer may jointly approve treasury 
transactions, provided the size of the transaction is below the limit approved by the 
Board for the risk rating of the counterparty, and the transaction does not exceed 
any other country or counterparty limits. EFIC policy is that these limits should be 
reviewed on an ongoing basis (EFIC 2008b). 
EFIC’s treasury is relatively small in comparison to those of other government 
enterprises, but accounts for a large proportion of EFIC’s income (EFIC, pers. 
comm., 18 November 2011). EFIC’s origination business has accounted for less 
than half of EFIC’s income in each of the past five years (figure 8.1). EFIC noted in 
its submission to the draft report that treasury income went directly to government 
until May 2007 (sub. DR90). 
A large part of the income from EFIC’s treasury comes from a large investment 
($1.3 billion at 30 June 2011) in liquid assets (including cash and equivalents, and 
available-for-sale securities). Some of this investment is supported by EFIC’s 
borrowings, which was $2.4 billion at 30 June 2011 (EFIC 2011a). 
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC noted that it considers that income from 
its investment of capital and reserves would more accurately be included in its 
origination income (sub. DR90) on the basis that the earnings are EFIC’s. The 
Commission considers that EFIC’s capital and reserves are owned by the Australian 
Government on behalf of taxpayers and have been provided for the purposes of 
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meeting the objectives of the EFIC Act, not for general investment of the 
Government’s financial resources. 
 
Box 8.5 EFIC’s treasury 
EFIC has stated that the core function of EFIC’s treasury is to obtain competitive rates 
on its borrowings and to manage the reserves that represent EFIC’s capital base 
(EFIC 2011a). The main functions of EFIC’s treasury are to: 
• borrow on international and domestic capital markets to fund its business activities 
• manage the Australian Government’s equity investment in EFIC 
• structure Australian dollar and foreign currency cash flows arising from transactions 
• enter into derivative contracts to manage currency and interest rate risk. 
EFIC must have the approval of the Minister for Finance to borrow under s. 59 of the 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth). The Minister has 
approved three funding programs at 30 June 2011: 
• US dollar medium term notes (MTN) 
– US$1.2 billion, limit of US$2 billion 
• Australian dollar MTN 
– $1.2 billion, limit of $1.5 billion 
• Euro-commercial paper (ECP) (short-term borrowings) 
– US$390 million (US$115 million funds export loans and US$275 million funds 
market recognition program), limit of US$1.5 billion. 
The EFIC Board also approved three investment programs in 2011: 
• capital and reserve portfolios, where equity is invested 
– about $400 million  
• surplus liquidity portfolio, where surplus cash is invested when the borrowing and 
lending profile do not exactly match 
– $837 million  
• market recognition program that enables EFIC to maintain a presence in the ECP 
market for name recognition purposes to facilitate the maintenance of credit lines, 
and, therefore, MTN issuance. EFIC’s relatively small size means that investors 
might not otherwise be familiar and comfortable with EFIC’s debt 
– about $300 million. 
The funds raised through these programs must be invested in accordance with the 
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth), in particular, s. 45 of the 
Finance Minister’s Orders, although the EFIC Board may determine additional criteria. 
Source: EFIC (pers. comm., 21 October 2011).  
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Figure 8.1 EFIC earns less than half of its income through originationa 
 
a Total income includes all revenue earned on the commercial account net of the allowance for credit risk, 
reinsurance and interest expenses.  b  Income from capital and reserves is net of the allowance for credit risk, 
but includes income from investments and foreign exchange.  c  Treasury margin income includes interest 
margins, liquidity margin, allowance for derivative risk and a fair value adjustment in 2006-07.  d Income from 
the origination business may vary from year to year because of differences in the volume of business 
undertaken and accounting conventions for provision for expected losses. However, only actual losses affect 
EFIC’s long term profitability. 
Sources: EFIC (pers. comm., 24 November 2011; 5 December 2011). 
A large proportion of EFIC’s income is earned through its treasury operations, 
with EFIC’s origination business accounting for less than half of its income in each 
of the past five years. 
The Commission considers that EFIC’s treasury operations should be 
commensurate with the size of EFIC’s origination business and the type of financial 
services offered. A reorientation of EFIC’s operations in response to the 
Commission’s recommendations would require treasury operations to be realigned 
accordingly or replaced with alternative arrangements.  
Alternative arrangements for EFIC’s four main treasury functions (box 8.5) could 
lead to lower overall costs than those of EFIC’s current treasury arrangements. The 
extent of any savings from alternative arrangements can only be rigorously assessed 
once the scope of EFIC’s future origination activities are determined by the 
Australian Government.  
As discussed in chapter 6, application of competitive neutrality arrangements will 
provide EFIC’s treasury with greater commercial discipline. Specifically, it will 
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provide the incentive to hold capital having regard to its opportunity cost and ensure 
that EFIC takes into account all costs when pursuing its objective of minimising 
borrowing costs. 
Alternatives for EFIC’s four main treasury functions include: 
• retaining the functions in EFIC 
• placing some functions with another Australian Government agency 
• outsourcing some functions to a private sector provider under a competitive 
tender arrangement.  
These alternatives will involve costs, including for the agency and for EFIC to 
establish arrangements to manage the outsourcing contract, which should be 
compared to the costs of retaining the function within EFIC (table 8.1). The 
management of currency and interest rate risk (through derivative transactions), 
investment management and cash flow structuring could be retained by EFIC, 
undertaken by another Australian Government agency (on a competitively neutral 
basis) or outsourced to a private provider. The Australian Office of Financial 
Management (AOFM) is prohibited under its enabling legislation from raising funds 
in foreign currencies. 
EFIC’s borrowing activities could be undertaken by the AOFM. The main 
advantage of borrowing from the Commonwealth through the AOFM is that the 
cost of funds may be reduced. Notwithstanding EFIC being able to use the 
Australian Government’s AAA credit rating, it pays a premium on its borrowings 
because it is not as well recognised as the Australian Government in domestic and 
international financial markets and its debt is considered to be less liquid.  
If EFIC borrowed from the Commonwealth through the AOFM, it could be treated 
in the same manner as other Australian Government agencies that borrow from the 
Commonwealth. For example, the AOFM provides funds to Defence Housing 
Australia (DHA) at a rate that includes a margin based on the credit rating of DHA 
and on the market rates applying to entities with similar credit ratings. This is 
reflected as a ‘debt neutrality charge’ in DHA’s loan agreement with the 
Commonwealth (Department of Finance and Deregulation, pers. comm., 27 April 
2012; 10 May 2012). 
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Table 8.1 Options for management of EFIC’s treasury functions 
 
EFIC AOFM 
Other Government 
agency Private sector 
Borrow 
Employs 5.4 
full-time equivalent 
staff to undertake 
all treasury 
functions. Incurs 
compliance costs 
such as meeting 
reporting and audit 
requirements 
No additional staff 
required at the 
AOFM, although 
there would be 
additional 
compliance costs, 
such as meeting 
reporting and audit 
requirements. 
These may be 
lower for the AOFM 
than for EFIC due 
to economies of 
scale 
Borrow directly 
from the Australian 
Government’s 
Consolidated 
Revenue Fund 
through an 
appropriation 
x 
Invest 
Cost determined by 
competitive tender 
on a competitively 
neutral basis 
Cost determined by 
competitive tender Structure cash 
flows, including 
foreign exchange 
x 
Manage currency 
and interest rate 
risk 
x 
x Option is unlikely to be least cost. 
Sources: AOFM (pers. comm., 10 May 2012); EFIC (pers. comm., 24 November 2011; 16 January 2012). 
Under the Commission’s proposed new arrangements for EFIC, it is likely that 
borrowing would only be required for the NIA, although the other options for 
borrowing would be suitable if there were reasons that EFIC needed to borrow to 
support facilities on the CA, for example, if EFIC retained capacity to provide direct 
loans or funded guarantees (table 3.2). 
The Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation should regularly 
review the need for, and the scope of, EFIC’s treasury function to ensure that the 
size of treasury operations is commensurate with the size and product offering of 
the origination business it supports. 
The first review of this type should include an assessment of EFIC’s capital 
requirements and dividend policy, and be completed by June 2013. 
8.4 EFIC’s financial performance 
Under the Statement of Expectations (SoE), the Minister states that ‘EFIC’s 
Commercial Account operations are to be conducted on a commercial basis, 
RECOMMENDATION 8.2 
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obtaining a return reflecting risks, and national interest account operations should 
normally be conducted on this basis’ (Emerson 2011, p. 2).  
Consistent with its SoE, the Commission considers that it is appropriate that EFIC: 
• recovers the expected full costs of its facilities (including opportunity costs) 
(chapter 6) 
• operates efficiently. 
If EFIC is achieving these objectives, it will be operating on a commercial basis, 
generating economic profits (discussed in chapter 6) and should earn an 
appropriately benchmarked return on equity (box 8.6). Where EFIC provides a 
facility that is not priced to earn an appropriately benchmarked rate of return on 
equity, and recover the expected full costs of provision, or is not operating 
efficiently, the taxpayer is not fully compensated for the risk EFIC incurs on the 
taxpayer’s behalf. 
In the course of this inquiry, EFIC has asserted that it has performed well 
financially. It has identified three reasons for this assessment: 
• It has regularly earned accounting profits. 
• Its return on equity has been above the return on Australian Government bonds. 
• The Minister and Australian Government central agencies have not expressed 
dissatisfaction with its returns. 
Accounting profit 
A key aspect of EFIC’s response to the draft report is that it has recorded 
accounting profits in 19 of the past 20 years: 
The quality of EFIC’s internal governance framework, systems and procedures is 
reflected in: … Almost 20 years of unbroken profits — since November 1991, through 
a series of global and regional economic shocks, EFIC has been profitable in 19 of the 
past 20 years … (sub. DR90, p. 53) 
EFIC has made modest accounting profits, has retained these profits or returned 
them to the Government in the form of a dividend in most of the past 20 years, and 
has not required direct support from the Government for operating expenses (apart 
from the initial equity investment). 
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Box 8.6 Return on equity 
Return on equity (RoE) is a commonly used measure to assess the financial 
performance of a firm. It measures how well management has performed in generating 
wealth for the shareholder, in EFIC’s case, the Australian Government on behalf of 
taxpayers. Return on equity is equal to the operating profit after all expenses, as a 
percentage of the equity invested in the business (such as contributed equity and 
retained earnings).  
The market’s expected RoE will not be the same for every asset or business, and will 
usually take into account risk, which will also affect the volatility of RoE over time. 
Investors will typically demand a higher RoE for higher risk businesses and assets, and 
expect more volatility in the RoE. An average RoE over longer periods may provide a 
more relevant measure in markets or periods with high volatility. 
Rates of RoE are only informative as comparisons to relevant benchmarks. 
Benchmarks can include assets that are risk free (to ensure RoE includes a premium 
for risk), assets with the same level of risk and assets in similar industries. It is also 
important to compare RoE with benchmarks based on the same definition of profit, 
including whether profit is before or after tax.  
RoE is not the only relevant benchmark for assessing financial performance. A rigorous 
framework for assessing performance would also include other measures such as 
return on assets, asset quality and leverage ratios. However, RoE provides a useful 
headline measure which is commonly used and easily understood, calculated and 
compared.  
 
However, EFIC’s exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements means that 
its accounting profits do not take into account the expected full cost of providing its 
financial services, including income tax expense, the opportunity cost of capital and 
lower borrowing costs arising from the Australian Government’s guarantee. As 
such, EFIC’s accounting profits do not provide an accurate reflection of EFIC’s 
economic profitability. Indeed, because EFIC’s treasury borrows in financial 
markets at a low rate, and lends surplus funds, and capital and reserves to financial 
markets at market rates, earning accounting profits is not a high hurdle to jump. 
Importantly, a modest accounting profit (especially one driven by its treasury 
operations and the return on the investment of the Australian Government’s equity) 
does not prove that EFIC’s finance and insurance activities are generating a net 
benefit to the Australian economy.  
Return on equity 
Commission estimates of EFIC’s after-tax return on equity suggest it ranged 
between 4.0 and 8.4 per cent, and averaged 6.6 per cent, over the past 10 years 
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(figure 8.2). On average, this is below that of the Bank of Queensland (13.3 per 
cent) and Bendigo and Adelaide Bank (11.4 per cent), both of which are of 
comparable size to EFIC (EFIC, sub. 18), and have a similar credit rating to EFIC’s 
CA (BBB) (S&P 2012a; 2012b). 
Figure 8.2 EFIC’s financial performance — low returns to government 
equitya 
 
a  For financial institutions, the benchmark is the after-tax return on equity as reported by each financial 
institution in its annual report for the year ending 30 June (Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, EFIC) or 31 August 
(Bank of Queensland).  b The average of daily quoted capital market yields for Australian Government 10 year 
bonds for the financial year ending 30 June.  c Commission estimates of EFIC’s after-tax return on equity are 
based on a tax rate of 30 per cent.  d For the Bendigo and Adelaide Bank, the quoted return on equity before 
2007-08 is for the Bendigo Bank. 
Sources: Bank of Queensland (2002–2011); Bendigo and Adelaide Bank (2008–2011); Bendigo 
Bank (2002–2007); EFIC (sub. 18); RBA (2012b). 
In its submission to the issues paper, EFIC highlighted as evidence of its financial 
performance that its: 
 … average annual return on equity over the period [since 2006] was approximately 
8.9 per cent compared to the ten-year government bond rate over the same period of 
5.7 per cent. (sub. 18, p. 3). 
However, the return on Australian Government bonds (considered low risk given 
the Australian Government’s AAA credit rating) alone does not represent an 
adequate benchmark for EFIC’s financial performance, given the risk EFIC incurs 
on the CA. 
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At public hearings, EFIC explained why it considers that its returns have been 
adequate: 
Our argument about return has been very simply that we price individual transactions to 
market, so we believe that we are delivering what the market would expect as a rate of 
return. (trans., p. 291) 
Pricing its financial services to match the prices of other providers in the market is 
not sufficient to ensure that EFIC is operating efficiently. For instance, it does not 
ensure that EFIC is delivering its products at an efficient price, including 
operational costs and the opportunity costs of its capital (discussed in chapter 6). 
EFIC’s low rate of return on equity indicates the Australian Government has not 
received an adequate return for the risk it has incurred from EFIC’s operations. 
External scrutiny of performance 
EFIC has also noted as evidence of its sound financial performance that the Minister 
and Australian Government central agencies have not raised issues with the forecast 
rate of return provided in its corporate plan or annual financial presentations (EFIC, 
trans., p. 154; pers. comm., 14 Oct 2011). 
The lack of clarity in the information provided by EFIC is likely to have reduced the 
ability of other government agencies to judge its economic performance (chapter 9). 
At present, EFIC’s performance management framework is not adequate to assess 
EFIC’s performance and ensure that EFIC is operating efficiently and generating a 
return for the Australian Government and taxpayers that is commensurate with the 
risk it incurs. 
Benchmarking 
The rate of return a firm or government agency earns is a useful indicator of 
financial performance when compared against relevant benchmarks (box 8.6). 
EFIC has argued against comparing its operations to other financial institutions: 
In general it is not appropriate to compare EFIC with other financial institutions in the 
private sector due to its mandate to operate in the market gap. For example, private 
sector institutions seek to increase returns for shareholders by maximizing profits. 
While EFIC is expected to be profitable, its main objective (and statutory mandate) is 
to facilitate and encourage Australian export trade where the private market is 
unwilling or unable to provide support. As a result of its mandate, EFIC does not have 
a well-diversified portfolio of risk either by borrower type or by product offering. It 
does not have, for example residential mortgage or credit card businesses, which form a 
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significant part of regional and major bank portfolios and are major drivers of their 
profitability. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 2) 
And: 
The premise we’ve disagreed with is that our returns would be comparable to the 
Australian banking system. (trans., p. 286) 
The Commission considers that although EFIC’s business is different from that of 
many of Australia’s banks, the relevant consideration is the return it earns relative 
to the risk it incurs. As such, comparison of the return on equity of banks and other 
financial institutions relative to the risk of their business (and consequent volatility 
of their profits) provides a benchmark to assess EFIC’s financial performance. 
Using financial indicators from major or regional banks as a benchmark does not 
mean the Commission is recommending that EFIC operate in the same way as those 
businesses. 
In practice, benchmarking the financial performance of government businesses is 
difficult. The Australian Government Competitive Neutrality Complaints Office 
noted: 
Benchmarking is seldom easy. For instance, it can be difficult to isolate specific factors 
affecting an individual firm’s return from underlying market performance. In addition, 
it is sometimes difficult to find comparable firms or industry averages for some 
government activities … While benchmarking may lack the appearance of precision, it 
nevertheless incorporates the activity’s level of market risk into the target setting 
process and provides a useful basis for setting or comparing returns. At the very least, 
the performance of other firms in an industry cannot be ignored when judging the 
performance of a government business. (CCNCO 1998, pp. 5-6) 
The Commission considers that appropriate benchmarking of EFIC’s financial 
performance could involve comparison of EFIC’s returns against a benchmark that 
is commensurate with the risk incurred and informed by a range of financial 
indicators, such as the yield on financial securities and return on equity of other 
financial institutions with similar levels of risk (and consequent volatility of their 
profits). The Minister should set an appropriately benchmarked rate of return on 
equity, in consultation with the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance, which 
should be reflected in the Minister’s SoE (chapter 6). 
Appropriate benchmarking of EFIC’s financial performance will improve the 
transparency of EFIC’s performance to Government. It will also provide a more 
credible demonstration to the private sector of the commercial viability of serving 
the market. 
   
  FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE 
257 
 
Explaining EFIC’s financial performance 
If EFIC’s return on equity is consistently below that of appropriate benchmarks, it 
suggests that: 
• not all of EFIC’s facilities are priced to reflect the expected full costs of 
provision, including the opportunity cost of capital (chapter 6), or 
• EFIC is not as operationally efficient at providing financial services as private 
sector providers because it has: 
– a conservative business model, retaining a large amount of capital to protect 
against insolvency or against calling on the Australian Government guarantee 
– high operating expenses relative to income. 
Retained capital 
As noted earlier in this chapter, EFIC retains capital well above regulatory 
minimums and EFIC’s internal limits. In its submission to the draft report, EFIC 
stated that its return on equity reflects that it ‘holds more capital to reflect its 
concentration risks, a function of the niche in which it is required to operate’ 
(sub. DR90, p. 48), and that this lowers its return on equity. However, the 
Commission does not consider a market failure (or even a market gap) mandate 
requires EFIC to deliver low returns to the Government’s equity investment. 
EFIC has identified its high capital holdings as the main reason for its low reported 
return on equity, and outlined its rationale for maintaining a relatively large amount 
of capital: 
If our return on equity is at odds with your expectations, it does not reflect our pricing, 
it does not reflect our costs, it certainly doesn’t reflect our losses. It may reflect, I think 
in fact we argue it does reflect, our capital base. 
There are two elements to that. Firstly, we are asked to do a great deal with our capital 
base, that is, we need to provide significant limits against our capital base and [second] 
we have to have a significant cushion. (trans., p. 291) 
The first element EFIC has identified is a need to maintain a large amount of capital 
in order to be able to provide large facilities while maintaining large exposure limits 
consistent with APRA guidelines, which are based on a percentage of capital 
(including callable capital).  
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The second element identified by EFIC is that its high level of capital provides a 
‘cushion’, or buffer, against insolvency risk arising from unexpected events. In 
relation to its high capital holdings, EFIC stated that this: 
 … gives a high degree of assurance to Government and the taxpayer that EFIC will be 
financially self-sustaining and will not call on the Government guarantee. (sub. DR90, 
p. 48) 
The Commission notes that retaining capital in order to minimise the risk of calling 
the guarantee is not a relevant indicator of financial performance, as the capital held 
by EFIC, as well as callable capital, are both owned by the Australian Government 
on behalf of the taxpayer.  
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC stated ‘Capital in excess of 16 per cent is 
necessary to support concentration risks arising from large export contracts and 
exposures’ (sub. DR90, p. 45). The Commission noted earlier in this chapter that 
EFIC holds capital in excess of its requirements, even after taking into account its 
requirement to cover concentration risk. 
The Commission considers that if EFIC’s facilities require a large amount of capital 
to satisfy concentration capital requirements, then the cost of holding this additional 
capital should be recovered from these facilities. Where providing large facilities 
reduces EFIC’s return on equity, it suggests that the Australian Government is 
undercompensated for the concentration risk borne on these facilities. 
It may also be the case that the cost of EFIC providing large facilities may be higher 
than that of private sector providers due to its relatively small balance sheet. The 
application of competitive neutrality arrangements to EFIC’s activities would 
ensure that it faces the full cost of providing the additional capital against large 
exposures and improve the incentive for EFIC to use its capital efficiently. 
Capital requirements are imposed by regulators on financial institutions principally 
to protect depositors. They also benefit shareholders. However, for shareholders, 
there is a tradeoff between the benefits of maintaining high levels of retained capital 
and the cost of doing so. Although it is necessary that EFIC maintains capital to 
meet appropriate prudential standards, retaining capital to the extent that it is 
inefficiently used and generates a low rate of return compromises EFIC’s claim that 
it is a successful commercial enterprise. 
In the 2012-13 Budget, the Australian Government made an allowance for a special 
dividend of $200 million to be paid from EFIC’s capital and reserves (Australian 
Government 2012). 
 
   
  FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT AND 
PERFORMANCE 
259 
 
The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 should be amended to 
allow the Minister to direct the Board of EFIC to return capital to the Australian 
Government when the Minister determines that EFIC has surplus capital, after 
seeking the views of the Treasurer and the Minister for Finance. 
Operating expenses 
A potential contributing factor to EFIC’s relatively low rate of return on equity may 
be high operating expenses, and low operational efficiency, compared to that of 
private sector providers. 
A common measure of cost performance in the banking industry is the 
cost-to-income ratio — the standard definition of which is non-interest costs 
(excluding bad and doubtful debts) divided by the total of net interest income and 
non-interest income. The focus on non-interest costs reduces the volatility caused 
by changes in interest rates (Tripe 1998). 
In its submission to this inquiry, EFIC stated that its cost-to-income ratio, which 
ranged between 36.6 and 48.8 per cent over the past four years, is consistently 
below that of Australian regional banks, and was below that of the major banks in 
2008-09 and 2009-10 (sub. 18, appendix A). However, as noted by EFIC (sub. 18), 
the cost-to-income ratio can vary significantly based on accounting policy. Of 
particular importance is how accounting policy makes allowance for credit risk. 
The use of the cost-to-income ratio to compare financial institutions with different 
business models has flaws, as it can be affected by non-performance characteristics. 
For example, as identified by Tripe (1998), a financial institution that reduces its 
branch network could use the savings to increase its interest rates in order to attract 
funds from other sources such as institutional lenders, improving its cost-to-income 
ratio without affecting the institutions’ profitability. Likewise, EFIC’s reported low 
cost-to-income ratio may reflect that its business model is to source funds from 
domestic and international capital markets (which it is able to do at a relatively low 
cost because of the government guarantee). In contrast, banks operate branch 
networks with high non-interest costs to obtain funds from depositors. 
Also, as noted by EFIC, banks generally do not separately report on their cost 
performance for their institutional or corporate banking arms: 
In the banking sector that is probably most relevant to EFIC from the perspective of 
corporate or institutional … the banks don’t actually report on a segment basis on that. 
(trans., p. 298) 
RECOMMENDATION 8.3 
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Although using financial ratios to benchmark EFIC’s operational efficiency against 
that of other financial institutions has limitations, examination of EFIC’s operating 
expenses can provide some indication of how well it is performing in constraining 
its cost growth over time. EFIC’s nominal CA operating expenses have increased by 
58 per cent in the past five years, from $15.5 million in 2006-07 to $24.5 million in 
2010-11. Staff costs (wages, provision for employee entitlements and 
superannuation) are EFIC’s largest expenditure item representing about 50 to 60 per 
cent of its total operating expenses. Staff costs increased by 53 per cent from 
2006-07 to 2010-11 (EFIC 2007–2011). 
Over the same period, the number of EFIC full-time equivalent (FTE) employees 
increased from 70.4 to 85.8 or by 22 per cent (for the CA and NIA). Annual staff 
costs per FTE employee increased from $141 000 to $179 000 or by 28 per cent 
(EFIC 2007–2011). This rate of increase in average staff costs per FTE employee 
exceeds the 15 per cent increase in the ABS labour price index (excluding bonuses) 
for the financial and insurance services industry between 2006-07 and 2010-11 
(ABS 2011e). At public hearings, EFIC did not contest that its staff costs have 
increased more than its staff numbers. It identified that this is due to its recruitment 
of a greater number of professional staff than administrative staff resulting in a 
higher average salary for its staff as a whole (trans., p. 292).  
In contrast, EFIC’s non-staff costs (for the CA and NIA) increased by 13 per cent in 
the five years to 2010-11, which is equal to the general increase in prices for goods 
and services during the period (as measured by the ABS all groups consumer price 
index) (ABS 2011d). 
The increase in EFIC’s operating expenses has been accompanied by an increase in 
some of EFIC’s reported output measures, including value of exports supported1 
and number of facilities (the face value of facilities signed was also slightly higher 
in 2010-11 than 2006-07) (figure 8.3). Although operating expenses increased in 
nominal terms, in terms of some outputs they decreased over the period. For 
example, EFIC’s average operating expenses per facility signed decreased from 
$0.41 million to $0.24 million, and operating expenses per million dollars of exports 
supported decreased from approximately $11 000 to $7000. 
However, both the value of facilities signed and exports supported are only partial 
measures of EFIC’s output and are not sufficient to demonstrate EFIC is becoming 
more efficient. For example, average expenses per facility signed could decrease 
                                                 
1  The Commission has previously noted there are technical difficulties with estimating the value 
of exports supported by EFIC (chapter 2). 
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without it necessarily achieving efficiency gains such as a cost reduction in its 
facility approval process. Other output measures on EFIC’s CA, such as profit, did 
not increase during the period. 
Figure 8.3 EFIC’s commercial account operating expenses and measures 
of activity and profitability 
Index, 2006-07 is equal to 100 
 
a Value of exports and overseas investments supported as calculated by EFIC. There are technical difficulties 
in accurately calculating an estimate of Australian exports supported by EFIC.  b Number of facilities includes 
facilities shared between the CA and NIA.  c Face value of loans, guarantees, insurance and bonds.  d Profit 
is the accounting profit reported by EFIC in its annual report. 
Sources: EFIC (2007–2011; pers. comm., 5 December 2011). 
The Commission’s analysis of EFIC’s operational performance is relatively simple 
and does not constitute an audit of EFIC’s operational performance. In its draft 
report, the Commission requested additional information regarding EFIC’s 
operational efficiency but none was forthcoming from participants or EFIC.  
In sum 
The key consideration in assessing EFIC’s financial performance on the CA is 
whether it operates on a commercial basis and achieves a return on equity 
commensurate with the risk it incurs. 
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Although EFIC has recorded accounting profits in 19 of the past 20 years, its 
exemption from competitive neutrality arrangements means that its profits do not 
take into account the full cost of providing its products, including income tax 
expense, the opportunity cost of capital and lower borrowing costs arising from the 
Australian Government’s guarantee. 
As a corporation, EFIC’s activities on the CA have earned a low rate of return on 
equity. A number of factors may be adversely affecting its financial performance: 
• As demonstrated in chapter 6, not all of EFIC’s transactions are priced to reflect 
the expected full cost given the risk incurred. 
• EFIC has a high level of retained capital, which may indicate it is using its 
capital inefficiently. 
• There has been rapid growth in EFIC’s operating expenses. 
An assessment of EFIC’s operational efficiency will not be possible until it is 
subject to competitive neutrality arrangements and operates on an equal footing 
with private sector providers. 
The Australian Government has not received an adequate return for the risk it has 
incurred from EFIC’s operations. This may reflect a number of factors, including 
that some facilities are not priced to reflect their expected full economic cost (given 
the risk incurred), a high level of retained capital, and possibly high operating 
expenses. 
 
FINDING 8.4 
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9 Governance arrangements 
 
Key points 
 The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC) has some of the building 
blocks for a strong governance framework. However, a number of its internal 
processes are weak and this increases the likelihood that financial and reputational 
risk will be unnecessarily transferred to the Australian Government. 
 EFIC’s overall performance would be improved if it had a clearly defined and 
rigorous objective that is based on market failure, around which a performance 
management framework was developed.  
 Transparency would be enhanced if there was greater public reporting of EFIC’s 
activities and performance, including through the publication of its corporate plan. 
 The Commission is not satisfied that the written material provided to the EFIC Board 
is sufficient to evaluate whether facilities submitted for Board approval on the 
commercial account are meeting the Minister’s expectations regarding pricing, or to 
determine that EFIC is not competing with the private sector. 
 EFIC’s compliance with the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 
(Cwlth)  and the Minister’s Statement of Expectations has not had sufficient focus in 
independent reviews or EFIC’s internal audit program over the past five years. 
 External governance could be improved by the Australian Government providing 
greater clarity on EFIC’s international obligations.  
 The potential for conflicts associated with having a representative from the 
Australian Government on the EFIC Board could be reduced by excluding 
Australian Public Service personnel from the EFIC Board. 
 Transparency of national interest account facilities could be enhanced by providing 
more information on the justification for, and performance of, these facilities.  
 
The earlier chapters of this report have raised concerns about the Export Finance 
and Insurance Corporation’s (EFIC’s) operations, and in particular whether they are 
based on a suitable rationale for government intervention, namely addressing 
market failure affecting newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). In view of these concerns, this chapter discusses the importance of 
appropriate governance arrangements, particularly given the inherent tensions when 
a commercially focused organisation is government owned. In line with the terms of 
reference for this inquiry, this chapter includes an assessment of EFIC’s external 
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and internal governance arrangements, including EFIC’s operations against the 
functions of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) 
(EFIC Act), its powers and priorities, and the nature and appropriateness of the 
information and advice provided by EFIC to the Australian Government and the 
public.  
9.1 The importance of good governance 
The framework of rules, relationships, processes and systems in which agencies 
operate is known as their governance arrangements. The need for governance 
arrangements arises from the principal-agent problem — when the incentives of the 
decision-makers of an organisation do not necessarily align with those of the 
owners. Where incentives are not aligned, executives may make decisions that are 
not in the best interests of the owners and undermine the benefits of delegation. The 
problem is exacerbated in the case of publicly listed companies (owned by 
shareholders) and public sector organisations (owned by taxpayers) where 
ownership is diffuse.  
One way of aligning the interests of owners and executives is for the owners to 
appoint or elect representatives (directors on a board) to oversee and advise, but not 
manage, operations. The appointment of a board of directors is the primary, and 
most important, means of aligning the Australian Government’s priorities with 
those of EFIC’s executive. Uhrig (2003) considered that ‘typically, the priorities of 
the board should be the priorities of government as the representative of the 
community’ (p. 42), and that the most effective way for this to occur is for the board 
to be given clearly defined objectives, and the full power to act, including to ‘“say 
no” to management’ (p. 65).  
Although the use of a board as a link between government and an agency is 
common in public sector organisations in Australia, this governance framework 
faces challenges. For example, the government is usually represented by a minister 
who acts on behalf of taxpayers. This makes the chain of accountabilities — from 
executives to boards to ministers (advised by Ministerial and departmental staff) to 
taxpayers — complex, and potentially dilutes accountabilities. Ministers (either 
directly or via their Ministerial or departmental staff) may seek to interfere with the 
operations of the organisation for politically motivated reasons. Moreover, the 
threats of takeover and bankruptcy, which impose market discipline on private 
sector boards and executives and an incentive to use capital efficiently, are usually 
absent (OECD 2005). 
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Decision makers in government-owned commercial entities (where public funds are 
at stake) may have different approaches to commercial risk than those in private 
sector firms, particularly with regard to activities with potentially high returns but 
also relatively high risk. For example, responsibilities for expenditure of public 
funds can lead to conservative behaviour, while government guarantees, or the 
ability to borrow at a lower cost than the private sector can increase risk taking 
(PC 2005). 
These challenges highlight the need for sound governance procedures to effectively 
manage public sector organisations. Governance tools — such as ministerial 
directions, corporate plans, a statement of expectations (SoE), performance 
management frameworks and reports on operating activities — can be used to 
codify the way governance arrangements work in practice. These tools can also 
ensure that the agency’s public policy goals are achieved efficiently and effectively, 
and that it is acting within its mandate and authorised powers. The quality of 
directors does not reduce the need for such tools. 
Making these documents transparent and publicly available can also facilitate input 
and monitoring from non-government organisations. This can provide a perspective 
on policy issues that might not otherwise be available to the government and 
enhance the legitimacy of outcomes (Gunningham and Grabosky 2004). The role of 
public reporting and performance monitoring ensures the agency is accountable to 
Parliament, government and the public in its operations (appendix D). 
9.2 EFIC’s governance arrangements 
EFIC is an authority constituted under the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) (CAC Act). Its features include it: 
 being a body corporate 
 being able to hold money on its own account rather than on behalf of the 
Australian Government 
 having a governing board subject to directors’ duties (or at least one director, 
subject to these duties) (DOFA 2005). 
EFIC’s governance arrangements, like those of other government-owned 
enterprises, can be considered as having two main aspects: 
 External governance — the roles, relationships and distribution of powers and 
responsibilities between Parliament, the responsible Minister and the relevant 
department. These arrangements include: EFIC’s legal authorisation and form; 
the degree of organisational separation from the responsible Minister; its 
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decision-making powers; and its accountability to the Australian Government 
and Parliament. This includes scrutiny by the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) through the annual financial statement audit and the potential for 
additional ANAO and Parliamentary Committee scrutiny. Ministerial directions 
and the Minister’s SoE also form part of the agency’s external governance 
arrangements. The SoE outlines the Minister’s expectations of the Board 
regarding EFIC’s provision of financial products and services, its pricing 
strategy, provision of information and compliance with international agreements 
(Emerson 2011). 
 Internal governance — EFIC’s organisational structure and lines of reporting, 
internal processes and procedures, financial and performance management 
practices, social and environmental responsibilities, and code of conduct. These 
are usually set out in internal policy documents. EFIC’s key internal governance 
policies include a risk management framework (chapter 2) from which risk 
management and credit policies and procedures have been developed, and a 
policy for environmental and social review of transactions (section 9.6). 
For governance arrangements to be effective and to ensure accountability, there 
needs to be a clear understanding of the interaction of, and a clear delineation 
between, the roles and responsibilities of the Australian Government (external 
governance) and the Board and management of EFIC (internal governance). In 
practice, this means the Australian Government should provide EFIC with a clear 
mandate under which to operate, a clear objective, and appropriate powers and 
resources. It should also ensure that there is performance reporting against EFIC’s 
objective and, where performance is poor, take action. 
The basis for EFIC’s external governance arrangements is EFIC’s enabling 
legislation, the EFIC Act. The Act, supported by regulations, determines EFIC’s 
functions and duties, its powers, the role of the Minister, the eligibility criteria for 
the transactions it can enter into, who it can transact with, and the financial 
constraints within which it must operate, among other things. With regard to 
internal governance arrangements, the EFIC Board is charged with managing the 
organisation’s affairs (EFIC Act, s. 33) and, through the preparation of a corporate 
plan, it must specify EFIC’s strategies for achieving the objectives set down by the 
Australian Government, including financial targets (EFIC Act, s. 49). The Board 
also has responsibility for selecting, appointing and, where appropriate, removing 
the Managing Director, approving decisions that are beyond the delegation of the 
Managing Director, and holding management responsible for its performance. 
The EFIC Board charter states that the Board is to review key internal governance 
arrangements, including managing portfolio risk, and maintaining corporate 
governance practices for EFIC’s compliance with its external governance 
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arrangements. The charter also states that the Board should monitor EFIC’s 
operational and financial position and performance (EFIC 2011b). 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was of the view that other 
Australian Government agencies also have a role in overseeing EFIC: 
DFAT considers that, while the Minister for Trade is responsible for administering 
EFIC’s enabling legislation, all Commonwealth supporting agencies have a role in the 
sound administration and governance of EFIC and in ensuring that its obligations under 
the CAC Act are met. The Departments of the Treasury, Finance and Prime Minister 
and Cabinet should therefore have timely access to EFIC information and documents to 
fulfil their responsibilities and ensure whole-of-government consistency in the 
management of Commonwealth authorities. (sub. 19, p. 13) 
If it is the case that other government agencies have a role in the sound 
administration and governance of EFIC, it is not clear what arrangement DFAT has 
put in place to facilitate this role. 
9.3 Are EFIC’s external governance arrangements 
adequate? 
The principles for determining the most appropriate governance arrangements for 
Australian Government agencies are outlined in the document Governance 
Arrangements for Australian Government Bodies (DOFA 2005). The discussion 
below follows these principles. 
Clarity of purpose 
Clear objectives provide the purpose for the activities that an agency undertakes on 
the Government’s behalf. They are essential for establishing priorities for the 
organisation and are also the basis for holding the organisation accountable for its 
performance. 
As discussed by Uhrig (2003): 
Having a clear purpose is essential to effective governance. Organisations which do not 
operate with clear purpose have a limited capacity to define long-term goals and are 
unlikely to meet the expectations of stakeholders. For statutory authorities, a clear 
purpose is essential to meeting the objectives of government and the expectations and 
needs of the public. 
When a statutory authority is unsure of the expectations of government there is a risk it 
will operate in a manner that represents a wider mandate than its legislation may 
envisage, leading to inappropriate use of resources and unintended outcomes. There is 
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also the risk that a statutory authority will not be undertaking operations that a Minister 
has anticipated, also resulting in a failure to meet expectations. (p. 59) 
EFIC’s primary duties are to: 
 comply with directions from the Minister 
 have regard to the desirability of improving and extending the range of insurance 
and other financial services and products available (whether from EFIC or 
otherwise) to persons involved, or likely to be involved, directly or indirectly, in 
Australian export trade 
 have regard to Australia’s obligations under international agreements 
 provide services and products as efficiently and economically as possible (EFIC 
Act, s. 8). 
The Minister, through the SoE, has directed EFIC to ‘perform these functions only 
in circumstances where the credit and insurance sectors are not able or are unwilling 
to provide credit and insurance services to financially viable Australian export 
transactions or overseas projects’ (Emerson 2011, p. 1). At the same time there is 
the expectation that ‘EFIC’s Commercial Account operations are to be conducted 
on a commercial basis’ (Emerson 2011, p. 2). 
The Commission considers that not all of EFIC’s facilities on the commercial 
account (CA) have been priced to reflect the expected full economic cost, given the 
risk incurred (chapter 6). Furthermore, the Commission does not consider that EFIC 
has, at all times, limited its activities to a part of the market where the private sector 
is absent, and that it is likely that some of the projects for which EFIC has provided 
facilities would have gone ahead without EFIC’s involvement (chapter 7). 
The Commission considers that EFIC’s overall performance would be improved if it 
had a clearly defined and rigorous objective directed at market failures affecting 
newly exporting SMEs. This would remove ambiguity about the extent to which 
EFIC’s commercial performance should be traded off against objectives such as 
encouraging export trade, providing information and advice, and encouraging other 
financial institutions to undertake trade-related transactions. It would also resolve 
the issue of EFIC being required to participate only where private sector providers 
are not willing or able to provide financial services — while meeting the objective 
of providing financial services on a commercial basis.  
Improved clarification of EFIC’s objective would make for better internal and 
external governance, and would better enable the Minister to evaluate EFIC’s 
performance. The Commission’s proposed changes to EFIC’s objective under the 
EFIC Act and its future role are discussed in chapter 10. 
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EFIC’s legal form and financial management legislation 
The Department of Finance and Deregulation’s (DOFD) framework for establishing 
a suitable legal form is broadly consistent with the recommendations of the 2002 
Uhrig Review (box 9.1). It provides for Australian Government agencies to be 
regulated by either the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (Cwlth)  
or the CAC Act, depending on each agency’s purpose and the nature of its 
activities.  Most Australian Government bodies operate as FMA agencies that are 
financially part of the Australian Government and receive public money that can 
only be spent with the authority of appropriation approved through Parliament. 
 
Box 9.1 The Uhrig Review and the Australian Government’s response 
In 2002, the Australian Government commissioned a review of the governance 
arrangements of its agencies. The resulting report, known as the Uhrig Review, 
concluded that: 
 statutory authorities would benefit from greater clarity in the definition of their 
purpose, direction and objectives, and that each Minister should issue a statement 
of expectations to statutory authorities within their portfolios. The statement would 
outline relevant government policies, including the Government’s current objectives 
relevant to the authority and any expectations the Government may have on how 
the authority should conduct its operations 
 board committees can be used to enhance the effectiveness of governing boards 
through detailed oversight and supervision of areas of risk critical to the entity’s 
success. However, the board remains responsible for the overall governance of the 
entity 
 most bodies (authorities and companies) covered by the Commonwealth Authorities 
and Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) should have a governing board (the ‘board 
template’) if they undertake predominately commercial operations. This is because 
a board is more likely to be given the necessary powers to govern such an authority. 
The role of public servants on governing boards needs to be carefully considered. 
In 2004, the Government endorsed the review’s recommendation that boards should 
only be used when they can be given full power to act, and if they are used, should not 
include Australian Public Service personnel. The Government also announced that it 
would implement the recommended governance templates and that ministers would 
provide agencies with a Statement of Expectations. 
Sources: DOFA (2005); Uhrig (2003).   
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The DOFD framework outlines a number of factors to be considered when 
assessing whether EFIC’s current legal form as a CAC Act authority is appropriate. 
 The body operates commercially with the intention of making a profit, in a 
competitive environment, and it would be likely classified as outside the general 
government sector.1 
 A governing board would provide effective governance. 
 There is a clear rationale for the assets of the body not to be owned or controlled by 
the Commonwealth directly. 
 The body requires a degree of independence from general policies of the Australian 
Government … (DOFA 2005, p. 24). 
The framework also notes that CAC Act bodies may be best suited to activities that 
create financial risk for the Australian Government. The board of directors is to 
exercise its powers in the best interests of the body and for a proper purpose, and 
can help to ensure that prudent decisions are made on the resources that, as a matter 
of law, the body holds in its own right (DOFA 2005). The Government relies on 
EFIC’s Board to properly govern the agency in line with its duties. The Board is the 
most important mechanism for ensuring that the agency is properly governed. 
The Commission considers it is important that EFIC has sufficient independence to 
fulfil its commercial role, and sees benefit in EFIC having a merit-based, 
commercially-focused board to align EFIC’s activities with the priorities of the 
Australian Government. 
Independence from government  
The EFIC Act articulates EFIC’s powers, roles and responsibilities and is the formal 
source of EFIC’s independence from government. The CAC Act provides a 
framework for the operations and governance of many Australian Government 
agencies and provides further guidance to EFIC. Ministers can request information 
and can expect to be informed by their department about issues concerning portfolio 
bodies. This is reiterated in the SoE through the expectation that EFIC will work 
closely with DFAT and provide support to prepare policy advice (Emerson 2011). 
EFIC manages its financial reserves and borrowings in a framework determined by 
legislation and the Minister for Finance. It is able to enter into individual 
transactions on the CA without ministerial interference, provided it is within the 
                     
1 The ‘general government sector’ comprises bodies that are primarily budget-funded, or that 
generally obtain their funds directly from government (DOFA 2005). 
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constraints stipulated in the EFIC and CAC Acts, and the transactions are consistent 
with ministerial directions. This independence was noted in the DFAT submission: 
All decisions about potential commercial account transactions are made by EFIC on the 
basis of commercial viability and market gap and without reference to prevailing 
government sentiment towards, or activities in, a particular sector or market. There is 
no expectation on the part of government that EFIC will do otherwise. (sub. 19, p. 4) 
The DFAT submission went on to say: 
EFIC’s exposures in [the] South Pacific, Asian and African economies potentially 
facilitate a range of development outcomes that align with Australia’s broader foreign 
and security policy objectives. (sub. 19, p. 4) 
It is not clear from the submission whether this comment relates to CA transactions 
or those on the national interest account (NIA), where these outcomes could be 
argued to constitute the ‘national interest’. As the Commission considers it would 
be inappropriate for EFIC to make decisions regarding Australia’s broader policy 
(or national interest) objectives — decisions that are properly the role of ministers 
— it is desirable that EFIC’s decisions on the CA are made purely on a commercial 
basis. 
Board composition 
The Uhrig Review (Uhrig 2003) recommended that all statutory authorities adopt 
one of two governance templates — the ‘board template’ or an ‘executive 
management template’. The review recommended the board template for statutory 
authorities that undertake predominately commercial operations, because a board is 
more likely to be given the necessary powers to govern such an authority. The 
review also considered that ‘Membership of the board by the related departmental 
secretary is unwise unless there are specific circumstances which require it’ (p. 99).  
The Australian Government partly implemented the Uhrig Review 
recommendations with respect to EFIC’s Board membership by discontinuing the 
practice of appointing the Secretary of the Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources to the Board, and by removing the legislated ex-officio status of the chief 
executive officer of Austrade from the Board. However, the Government decided to 
retain a Government member on the EFIC Board, and appoints DFAT’s Secretary 
(or an alternate).  
The Commission understands there are only five boards of Australian Government 
agencies that retain a government member and that, of these, only EFIC has a 
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predominantly commercial purpose.2 The then Minister decided to retain EFIC’s 
government board member because: 
 EFIC has a role in managing the NIA 
 the government board member makes a contribution to country risk assessments, 
which form an important part of the Board’s deliberations 
 it is the most efficient means of ensuring EFIC’s compliance with the ‘market 
gap’ mandate and ensuring that the Board’s decisions are taken within the 
framework of a deeper understanding of the Government’s foreign and trade 
policy objectives (SFADTLC 2006). 
In its submission to the issues paper DFAT noted that: 
The inclusion of a government member on the [EFIC] Board is considered critical 
because of the specialised foreign and trade policy expertise that the member can bring 
to EFIC’s management of transactions on its commercial account, as well as complex 
NIA transactions. (sub. 19, p. 10) 
Regarding the first point, DFAT further noted that ‘EFIC manages all NIA 
transactions as if they were on the commercial account’ (sub. 19, p. 11). EFIC has a 
service level agreement (SLA) with DFAT detailing how the NIA is to be managed 
(box 9.2), so it is not clear what additional value the Government board member 
brings to this role. 
Although country risk assessment assists EFIC in analysis of the risk of projects, it 
can be provided by DFAT to EFIC in other ways (at an operational rather than 
board level). The Commission considers this information role is not sufficient to 
justify retention of the Government board member. The information could be 
effectively conveyed through other means. 
The role of the Government board member in ensuring EFIC’s compliance with its 
mandate also appears flawed. DFAT officers would typically not possess significant 
commercial experience and their expertise would not normally be expected to 
extend to market and financial analysis. The challenge is complicated by the 
vagueness of the market gap mandate. Even with the new market failure mandate 
that the Commission proposes, it is unlikely that DFAT officials would possess the 
relevant economic and commercial skills. 
                     
2 These agencies are: EFIC; the Australian Reinsurance Pool Corporation; the Reserve Bank of 
Australia; the CSIRO; and the National Library. 
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Box 9.2 Management of the national interest account 
Management of the national interest account (NIA) is based on a service level 
agreement (SLA) between EFIC and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT). The current SLA runs from July 2011 to July 2014, and includes: 
 requirements for DFAT to provide timely advice about any new information or 
decisions that may be relevant to EFIC’s operations 
 requirements for EFIC to conduct due diligence and manage its NIA operations 
efficiently, and in compliance with the EFIC Act and ministerial decisions 
 a range of reporting, consultation and information sharing obligations between EFIC 
and DFAT. 
Source: DFAT (sub. 19).  
 
The notion that the Government board member ensures that EFIC’s Board decisions 
are taken within the framework of a deeper understanding of the Government’s 
foreign and trade policy objectives is also problematic. With regard to public 
servants sitting on boards, Uhrig (2003) said: 
 … care should be exercised when appointing public servants to boards. In 
circumstances where a departmental staff member is appointed on the basis of 
representing the government’s interests or having a ‘quasi’ supervision approach, 
conflicts of interest may arise and poor governance is likely. Through participation in 
decision-making, either directly or implied, the departmental representative may 
become an advocate for the organisation rather than contributing critical comment … 
Membership of the board by the related departmental secretary is unwise unless there 
are specific circumstances which require it. (p. 99) 
The Commission shares these concerns. Given that the EFIC Board is expected to 
take a commercial approach, there is a risk of conflicts of interest emerging of the 
type envisaged by the Uhrig Review. For example, conflict may emerge between 
the foreign, trade and security policy objectives of the Government and DFAT, and 
the commercial interests of EFIC. The Commission considers EFIC’s compliance 
with such policy objectives is more appropriately achieved by clear direction from 
the Minister. 
This is not to say that there is no role for DFAT officials in engaging with EFIC or 
its Board. As stated by Uhrig (2003): 
[The concerns expressed] do not mean that departmental representatives should not 
attend board meetings as agreed by the chairman. No objections are raised to either 
staff of the entity or other public servants attending specific parts of a meeting to 
discuss or clarify issues with the board. (p. 99) 
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Where the EFIC Board considers that DFAT can usefully contribute to EFIC’s 
understanding of foreign affairs, trade or security developments surrounding a 
transaction, it may be appropriate that a DFAT official be invited to present to 
Board meetings for the relevant agenda items and to answer questions relating to 
those items. 
Importantly, if EFIC were engaging in transactions for reasons relating to foreign 
affairs or security considerations, it is not clear why these transactions would take 
place on the CA. As noted earlier, the CA should be used to support eligible 
transactions on a commercial basis and transactions made for national interest 
reasons should go on the NIA. 
Consistent with the findings of the Uhrig Review, the Australian Government 
should amend the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 to 
exclude Australian Public Service personnel from the EFIC Board. Where the 
EFIC Board considers departmental advice beneficial, officials from the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade should be invited to present to board 
meetings for the relevant agenda items and to answer questions relating to those 
items. 
9.4 Are EFIC’s internal governance arrangements 
adequate? 
EFIC’s Board is responsible for ensuring that EFIC complies with its legal 
obligations under the CAC and EFIC Acts, as well as the Minister’s expectations 
outlined in the SoE. The Board is assisted in this regard by a number of governance 
committees (box 9.3). 
RECOMMENDATION 9.1 
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Box 9.3 EFIC’s governance committees and compliance activities 
The Board is ultimately responsible for setting EFIC’s risk appetite and tolerances, and 
is assisted by a number of internal committees, including: 
 EFIC executive and the senior management teams — responsible at the 
management level for implementing the Board-approved risk management strategy 
and developing policies, processes, procedures and controls for identifying and 
managing risks in all areas of activity 
 Audit Committee — responsible for overseeing all aspects of risk management and 
internal control, including compliance activity, the audit program, the 
appropriateness of accounting policies and the adequacy of financial reporting 
 Credit Committee — chaired by EFIC’s chief credit officer, examines credit policy 
and practices in relation to all exposures and potential transactions  
 Risk and Compliance Committee — chaired by EFIC’s compliance counsel, 
examines, monitors and regulates compliance risks  
 Treasury Risk Review Committee — chaired by EFIC’s head of treasury, examines 
treasury activities, limits, noteworthy transactions and current issues. 
EFIC contends that the quality of its internal governance framework and procedures is 
reflected in: 
 its unqualified financial statements 
 compliance regimes including its Compliance Program that is benchmarked against 
Australian standards 
 the results of a control culture survey performed by Deloitte in 2010, which found 
that EFIC’s ‘culture’ performed well relative to other organisations. 
Sources: EFIC (2011a); sub. DR90.  
 
Information provided to the EFIC Board 
The Commission is of the view that the written material currently provided to the 
Board would not support a robust audit program in relation to EFIC’s mandate. The 
board papers provided to the Commission in the course of this inquiry have 
contained little analysis or discussion on how EFIC’s potential intervention in 
financial markets meets EFIC’s primary duties under s. 8 of the EFIC Act. For 
example, although EFIC is to have regard to the desirability of improving and 
extending the range of insurance and other financial services and products available, 
the board papers seen by the Commission do not discuss the likely impact of EFIC’s 
involvement in promoting (or potentially dissuading through a crowding out effect) 
private sector provision. 
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Assessment of the market gap 
The Minister requires that: 
EFIC is to manage its activities so that it does not compete directly with existing 
commercial sector providers of insurance, reinsurance and financial services and 
products which support Australian exports and foreign investment. Each transaction 
considered by EFIC must be assessed on this basis and information which shows that 
EFIC is not competing directly with existing commercial sector providers must be 
included in any Board paper seeking approval for a transaction. EFIC is not to compete 
with private sector operators as this is the basis of EFIC’s current exemption from 
financial services and banking Competitive Neutrality legislation. (Emerson 2011, p. 2) 
The Commission has been provided with market gap analysis for some facilities 
that have been approved by the Board. This analysis tends to involve statements that 
the project related to the facility would not have proceeded without EFIC’s support 
and that other financiers have not provided sufficient support to meet the client’s 
required level of funds. It also typically notes the need for facilities of longer tenor 
than the market is willing to provide and observes where there is support from other 
export credit agencies ECAs. In some cases, involvement of other countries’ ECAs 
in a project, or in similar projects, is cited as providing assurance that a proposed 
facility is within the market gap. The discussion sometimes notes the inability or 
unwillingness of the private sector to provide additional debt or equity financing 
(EFIC, pers. comm., 25 October 2011). 
The discussion of the market gap in board papers sighted by the Commission could 
be regarded as perfunctory. For example, in one instance, the analysis of the market 
gap for a project with substantial value extended to little more than four lines of 
text: 
 … has confirmed that the [a bank letter of credit] is not adequate security to enhance 
[the company’s] obligations for the 10-year bank finance required to fund the [project]. 
Consequently, EFIC and [another export credit agency] have been approached to 
provide credit support. Management is satisfied that the transaction falls within EFIC’s 
market gap mandate. (EFIC, pers. comm., 12 December 2011) 
When questioned about this at public hearings, the Managing Director and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) noted that the discussion in the boardroom about whether 
a facility falls within the market gap might be more comprehensive (trans., p. 161). 
However, as noted above, the Commission does not consider that the documentation 
of the analysis of the market gap is sufficient to support well informed decisions on 
whether the proposed facility is within EFIC’s mandate. Nor is it sufficient to 
provide the information required by an internal audit to confirm EFIC’s compliance 
against its mandate. The Board should also have information before board meetings 
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to give due consideration to the material presented in the board papers 
(OECD 2004). 
Another board paper appeared to be based on the fact that the bank of EFIC’s client 
was not willing to provide finance. The paper noted that the client’s bank: 
… provides general banking facilities to [the company], secured by a fixed and floating 
charge over the company’s assets, although there is no material debt outstanding. [The 
company] has no other banking relationship. [The bank] is unable to satisfy the entire 
debt requirement and the FX hedging facilities. … [the company] has financed … on a 
contract by contract basis. ... We are satisfied that the proposed facility falls 
comfortably within the Market Gap. (EFIC, pers. comm., 12 January 2012). 
Analysis of the market gap in relation to a facility provided to Greyhound Australia 
was described to the Commission as follows: 
The reality is that we have issued the bond currently at 100 per cent cash cover. The 
bank was only prepared to do that at 100 per cent cash cover [by Greyhound Australia]. 
… The market gap, the way we see it here, is a 100 per cent cash cover for a bond, 
which puts a considerable amount of working capital constraint on a company if they 
want to fulfil a large contract. … We are looking to release some of that cash 
throughout the phase of that project. That’s what we’re currently negotiating with the 
company. (trans., pp. 122-3) 
The Commission considers that the analyses of the market gap in board papers is 
simply asserting that no other financial institution is willing to provide the financial 
services provided by the proponent. This is inadequate because board papers do not 
discuss pricing strategy or prices for comparable risk, or the premium that is being 
charged to encourage the private sector to fill the gap, as required by the Minister 
(Emerson 2011). Although the analysis sometimes notes the inability or 
unwillingness of the private sector to provide additional debt or equity financing, it 
does not assess the reasons, including whether risk is being adequately priced, or 
provide data that might support such a conclusion. 
Given the vagueness of the market gap concept, it is not surprising that the quality 
of analysis by EFIC to ensure facilities are within a market gap is poor. The 
Commission also notes that difficulties in ensuring ECAs operate within a market 
gap framework are not confined to Australia. For example, a 2008 review of Export 
Development Canada (EDC) found ‘there can be no doubt that EDC operates 
outside any “market gap”, however defined’ (International Financial 
Consulting 2008, p. viii). 
Neither the committees that have been established as part of EFIC’s internal 
governance arrangements, nor previous reviews of EFIC, have been given the 
explicit role of examining EFIC’s compliance with its mandate. The Board has also 
   
278 AUSTRALIA’S  
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
not sought independent assurance that its operations are consistent with the SoE and 
Part 4 of the EFIC Act (EFIC, pers. comm., 25 November 2011, 6 December 2011).  
The Commission considers that the Board should rectify this by including in its 
internal audit program independent assurance that EFIC’s operations are consistent 
with its mandate. 
The Commission is not satisfied that the EFIC Board is provided with sufficient 
information in board papers to evaluate whether facilities submitted for approval 
on the commercial account are meeting the requirements set out in the Minister’s 
Statement of Expectations with regard to pricing, or to determine that EFIC is not 
competing with the private sector.  
EFIC’s compliance with the operational restrictions in the Minister’s Statement of 
Expectations and Part 4 of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 
has not had sufficient focus in independent reviews or EFIC’s internal audit 
program over the past five years. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
include in its regular internal audit program an assessment of its compliance with 
the operational restrictions, as set out in the Statement of Expectations, any 
relevant directions from the Minister, and Part 4 of the Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation Act 1991. Board papers should be sufficiently robust to 
ensure that they can be used in EFIC’s internal audit program to confirm that 
EFIC is complying with its mandate. 
EFIC’s operations extend beyond addressing market failures 
It has been noted elsewhere in this report that EFIC’s operations have extended 
beyond what the Commission considers is appropriate based on market failure 
rationales for government intervention (chapters 5 and 7). Two examples are the 
support for large resource-related projects, and for suppliers to those projects, in 
Australia. The Commission’s approach to this inquiry does not extend to an 
evaluation of EFIC’s legal affairs and whether its current or proposed activities are 
lawful. 
FINDING 9.1 
RECOMMENDATION 9.2 
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Supporting large resource-related projects in Australia 
In the past few years, EFIC has increasingly focused on large resource projects, and 
has contributed to the financing of onshore infrastructure and resource processing 
projects that will be used for supporting exports, primarily commodity exports. 
Support for these types of projects is based on sections of the EFIC Act that allow 
EFIC to provide insurance contracts (s. 14), and guarantees and subsidies (s. 16) in 
relation to loans to Australian suppliers where the purpose of the loan is the 
financing of Australian export trade.  
The focus of EFIC’s activities to support projects of this type was noted in EFIC’s 
2011 annual report: 
EFIC’s recent focus has been drawn to large-scale resource projects and related 
infrastructure in Australia and the region. The demand for debt to finance these projects 
is unprecedented and EFIC, together with export credit agencies from other countries, 
is increasingly being asked to deliver cornerstone components of the financing required 
because traditional sources cannot now satisfy the longer-tenor commitment 
requirements for such projects. (EFIC 2011a, p. 13) 
EFIC has claimed that there may be an argument that s. 23 of the EFIC Act allows 
EFIC to provide loans to foreign-owned resources projects in Australia, such as the 
Ichthys project in Northern Australia. EFIC indicated that it has been selected as 
one of six ECAs to form what is described as a ‘pathfinder group’ for the Ichthys 
project — a US$34 billion liquefied natural gas project in northern Australia being 
undertaken by two large international companies: Inpex (Japan) and Total (France) 
(Inpex 2012). EFIC stated: 
That selection was based on our ability, effectively, to catalyse the support of those 
other five export credit agencies. So they wanted to provide a framework, establish it 
amongst the six export credit agencies that would start this process, which would then 
roll into the balance of the financing at which we would include a syndicated bank 
piece. So our function was to, effectively, negotiate the terms and the conditions of the 
project financing for the project. (trans., p. 146) 
In relation to the Ichthys project EFIC also stated: 
 … that is our intention, to pursue an approval from our board to participate in this [the 
provision of debt] financing … [but] it is undecided whether it will be in the form of 
debt or in the form of a guarantee. (trans., p. 146) 
It further noted that s. 23 of the EFIC Act could be interpreted as supporting the use 
of a loan:  
 … you would have to go to look at the EFIC Act to look at in what circumstances 
Section 23 operates and you would have to look at the facts surrounding the transaction 
itself and the transactions within the broader project as well. We have had a look at that 
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and we have considered whether there may be an argument that the facts would support 
the application of Section 23 in the use of a loan. (trans., pp. 294-5) 
EFIC has not disclosed publicly or privately to the Commission the extent of its 
potential involvement in the Ichthys project. However, the potential to provide loans 
for a resource project located in Australia appears contrary to advice previously 
provided by EFIC to the Commission. EFIC noted in its submission to the issues 
paper that the provision of loan facilities is limited to the export of capital goods: 
EFIC cannot enter into loans for the export of non-capital goods including, for 
example, commodities and domestic infrastructure projects that support the export of 
commodities. This is a significant and unreasonable restraint on EFIC’s ability to 
provide direct finance to Australian exporters of commodities and related domestic 
infrastructure projects. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 33) 
Supporting suppliers to resource-related projects located in Australia 
EFIC has extended its involvement in onshore projects by marketing its financial 
services under a new initiative to serve suppliers to projects located in Australia, 
where the ultimate goods produced are exported but the companies receiving the 
facility are not exporting. EFIC considers the initiative complements other 
Australian Government policies that have been developed to help Australian 
companies participate in the resources sector, including the Resources Sector 
Supplier Advisory Forum (trans., p. 121) (box 2.5). 
Under EFIC’s initiative, suppliers ‘must form an integral part of the overall resource 
export project’ to be eligible for EFIC’s support (EFIC ndd, p. 1). Eligible suppliers 
can apply to EFIC for bank guarantees, working capital support and longer-term 
finance. 
EFIC’s intention to provide financial services under this initiative is mentioned in 
the current corporate plan, which is endorsed by the Board. The corporate plan 
states that: 
At the same time, [the development of export focused, resource and energy related 
projects and associated infrastructure in Australia] will present opportunities to support 
participants in the ‘exporting chain’, including SME clients, who will be involved and 
primary or sub-contractors in the development of these projects. (EFIC 2011c, 
pp. 10-11) 
EFIC described the initiative at the public hearings : 
The idea is really to support subcontracting companies with the large natural resources 
projects. They are generally SMEs, as you know. We’ve done a few others. Lean Field 
is another one which we supported in Queensland. More broadly we are definitely 
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planning to help more SMEs if … they deliver a service that is integral to the project. 
(trans., p. 120). 
EFIC has disclosed its approval of six facilities located in Australia since 1 July 
2011, with a total face value $128 million (in addition to the three resource-related 
projects discussed in chapter 7 — Wiggins Island coal export terminal, the Santos 
LNG project in Gladstone and the Brookfield rail upgrade). EFIC confirmed at the 
public hearings that two facilities have been provided under the initiative this 
financial year, including the provision of a performance bond to Greyhound 
Australia (box 7.2) (trans., p. 142). There is insufficient public information 
available about the remaining four facilities. 
According to EFIC, the ‘integral’ test was developed to be consistent with the EFIC 
Act. EFIC stated: 
We looked to section 19 of the EFIC Act and the wording in there allows us to provide 
bonding support for a contract or in relation to the performance of a contract that would 
be an export contract, in this case the export of a commodity. So it’s those words ‘in 
relation to the performance of’ in the preamble that led us to develop this test of ‘is this 
particular element or component of the transaction integral to the ultimate export 
contract?’ (trans., p. 126) 
Although facilities have been approved, EFIC stated that it is still developing the 
criteria that determine whether the proposed facility supports a good or service that 
is integral to the ultimate export. EFIC acknowledged that it is ‘learning by doing’ 
and is effectively developing the criteria as it goes along, on a case-by-case basis 
(trans., p. 134). EFIC did not provide written documentation to the Commission on 
the definition of ‘integral to the ultimate export’ or confirm whether the initiative 
will be restricted to SMEs. 
When considering a proposed facility for eligibility, EFIC stated at the public 
hearing that it considers the ‘conditions that sit around this transaction’ and 
indicated that those conditions include whether a project — or a contract — is 
particularly large or involves particular investment by a firm (trans., p. 127). This 
would mean, for example, that a cleaning contract or catering services would not be 
considered by EFIC to be integral: 
I don’t think a reasonable person would see that a relatively low value commodity-type 
transaction like cleaning or cooking or supplying bread and milk is integral to the 
project. (trans., p. 127) 
The Commission acknowledges that the initiative is new but it does not consider 
that approving facilities before eligibility criteria are adequately developed is 
consistent with the principles of good internal governance. The provision of 
financial services exposes the Australian Government, and therefore the taxpayer, to 
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risk and it is important that EFIC’s facilities are approved on the basis that they 
meet the objective of the EFIC Act, and are consistent with the expectations of the 
Minister. It is not possible to know if this is the case in the absence of eligibility 
criteria that align with EFIC’s mandate. 
As discussed in chapter 7, there are also equity and efficiency considerations when 
EFIC provides facilities to some firms but not others. Clear, transparent and 
predictable eligibility criteria are important — not only for firms successful in 
gaining EFIC support, but also for those that are not. 
Transparency and information provision 
Transparency is critical to ensuring effective accountability. It is important to 
ensure regular reporting to ministers, the Government and the public, regarding 
EFIC’s activities and performance. Information needs to be timely, relevant and of a 
high standard (PC 2005). 
EFIC’s management appears to rely significantly on the Government board member 
to communicate EFIC’s activities to the Minister. EFIC’s supplementary 
submission to this inquiry noted that:  
Government is kept regularly updated by virtue of the Government member of the 
Board attending EFIC Board meetings and key performance indicators are provided 
regularly to the Board to inform them of EFIC performance. (sub. DR90, p. 55) 
During public hearings on the inquiry, EFIC’s Managing Director and CEO noted 
that ‘the government member presumably advises the Minister on these [human 
rights] issues’ (trans., p. 115) and noted that EFIC would rely on the Government 
member to communicate the outcome of the policy review, through the annual 
report or the corporate plan, to the Minister. The Managing Director and CEO also 
noted that EFIC relies on its ‘departmental colleagues’ to pass on relevant 
information to the Minister when the executive briefs the Board (trans., p. 247).  
The major mechanism for providing information to the public about EFIC’s 
performance is the annual report. The report summarises EFIC’s activities each year 
and details its financial results. Some information on its activities during the year is 
also published on EFIC’s website. The service level agreement between DFAT and 
EFIC sets out reporting, consultation and information sharing obligations for NIA 
transactions. 
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EFIC’s corporate plan 
A further potential accountability tool is the corporate plan. The process of drawing 
up the plan, having it approved by the Minister, and publishing it increases the 
transparency and accountability of an organisation to the Minister, Parliament and 
the public. As the corporate plan primarily sets out an organisation’s expected 
activities and outcomes with respect to its broad mandate in aggregate, information 
about specific transactions and EFIC’s clients would not be expected to be 
contained in the corporate plan.  
In its response to the draft report, EFIC noted that few agencies publish their 
corporate plans, and that it considered there was already information on its 
operations published on its website (sub. DR90). There is precedent in Australian 
Government agencies releasing their corporate plan — with measures taken to 
protect commercially sensitive information. For example, Airservices Australia 
provides revenue forecasts in its corporate plan, which is tabled in Parliament. 
These forecasts are based on assessments of airline activity that are not published. 
The information published by EFIC in the annual report and website is 
predominantly retrospective. The Commission does not consider that this is 
sufficient to allow input from stakeholders, including non-government organisations 
and other Australian Government agencies, on EFIC’s forthcoming activities. 
Performance reporting 
The reporting requirements prescribed under the EFIC Act relate to the information 
to be included in the annual report. The principal measures against which EFIC 
reports are: 
 the value of facilities signed 
 the value of exports and overseas investments supported 
 the number of facilities provided 
 profit on the CA 
 capital adequacy ratio 
 overall portfolio risk measured by weighted average portfolio risk grade 
(EFIC 2011a, pp. 4–5). 
The value of signings and exports supported by EFIC, and the number of facilities 
provided, are easy to understand and collate, and demonstrate the level of activity 
that EFIC has been engaged in. However, they are measures of output and do not 
provide information about the efficiency or appropriateness of EFIC’s facilities. 
   
284 AUSTRALIA’S  
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Capital adequacy and weighted average portfolio risk grade are indicators of an 
entity’s ability to withstand unexpected events and credit risk, respectively. They 
are commonly used and widely accepted in the finance sector. 
The indicators published by EFIC do not provide information on how effectively or 
efficiently the Board and management are meeting the objectives of the EFIC Act or 
the SoE. These indicators also do not provide a check against whether EFIC is 
fulfilling its mandate. There is no qualitative or quantitative measure of whether 
EFIC’s facilities meet its objective of encouraging private sector providers to assist 
in financing exports such that EFIC is able to subsequently withdraw its support. 
Other measures that could inform the Government on EFIC’s performance are not 
reported, or they are difficult to find and interpret. For example, measures of EFIC’s 
non-performing facilities are not published regularly (although they have been 
included in EFIC’s submission on the issues paper (sub. 18)). 
As discussed earlier, the Commission considers that the governance arrangements to 
ensure that EFIC is meeting the Government’s expectations (and in particular in 
relation to pricing and potential crowding out of the private sector) are insufficient. 
EFIC’s performance against its objectives is not assessed in the internal audits, or 
by the audit committee on behalf of the Board. With the exception of the 
(infrequent) general reviews of EFIC, there are no effective mechanisms to ensure 
that EFIC is meeting its objectives either on an individual facility basis, or as a 
matter of broader strategy. 
In the Commission’s view, the lack of clarity in the information provided by EFIC 
is likely to have reduced the ability of some parts of the Government to fully 
understand EFIC’s activities, increasing the likelihood of facilities being provided 
that were not in line with the Government’s expectations. 
There is insufficient clarity in the information provided by EFIC to the Australian 
Government and the public, and this impairs EFIC’s accountability. 
The Commission considers a new performance management framework should be 
developed for EFIC with indicators based on a more clearly defined and rigorous 
objective for the agency (chapter 10). Reporting against the performance 
management framework should be included in EFIC’s annual report and corporate 
plan. The Minister should table the corporate plan in Parliament, and in due course, 
the EFIC Act should be amended to require this.  
FINDING 9.2 
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To ensure EFIC’s ongoing accountability, the Minister should be informed quarterly 
about new facilities on the CA, through reports against the corporate plan. The 
Minister’s SoE to EFIC should reflect this.  
The Minister should table EFIC’s corporate plan in Parliament and, in due 
course, the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 should be 
amended to require this. 
EFIC should provide quarterly progress reports to the Minister against its 
corporate plan, including information about facilities on the commercial account 
executed during that quarter. 
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require the EFIC 
Board to establish a performance management framework, based on a more 
clearly defined and rigorous objective under the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991, directed at market failures affecting small and 
medium-sized enterprises. The framework should be developed in consultation 
with other Australian Government agencies, and use relevant performance 
benchmarks and indicators for EFIC’s business units, including treasury 
operations. 
EFIC should report its performance against this framework in its annual report 
and corporate plan. 
Compliance costs for clients 
The terms of reference for this inquiry require the Commission to report on the level 
of compliance costs for businesses accessing EFIC’s financial products. These 
compliance costs include the time and effort necessary to fill out applications, 
produce and supply documents to assist EFIC’s assessment and other costs incurred 
such as seeking legal advice. More broadly, other considerations such as the time it 
takes EFIC to reach a decision on an application can also be considered a cost, as it 
may prevent or reduce the likelihood of completing an export transaction. 
Minimising the costs involved to prospective clients, while maintaining appropriate 
credit application and risk assessment processes, should be an important priority for 
EFIC, particularly as its SME clients could find compliance costs burdensome. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.3 
RECOMMENDATION 9.4 
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Quantitative assessment of EFIC’s compliance costs is difficult as the costs for each 
business are not readily observable, and the cost faced by each business varies. As 
such, it is necessary to rely on qualitative evidence such as customer satisfaction 
surveys and other objective assessments of EFIC’s processes. 
In its submission to this inquiry, NSW Trade and Investment (sub. 25) stated that it 
had received feedback from exporters that EFIC’s application and approval process 
is cumbersome and the level of detail required is prohibitive. However, confidential 
survey results sighted by the Commission suggest that EFIC’s customers do not find 
compliance costs particularly burdensome. 
9.5 The national interest account 
Under the EFIC Act, any decision about whether or not to accept a facility on the 
NIA is required to be taken by the Minister, although by convention Cabinet 
approval is sought (DFAT, sub. 19). The Minister can give EFIC approval to 
facilitate, or may direct, an NIA facility if it is deemed to be in the national interest 
to do so. The national interest is not defined in the EFIC Act and is not set out in 
government policy. Proposed facilities on the NIA can be initiated either by EFIC 
or the Government. 
EFIC states that the EFIC Board typically refers a proposal for a facility to the 
Minister for inclusion on the NIA if there is a high degree of country or 
project-related risk, or if the exposure would exceed country and risk party limits 
for the CA, and where the project may be acceptable to the Government. EFIC 
states that when a proposal is referred by EFIC, it does not make a recommendation 
to the Minister, and only makes an assessment as it would normally do for a 
proposed facility on the CA. It is up to the Minister to make a judgement as to 
whether costs of the proposed facility are offset by national interest benefits before 
the transaction proceeds to Cabinet for final approval (EFIC 2008b).  
When an NIA transaction is initiated (either by EFIC or the Government), the 
Commission understands an interdepartmental committee examines it before it is 
presented to the Minister for approval to be submitted to Cabinet. NIA transactions 
are accounted for on DFAT’s balance sheet in the Budget statements and under 
DFAT in the statement of risks. 
EFIC states that the NIA is managed in a similar way to the CA. It borrows in 
domestic and international capital markets to fund NIA loans and contingent 
liabilities, and does not separate NIA borrowings from CA borrowings. The 
Australian Government is responsible for the financial consequences of NIA 
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facilities. EFIC remits the revenue from NIA facilities to the Australian 
Government and the Australian Government reimburses EFIC for the costs of 
servicing the portfolio and for any losses arising from it. 
Some participants have criticised procedures surrounding the use of the NIA. For 
example, Jubilee Australia said: 
Jubilee Australia contends that the rationale for a National Interest Account is flawed: 
Australian taxpayers are told that, in their interest, Commonwealth funds are to be 
appropriated from the budget and used to assist a small number of Australian private 
corporations to win export contracts — in many cases to assist Australian companies to 
participate in projects considered excessively risky by private financiers. Any 
substantive information used to justify this decision, however, is protected by 
‘cabinet-in-confidence’ and the validity of the decision is not open for debate even by 
elected members of the Federal Parliament. There are no checks and balances in this 
system and in an environment of minimal transparency, intended or unintended abuses 
of the policy can occur and go undetected. (sub. 12, p. 8) 
As part of its activities, EFIC will, from time to time, be presented with 
opportunities that it perceives as being in the national interest. However, any 
decision by EFIC to support a proposal on the CA should be made separately from 
national interest considerations. This is in keeping with the Minister’s expectation, 
as specified in the SoE, that ‘EFIC’s Commercial Account operations are to be 
conducted on a commercial basis, obtaining a return reflecting risks’ 
(Emerson 2011, p. 2). Where support for a proposal is being sought on both the CA 
and the NIA, the CA supported component should be supported by EFIC for 
commercial reasons only. 
The Commission considers that some NIA processes should be reformed. Before 
the Minister determines that facilities are to be placed on the NIA, assessment of the 
proposed facility should be undertaken to determine whether the proposal is the 
most cost-effective way of achieving the outcomes intended by the Government. 
When approved, the justification for NIA facilities should be clearly and publicly 
articulated. 
Proposed facilities with national interest objectives should only be considered in 
the context of the national interest account.  
The Australian Government’s assessment of national interest account facilities 
should include analysis of whether the proposal is the most cost-effective way of 
achieving intended outcomes. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.5 
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The Australian Government should clearly and publicly articulate the 
justification for a national interest account facility after it has been approved by 
the Minister. 
Information on the performance of national interest account facilities should be 
collated and publicly reported by the Australian Government. 
Over the medium term, there may be a case for moving responsibility for 
post-approval administration of the NIA from EFIC to another agency (such as the 
Department of Finance and Deregulation or the Treasury), or the private sector. An 
assessment of alternative arrangements to manage the national interest account 
should be included in the next independent review of EFIC to ensure they meet 
government objectives at least cost. 
9.6 EFIC’s environmental and social responsibilities 
In the SoE, the Minister states: 
In effectively managing social and environmental risks relating to transactions, I expect 
EFIC to fully comply with the OECD Common Approaches on the Environment and 
Officially Supported Export Credits, the Equator Principles and any other relevant 
international standards. (Emerson 2011, p. 3) 
The two international agreements that relate to EFIC are the OECD Common 
Approaches on the Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD 
Common Approaches) and the Equator Principles (box 2.3). A number of 
submissions raised concerns about the environmental and social consequences of 
EFIC’s operations. 
EFIC has developed a Policy for Environmental and Social Review of Transactions 
(EFIC 2011h) and a Procedure for Environmental and Social Review of 
Transactions (EFIC 2011i), referred to collectively as the Environmental and Social 
Policy and Procedure (ESPP) (appendix E has a detailed description of the ESPP). 
These documents are based on the OECD Common Approaches and Equator 
Principles, and have recently been revised in consultation with non-government 
organisations (EFIC 2011a). Although the agreements that EFIC must comply with 
can be narrow in their scope and may be relevant for only some products that EFIC 
provides, EFIC states that it extends the principles they embody to all facilities it 
considers (EFIC 2011h).  
EFIC’s ESPP was adopted on 17 February 2011. EFIC states that it will engage an 
independent expert to review the application of the ESPP within two years of the 
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policy being adopted, and provide reports to the Board and the public 
(EFIC 2011h).  
The type of environmental and social review that EFIC undertakes under the ESPP 
is determined by the type of support requested, the nature of the project associated 
with the facility and the role of EFIC’s client (EFIC 2011i). EFIC undertakes an 
environmental and social risk evaluation of all proposed facilities and discloses its 
potential involvement in new projects that are considered to have potentially 
significant adverse environmental and social impacts (known as category A 
projects, consistent with guidelines under the OECD Common Approaches and 
Equator Principles). EFIC also maintains an archive register that publicly discloses 
its potential involvement in all category A projects, whether the project was 
supported or not. EFIC adopts a different procedure for review of proposed facilities 
that involve existing projects, ‘non-projects’ and bonds (appendix E).  
EFIC has discretion to impose contractual terms on its clients as a condition of 
approval such as: 
 requirements for additional work 
 compliance with environmental and social standards 
 monitoring and reporting requirements 
 requirements for auditing by independent environmental and/or social experts 
(EFIC 2011h). 
Comments from participants on EFIC’s environmental and social 
performance 
Environmental and human rights organisations have criticised EFIC and ECAs 
more generally for using government subsidised trade finance to support industries 
in developing countries that may be environmentally unsustainable or have adverse 
human rights impacts, and for contributing to the ‘unpayable debt’ of developing 
countries by lending to their governments (box 9.4). 
A concern raised during this inquiry is the limited disclosure required by EFIC’s 
ESPP. Some participants are of the view that there is limited transparency in the 
classification of projects with adverse environmental or social risks, EFIC’s 
rationale for approving projects, and the application and adherence to conditions of 
approval. That is, they are classified as ‘commercial-in-confidence’ by EFIC and, 
therefore, are not able to be disclosed. 
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Participants also expressed concern that ECAs gave insufficient attention to human 
rights considerations in the policy and procedures. The Human Rights Law Centre 
noted that inadequate assessment of human rights can ‘have moral, reputational and 
political consequences for the ECA’ (sub. 13, p. 17) and, consequently, for the 
Australian Government. It also noted that delays to projects, and, therefore, 
increased financial exposure, could result from adverse human rights outcomes 
(sub. 13). 
Another problem participants identified is the lack of a grievance mechanism. The 
current process does not allow stakeholders to have submissions considered during 
the classification process or at any point for category B projects (which may have 
adverse social or environmental impacts), or for non-projects or existing projects 
with adverse social or environmental impacts. 
 
Box 9.4 Concerns raised by environmental and human rights 
organisations 
Issues raised by non-government organisations include: 
 EFIC’s consideration of the investor’s responsibilities relating to environmental and 
social risks and the investor’s ability to mitigate risks as part of the classification 
procedure (Jubilee Australia, sub. 12) 
 the impact of publicly funded projects on the environment. Greenpeace Australia 
suggested that: 
Throughout 2001–09, the oil, gas and mining sectors accounted for over a quarter of EFIC 
financing … Given the urgency of global ecological concerns such as biodiversity loss, 
ecosystem decline and climate change, the question must be asked; why is the Australian 
government allowing EFIC to provide publicly backed … financial services to the industries 
that are most responsible for climate change and global ecological decline? (Greenpeace 
Australia, sub. 9, p. 2) 
 that EFIC may have been involved in projects with adverse human rights impacts 
(Human Rights Law Centre, sub. 13) 
 limited transparency of environmental or social risks and management of these risks 
(Jubilee Australia, sub. 12) 
 absence of a satisfactory contestability mechanism, to allow stakeholders to object 
to decisions (Oxfam Australia, sub. 15).  
 
Assessment of potential environmental and social impacts 
Risks faced by EFIC — including reputational risk — are ultimately borne by the 
Australian Government. To ensure any risk to the Australian Government is 
avoided or mitigated, it is important that EFIC’s obligations under international 
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agreements are expressed clearly to EFIC by the Australian Government, and that 
EFIC meets these obligations. 
The SoE outlines some of the international obligations that the Minister expects 
EFIC to adhere to, but references to ‘other relevant international standards’ and 
‘other international commitments’ may not provide EFIC with sufficient clarity on 
the international obligations that it is required to comply with. However, the 
Minister’s expectations are clear in relation to the OECD Common Approaches and 
the Equator Principles: EFIC is expected to be in full compliance, and the ESPP 
claims to extend these principles to all transactions EFIC considers (EFIC 2011h). 
Disclosure and classification 
Transparency is an important aspect of the OECD Common Approaches and the 
Equator Principles. Transparent reporting and disclosure allows examination of the 
activities of government agencies, and can assist in managing reputational risk to 
the Australian Government. The OECD Common Approaches (OECD 2007) state: 
 … taking into account the competitive context in which they operate and constraints of 
business confidentiality, Members should … make available to the public at least 
annually, subject to legal provisions on public disclosure in Members’ countries, 
information on projects classified in category A and category B, including 
environmental information, for which a member has made a final commitment with 
respect to providing official support. (p. 7) 
Disclosure of prospective involvement 
There are a number of exceptions to disclosure of prospective involvement in 
transactions with potential environmental and social effects. For example, EFIC’s 
policy is to not disclose potential involvement in new projects that have been 
classified as category B3, or category A projects that: 
 are located in Australia  
 have a repayment term of less than two years 
 are valued at less than $15 million unless they are in sensitive areas such as 
national parks. 
EFIC’s ESPP includes an assessment of the potential environmental and social 
impacts of non-projects (that is where a proposed facility is not associated with an 
identified location) and bonds. However, EFIC is not required to disclose 
                     
3 Projects that fall between category A and category C (table E.1). 
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prospective involvement in ‘non-projects’ and bonds that have significant potential 
environmental or social impacts. EFIC states this is because these proposed 
facilities are not associated with a particular location or operation (for example, 
equipment manufacture where the equipment will have many different purchasers 
or users). EFIC states that the client, and therefore EFIC, cannot usually ‘access 
environmental and social information’ and has ‘no influence on the environmental 
and/or social management of the project for which the export is destined’ 
(EFIC 2011h, p. 4). 
However, any facility that is linked to activity with significant environmental and 
social impacts may result in reputational risk to the Australian Government. 
Stakeholder engagement in the decision making process would allow input from 
Australian Government agencies and non-government organisations that may 
reduce the likelihood of reputational risk to the Australian Government from EFIC’s 
support of such a facility. 
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC noted that: 
Issuance of bonds is typically time sensitive and delays associated with disclosure 
periods could render Australian exporters uncompetitive. (sub. DR90, p. 60) 
The Commission considers that reputational risk to the Australian Government 
should not be overridden by commercial imperatives, including delays due to 
disclosure periods. 
EFIC notes that its approach to classification and disclosure of non-projects and 
existing projects, and projects valued at less than $15 million is in accordance with 
the OECD Common Approaches. However, EFIC’s statement that it extends the 
‘principles they [the OECD Common Approaches and the Equator Principles] 
embody to all transactions it considers’ (EFIC 2011i, p. 3) is weakened by the 
various exceptions it applies to the general principle contained in the OECD 
Common Approaches. That principle is to ‘foster transparency, predictability and 
responsibility in decision making by encouraging disclosure of relevant 
environmental information’ (OECD 2007, p. 3). 
Classification of proposed facilities 
A number of stakeholders also considered EFIC’s environmental and social 
classification of proposed facilities as being controversial. EFIC’s classification of a 
proposed facility determines whether disclosure of prospective involvement is 
required. EFIC classified some projects as category B that stakeholders thought 
should have been classified as category A, including: 
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 the construction of an ammonium nitrate plant in Indonesia in 2010 
(Ludlam 2011) 
 the sale of contract mining services to a gold mine in Ghana in 2010 (Jubilee 
Australia, sub. 12). 
Senator Conroy (Senate 2011) said, in response to a question on notice, that the 
classification of a gold mine in Ghana as category B was taken following an 
assessment by EFIC, including a review of publicly available information on its 
client’s customer. That review indicated that the project had been assessed and 
funded by the commercial arm of the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). The IFC financing of the project was subject to the mine 
operator meeting stringent environmental and social standards, with ongoing 
monitoring and reporting in place (including assessments by independent 
consultants) (Ludlam 2011). There had been a number of controversies associated 
with the mine prior to EFIC’s involvement in 2010, including a cyanide spill in 
2009 (Jubilee Australia, sub. 12). 
The Commission considers that although risk mitigation practices by project 
operators, and the role of EFIC’s client in risk mitigation, are relevant to the final 
decision as to whether to provide a facility, they should not be a factor in 
determining the type of environmental and social assessment that EFIC undertakes, 
or the classification of the proposed facility. 
Disclosure of assessments 
Under the ESPP, EFIC does not release environmental and social information 
contained in impact assessments it considers are commercial-in-confidence and not 
required to be disclosed under EFIC’s statutory confidentiality obligations 
(EFIC 2011h). There is also limited transparency as to how environmental and 
social risks are factored into decisions to approve facilities.  
EFIC also does not disclose contractual conditions that may apply on an individual 
transaction basis. This makes it difficult to determine whether EFIC is actively 
encouraging the mitigation of adverse environmental and social impacts of new or 
existing projects, and the client’s performance against such terms. 
In its response to the draft report, EFIC noted that: 
The publication by EFIC of information that is confidential to a client (whether it be 
‘financial’ or otherwise) would inevitability undermine the confidence EFIC’s clients 
and counterparties have that EFIC is able to keep information confidential (sub. DR90, 
p. 66) 
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As mentioned earlier in this chapter, transparency and publicly available 
information can facilitate input and monitoring from non-government organisations, 
provide a perspective on policy issues that might not otherwise be available to the 
government and enhance the legitimacy of outcomes. Transparency and public 
reporting of information that is not commercial in nature can improve accountability 
to Parliament, government and the public. Section 9.7 has further discussion of 
disclosure issues. 
Increased public disclosure of information relevant to environmental and social 
impact assessments, including contractual terms to manage and mitigate risk, 
would enhance the transparency of EFIC’s operations to the public and to the 
Australian Government.  
The Minister should amend the Statement of Expectations to require EFIC to 
publicly disclose its prospective involvement in any facility with potentially 
significant environmental or social impacts. This includes all category A projects, 
and ‘non-projects’ and bonds where it has been determined that there is potential 
for significant environmental and social impacts. 
Information relating to the environmental and social classification of projects 
and the reasons for their approval should be predictable and disclosed in the 
annual report and on EFIC’s website. This information should include 
assessment benchmarking and processes, conditions of approval and 
consequences for non-compliance. Information that is relevant to EFIC’s 
assessment of environmental and social impacts should be made public. 
EFIC should make public its involvement in supporting projects that are subject 
to environmental assessment in Australia. 
Measures to mitigate against bribery of public officials 
Bribery of foreign public officials is a crime under the Criminal Code Act 1995. As 
a member of the Export Credits Group (ECG) of the OECD, EFIC states that it 
complies with the OECD Council Recommendation on Bribery and Officially 
Supported Export Credits (OECD 2006a). It is also a member of the local chapter of 
Transparency International (EFIC ndb). The international regulatory framework and 
EFIC’s anti-bribery and corruption measures are discussed in appendix E. 
FINDING 9.3  
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The OECD Council Recommendation outlines measures to be undertaken by ECG 
members to deter and combat bribery in connection with officially supported export 
credits. These obligations include: 
 informing clients of the legal consequences of engaging in bribery in 
international business transactions  
 encouraging clients to develop, apply and document appropriate management 
control systems that combat bribery 
 requiring clients to provide an undertaking that they, or anyone acting on their 
behalf, will not engage in bribery in the transaction 
 informing the law enforcement authorities and refusing to provide credit or other 
support for a transaction if there is credible evidence that bribery was involved 
in the award or execution of an export contract. (EFIC ndb, OECD 2006a). 
During the course of this inquiry, two of EFIC’s clients were the subject of 
Australian Federal Police investigations for alleged bribery in relation to projects 
that have also received EFIC support (box 9.5). 
Human rights 
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted that Australia co-sponsored the 
resolution endorsing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(known as the Ruggie Principles) in June 2011. It also notes that Australia is a 
signatory to the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
However, Australia has not taken a formal position on the policy statement from the 
forty-sixth session of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Further, Australia has not taken a formal position on the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which were adopted on 28 September 2011 (DFAT, pers. comm., 
23 January 2012). 
It is important to have clarity on which international obligations EFIC is required to 
adhere to, particularly as these obligations are likely to change over time. As noted 
above, references in the SoE to ‘other relevant international standards’ and ‘other 
international commitments’ are unlikely to provide EFIC with sufficient clarity on 
the international obligations that it is required to comply with.  
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Box 9.5 EFIC’s support for Leighton Offshore and Tenix 
EFIC provided two performance bonds, together worth US$36.7 million to enable 
Leighton Offshore (a subsidiary of Leighton Holdings) to provide enhanced oil export 
facilities to the state-owned South Oil Company in southern Iraq. The bonds were 
issued in 2010 under a bonding line provided by EFIC to Leighton Holdings, that is 
available to companies in the Leighton Group for projects undertaken worldwide.  
On 7 November 2011, Leighton Holdings reported to the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) possible payments made by Leighton Offshore to a foreign public official in 
connection with oil contracts in Iraq for two major oil construction projects worth 
$1.2 billion. The AFP and an anti-corruption unit inside the Iraqi Oil Ministry have 
commenced investigations into the allegations. The matter is under investigation and 
the alleged payments have not been confirmed. 
EFIC stated in a response to a question taken on notice during Senate Estimates 
hearings on 16 February 2012 that a review of all facilities related to the Leighton 
Group was conducted in December 2010 prior to the issuing of performance bonds, 
and more recently in January 2012 as part of an annual client review process. EFIC 
stated that it uses a proprietary external service that searches databases to identify 
information on the background of its clients that may include information relating to 
bribery and corruption. EFIC also stated that its annual review focused on 
information from this report, but did not specifically focus on the Leighton Group’s 
published Code of Ethics. EFIC did not state when the Code of Ethics was last 
examined (DFAT 2012). 
During the public hearings on this inquiry, EFIC indicated that it did not have any 
reasonable grounds for concern in regards to the conduct of Leighton Holdings or the 
South Oil Company prior to the announcement of the AFP investigation. 
In 2001-02, EFIC provided a $109.9 million export finance guarantee to Tenix Defence, 
an Australian military contractor, to provide six search-and-rescue vessels to the 
Philippines Coast guard. The guarantee enabled the Philippines Government to borrow 
from banks to finance the contract. Tenix is currently being investigated by the AFP in 
response to alleged bribery in its business conduct in Asia, including the contract in the 
Philippines. EFIC’s support for the Tenix contract was provided prior to the signing of 
the OECD Recommendation on Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits in 2006 
and the establishment of EFIC’s current Environmental and Social Policy and 
Procedure. Information pertaining to any current debt owed by the Philippines 
Government, including the amount that remains outstanding, has not been publicly 
disclosed by EFIC. 
Sources: Armour (2012); EFIC (2002); Leighton Holdings (2012). 
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During public hearings on the inquiry, Jubilee Australia noted the absence of 
direction to business and agencies from the Australian Government in relation to the 
Ruggie Framework:  
That’s the missing piece here, is the messaging and the leadership from the Australian 
Government in setting the standards for EFIC and for EFIC’s clients to comply with. 
(trans., p. 101) 
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC argued that the Government articulating 
all of its international human rights obligations in a general direction would not 
provide any information that is not currently available on the Australian Treaties 
Database on DFAT’s website. In addition, EFIC stated that it uses a variety of 
sources as part of its due diligence process for examining human rights issues, 
including the IFC Performance Standards, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and its 
participation in the OECD Export Credit Group and the Equator Principles working 
groups (sub. DR90).  
The Commission notes that the Australian Treaties Database includes hundreds of 
treaties, including 50 relating to human rights. It is not clear to the Commission 
how, using this approach, EFIC is able to identify which obligations apply to its 
operations and how it ensures it is complying with these obligations.  
The Commission considers it important that ministerial directions should articulate 
precisely which international obligations EFIC is required to comply with, and that 
compliance with those obligations should be part of EFIC’s internal audit program 
and publicly reported. 
The Minister, by way of a direction under the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991, should articulate which international obligations, 
including human rights obligations, EFIC is required to comply with. 
EFIC’s compliance with those obligations should be included in its internal audit 
program with outcomes publicly reported, including in EFIC’s annual report. 
9.7 Confidentiality and disclosure issues 
As discussed in chapter 2, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cwlth) (FoI Act) 
provides exemptions for EFIC in relation to documents concerning anything done 
by it under Part 4 or 5 of the EFIC Act (that is, in relation to insurance and financial 
services and national interest transactions).  
RECOMMENDATION 9.7 
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EFIC is also subject to secrecy requirements under s. 87 of the EFIC Act that 
prevents outside communication of information relating to the affairs of EFIC’s 
clients (although this information may be disclosed to the Minister, or the Secretary, 
or a designated officer of DFAT). However, the s. 87 provisions are limited and, as 
noted by DFAT, the EFIC Act explicitly ‘does not prevent EFIC publishing 
particulars about guarantees, contracts or loans made or proposed to be made under 
the Act’ (sub. 19, p. 13). 
The FoI Act exemptions reduce the ability of the public and the Australian 
Parliament to examine facilities for their environmental, social and human rights 
impacts. EFIC has stated that the FoI exemption is justified as it ensures 
commercially sensitive information is provided to EFIC: 
The disclosure or tabling of confidential information would inevitably undermine the 
confidence that EFIC’s counterparties have that EFIC is able to keep information 
confidential. These parties rely on EFIC’s obligations under the EFIC Act and FOI Act 
and without the reassurance of this protection information may be withheld, which 
would restrict EFIC’s capacity to assess, monitor and manage risk with important 
implications for project outcomes and potential financial losses for EFIC and ultimately 
the Government. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 43) 
However, a number of submissions have raised doubts about whether 
confidentiality provisions are appropriate. For example, Greenpeace Australia 
noted: 
Information on the levels of public risk, the environmental considerations and 
deliberations made in financing decisions, the nature of the ecological information 
relied [upon] in making decisions are all examples of information that is of legitimate 
public interest. (sub. 9, p. 4) 
And Jubilee Australia said that it: 
 … is in full agreement with EFIC that documents such as financial statements and cash 
flows of client companies should be kept confidential. We ... also … [agree] that there 
is a distinction between commercial information and information pertaining to social 
and environmental issues. Yet neither in the policies nor the practices of EFIC is this 
distinction clear. ‘Commercial-in-confidence’ is not defined and no Disclosure Policy 
exists. (sub. 12, p. 13) 
Following a visit to Australia in 2011, Dr Cephas Lumina, the UN Independent 
Expert on foreign debt and human rights also expressed concern about EFIC’s 
disclosure policies: 
 … the Independent Expert fully supports the view that the absence of transparency 
requirements raises serious questions about the agency’s accountability to Australian 
taxpayers and to citizens of the developing countries where it supports projects. Loans 
underwritten by the Government of Australia or guaranteed by the Governments of the 
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countries where EFIC-supported projects are being implemented are matters of public 
concern. Consequently, he is of the view that EFIC should be required to publicly 
disclose information concerning its activities, including project assessment, decision-
making and implementation and to undertake assessments of the human rights impact 
of its financing decisions (in addition to its environmental and social impact 
assessments). In particular, the Government of Australia should ensure that the 
activities of EFIC are fully compliant with Australia’s international human rights 
obligations. (Lumina 2011, p. 12) 
In response to a question on the costs to EFIC of improving its disclosure practices, 
Jubilee Australia noted during the public hearings:  
I think that it’s justified, the cost, if there is a cost. I think that there is an imbalance. I 
think issues are lurking in the shadows that need to be brought out. I don’t think that 
these broad sweeping protections are necessary. They hide … issues and circumstances 
that the Australian taxpayers and the Australian Government needs to be looking at 
(trans., pp. 101-2).  
The costs of publicly releasing material that may compromise a firm’s commercial 
advantage must ultimately be weighed against the reputational risks to the 
Australian Government of supporting projects with potential significant 
environmental and social impacts. As public sector entities have stewardship of 
public funds, they are subject to different forms of operational accountability than 
private sector entities. The requirement for such transparency could reasonably be 
thought of as a cost of dealing with a government-owned entity. 
If EFIC were subject to the FoI Act, exemption provisions under the legislation 
would apply to information in its possession, including those related to Cabinet and 
commercial-in-confidence material. This would maintain the confidentiality of 
EFIC’s client’s commercially valuable information while also providing scope for 
enhanced transparency of EFIC’s operations on the CA. 
The Australian Government should remove EFIC’s special exemption in relation 
to matters done under Parts 4 and 5 of the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation Act 1991 from the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (while 
retaining protection for Cabinet and commercial-in-confidence material). 
9.8 In sum 
EFIC has some of the building blocks for a strong governance framework, such as a 
merit-based board with members who have experience in managing financial 
institutions. However, some of EFIC’s internal governance processes are weak and 
RECOMMENDATION 9.8 
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would be improved with the implementation of the Commission’s 
recommendations.  
EFIC’s business activities are extending in scope. It has recently focused on large, 
resource-related projects located in Australia. The Commission has found that 
facilities to support suppliers to onshore resource-related projects have been 
approved in the absence of adequate eligibility criteria to determine whether the 
good or service provided is integral to the ultimate export. 
As discussed in chapter 8 some aspects of EFIC’s credit risk management have not 
been sufficiently robust, and it is important that EFIC’s governance arrangements 
provide confidence that the Australian Government will not be unnecessarily 
exposed to financial risk. 
Decision making is typically improved by having better information available. Poor 
transparency and low levels of stakeholder engagement in EFIC’s decision making 
increases the likelihood that EFIC will not successfully mitigate the environmental, 
social and reputational risks.  
The Commission considers governance practices, including EFIC’s internal audit 
program, are not sufficient to ensure EFIC’s activities are consistent with the 
operational restrictions set out in the SoE and Part 4 of the EFIC Act. Further, there 
is also a lack of clarity in the information provided by EFIC to the Australian 
Government, and to the public, and this impairs EFIC’s accountability. 
   
 A FUTURE 
ROLE FOR EFIC 
301 
 
10 A future role for EFIC: limited 
support for SMEs 
 
Key points 
• The Commission considers that, until it is next reviewed by an independent body, 
EFIC’s mandate and operations on the commercial account (CA) should be 
reoriented to address information-related failures in financial markets that impede 
access by newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to export 
finance.  
• EFIC’s role on the CA should be to demonstrate to the private sector that providing 
export finance to newly exporting SMEs can be commercially viable. 
• To be effective in this demonstration role, EFIC should: 
– charge a price covering the expected full economic cost of provision 
– be subject to competitive neutrality arrangements including earning an 
appropriately benchmarked rate of return on equity, setting prices that are 
commensurate with the level of risk incurred, and paying a tax-equivalent charge 
and a debt neutrality fee 
– publish information on the facilities it approves on the CA, including the name of 
the firm, price and other terms of provision. 
• EFIC’s CA product range should be limited to guarantees and bonds, including the 
provision of bonds on behalf of the exporter. When directed by the Minister, the 
product range may include the provision of reinsurance, for a limited period, to cover 
country and sovereign risk insurance provided to SMEs by the private sector. 
Assistance on the CA is only to be provided in respect of export contracts. 
• The Commission has found no convincing evidence to indicate there are failures in 
financial markets that impede access to debt or equity finance for large firms, or for 
resource and infrastructure projects located in Australia. EFIC should not continue 
to provide financial services to large corporate clients or for domestic 
resource-related projects on the CA. 
• Under the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) (EFIC Act), 
EFIC is able to support projects and firms that are increasingly remote from the 
export focus of the Act. This increases the risk that EFIC will provide financial 
services to firms that do not require assistance, or to less efficient firms that do. 
• The Australian Government should not broaden the eligibility criteria under Part 4 of 
the EFIC Act. In particular, the Act should not be amended to enable EFIC to 
provide loans on the CA involving export transactions for non-capital goods.  
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This report has highlighted a number of issues with the way the Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation (EFIC) is currently operating, and detailed a number of 
recommendations on how aspects of its operations could be improved. This chapter 
discusses the Commission’s views on a future role for EFIC. 
10.1 Changing EFIC’s scope of operations 
The scope of EFIC’s operations has evolved since it was established in its current 
form in 1991. For example, the short-term insurance arm of EFIC’s origination 
business was divested in 2003, new products have been developed, such as the 
Producer Offset loan, and EFIC has recently focused on supporting resource 
projects and related infrastructure located in Australia on the commercial account 
(CA). EFIC’s operations in 2011-12 have expanded to include support for suppliers 
to resource-related projects in Australia. 
The 2006 review of EFIC considered the scope of EFIC’s operations and canvassed 
options to amend Part 4 of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 
(Cwlth) (EFIC Act), discussed below. In its submission to this inquiry, EFIC 
highlighted some areas of the EFIC Act that it considers unnecessarily constrains its 
scope and flexibility to support Australian exports. 
Exporters and private sector providers have identified further scope to expand 
EFIC’s operations. For example, in discussing EFIC’s role during the current 
European debt crisis, Austal stated: 
In this regard, Austal considers that there is substantial opportunity to enhance the role 
that EFIC plays in these difficult economic times to support Australian manufacturing 
jobs. Austal would like to see EFIC’s role broadened to … include the direct funding of 
transactions, residual value of financing, direct asset ownership and leasing/chartering 
of vessels to clients. (sub. 27, p. 2) 
Other participants to this inquiry noted that there may be opportunities for EFIC to 
expand its operations. The Australian Institute of Export, for example, noted there is 
a need for EFIC to provide greater support to the small exporters who have strong 
potential for growth, and that the EFIC Act should be broadened to include a wider 
range of goods and services (sub. 4). The Construction, Forestry, Mining and 
Energy Union expressed a similar sentiment suggesting that amendments may be 
made to enable:  
EFIC [to] fund new businesses with one type of support (taking equity for instance and 
selling it down over time) and more established business with another (traditional 
methods of export facilitation provided by EFIC). (sub. 10, p. 2) 
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Proposals to expand EFIC’s operations should be considered in the same way as 
EFIC’s current operations — on the basis of a market failure rationale for 
government intervention. 
The following sections present the Commission’s views on the various paths for 
expanding the scope of EFIC’s operations that have either been taken by EFIC in 
recent years or have been proposed by participants to this inquiry. These include: 
• EFIC’s support for resource-related and infrastructure projects located in 
Australia 
• EFIC’s ability to provide loans for non-capital goods 
• EFIC’s ability to support overseas investment by Australian firms 
• the size of EFIC’s capital base.  
Support for resource-related projects located in Australia 
As discussed in previous chapters, EFIC has recently extended its operations to 
provide financial services to firms undertaking resource-related projects in Australia 
and to domestic suppliers of goods and services to those projects.  
This expansion of EFIC’s operations has occurred pursuant to sections 7 and 8 of 
the EFIC Act that allow EFIC to support persons ‘indirectly’ involved in Australian 
export trade, and the eligibility criteria in section 3 of the Act that allows support 
for export, or export related, transactions that meet one of the criteria below:  
• eligible export transaction 
• export contract 
• carrying on Australian export trade 
• overseas investment transaction. 
These provisions are problematic, because they are very broad, conceivably 
covering any transaction in the supply chain. They create the risk of EFIC 
supporting projects and firms that are increasingly remote from the original export 
focus of the EFIC Act and from the market failures affecting exporters’ access to 
finance or insurance. As discussed in chapter 7, the Commission did not find 
compelling evidence of market failure affecting availability of finance for 
infrastructure and resource projects located in Australia and associated export 
supply chains. The Commission also notes that government assistance is potentially 
available to these firms through other programs (discussed in chapter 2). There is a 
risk that EFIC, through its expansion into those areas, will provide assistance to 
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those that do not require it or to less efficient firms that do, while acquiring the 
focus and characteristics of an investment bank. The Commission has discussed the 
risks and potential costs associated with governments owning banks in chapter 4. 
These provisions can also be a source of considerable uncertainty over EFIC’s 
mandate. In public consultation with the Commission, EFIC did not provide 
evidence of adequate eligibility criteria to determine when a particular transaction 
should be within or outside of its scope of operations.  
The Commission considers that the EFIC Act should be amended to remove all 
references to EFIC providing support on the CA to those indirectly involved in 
Australian export trade, and to constrain the eligibility criteria to transactions based 
on an export contract. A direction to this effect from the Minister would be 
warranted, pending the legislative amendment. This would improve certainty for 
EFIC and its potential clients, discourage firms indirectly involved in export 
transactions from seeking assistance, and refocus EFIC toward meeting its objective 
of facilitating and encouraging Australian export trade. 
Loans for non-capital goods 
In its submission to the issues paper, EFIC (sub. 18, appendix A) noted that the 
current eligibility criteria for loans restrict EFIC to lending for the purposes of 
financing an ‘eligible export transaction’ (EFIC Act, s. 23). The definition of 
eligible export transaction in the EFIC Act includes capital goods, the provision of 
services related to the export of capital goods produced in Australia or the provision 
of construction, technological, managerial or other services in another country. In 
that submission, EFIC claimed it was unable to make loans for non-capital goods 
including commodities and argued it was: 
 … a significant and unreasonable restraint on EFIC’s ability to provide direct finance 
to Australian exporters of commodities and related domestic infrastructure projects. 
(sub. 18, appendix A, p. 33) 
As discussed in chapter 9, EFIC has subsequently claimed to have received legal 
advice that section 23 of the EFIC Act gives it the power to provide loans to 
companies undertaking the Ichthys project — a US$34 billion liquefied natural gas 
project in northern Australia being undertaken by a consortium of foreign oil and 
gas companies.1 
                                                          
1  At the time of writing this report, no decision had been taken by the EFIC Board as to whether 
EFIC would provide debt or a guarantee to the Ichthys project but discussions have taken place 
on EFIC’s support. 
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As noted, the Commission has not found convincing evidence to indicate there are 
failures in financial markets that impede access to debt or equity finance for large 
firms, or for domestic resource projects and related infrastructure. Furthermore, as 
discussed below in a more general context, the Commission does not support EFIC 
performing a direct lending role on the CA. Consequently, the Commission does not 
support the proposed amendment to the EFIC Act to enable EFIC to support loans 
for non-capital goods on the CA, nor does the Commission support EFIC relying on 
the existing provisions of the Act to this effect. 
Support for overseas investment 
The 2006 review of EFIC noted that EFIC had proposed to improve small and 
medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs) access to financial services when expanding 
their supply and distribution chains overseas. The review stated that consultations 
with exporters and industry groups highlighted that exporting had moved away from 
a ‘produce and ship model’, and that changes to the eligibility criteria under the 
EFIC Act were needed to support offshore investment. 
In May 2007, the then Minister for Trade announced that EFIC’s powers on the CA 
would be expanded to provide for a broader eligibility test to enable support for 
SMEs seeking to expand globally (Truss 2007). In 2009, the then Minister for Trade 
announced that the Australian Government would simplify and expand EFIC’s 
powers so it could more effectively provide financial support by streamlining the 
eligibility criteria (Crean 2009a). The proposed new arrangements were to involve a 
‘net economic benefits test’ and would allow SMEs to establish global supply and 
distribution chains, and reduce the cost burden of accessing EFIC’s services. This 
change would enable EFIC to take account of factors such as financial returns to the 
company (in the form of dividend income and other revenue) and increased 
overseas market access when determining eligibility for support. It would enable 
EFIC to provide increased support for Australian firms making investments 
overseas. 
However, while the Commission has identified potential information-related 
failures that may affect the access to finance and insurance by newly exporting 
SMEs, it remains to be seen whether EFIC is able to resolve those in a way that 
generates a net benefit to the community. It would be imprudent to expand the 
scope of EFIC’s operations before this question is answered empirically. Therefore, 
the Commission does not support this amendment to the EFIC Act at this time. 
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EFIC’s capital base 
At 30 June 2011, EFIC’s capital base was about $408 million of paid-in equity and 
retained earnings. In the 2012-13 Budget, the Australian Government made an 
allowance for a special dividend of $200 million to be paid from EFIC’s capital and 
reserves (Australian Government 2012).  
In its submission to this inquiry made before the Budget announcement, EFIC 
observed: 
EFIC is constrained by the size of its balance sheet and capital base from supporting 
larger transactions over A$100-150 million. This inability to provide large sums 
curtails EFIC’s ability to support large export transactions. Without EFIC’s backing, 
Australian exporters may be disadvantaged as a foreign buyer may direct its 
procurement plans elsewhere. (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 33) 
In the Commission’s view, the only area where government intervention through 
EFIC may be warranted concerns newly exporting SMEs. In that context, EFIC 
noted that: 
EFIC has sufficient capital to service a number of SME transactions. (sub. 18, 
appendix A, p. 33) 
The Commission also proposes that this intervention will be more limited than 
currently, due to the adoption of more restrictive criteria for defining an SME. 
In sum 
The Commission considers that neither the expansion of the scope of EFIC’s 
operations through amendments to the EFIC Act proposed by EFIC, nor EFIC’s 
recent expansion into supporting resource-related projects located in Australia and 
their suppliers, are justified on market failure grounds. Therefore, the Commission 
recommends that EFIC’s support for resource-related projects located in Australia 
should cease, and there should be no further broadening of EFIC’s activities. In 
particular: 
• EFIC should be given a direction by the Minister to cease support for 
transactions that are not based on an export contract. 
• The Australian Government should not proceed with a broadening of the 
eligibility criteria under Part 4 of the EFIC Act. Specifically, the EFIC Act 
should not be amended to:  
– give EFIC additional powers to support offshore investment 
– allow EFIC to enter into loans for the export of non-capital goods. 
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As soon as possible, the Minister should direct EFIC to cease providing financial 
services for transactions that are not based on an export contract as defined in 
section 3 of the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC Act). 
This includes resource projects located in Australia, and related infrastructure, 
and suppliers of goods and services to those projects. 
The Australian Government should not broaden the eligibility criteria under 
Part 4 of the EFIC Act. Specifically, the EFIC Act should not be amended to 
allow EFIC to enter into loans for the export of non-capital goods. 
10.2 Structural and operational reform of EFIC 
It is the Commission’s view that a number of changes should be made to EFIC’s 
mandate and operations to ensure its CA activities align with a market failure 
rationale for government intervention. These changes seek to improve EFIC’s 
governance arrangements and ensure that it offers export finance products to newly 
exporting SMEs on a commercial basis, that is, the price for EFIC’s financial 
services should cover the expected full economic costs of provision. 
A more clearly defined objective 
The Commission has concluded that there may be information-related market 
failures affecting access to export finance and insurance by newly exporting SMEs. 
EFIC’s CA objective should be to address these market failures. EFIC’s role should 
be to demonstrate to the private sector that providing export finance to newly 
exporting SMEs can be commercially viable. This role is consistent with EFIC’s 
function under section 7(b) of the EFIC Act: 
 … to encourage banks, and other financial institutions, carrying on business in 
Australia to finance, or assist in financing, export contracts or eligible export 
transactions … 
In order to perform this role, it is important that EFIC generates reliable and 
relevant information that is disseminated to market participants. It is essential that 
EFIC operates on the same basis as the private sector — with price covering 
expected full cost of provision. This should be underpinned by removing EFIC’s 
exemptions from competitive neutrality arrangements. This will not only improve 
EFIC’s incentives to provide financial services more efficiently, it will also improve 
the incentives of those who use EFIC’s financial services. EFIC’s services will be 
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demanded when it is more efficient — from an economy-wide perspective — to do 
so. 
As a matter of good governance, the scope of EFIC’s operations should be regularly 
reviewed, internally through its audit program, and independently, for consistency 
with its mandate. 
Until it is next reviewed by an independent body, EFIC’s role on the commercial 
account should be limited to demonstrating to the private sector that providing 
export finance to newly exporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
can be commercially viable. This demonstration role should be articulated in the 
Minister’s Statement of Expectations. 
EFIC should demonstrate that the provision of financial services to newly 
exporting SMEs can be done on the same basis as the private sector — with price 
covering the expected full economic cost of provision. 
Changes to the product scope 
The financial products and services offered by EFIC should address the source of 
any market failure in the most direct way possible, and generally be the minimum 
necessary to facilitate the efficient functioning of the market. Some of the products 
offered by EFIC are rarely used by its clients because they are widely available 
from private sector providers or there are preferred alternatives. For example, EFIC 
acknowledged in its submission that ‘political risk insurance represents a small and 
infrequent portion of EFIC’s business’ (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 29). 
Some of EFIC’s other products may not be matched to a policy problem. For 
example, EFIC’s Producer Offset loan brings forward payment of a government 
rebate for film production. EFIC justified retaining this product by stating: 
Due to the small size of the transaction and the high level of documentation involved, it 
would be difficult and unnecessarily costly for EFIC to provide guarantees to 
commercial lenders to support these transactions. (sub. DR90, p. 76)  
However, the Commission does not consider EFIC’s involvement in the Producer 
Offset scheme is necessary at all. As discussed in chapter 3, this product is available 
from several private and public sector providers. More importantly, to the extent 
that there is any inefficiency associated with accessing the Producer Offset scheme, 
it is best to address it through the effective design of that program, rather than 
through EFIC.  
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More broadly, where the inefficiencies arise out of information problems, the most 
direct and least distortionary way of addressing them is through providing the 
information to market participants. At the other end of the spectrum is full public 
provision of finance and insurance that displaces any actual or potential 
participation by private sector providers. Between the two extremes are financial 
and insurance products, which by their nature require complementary participation 
by a financial institution (figure 10.1). For example, provision of a guarantee by 
EFIC presupposes the involvement of a financial institution to provide a product 
such as a loan. 
Figure 10.1 Alignment of government action with information problems 
affecting access to export finance and insurance 
 
As outlined in chapter 3, EFIC provides a range of export finance and insurance 
products. These products can be classified into one of the categories below 
(table 10.1).  
To the extent that the dissemination of information may not be a cost-effective or 
practical approach to addressing the information-related problems that affect access 
to export finance and insurance, there are several compelling reasons for limiting 
the scope of EFIC’s products to those that require the involvement of private sector 
providers. 
First, this approach limits the scope for EFIC to crowd out the private sector, with 
operations limited to areas in which the private sector may underprovide financial 
services due to information-related market failures. Second, where private sector 
providers have cost advantages in delivery (both by virtue of their size and a 
stronger profit maximising motive), this approach would capitalise on those 
advantages.  
Third, facilities that require participation of another financial institution are a more 
direct way of generating a demonstration effect and facilitating future private sector 
involvement. This approach will also generate useful information on private sector 
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capacity and could inform decisions on whether government presence is still 
warranted. 
Table 10.1 Classifying EFIC’s products and services  
Information dissemination Complementary provision  Full public provision 
Export Finance Navigator Export finance guarantee Direct buyer finance 
Country profiles Documentary credit guarantees Direct exporter finance 
World Risk Developments Working capital guarantee Producer Offset loan 
Economics chartpack Foreign exchange facility 
guarantee 
Contract bond insurance 
Global Readiness Index  Reinsurance Bond insurance 
 Advance payment, 
performance and warranty 
bonds that are provided by the 
client’s bank and guaranteed 
by EFIC 
Insurance to cover sovereign 
and country risk 
 US bonding line Credit insurance 
  Advance payment, 
performance and warranty 
bonds that are provided directly 
by EFIC to the buyer 
In the United Kingdom, a divestment of the short-term insurance arm of the Export 
Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) was preceded by the agency limiting its 
services to reinsurance for private providers. The subsequent lack of demand for 
such reinsurance provided the evidence that private sector capacity was sufficient 
and future government involvement was no longer warranted (NERA 2000).  
In an economic analysis of the US Export-Import Bank, Baron (1983) assessed the 
rationale for government provision of export finance and argued that even where it 
was warranted, direct lending would exceed the minimum required to resolve the 
market failure. Baron concluded that loans were an inferior option to loan 
guarantees and insurance. Similarly, Ascari (2007) argued that provision of 
guarantees limited the risk of crowding out other participants because the product 
still requires an underlying loan from the private sector. 
In its response to the Commission’s draft report, EFIC noted that in the majority of 
cases it operated by providing guarantees. However, it argued that the approach of 
limiting its scope to just that type of product was flawed: 
This rigid approach reduces the ability of EFIC to structure flexible responses to the 
increasingly complex demands of exporters. (sub. DR90, p. 77) 
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It further claimed:  
The evidence from the GFC is that a guarantee only model has a fundamental weakness 
in a credit crisis … ECAs that provide only guarantees and insurance have been 
struggling to establish funding vehicles in the context of a credit market collapse. 
(sub. DR90, pp. 77-78) 
However, as discussed in chapter 5, the Commission considers that those arguments 
are not grounded in a sound rationale for government intervention. While it is 
important that EFIC’s ability to generate a benefit for its client base is not unduly 
compromised, the underlying and more important objective is targeting the potential 
market failures affecting private sector provision of finance and insurance. As 
noted, fluctuations in the global supply of finance, in and of themselves, are not a 
sound rationale for intervention, nor is supporting exports as an end goal likely to 
maximise the net benefit to the community as a whole. 
In future, the Commission considers that EFIC’s product range should be limited to 
guarantees and bonds, that fall within the definition of a ‘guarantee’ in section 3 of 
the EFIC Act. This includes the provision of bonds on behalf of the exporter. In 
times of significant market disruption, and subject to ministerial direction, there 
may be a case to temporarily include the provision of reinsurance in the product 
range to cover sovereign and country risk insurance provided by the private sector. 
In respect of the commercial account, the Australian Government should make 
amendments to the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (EFIC 
Act) to: 
• reorient EFIC’s objective to addressing information-related market failures in 
financial markets affecting newly exporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) seeking access to export finance 
• specify that EFIC is to demonstrate to the private sector that providing export 
finance to newly exporting SMEs can be commercially viable 
• clarify that assistance is only to be provided in respect of export contracts as 
currently defined in the EFIC Act 
• remove references to EFIC providing support to persons indirectly involved in 
Australian export trade 
• limit the financial products offered by EFIC to guarantees and bonds falling 
within the definition of ‘guarantee’ under section 3 of the EFIC Act 
• allow for the product range to include the provision of reinsurance cover for 
sovereign and country risk insurance provided by the private sector in times of 
disruption in particular markets, subject to ministerial direction. 
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Limiting the number of facilities provided to EFIC’s clients 
Several of EFIC’s clients have been provided with many facilities. This repeat 
business is inconsistent with EFIC effectively pursuing a demonstration role for 
private sector providers and locks in the status quo in the export finance and 
insurance markets. It reduces the incentives of exporters to find alternative sources 
of finance or alter their business practices, and can discourage the private sector 
from developing the requisite capacity to assist newly exporting SMEs. 
There is a strong case to establish a limit on the number of facilities to be provided 
to the same client on the CA. In its draft report, the Commission proposed a limit of 
three, with subsequent facilities requiring approval by the EFIC Board and 
notification to the Minister. EFIC and several of its clients disagreed with this 
recommendation (box 10.1). 
 
Box 10.1 Some participant views on the limit of three facilities per client 
• EFIC may assist the same firm in one market more than once. If the firm’s 
transaction bank supports the bulk of the firm’s activity with the exception of one 
market, it will be more efficient for EFIC to provide support than the firm to 
experience switching costs. EFIC may assist the same firm in more than one 
market. If the ‘market gap’ is perceptions of risk in different markets (e.g. five 
different emerging and frontier markets), or funding issues (e.g. large infrastructure 
projects or the export of high-value capital goods), there could be demand for 
EFIC’s support. (EFIC, sub. DR90, p. 79) 
• We are concerned that the Productivity Commission report has recommended EFIC 
should not support companies more than 3 times … The arbitrary limit does not take 
into account such things as the possibility of new markets, new products, new 
services, different EFIC products available now or in the future … (Synertec, 
sub. DR43, p. 2) 
• What is the rationale for stopping at three transactions? If there is an information 
gap for 3 transactions, there is likely to be the same gap for 10, 20 or 103 
transactions. Such a gap does not suddenly disappear after 3 transactions. (Whittle 
Consulting, sub. DR60, p. 3)  
• … certain industry sectors have a greater need (eg shipbuilding where the asset is 
literally ‘floating’) and industry confidence will not be sustained on the back of ‘we’ll 
support your first sales and then you are on your own’. If the private sector had 
appetite for these transactions they would be there on day one. (Export Council of 
Australia, sub. DR107, p. 3)  
 
The Commission disagrees with participants that argued that EFIC should continue 
to provide support until it is available from private sector providers on terms 
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suitable to the exporter (and by implication, provide it indefinitely, if no private 
sector support is forthcoming). As discussed in previous chapters, absence of 
private sector support could indicate appropriate commercial decisions on the risks 
and expected returns of the project. The Commission also disagrees with the 
argument that continued support is warranted to avoid the cost of switching to 
another provider. As discussed in chapter 7, the costs of switching to another bank 
are not a market failure and continued support on this basis is likely to entrench the 
status quo and be inefficient in the long run. 
However, the Commission acknowledges that a blanket approach may not be 
optimal in all cases. It also agrees that the potential information-related failures are 
not limited to the risks specific to the newly exporting SME. As discussed in 
chapter 5, the second area where information problems may prevent commercially 
viable export transactions relates to country risks in emerging export markets. 
The Commission has revised its recommendation to take the above considerations 
into account. It considers that a limit of three facilities per client should normally 
apply. However, there should be some scope to exceed the limit, while still 
generating a demonstration effect. Proposals to exceed the limit of three facilities 
should be subject to one of the two conditions below: 
• the export transaction is in an emerging export market or 
• the facility has been explicitly approved by the EFIC Board (and not by a 
delegate), is notified to the Minister and is included in EFIC’s internal audit 
program and independent review of EFIC’s operations. 
The limit should not apply to political risk reinsurance facilities provided pursuant 
to the direction by the Minister. 
A limit of three facilities per client should normally apply to EFIC’s future 
operations on the commercial account. Proposals to exceed this limit should be 
subject to at least one of the two conditions below: 
• the export transaction is in an emerging export market or 
• the facility has been explicitly approved by the EFIC Board (and not by a 
delegate), is notified to the Minister and is included in EFIC’s internal audit 
program and independent review of EFIC’s operations. 
The limit of three facilities should not apply to political risk reinsurance facilities 
provided pursuant to the direction by the Minister. 
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The need for greater transparency on commercial matters 
A key condition for EFIC to successfully perform a demonstration role is that its 
activities are transparent. In the Commission’s view, the current arrangements are 
not conducive to performing that role. 
EFIC does not publish information on its pricing for particular facilities. Several 
other Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), including those of Germany and Denmark 
provide some guidance on their pricing in the form of online calculators. Under the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cwlth) all documents relating to anything done 
by EFIC under Part 4 (Insurance and Financial Services and Products) of the EFIC 
Act are exempt from disclosure. 
Within a month of execution, EFIC should publish information on the facilities it 
approves on the CA, including the name of the firm, price and other terms of 
provision. This would facilitate the pursuit of three objectives: 
• It would demonstrate to private sector providers where EFIC is placed in the 
market and possibly highlight some commercial opportunities. 
• It would reduce the transaction costs for EFIC’s potential clients and private 
sector providers. 
• It would impose pricing discipline on EFIC and discourage strategic behaviour 
by potential clients to obtain support on subsidised terms. 
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC (sub. DR90) argued against disclosing 
information on the price and terms of its facilities, on the following grounds: 
• EFIC’s clients have a reasonable expectation of client confidentiality — 
disclosing the prices of the facilities indicates a credit judgement by EFIC and 
could have adverse consequences for its clients. 
• The disclosure would not achieve its objectives, because the information would 
not be useful for market participants due to:  
– EFIC’s pricing being affected by information not related to the exporter, such 
as the buyer’s credit worthiness and country of origin  
– the bespoke nature of the facilities.  
The Commission is not proposing that the broader financial details of the applicant 
are made public, rather only information that relates to the facility. The Commission 
does not expect that the publication of this information would generate a significant 
impost for EFIC’s clients, and it has not received any evidence in submissions from 
EFIC’s clients to indicate otherwise. For example, Marine Western Australia 
indicated that such disclosure would not be a concern for its members (trans., p. 21) 
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and Greyhound Australia (sub. DR59) supported the recommendation. Furthermore, 
to the extent that EFIC’s clients are aware of the disclosure requirements prior to 
obtaining the facility, this would form part of their consideration on whether to 
obtain it. Consequently, only the facilities for which the benefits of disclosure 
outweigh the costs will be provided.  
The Commission also disagrees that disclosure will not generate useful information.  
First, as discussed by the Commission, information-related market failures are not 
necessarily limited to the exporter and could include the buyer’s country. Thus, 
even where EFIC’s pricing primarily reflects the risks relating to the buyer’s 
country, it could still be addressing an information-related market failure. Second, 
while individual facilities may be bespoke in nature, their demonstration value 
should not be assessed in isolation. The information published by EFIC relating to 
facilities for a particular importing country, type of export or exporter should be 
considered in aggregate and as such, would have demonstration value. For example, 
the Australian Centre for Renewable Energy stated: 
ACRE agrees with [the] recommendation … and believes that the publication of 
transactions executed by EFIC would be an important measure to correct the 
information failure which currently exists with financiers and investors considering 
renewable energy projects. (sub. DR115, p. 2) 
EFIC should publish information on the facilities it approves on the commercial 
account within a month of execution, including the name of the firm, price and 
other terms of provision. 
A move to another form of provision? 
The Commission has also given consideration to whether a different model of 
provision would be more appropriate, drawing on the experience of other ECAs. 
The similarities and differences between the approaches of other ECAs are 
discussed in appendix C. 
ECAs around the world broadly fall into three institutional models, namely the: 
• departmental model 
• state-owned corporation or agency model 
• private company as agent model (Wang et al. 2005) (table 10.2). 
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Departmental model 
The setting up of ECAs as government departments is relatively rare in OECD 
countries. The United Kingdom’s ECGD is an example of this model, with the 
ECGD responsible to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills. 
ECAs set up under a departmental model are typically less structurally independent 
than those constituted under an arm’s length state-owned corporation or agency 
model. However, depending on prevailing governance arrangements, departmental 
agencies might be more accountable to the government and Parliament. 
The departmental model is likely to be more appropriate when an agency is 
predominantly pursuing non-commercial objectives on behalf of government. 
Where agencies are largely commercial in their operations, there are likely to be 
benefits from providing them with greater independence and placing them on a 
more commercial footing. Thus, the Commission considers that the departmental 
model is not suitable for the role proposed for EFIC. 
Table 10.2 Selected ECAs: institutional models and product offerings 
   Key product offerings 
ECA Country Institutional model Loans Insurance 
Bonds and 
guarantees 
EFIC  Australia State-owned    
ECGD United Kingdom Departmental    
US Ex-Im United States State owned    
NZECO New Zealand State owned    
Coface France Private    
Euler Hermes Germany Private    
Atradius Netherlands Private    
EDC Canada State-owned    
JBIC Japan State-owned    
NEXI Japan State-owned    
Sinosure China State-owned    
China Ex-Im China State-owned    
Sources: Berne Union (2011); ECA websites. 
State-owned corporation or agency model 
The state-owned corporation or agency model is the most commonly employed for 
ECAs, and includes agencies such as EFIC, the Ex-Im Bank in the United States 
and the New Zealand Export Credit Office (NZECO). This model puts agencies at 
arm’s length from government, providing them with greater autonomy and making 
them less vulnerable to political intervention by ministers. 
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Among those ECAs constituted under this model, there are varying arrangements 
incorporating differing degrees of independence. The Ex-Im Bank in the United 
States is constituted as an independent agency by Congress, with appointments to 
the Board made by the US President after congressional advice and consent. The 
NZECO is set up as a business unit within NZ Treasury, with the Secretary of 
Treasury approving all transactions after advice from technical advisers and an 
independent agent (namely EKN, Sweden’s ECA, appointed after a contestable 
process). This level of oversight could help to ensure funds are wisely spent. 
However, the involvement of a senior departmental official who reports to a 
minister, and must take into account the views and instructions of a minister in 
decisions about individual transactions, has the potential to reduce ECA 
independence. That said, legislative measures to prevent ministers intervening in 
individual transactions could go some way to dealing with this potential problem — 
such arrangements are common in other areas of public administration where senior 
department officials have some statutory decision-making powers. 
Where the objectives of an ECA are largely commercial, the state-owned agency 
model is likely to be most appropriate as it allows ECAs to pursue those objectives 
relatively free of political constraints. However, for the model to operate 
effectively, it is important to have effective governance arrangements. Governance 
arrangements for EFIC are described, and improvements proposed, in chapter 9. 
Private company as agent model 
While most ECAs are government owned, the governments of some countries have 
entered into arrangements with private companies to fulfil the ECA role. Examples 
of such arrangements include Coface in France, Euler Hermes in Germany and 
Atradius in the Netherlands. Under these arrangements, the companies perform the 
initial risk analysis and transact on the government account. Where the private 
company is acting as an agent for the government, all risks remain with the 
government (Wang et al. 2005). A similar approach, but one where the commercial 
risks would not remain with the government, involves the private provider receiving 
a subsidy from the government to undertake transactions on its own account. 
Where private firms are used, there could be efficiency gains and benefits from 
independence, although these are not guaranteed (and the latter would depend 
heavily on governance arrangements). However, there is also potential for higher 
transaction costs and conflicts of interest between the government and private 
company involved. Under the model, governments would still provide direction 
with regard to the ECA’s overall direction and priorities. 
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It is also unclear how this approach would overcome the potential market failure 
identified by the Commission. To the extent that the government has an 
informational advantage over the private sector in assessing the risks associated 
with particular transactions, this approach would not utilise it. The Commission 
considers that its recommendation on limiting EFIC’s product scope to products that 
require private sector participation strikes a better balance between capturing any 
informational advantages associated with government involvement and the 
efficiencies associated with private sector provision. 
A move away from provision of finance and insurance — the case for 
direct provision of information  
An alternative to provision of finance and insurance as a means of conveying 
information to market participants is for EFIC to provide the information it has 
directly to the market. As discussed in chapters 2 and 5, there are several state and 
Australian Government programs aimed at addressing the various information 
problems potentially faced by exporters. In this scenario, EFIC would operate 
similarly, while addressing the specific problems affecting the access to finance and 
insurance of newly exporting SMEs. A variant of this approach involves rolling the 
function of addressing any information problems affecting export finance and 
insurance markets into one of the existing Australian Government programs. For 
example, moving this function to Austrade could generate administrative synergies, 
although these may be limited, if as claimed by EFIC (sub. 18) and the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (sub. 19), the functions performed by EFIC and 
Austrade are complementary and there is little overlap. 
However, the approach of addressing potential information problems through pure 
information provision faces some practical challenges that would limit its 
effectiveness. First, it may not be possible to disclose some of the information 
utilised by EFIC in its assessments due to the sensitive nature of the information.   
Second, this information may not be as credible to market participants as that 
generated from direct involvement in the provision of finance or insurance. There is 
a stronger incentive for EFIC to ensure the information it signals to the market is 
correct where it is the provider of finance and insurance, due to the financial 
consequences to EFIC of making a mistake. As noted by NERA (2000), potential 
investors and financiers are more likely to believe government claims about 
creditworthiness if the government backs its claims with financial resources.  
In summary, the Commission considers that at this time greater gains can be made 
by focusing on the recommended reforms to EFIC’s mandate, operations and 
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governance, rather than through adopting a different model of delivery of export 
finance and insurance or a shift to direct information provision. 
Summary of the Commission’s proposals 
The Commission’s analysis indicates that EFIC’s operations on the CA at present 
are poorly directed and inequitable. EFIC’s current CA mandate is inefficient, 
vaguely defined and has not been subject to adequate internal or external oversight. 
A focus on the so-called ‘market gap’ has meant that EFIC has not targeted its 
operations to address market failures, but rather to areas that should be the domain 
of the private sector. EFIC’s pricing and project selection criteria distort the 
allocation of resources within the trade finance sector and within the economy, and 
these distortions would be magnified with any expansion of EFIC’s CA operations. 
The Commission has concluded that EFIC’s CA operations need to be significantly 
reformed to reduce the likelihood that financial and reputational risk is 
unnecessarily transferred to the Australian Government, and ultimately, taxpayers. 
The reforms to EFIC’s mandate and operations recommended in this report seek to 
reorient EFIC’s activities to address information-related market failures confronting 
newly exporting SMEs and to improve EFIC’s governance arrangements. The 
Commission acknowledges the advice from EFIC that the Commission’s proposed 
model for EFIC would make it unique among the world’s ECAs. However, the 
Commission’s assessment is grounded in assessing the rationale for intervention 
and determining the best policy response. 
Finally, the proposed reforms to EFIC’s mandate will be testing for EFIC. However, 
if it is the case that information-related market failures are impeding access to 
finance by newly exporting SMEs, over time private sector providers will see 
opportunities in this market segment if EFIC is able to demonstrate that these 
failures are preventing commercially viable export transactions. If demand for 
EFIC’s services gradually declines over time as a consequence, this should be seen 
as a policy success. If on the other hand, EFIC struggles to develop a sustainable 
business, this would be evidence that either the market failures of concern are not 
extensive or that they are not amenable to being addressed through the direct 
provision of financial services by EFIC. These matters would need to be considered 
in an independent review of EFIC. 
The Commission’s reform proposals outlined in this and the previous chapters are 
summarised in table 10.3. 
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Table 10.3 Selected features of current and proposed arrangements 
EFIC’s activities on the commercial account 
 Current arrangements Proposed arrangements 
Objective Facilitate and encourage 
Australian export trade 
Operate in the market gap 
Address potential information-related market failures 
affecting newly exporting small and medium-sized 
enterprises’ (SME) access to export finance 
Policy 
mechanism 
Provision of export finance 
and insurance that is not 
always priced on a 
commercial basis 
Demonstrating to the private sector that providing 
export finance to exporting SMEs can be 
commercially viable 
Transparent and limited provision of export finance to 
SMEs, reflecting expected full economic cost 
Governance  Insufficient internal and 
independent oversight of 
compliance with mandate  
Internal audit program and independent review of 
compliance with mandate  
Improved transparency through publication of 
corporate plan 
 Reporting arrangements that 
are inadequate to assess 
EFIC’s performance 
Reporting against a performance management 
framework reflecting the clearly defined, rigorous 
objective. More frequent reporting to the Minister 
Independent review against the new limited mandate 
three years after revised Statement of Expectations or 
legislative amendments have passed 
Scope and 
focus  
Predominant focus on large 
corporate clients, and 
resource-related projects in 
Australia  
Focus on newly exporting SMEs 
A direction from the Minister to cease support for 
resource projects located in Australia, and related 
infrastructure, and suppliers to those projects 
 Broad range of products 
overlapping with those offered 
by the private sector 
Product range limited to guarantees and bonds, 
including the provision of bonds on behalf of exporters 
 No limits on the number of 
facilities per client. Often 
repeat clients 
Normally three facilities per client. Proposals beyond 
the three facility limit should either relate to an 
emerging export market, or require approval by the 
Board, be notified to the Minister and be included in 
EFIC’s internal audit program and independent review 
 Support can include provision 
of facilities for transactions 
indirectly related to Australian 
export trade 
Transactions limited to those based on an export 
contract 
 Relationships with financial 
institutions beyond 
demonstration role 
Engagement with financial institutions based on 
demonstrating commercial viability through 
transparency in pricing, facing the expected full 
economic cost of provision 
Operational 
 outcomes 
Low rate of return on equity Return on equity appropriately benchmarked  
The price of some facilities is 
not sufficient to cover 
expected full economic costs 
Pricing that reflects the expected full economic cost of 
the product or service, underpinned by compliance 
with competitive neutrality arrangements 
 Strategic conduct by clients Low incentive for strategic conduct by clients due to 
appropriate pricing, transparency and increased 
disclosure requirements 
 Misallocation of resources that 
impose an efficiency cost on 
the Australian economy 
Private sector provision of export finance to newly 
exporting SMEs achieved through a demonstration 
effect 
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10.3 Next steps 
Mechanics of reform 
Some of the reforms to EFIC’s mandate, structure and operations proposed in this 
report require amendments to the EFIC Act, although initially many of the reforms 
can be instituted through the Statement of Expectations, and a ministerial direction. 
The Commission considers that, where possible, the changes should not wait for 
legislative amendments to be passed by Parliament but that having the measures 
clearly specified in the Act would ultimately be prudent.  
Sections 9(2) and 9(3) of the EFIC Act provide a mechanism for the Minister to 
issue broad directions to EFIC on the performance of its functions: 
9(2) The Minister may give written directions to EFIC with respect to the performance of its 
functions or the exercise of its powers if the Minister is satisfied that it is desirable in the public 
interest that the directions be given.  
(3) EFIC must comply with any direction under subsection (2). 
The Commission notes that this power is limited by section 9(5) which states: 
9(5) Subsection (2) is not intended to authorise a direction:  
(a) requiring the Minister’s approval of the entry by EFIC into a particular contract or the 
giving by EFIC of a particular guarantee or the making of a particular loan; or  
(b) giving the Minister power to determine that EFIC is or is not to enter into a particular 
contract, give a particular guarantee or make a particular loan. 
However, the Commission considers that its recommendations are broader in scope 
than directions that apply to a particular transaction and, therefore, would not fall 
under s. 9(5).  
The Commission recommends that — pending legislative amendment where it is 
required — the proposed changes should, where possible, be directed by the 
Minister in the form of a ministerial direction or revised Statement of Expectations 
(table 10.4). 
Where possible, the Minister should give effect to the proposed changes to 
EFIC’s operations through a ministerial direction or a revised Statement of 
Expectations, until such time as the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
Act 1991 can be amended. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.6 
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Table 10.4 Possible mechanics of reform  
 Implementation instrument 
Recommendation  MDa SoE EFIC Act Other 
Mandate      
7.1 Market gap mandate to be discarded      
10.2 
10.3 
Objective changed to addressing information failures for newly 
exporting SMEs via demonstration effect for the private sector 
     
10.1 
10.3 
EFIC to cease supporting projects not based on an export 
contract and persons indirectly involved in exporting 
     
Scope of operations 
5.1 SMEs defined as entities with annual turnover of $50 million or 
fewer than 100 employees  
     
10.3 Product range limited to guarantees and, subject to ministerial 
direction, political risk reinsurance  
     
10.4 Limit on the number of facilities per client       
Pricing of products and services 
6.2 EFIC required to price its facilities at expected full economic cost 
and achieve an appropriately benchmarked rate of return  
     
 Exemption from competitive neutrality arrangement removed; 
report revenue relating to tax-equivalent charge and debt 
neutrality fee pending amendment of EFIC Act 
     
6.1 Process for allocating risk scores to be independently reviewed      
10.5 EFIC to disclose price and terms of its facilities       
Financial performance and risk management 
8.1 EFIC to set a limit on particular industry exposures       
8.2 Size and scope of EFIC’s treasury to be reviewed by The 
Treasury and the Department of Finance and Deregulation 
     
8.3 EFIC Act to be amended to allow the Minister to direct the Board 
to return surplus capital  
     
Governance 
9.1 EFIC’s Board not to have Australian Public Service members      
9.2 EFIC’s compliance with operational restrictions to be included in 
the internal audit program 
     
9.3 
9.4 
Corporate plan to be tabled; EFIC to report quarterly against it      
Performance management framework; reporting of performance 
in annual report and corporate plan. 
     
Social and environmental obligations      
9.6 Public disclosure of involvement in projects with potentially 
significant environmental or social impacts 
     
9.7 EFIC’s international obligations clarified by the Minister; 
compliance subject to internal audit program 
     
9.8 EFIC’s exemption from FOI to be removed      
National interest account 
9.5 National interest objectives only considered in the context of NIA      
 NIA proposals to be assessed on cost effectiveness against 
alternatives; justification for approval made public  
     
 Information on performance of facilities to be published by the 
Australian Government 
     
a Ministerial direction under section 9 of the EFIC Act.   
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Future review of EFIC 
EFIC should operate under this mandate until it is next reviewed by an independent 
body. Its performance against the objective of addressing information-related 
failures in financial markets affecting newly exporting SMEs should be 
independently reviewed three years after a revised SoE is issued by the Minister or 
the amendments to the EFIC Act have been passed by Parliament, whichever occurs 
first. At this time, there should be sufficient information available to form a more 
definitive view of the extent of any market failures affecting newly exporting 
SMEs. Based on this view, the independent review should consider whether the 
rationale for government intervention remains valid, and whether the provision of 
export finance and insurance through EFIC is the most effective and efficient way 
of addressing any failures in financial markets that are impeding otherwise 
commercially viable export transactions. The review should also include 
examination of alternative arrangements for post-approval administration of the 
national interest account to ensure current arrangements meet government 
objectives at least cost. 
EFIC’s performance against the more clearly defined and rigorous objective 
should be independently reviewed three years after a revised Statement of 
Expectations is issued by the Minister or the amendments to the Export Finance 
and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 have been passed by Parliament, whichever 
occurs first. 
This independent review should consider whether the rationale for government 
intervention remains valid, and whether the provision of financial services 
through EFIC is the most effective and efficient way of addressing any failures in 
financial markets that are impeding otherwise commercially viable export 
transactions. This review should also include examination of alternative 
arrangements for post-approval administration of the national interest account. 
RECOMMENDATION 10.7 
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A Conduct of the inquiry 
Outlined in this appendix are details relating to consultations through: 
• submissions received (table A.1) 
• visits (table A.2) 
• public hearings (table A.3). 
The Commission received the terms of reference for this inquiry on 
1 September 2011. Following receipt of the terms of reference, the Commission 
placed notices in the press and on its website inviting public participation in the 
inquiry. Information about the inquiry was also circulated to people and 
organisations likely to have an interest in it. The Commission released an issues 
paper on 7 October 2011 to assist inquiry participants with preparing their 
submissions. The Commission received a total of 116 submissions.   
Public hearings were held in Perth, Sydney and Canberra in March and an 
additional hearing was held in Sydney in April, which together attracted 
17 participants. 
The Commission has conducted meetings with a range of organisations, individuals, 
financial institutions, industry bodies and government agencies. 
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Table A.1 Submissions received 
Individual or organisation Submission number 
Airport Support Industries DR28 
Allens Arthur Robinson DR42 
Almondco DR36 
ANZ 20, DR101 
Asian Development Bank 2 
Ausenco Limited DR86 
Austal Limited 27, DR110 
Australian Trade Commission  14 
Australian Centre for Renewable Energy 22, DR115 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 5, DR106 
Australian Industry Group 23, DR98 
Australian Institute of Export 4, DR107 
Australian Manufacturing Workers Union DR111 
Australian Rural Exports Pty Ltd  7*, DR74* 
Australian Services Roundtable 21, DR114 
Bothar Boring & Tunnelling  DR73* 
Bronx International Pty Ltd DR81 
Brookfield DR102 
Business SA 6 
Chartis DR89 
Citibank DR108 
Clifford Chance DR52 
Clough  DR104* 
Codan Ltd DR65 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia DR100 
Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union of Australia 10 
Consult Australia DR109 
Contrarian Tax Unit Pty Ltd DR57 
Credit Agricole CIB DR75 
Department of Agriculture and Food (WA) 16 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 19 
Deutsche Bank AG DR38 
Downer EDI Limited DR40 
Dragonet Films DR33 
E W Cox International Pty Ltd DR69 
Eco-kinetics  DR61 
Emtivac Engineering Pty Ltd DR77 
Environmental Systems & Services Pty Ltd 11 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 18#,DR90 
Ferra Engineering Pty Ltd 8 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Individual or organisation Submission number 
 
Freehills DR70* 
Frosty Boy Australia DR80 
Gasco Pty Ltd DR82 
General Electric DR116 
Goalpost Pictures Australia DR30 
GP Graders DR35 
Greenpeace 9 
Greyhound Australia DR59 
GRM International Pty Ltd DR85* 
Gulf Industrials  DR113* 
Hanseatic Marine 26* 
Human Rights Law Centre 13, DR103  
HSBC (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation)  DR95* 
Incat Australia Pty Ltd DR56 
Insurance Council of Australia 3 
Investec Bank PLC DR72 
Joan B Peters DR44 
Jubilee Australia 12, DR71 
Kempe Engineering DR83 
King and Wood Mallesons DR84 
Knog Pty Ltd DR49 
Latham & Watkins DR51 
Lean Field Developments DR78 
Leighton Holdings DR79 
Macmahon Holdings DR47 
Macquarie Capital Group DR45 
Marand Precision DR63 
Marine Western Australia Inc 24 
McDonnell Dowell Corporation Limited DR29 
Mindful Media DR94 
Mono Pumps (Australia) DR54 
National Australia Bank DR92 
Noja Power DR32 
NSW Business Chamber DR105 
NSW Trade and Investment 25 
Oil Search Limited DR53 
Orpheus Geoscience Pty Ltd DR62 
Outotec Pty Ltd – Jagger, Neil  DR68* 
Outotec Pty Ltd – Sneyd, Stuart DR67* 
(Continued next page) 
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Table A.1 (continued) 
Individual or organisation Submission number 
 
Outotec Pty Ltd –Whatson, Brad DR66* 
Oxfam Australia 15, DR96 
Quickstep DR41 
Riverstone Advisory Pty Ltd DR88 
Santos Ltd DR64 
Screen Australia 17, DR46 
Screen NSW DR91 
Screen Producers Association of Australia DR55 
Screenwest DR76 
Société Generale DR87 
Stephens, Malcolm  DR93 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation DR99* 
Synertec DR43 
Thiess Pty Ltd DR50 
TTG Transportation Technology Pty Limited 1 
UGL DR112 
Viocorp International DR48 
Wagner Group Holdings Pty Ltd DR31 
Wellard Rural Exports Pty Ltd DR34 
Westpac DR97 
Whittle Consulting Pty Ltd DR60 
Wiggins Island Coal Export Terminal Pty Ltd DR37 
WorleyParsons DR39 
Zurich Australian Insurance Limited DR58 
a An asterisk (*) indicates that the submission contains confidential material NOT available to the public. A 
hash (#) indicates that the submission includes attachments.  
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Table A.2 Visits 
Individual or organisation 
ACT 
Ausaid 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Australian National Audit Office 
Australian Office of Financial Management 
Department of Finance and Deregulation 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Treasury, The  
New South Wales 
ANZ 
Atradius 
Australian Trade Commission 
Australian Bankers’ Association Inc 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Ernst & Young 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
HSBC (Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation) 
Insurance Council of Australia 
Mohl, Andrew (Chairman - Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Board) 
National Australia Bank 
QBE Australia 
Rabobank 
Westpac 
Victoria 
ANZ 
Australian Council of Trade Unions 
Business Council of Australia 
General Electric 
Parkthorn Leisure 
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Table A.3 Public hearings  
Individual or organisation Transcript page numbers 
Perth — 23 March 2012  
Orpheus Geoscience Pty Ltd 3–13 
Marine Western Australia Inc 14–22 
Austal Ltd 23–50 
Wellard Rural Exports Pty Ltd 51–60 
Joan B Peters 61–66 
Screenwest  
Hanseatic Marine  
Thornycroft Maritime and Associates Pty Ltd 74–85 
Sydney — 26 March 2012  
Aircraft Support Industries 89–96 
Jubilee Australia 97–105 
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 106–167 
Australian Institute of Export 168–176 
NSW Department of Trade and Investment, Regional, Infrastructure and Services 177–190 
Stolway Holdings Pty Ltd 191–197 
Bronx International Pty Ltd 198–208 
Canberra — 27 March 2012  
Australian Services Roundtable 212–221 
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 222–234 
Sydney — 4 April 2012  
Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 237–303 
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B Estimating export credit subsidies 
Chapter 6 discussed how the use of officially supported export credits could result 
in the provision of subsidised finance to exporters or buyers of the exported goods. 
This appendix describes methods researchers have used to estimate export credit 
subsidies. 
B.1 Net present value methods 
Boyd (1982) and the OECD (2000) use a net present value method to estimate a 
subsidy rate. The subsidy rate is the subsidy amount expressed as a percentage of 
the value of the exports financed by an export credit agency (ECA). For a loan, the 
calculation requires estimating a ‘market’ rate of interest that would have been 
applied without intervention by the ECA and a lower, subsidised rate of interest 
provided by the ECA. The net present value calculation represents the value of the 
export credit, taking into account the lower rate provided by the ECA and 
converting it into a present value by discounting it by the market rate.  
Estimating the ‘market’ interest rate using the cost of capital rate as a 
proxy 
Boyd (1982) estimated the subsidy rate on products offered by Eximbank –– the 
ECA in the United States. Boyd estimated that the subsidy rate for that ECA was at 
least 2 to 20 per cent for loans issued by the ECA in the period 1976 to 1980.  
Boyd estimated the present value of the direct benefit and cost of a loan. Using the 
terminology of Boyd (1982), the direct cost of a loan in year t is Ct. The direct cost 
is the amount of the loan. 
The direct benefit of the loan is the future stream of payments the ECA will receive 
on this investment. The benefit stream is Bt = bt+1, bt+2, …, bt+n where b represents 
payments on the principal and interest on the loan and n is the maturity date (in 
years). 
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The present value of direct benefits is: 
Γ𝑡 = � [𝑏𝑖/(1 + 𝑚𝑡∗)𝑖]𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑚𝑡∗ is the market discount rate, defined by Boyd (1982) as the risk-adjusted 
private market discount rate. 
Boyd (1982) assumes that loans are repaid semi-annually, with 𝜓 denoting the delay 
in payments to the ECA as a proportion of the average maturity of loans and 𝑚𝑡 the 
average rate of interest on new loans. Under this method, the present value of direct 
benefits provided by the ECA can be written as: 
Γ𝑡 = �𝐶𝑡 𝑚𝑡∗� � �𝑚𝑡(1 − [1 + (𝑚𝑡∗ 2⁄ )]−2𝑛) + [𝑛(1 − 𝜓)]−1× {[1 + (𝑚𝑡∗ 2⁄ )]−2𝑛𝜓−1 − [1 + (𝑚𝑡∗ 2⁄ )]−2𝑛}� 
A key parameter to estimate using Boyd’s method is the market discount rate, mt∗. 
Boyd (1982) states the market discount rate is the cost of capital rate that Eximbank 
would have faced had it been a private firm. It would have paid taxes, been required 
to earn a market-determined rate of return on its equity, and possibly borrow in 
corporate debt markets. 
If the market value of a firm is denoted by 𝑉, and the firm is financed partly with 
debt (𝐿) and partly with equity (𝐸), such that 𝑉 = 𝐿 + 𝐸, the firm will acquire assets 
up to the point where: 
𝑚∗ = [𝑟𝑒(1 − 𝐾) (1 − 𝜏)⁄ ] + 𝑟𝑙𝐾 
Where 𝑟𝑒 is the cost of equity capital, 𝐾 = 𝐿 𝑉⁄ , 𝜏 is the corporate tax rate, and 𝑟𝑙 is 
the cost of debt to the firm. 
Accordingly, determining the risk-adjusted private market discount rate requires 
estimation of the four elements of the above equation. The cost of borrowing, 𝑟𝑙, 
can be estimated using data on corporate bond yields, and 𝜏 can be determined from 
company tax rates. 
Estimation of 𝑟𝑒 and 𝐾 requires a comparator group of firms that undertake similar 
activities to the ECA. Boyd (1982) used a sample of banks in the United States. 
Boyd (1982) outlines two methods to estimate the cost of equity, 𝑟𝑒. One involves 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which requires a risk-free rate of 
interest, expected rate of return on a market portfolio, and company betas, where 
   
 ESTIMATING EXPORT 
CREDIT SUBSIDIES 
333 
 
beta measures the extent to which a company’s stock returns move with those of the 
rest of the market.  
The second approach is to capitalise a stream of expected future dividends. If 𝐷 
denotes current dividends per share, 𝑃 denotes the current share price, and 𝐸(𝑔) is 
the future expected growth rate in dividends per share, the cost of equity capital can 
be written as: 
𝑟𝑒 = (𝐷 𝑃⁄ ) + 𝐸(𝑔) 
𝐸(𝑔) is an expectation variable and a proxy of it is the geometric growth rate in 
dividends per share between the current year and four years prior.  
It is also necessary to estimate 𝐾 = 𝐿 (𝐸 + 𝐿)⁄ , and therefore, what the values of 
the ECA’s debt and equity would have been if it were a private corporation. The 
calculation for the market value of equity is based on the following formula: 
𝐸 = 𝜋(1 − 𝜏) 𝑟𝑒⁄  
Where 𝜋 is the profit reported by the ECA in a given year. 
To estimate the market value of debt that the ECA would have carried had it been a 
commercial entity, the following equation is used: 
𝐿 = 𝐼 𝑟𝑙⁄  
Where 𝐼 is the interest expense reported in a particular year.  
The cost of borrowing, 𝑟𝑙, is estimated by corporate bond rates. 
Once these variables are estimated, 𝑚𝑡∗ can be determined and the subsidy can be 
estimated. 
The method that Boyd (1982) used requires estimation of many variables –– in 
particular, the cost of equity requires either estimating a CAPM model or dividend 
growth model. Both of these models have many assumptions underlying them. 
Boyd’s method only generates one market discount rate, in each year, applied 
across all loans. This method is not useful when examining the subsidy for different 
loans, with different risk levels. Chapter 6 showed that the risk of a facility such as 
a loan (measured by the EFIC risk score) can vary, and that facilities with higher 
risk should have a higher interest rate margin. Under Boyd’s approach, there is only 
one market discount rate used to discount all loans. This can over or underestimate 
the subsidy rate. In cases where two loans are priced with different interest rates, 
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reflecting their different risk levels, the one with the higher interest rate margin 
would have a larger estimated subsidy rate and be biased upwards compared to the 
loan with lower risk (and lower interest rate margin). Thus Boyd’s method will not 
provide an accurate subsidy rate for the purposes of comparing the subsidy across 
different transactions. 
Mapping of credit ratings to ‘market’ interest rates 
The OECD (2000) examined the subsidy of some OECD countries. Thirteen 
countries were included in the analysis, although the study was restricted to 
agricultural exports. To generate the market rate of return (market interest rate), the 
study considered what the borrower in the country that received the exports would 
have paid (not what similar private sector providers would offer, as in the case of 
Boyd (1982)). This was done by evaluating the credit risk of the country that 
imported the agricultural export and assigning it a corresponding ‘market’ interest 
rate. A different market rate was obtained for different loans, depending on the 
country of export destination and its associated credit risk. 
Similar to the approach of Boyd (1982), the OECD (2000) also used a net present 
value formula to estimate the subsidy rate. 
Under the ‘Ohlin formula’ that was used the subsidy rate, S, is defined as: 
𝑆 = �1 − 𝑔
𝑟
� �1 − 1(1+𝑟 𝑎⁄ )𝑎𝐺− 1(1+𝑟 𝑎⁄ )𝑎𝑇
𝑟(𝑇−𝐺) � − 𝑓  
Where g is the interest rate that the ECA charges, r is the market interest rate, a is 
the number of repayments made per year, T is the term of the loan in years and G is 
the grace period in years. f is the initial fee paid from the borrower to the ECA 
expressed as a percentage of the value of the loan. 
This formula, and other net present value formulas, can generate imprecise 
estimates of subsidy rates in some cases. For example, Yassin (1989) notes that if 
the market interest rate in the Ohlin formula is equivalent to the interest rate of the 
ECA (g = r) then the subsidy rate (excluding the initial fee) is zero, irrespective of 
the loan’s grace period or maturity. To obtain more accurate subsidy rate estimates 
in these cases Yassin (1989) provides a different method to estimate the subsidy 
rate. Unlike the Ohlin formula, Yassin’s method can more accurately estimate the 
subsidy rate for bullet loans (that is, where the grace period is the same as the term 
of the loan, or T = G) and generates non-zero subsidy rate estimates when the 
subsidised rate (g) and market rate (r) are the same, but other terms differ. 
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To estimate the market interest rate using the Ohlin formula, the OECD (2000) 
drew on an earlier paper that mapped credit ratings to interest rates. To convert a 
credit rating to an interest rate, the first step was to convert credit ratings (from 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s) into ordinal rankings. For example, AAA = 1, 
AA+ = 2, A2 = 6. A regression is then specified to derive a relationship between 
credit ratings and contemporaneous interest rates. It also controls for tenor, currency 
and other factors. 
Under this method interest rates vary according to risk, meaning a more accurate 
relationship between price and risk is estimated, compared to having one interest 
rate across all risk classes (as is the case with Boyd’s cost of capital calculation). 
Although there are some data limitations with this analysis (for example, missing 
data for some observations) the authors maintain confidence in the method to map 
interest rates and credit ratings. (The r-squared for the regression is 82 per cent). An 
important caveat, however, is that the method assumes that credit rating agencies’ 
valuations of sovereign credit risk is accurate: 
The interest rate estimates are intended to be as accurate as possible and as complete as 
required for the purposes of the present study. However, there are legitimate arguments 
that the interest rates allow an additional element of error beyond the survey 
data … First, they are derived from an estimated contemporaneous relationship 
between credit ratings and interest rates. The original credit ratings may contain errors 
and the estimated link also has statistical errors although, as already discussed, the 
original study reports good statistics of fit. (OECD 2000, p. 48) 
The study found the overall subsidy rate across the thirteen countries to be less than 
four per cent. The United States had the highest subsidy rate (6.6 per cent), and 
contributed to the majority of distortion in agricultural exports. Other countries, 
including Australia, had lower estimated subsidy rates. 
The authors undertook sensitivity analysis to examine how the subsidy rate would 
change if the estimated market interest rate was different. An increase in the market 
interest rate of one per cent led to an increase in the overall subsidy rate from 2.6 to 
3.5 per cent. The small change reflects that the analysis was restricted to agricultural 
sector export credits, which have a short tenor compared to exports from other 
industries. The majority (55 per cent) of export credits used in the analysis had a 
tenor of less than one year. The estimated subsidy rate increases as the tenor of an 
export credit increases, all else equal. 
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B.2 Other methods 
Pricing that reflects full economic costs of provision 
NERA (2003) reviewed the UK’s Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) 
and found it provided a subsidy because its pricing model did not allow for a cost of 
capital: 
 … ECGD is currently not required to provide a return on the notional capital required 
to run its business. This means that premiums charged by ECGD do not reflect the cost 
of the notional capital required to meet claims arising from ECGD’s portfolio of 
exposures and, thereby, comprise a subsidy element. (NERA 2003, p. ii) 
Therefore, to estimate the subsidy, NERA required an estimate of the cost of capital 
amount and cost of capital rate. NERA considered two approaches to determine the 
cost of capital rate, by comparing the rate of return from: 
• private sector providers that provide similar products to those of ECGD 
• other government organisations –– because ECGD is government-owned and 
should earn a rate of return that the UK Government requires for public-owned 
entities. 
The UK Government requires that the rate of return on capital for public-owned 
entities be no less than 8 per cent (NERA 2003). Alternatively, the cost of capital 
rate is estimated by NERA to be 11 per cent pre-tax real if it was assumed that 
ECGD operates as a private sector provider. To estimate the private sector cost of 
capital rate, a CAPM equation was used to estimate the return on equity for 
insurance companies in the United Kingdom. This approach is one of the two 
methods Boyd (1982) used to estimate the cost of equity. 
With a cost of capital rate determined, the authors then require an estimate of the 
capital amount required for unexpected losses. A value-at-risk portfolio pricing 
approach is used. This approach assumes there is some covariance between the 
return of one transaction and the rest of the portfolio. The higher the covariance 
(less diversified the risk of the portfolio) the greater the required capital amount. 
With a cost of capital estimated, NERA requires the expected loss and 
administration charge to determine an ‘ideal price’ that ECGD should charge. The 
difference between the ‘ideal price’ and the price ECGD charges is the estimated 
subsidy. 
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To estimate expected losses, NERA used ECGD’s own pricing model: 
Regarding expected losses (i.e. the mean loss), these were taken from ECGD’s in-house 
credit models. Utilising all of the parameter values as set out, we calculated an ‘ideal 
price’ for each exposure and compared this to the price actually charged by ECGD. 
(NERA 2003, p. iv) 
This method requires estimating a cost of capital rate (if it is assumed that an ECA 
should earn a return comparable to private sector providers). As noted above, this 
could be done using a CAPM model, which requires various assumptions. The 
method also requires that inputs in the pricing model (including default 
probabilities) are accurate, in order to correctly estimate the ‘ideal’ price. 
Option pricing of export credit guarantees 
Dahl et al. (1995) evaluated the price of export credit guarantees using an option 
pricing model. The study was applied to US agricultural commodities and compared 
the export credit program features for credit guarantees of the United States to those 
of other, competing countries, including Canada, France and Australia. 
The authors used the Black-Scholes option pricing model to estimate the value of a 
credit guarantee. That model provides an estimate of a ‘fair market value’ of the 
guarantee if it were traded on an organised exchange, and is comparable to the 
‘actuarially fair’ premium an insurer (importer or US bank) would pay for the 
guarantee. 
The Black-Scholes option model assumes that the value of the credit guarantee is a 
function of the term of the loan guarantee, the guarantee price, and current value of 
the asset. The model can also be extended to allow for coverage of freight and 
insurance and exchange rate guarantees. 
The paper did not aim to estimate a subsidy, but it could be inferred from the 
results. The authors concluded that the overall subsidy was about 13 per cent 
(aggregated across all countries), but noted the estimate is sensitive to critical 
variables that were unobtainable. For example, the default risk of the importer is 
represented by the volatility or price level of the underlying asset, which is the letter 
of credit. The authors found that ‘changes in either the volatility or price level of the 
letter of credit, within the range examined, has a dramatic impact on the value of 
credit guarantees’ (Dahl et al. 1995, p. 12), highlighting the importance of correctly 
estimating default probabilities in order to price export credit guarantees accurately. 
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C Approaches of other ECAs: 
similarities and differences 
The export credit agencies (ECAs) of most countries share similar features in their 
design and operations. This is in part due to the OECD Arrangement on Officially 
Supported Export Credits (OECD 2011a) which was prepared to harmonise the 
terms on which official export credits are provided. However, there are a number of 
important distinctions between them that can provide lessons about the scope and 
effectiveness of ECAs. This appendix provides background about other ECAs, and 
explores some of these differences. 
C.1 Institutional models 
ECAs broadly fall into three institutional models: 
• departmental 
• state-owned corporation or agency 
• private company as agent (Wang et al. 2005). 
Departmental model 
Although ECAs are typically subject to ministerial or departmental oversight, 
setting up an ECA as a government department is relatively uncommon. The UK’s 
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) is one example of this arrangement. 
The various institutional models represent a range of tradeoffs between 
independence — that is, freedom for the entity to make its own commercial 
decisions — and accountability. Good governance arrangements could ensure these 
under any of the models. However, ECAs set up under a departmental model are 
typically less structurally independent than those constituted under an arm’s length 
state-owned corporation or agency model (although they may have greater financial 
and governance accountability). 
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State-owned corporation or agency model 
The state-owned corporation or agency model provides greater autonomy and 
makes ECAs less amenable to political intervention than the departmental model. It 
is the most commonly employed model for ECAs around the world, with examples 
including agencies such as Australia’s Export Finance and Insurance Corporation 
(EFIC), the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) and the New 
Zealand Export Credit Office (NZECO). 
There are varying arrangements between ECAs constituted under this model, 
incorporating differing degrees of independence. For example, the Ex-Im Bank in 
the United States is constituted as an independent agency by Congress. In contrast, 
NZECO is set up as a business unit within the NZ Treasury, with the Secretary of 
Treasury approving all transactions after advice from technical advisers and an 
independent agent. This level of oversight could help to ensure funds are wisely and 
appropriately spent. However, there is still a potential for reduced independence. 
The senior departmental official who reports to the NZ Minister must take into 
account the views and instructions of the Minister, when deciding on individual 
transactions. That said, legislative measures to prevent ministers intervening in 
individual transactions could go some way to dealing with this potential problem —
such arrangements are common in other areas of Australian Government public 
administration, where senior department officials have some statutory 
decision-making powers. 
Where the objectives of an ECA are largely commercial, the state-owned agency 
model allows ECAs to pursue those objectives relatively free of political 
constraints. However, the effectiveness of the model is dependent on the adequacy 
of governance arrangements. 
Private company as agent model 
In some countries, governments have entered into arrangements with private 
companies to fulfil the ECA role. Examples of such arrangements include Coface in 
France, Euler Hermes in Germany and Atradius in the Netherlands. Under these 
arrangements, the companies perform the initial risk analysis and transact on the 
government account. Where the private company is acting as an agent for the 
government, all risks typically remain with the government (Wang et al. 2005). 
There are potential efficiency gains from private-sector involvement under this 
model, particularly if there is contestability for the ECA role. There are also 
potential benefits flowing from the relative independence of the agency under this 
model. However, these benefits are not guaranteed and depend heavily on 
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governance arrangements. There is also potential for higher transaction costs and 
conflicts of interest between the government and the private company involved. 
Under the model, governments can still provide direction on the ECA’s overall 
direction and priorities. 
In 2011, the Norwegian Government announced that it would transfer 
administration of its export credit scheme from the private company Eksportfinans 
to a newly formed government agency. The decision follows the imposition of more 
stringent European Union rules on large exposures which Eksportfinans was not 
able to satisfy. Eksportfinans will manage the Norwegian scheme until the 
establishment of the new agency by 1 July 2012. As it is not able to satisfy 
prudential requirements, Eksportfinans is not able to issue new loans in its own 
name but will manage the runoff of its existing portfolio (Norwegian Ministry of 
Trade and Industry 2011).  
C.2 Portfolio responsibility 
The portfolio responsibility for an ECA varies across countries and can potentially 
have an impact on its priorities. In Australia, EFIC is part of the Foreign Affairs and 
Trade portfolio and is the responsibility of the Minister for Trade and 
Competitiveness. NZECO has similar objectives, although it operates as a business 
unit within the NZ Treasury, and is overseen by the Minister of Finance (although 
the Ministers of Trade, and of Economic Development, are also provided with 
NZECO’s strategic plan for approval). 
Other countries have different approaches. Japan’s Nippon Export and Investment 
Insurance (NEXI) is the responsibility of the Minister of Economy, Trade and 
Industry. The Ex-Im Bank in the United States is an independent government 
corporation established by the Congress, with the board appointed by the President 
after congressional advice and consent. 
C.3 Product offerings 
Product offerings represent a key difference between ECAs; in particular whether 
an ECA offers direct finance. ECAs that offer direct finance, in addition to 
insurance and guarantees, include EFIC, Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC) and Export Development Canada (EDC). ECAs that are restricted to 
insurance and guarantee-type products include the NZECO and NEXI. 
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Where ECAs can offer a range of products, there are advantages of greater 
flexibility for the ECA. However, against this there are also the larger potential 
costs associated with the distortions to financial and other markets, and the greater 
potential for crowding out private sector financiers. Greater flexibility also provides 
greater scope for organisations to go beyond their mandate. 
There has generally been a move away from ECAs providing short-term products 
due to the increased capacity and preparedness of private sector markets to 
undertake this role. Australia, the United Kingdom and Denmark have privatised the 
short-term operations of their ECAs (IFC 2006), although the UK ECA has recently 
re-entered the market for some short-term products in response to perceived 
problems in obtaining credit following the global financial crisis (Crawford 2011). 
Several ECAs continue to provide short-term finance products. For example, EDC 
is still Canada’s dominant provider of short-term insurance for exporters (DFAT, 
sub. 19). 
A further key influence on the product offerings of ECAs is the other government 
organisations operating in the same or similar policy space in a particular country. 
Where a country has development finance institutions (such as the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation in the United States) or institutions designed to help small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (such as the Business Development Bank of 
Canada), the ECA’s product range is likely to be narrower, in part to prevent 
overlap between organisations. 
Some countries have more than one ECA, with each organisation performing 
different roles. For example, Japan has two ECAs, the JBIC providing direct 
financing, and NEXI providing insurance. China and India have similar 
arrangements to Japan. 
C.4  Eligibility for assistance 
The Export Finance and Insurance Corporation Act 1991 (Cwlth) contains a 
number of provisions limiting the products that EFIC is able to offer, and the 
circumstances under which they are able to offer them. EFIC also has internal 
policies designed to ensure compliance with the Act in areas such as local content.  
For example, EFIC noted: 
Currently, EFIC generally requires an Australian content level for its export finance 
products of 50 per cent, reflecting the use of the language ‘produced or manufactured 
wholly or substantially in Australia’ in the definition of ‘eligible export transaction’ (in 
section 3(3)) and similar language is used in the definition of ‘export contract’ (in 
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section 3(1)). Both definitions form the basis of the eligibility criteria for certain [types] 
of EFIC’s Part 4 products and services (sub. 18, appendix A, p. 36).1 
EFIC has noted in its initial submission that ECAs are typically moving away from 
‘local content’ rules regarding which exports it can support. EFIC sees these as 
‘dated given the increased use of imports in production as a strategy by Australian 
firms to provide cost competitive products through global supply chains’ 
(EFIC, sub. 18, appendix A, p. 36). 
A number of ECAs (such as Austria’s OeKB, Belgium’s ONDD, Canada’s EDC, 
China’s Sinosure, Denmark’s EKF, Finland’s Finnvera, Italy’s SACE, and most 
recently NZECO)2 have introduced eligibility criteria based on a benefits test 
(EFIC, sub. 18). EFIC considers a ‘national benefits’ test ‘would allow a wider 
range of factors (such as dividend flows and improved access to markets) to be 
taken into account, in determining whether EFIC’s support may be appropriate for a 
particular proposal (EFIC, sub. 18, appendix A, p. 36). The merits of such a change 
are discussed in chapter 10. 
Eligibility for EFIC’s assistance, as with most ECAs, is primarily focused on 
domestic companies that are exporting or investing overseas. However, the 
relationship between an ECA’s clients and exporters may not always be direct. 
Some governments have relaxed the eligibility for ECA support to include domestic 
activity in specific circumstances. In 2008, the Government of Canada extended the 
powers of EDC to support domestic lending for a period of two years in response to 
the global financial crisis (Argitis 2010). This has been extended until 2013 
(EDC 2012b). The US Government announced in February 2012 that eligibility for 
Ex-Im Bank financing would be extended to US firms competing with foreign 
companies for domestic sales. This is intended to assist US firms by ‘matching 
financing support to counter foreign non-competitive official financing that fails to 
observe international disciplines’ (White House 2012). 
C.5  Focus on small and medium-sized enterprises 
In the draft report, the Commission recommended that until it is next reviewed, 
EFIC’s role on the commercial account should be limited to demonstrating to the 
                                                     
1 The EFIC website notes that some assistance can be provided for Australian content under 
50 per cent in particular circumstances (EFIC, ndc). 
2 Oesterreichische Kontrollbank AG (OeKB); Office National du Ducroire (ONDD); China 
Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure); Eksport Kredit Fonden (EKF); Finnvera 
Oyg (Finnvera); SACE S.p.a. Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero (SACE). 
   
344 AUSTRALIA’S   
EXPORT CREDIT 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
private sector that providing export finance to newly exporting SMEs can be 
commercially viable. 
The Commission is not aware of any ECA that explicitly limits its activities to 
SMEs, but some ECAs are expected to have an SME focus. For example, 
Ex-Im Bank has been mandated by Congress to have a particular focus on SMEs. 
This includes a requirement that it set aside 20 per cent of its authorised funding 
specifically to support exports by small businesses. About 85 per cent of Ex-Im 
Bank’s transactions benefit small business directly (which is approximately 
18 per cent of the bank’s business by value in 2011) (Ex-Im Bank 2012). 
ECAs also commonly report on their dealings with SMEs. EDC has highlighted that 
about 80 per cent of the companies it supported in 2010 were SMEs (which 
represented about 10 per cent of business facilitated by EDC by value) (EDC 2011). 
The ECGD has recently re-badged itself as ‘UK Export Finance’ for trading 
purposes to generate more awareness of its operations among potential SME clients 
(Crawford 2011). Although governments often encourage their ECAs to promote 
their services to SMEs, the majority of their business by value is consistently with 
larger firms. 
In its submission to the draft report, EFIC stated that its support for SMEs was 
relatively greater than either Ex-Im Bank or EDC. It cited that 89 per cent of its 
signings by number and 23 per cent by value were with SMEs in 2010-11 (EFIC, 
sub. DR90). EFIC stated: 
The conclusion therefore that EFIC is ‘focused on large corporate clients’ as evidenced 
by EFIC’s supposedly ‘low’ level of support for SMEs and the following Draft 
Recommendation that EFIC should limit its services to ‘newly exporting’ SMEs only is 
incongruous with the reality of EFIC’s activities and those of its international 
counterparts. (sub. DR 90, p. 75) 
However, EFIC has a higher cut-off for its definition of SMEs (turnover of 
A$150 million) than either Ex-Im Bank or EDC, and other Australian Government 
agencies and private sector providers (chapter 2). This allows EFIC to classify 
larger businesses as SMEs. By comparison, EDC defines an SME as any business 
with total annual turnover of less than Can$25 million (EDC 2008). Ex-Im Bank’s 
definition of small business is determined by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration, which classifies businesses based on turnover or employee numbers 
depending upon the industry. Industries such as services, retailing and construction 
are classified as small businesses if they have annual turnover of less than about 
US$20 million. The ceiling for manufacturing and wholesaling businesses ranges 
from 100 to 1500 employees depending on the type of product manufactured or 
provided (US Small Business Administration 2012). 
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Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendation of a mandate for EFIC that is 
focused on  SMEs was not made on the basis that it corresponds to the mandates of 
other ECAs. Instead, it was made on the basis of evidence related to Australia’s 
ECA and a market failure rationale for EFIC’s operations on the commercial 
account.  
C.6 Competition with the private sector 
Although there are usually ongoing concerns about crowding out, it is generally 
intended by governments that ECAs (including EFIC) do not compete with the 
private sector. However, some ECAs have broad mandates and are more likely to be 
competing with the private sector than others. For example, a 2008 review of EDC 
found ‘there can be no doubt that EDC operates outside any ‘market gap’, however 
defined’ (International Financial Consulting 2008, p. viii). 
In recent years, the private sector has improved its capacity to meet the needs of 
exporters in most countries. The role of ECAs has generally been wound back, 
although since the emergence of the global financial crisis this trend has been 
reversed in some countries, at least temporarily. 
The winding back has also been influenced by: 
• pressure on government budgets (which has reduced funding for ECAs in some 
countries) 
• the OECD Arrangement that was established in 1978 and has increased in scope 
since then (reigning in ECA activity in some countries) 
• the European Commission guidelines set in 1997 to dissuade the governments 
from competing with the private sector (Wang et al. 2005).  
ECAs can often enter into risk-sharing arrangements with the private sector on the 
basis that this will facilitate private sector participation in the export credit sector. 
For example, Wang et al. (2005) observed that many ECAs become more willing to 
enter into risk-sharing arrangements with the private sector as the role of the private 
sector increases. The logic behind these arrangements has generally been that ECAs 
take on political risks, while the private sector takes on commercial risk. For 
example, ECAs have acted increasingly as reinsurers. The ECAs in the United 
Kingdom and Denmark maintained backstop reinsurance facilities after their 
withdrawal from short-term business. 
The Commission has also noted that ECAs enter into risk-sharing arrangements 
with each other. 
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C.7 Commercial focus 
The degree to which ECAs are required by their governments to have a commercial 
focus varies. Most ECAs are obliged by their governments (and international 
agreements) to recover the cost of their operations from their fees and charges 
without drawing on government funding. Most ECAs have provisions in their 
legislation or administrative rules that permit the payment of dividends or surplus 
funds to their shareholding governments. EFIC, Ex-Im Bank, EDC, JBIC and 
ECGD have paid dividends or excess funds to their governments in recent years.  
ECAs also typically claim that they price their products to recover their costs and do 
not provide subsidies. The provision of export credits by ECAs is governed by 
various international agreements intended to promote the sustainability of ECAs, 
reduce competition based on subsidised financing and provide a mechanism through 
which to resolve disputes when they arise. These agreements include the OECD 
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM) and Agriculture. 
However, the existence of these agreements does not guarantee subsidies do not 
occur. The OECD Arrangement is a gentlemen’s agreement, applies only to a 
relatively small number of OECD countries and is not enforceable. Almost all 
countries are a party to the WTO ASCM but taking action is a long and involved 
process. 
ECA activity has resulted in a number of claims of trade distorting subsidies. Since 
1995 the WTO dispute settlement body has examined six cases brought by member 
governments alleging the provision of subsidised export credits. These include: 
• a 2001 complaint from Brazil that EDC provided subsidised buyer finance for 
aircraft exported from Canada — the WTO panel ruled that EDC charged 
interest at rates below those available commercially and this constituted a 
subsidy 
• a 2003 complaint from the European Communities that the Korean 
Export-Import Bank (KEXIM) provided subsidised pre-shipment loans and 
advanced payment refund guarantees to Korean shipyards — the WTO ruled that 
KEXIM’s fees and interest rates were below what could be obtained on the 
market and were, therefore, a subsidy (WTO 2010). 
Although WTO dispute resolution panels have interpreted the language of the 
ASCM to mean that an export credit that is priced below the market price is a 
subsidy (Coppens 2009), many ECAs have interpreted the ASCM to mean they only 
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need to price their products such that they recover their costs. This latter benchmark 
is a low hurdle and does not ensure that subsidies do not occur if ECAs that are 
guaranteed by their governments do not account for lower borrowing costs in their 
pricing techniques. Negotiations on WTO rules are ongoing and the definition of an 
export credit subsidy is a particularly contentious issue (box C.1). 
ECAs have also been accused of providing subsidies by some companies competing 
with the beneficiaries of ECA financing. In an address to the US Chamber of 
Commerce, the CEO of Delta Airlines Richard Anderson stated that the company 
opposes Ex-Im Bank loan guarantees to foreign airlines purchasing Boeing aircraft 
because it assists its overseas competitors. He stated:  
[Delta] spent [US]$300 million to buy two widebody airplanes to serve India, and a 
government-sponsored carrier comes in with Ex-Im Bank [support] and basically takes 
you out of the market because they’re pricing [US]$300 or [US]$400 a ticket below 
you. (Carey 2012).  
In 2011 the Air Transport Association of America sued Ex-Im Bank to stop it 
providing US$3.4 billion of loans to Air India for it to purchase Boeing aircraft. The 
ATA alleges the finance is subsidised and will harm competing US airlines (Air 
Transport Association of America 2011). 
ECAs and governments have also identified subsidised export credits as an issue. In 
its submission to the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, EFIC identified 
ECA activity in Australia as potentially subsidised: 
Such activities are feeding concerns that non-OECD ECA offshore investment 
financing, both tied and untied to exports, may be distorting international purchasing 
and investment decisions as firms from those countries are receiving subsidised 
financing … (EFIC 2012e, p. 11) 
The White House, in a press statement announcing new powers for Ex-Im Bank 
stated: 
The President will not allow U.S. companies and workers to lose out on valuable 
business due to unfair export financing — and will use the Administration’s full powers 
to ensure they are competing on an even footing. (White House 2012) 
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Box C.1 Export credit subsidy benchmarks 
The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) uses 
language that suggests prohibited export credit and guarantee subsidies are defined 
according to a ‘cost-to-government’ benchmark. Under this definition, an ECA’s export 
credits are deemed not to be prohibited export subsidies if they are priced above the 
ECAs costs. 
This is a low hurdle because ECAs have better credit ratings and may be able to 
provide export credits at a lower cost than private sector providers (not including the 
implicit cost of ECA government guarantees). In doing so they could provide a subsidy 
without contravening the ASCM. 
In the most recent round of ASCM negotiations, some WTO members asserted that the 
cost-to-government definition places developing countries at a disadvantage. This is 
because developing countries generally have a higher cost of funds than developed 
countries and cannot match the terms offered by developed countries. 
Some WTO members have argued that the cost to government benchmark for defining 
prohibited export subsidies should be replaced with a ‘benefit-to-recipient’ benchmark. 
This would oblige ECAs to charge market prices for their products and reduce the 
likelihood of subsidies occurring. 
However, this has been opposed by some WTO members who argue that the current 
language is consistent with the OECD Arrangement of Officially Supported Export 
Credits and changing the benchmark would increase the cost of trade finance. They 
also argue that since most developing countries are importers of capital goods, low 
cost of trade finance actually benefits them.  
Source: WTO (2011).  
 
C.8 Exposure concentration 
Many ECAs have high exposures to particular counterparties or industries/sectors, 
reflecting economic and political demand for their products. Sectors to which ECAs 
commonly have high industry exposures include transportation, shipping and 
aerospace. EFIC has a high concentration of exposures to ship-related industries 
(chapter 8). High exposure concentration to counterparties or sectors can result in 
large losses if adverse circumstances affect the counterparty or sector. 
ECAs benefit from the financial backing of their countries’ governments and may 
be exempt from prudential requirements limiting large exposures (chapter 8). Table 
C.1 presents the largest industry exposures of several ECAs and private providers. 
For ECAs for which data are available, the largest industry exposure generally 
exceeded those of private providers operating in similar markets in 2010-11 
(table C.1). 
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Table C.1 Largest classified industry/sector exposure for selected ECAs 
and private providers, 2010-11a 
 Industry/sector Exposure 
  % of total 
ECAs   
EFIC (Australia) (2011) Ship building and operations 30.8 
Ex-Im Bank (US) (2011) Air transportation 48.2 
ECGD (UK) (2011) Civil aerospace 62.4 
Hermes Cover (Germany) (2010) Ships 18.7 
EDC (Canada) (2011) Transportation 27.0 
KEXIM (Korea) (2011)   
Loans Manufacturing 45.4 
Guarantees Manufacturing 70.7 
SACE (Italy) (2010) Oil and gas 22.0 
Private providers   
Atradius (2011) Consumer durables 12.1 
Coface (2010) None greater than  10.0 
Euler Hermes (2011) Construction 14.5 
a Industries/sectors are presented as defined by the relevant organisation in its 2010 or 2011 Annual Report. 
Source: Atradius (2012); Coface (2011); ECGD (2011); EDC (2012a); EFIC (pers. comm., 25 November 
2011); Euler Hermes (2012); Ex-Im Bank 2011a; Hermes Cover (2010); KEXIM (2012); SACE (2010). 
   
 OTHER  
GOVERNMENT 
BODIES  
351 
 
D Other government bodies 
As discussed in chapter 9, a range of governance frameworks and financial 
management arrangements apply to Australian Government statutory bodies (both 
authorities and companies) subject to the Commonwealth Authorities and 
Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) (CAC Act). This appendix compares EFIC’s 
governance and reporting arrangements with those of four CAC Act bodies: 
Airservices Australia, Australia Post, Medibank Private and the Australian 
Reinsurance Pool Corporation (ARPC). There are various governance models 
adopted by CAC Act bodies to undertake their activities and meet objectives. 
Governance frameworks vary in terms of: 
• the scope of ministerial powers to direct authorities or companies in performing 
their functions 
• board composition and committees 
• reporting and disclosure requirements relating to planning and performance 
• regulation and reporting of pricing of services.  
Some characteristics of EFIC and other CAC Act bodies are summarised in 
table D.1, as well as requirements relating to competitive neutrality and payments to 
government. 
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Table D.1 Governance and other characteristics of selected CAC Act bodies 
 Airservices Australia 
Australian Postal 
Corporation 
Medibank Private 
Limited 
Australian Reinsurance 
Pool Corporation 
Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation 
Type of CAC Act bodya Authority, PNFC Authority, PNFC, GBE Company, PFC, GBE Authority, PFC Authority, PFC 
Enabling or applicable 
legislation 
Airservices Act 1995, 
(AA Act), Air 
Navigation Act 1920, 
Aviation Transport 
Security Act 2004, 
Civil Aviation Act 1988 
Australian Postal 
Corporation Act 1989 
(APC Act) 
Private Health Insurance 
Act 2007 (PHI Act) 
The Terrorism Insurance 
Act 2003 (TI Act) 
Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation 
Act 1991 (EFIC Act) 
Principal activities Air traffic control and 
related services, 
aviation rescue and 
fire fighting 
Supply of postal services 
within and outside 
Australia 
Operation of private 
health insurance 
business in accordance 
with the PHI Act and 
Regulations, and direct 
or indirect provision of a 
range of insurance 
services 
Provides reinsurance 
cover to primary 
insurers for losses to 
commercial property 
and associated 
business interruption 
arising from a declared 
terrorism incident 
Provision of export 
credits, insurance, 
reinsurance and other 
financial services that 
support Australian 
exports and overseas 
investments 
Ministerial power to give 
directionsb 
 
AA Act, s. 16 
 
 
Except in relation to rates 
of postage (APC Act, 
s. 49) 
 
 
 
APC Act, s. 38 
 
EFIC Act, s. 9 
Composition of 
Board/Executive 
Chairperson, deputy 
chair, non-executive 
directors appointed by 
the Minister. CEO 
appointed by the 
Board 
Chairman, deputy 
chairman, non-executive 
directors appointed by 
the Governor General on 
the nomination of the 
Board 
Executive managing 
director, non-executive 
chairman and directors 
appointed by the 
Minister. A company  
Chairperson and 
non-executive members 
of the Board appointed by 
the Minister. The CEO 
is appointed by the 
Board 
Managing director and 
CEO, executive directors, 
chief financial officer & 
board secretary, and chief 
credit officer  
(Continued next page) 
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 Airservices Australia 
Australian Postal 
Corporation 
Medibank Private 
Limited 
Australian Reinsurance 
Pool Corporation 
Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation 
  Minister. Managing 
Director appointed by 
the Board 
Secretary is appointed 
by the Board 
 Managing director is 
appointed by the Board 
Government board 
member 
     
Board or executive 
Committees 
Audit and Risk, Safety, 
Environment, 
Remuneration, Ethics 
Audit and Risk, Human 
Resources, 
Superannuation 
Audit and Risk, Human 
resources, Investment, 
Nomination, Health and 
Business Innovation 
Audit and Compliance, 
Risk 
Audit, Credit, Risk and 
Compliance, Treasury 
Risk Review  
Publishes Corporate Plan      
Treasury 
functions/investment 
powers 
The AA Act provides 
for Airservices to enter 
into approved 
contracts in relation to 
foreign currency and 
interest contracts, 
futures, commodity 
contracts 
Treasury policy provides 
for the use of hedging 
instruments to protect 
against adverse interest 
rate and foreign 
exchange rate 
movements 
Board delegates to an 
Investment Committee 
the powers to authorise 
derivative purchases 
and/or sales to 
manage the investment 
portfolio 
Cash deposits are 
managed internally, the 
balance of pool funds 
in medium-term 
investments are 
managed by external 
fund managers. All 
investments are held in 
the ARPC’s name 
Treasury operations 
borrow on international 
capital markets, structure 
cash flow in Australian 
and foreign currencies 
and manage EFIC’s 
investment portfolio of 
capital and reserves 
Borrowing powers in its 
own right  
 
AA Act, s. 11 
 
APC Act, s. 61 
 
MPL Constitution, 
s. 35.2(a) 
 
Under s. 38 of the TIA Act, 
Minister may give 
directions requiring the 
ARPC to enter in to 
contracts to borrow  
 
EFIC Act, s. 58-59 
(Continued next page)   
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 Airservices Australia 
Australian Postal 
Corporation 
Medibank Private 
Limited 
Australian Reinsurance 
Pool Corporation 
Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation 
Price regulatory 
arrangements 
The board’s power to 
set prices for core 
services is subject to 
price notification 
provisions under 
Part VIIA of the 
Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010. 
Minister can make price 
determinations 
Declared letter services 
are subject to price 
notification provisions 
under Part VIIA of 
the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010. 
(although certain letter 
services are excluded).c 
The ACCC can inquire 
into disputes about pricing 
of access to Australia 
Post’s bulk mail services 
MPL can vary future 
premium rates subject 
to the approval of the 
Minister for Health and 
Ageing and the 
requirements of PHI Act 
The Minister gives 
written directions to set 
premium rates charged 
by the ARPC under 
reinsurance contracts 
(TI Act, s. 38 (d)) 
The OECD Arrangement 
on Officially Supported 
Export Credits establishes 
minimum prices and 
maximum terms for export 
credit. The WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing 
Measures prohibits rates 
below long-term cost 
recovery  
Subject to competitive 
neutrality arrangementsd 
     
Tax or tax equivalent 
payments 
 
Airservices Australia is 
subject to income tax 
and GST 
   
The ARPC is exempt 
from income tax under 
s. 36 of the TI Act. It is 
subject to FBT and GST 
 
EFIC is exempt from 
income tax and other 
taxes under s. 63 of the 
EFIC Act. EFIC is subject 
to GST and FBT 
Payment of debt neutrality 
charge 
 
Interest on capital is not 
payable to the 
Commonwealth but 
the capital is 
repayable to the 
Commonwealth at such 
times as determined by 
the Minister in writing 
(AA Act, s. 44) 
 
No current borrowings. 
Borrowing terms must 
comply with competitive 
neutrality 
 
No current borrowings. 
Borrowing terms must 
comply with competitive 
neutrality 
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 Airservices Australia 
Australian Postal 
Corporation 
Medibank Private 
Limited 
Australian Reinsurance 
Pool Corporation 
Export Finance and 
Insurance Corporation 
Commonwealth guarantee 
of liabilities 
Airservices has an 
implicit Commonwealth 
guarantee by virtue of 
its government 
ownership 
Australia Post has an 
implicit Commonwealth 
guarantee by virtue of its 
government ownership 
MPL has an implicit 
Commonwealth 
guarantee by virtue of 
government ownership 
The TI Act provides an 
explicit Commonwealth 
guarantee of the ARPC’s 
liabilities (s. 35) 
The EFIC Act provides an 
explicit Commonwealth 
guarantee of the ARPC’s 
liabilities (s. 62) 
Commercial rate of return 
required under 
competitive neutrality 
policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Dividend policy  
Based on board 
recommendation to 
the Minister 
 
Consistent with part 4 
GBE governance 
arrangements 
 
Consistent with part 4 
GBE governance 
arrangements 
 
The TI Act provides that 
the Minister may direct 
the ARPC to pay 
dividends to the 
Commonwealth. However, 
no such payments have 
been made to date 
 
Based on board 
recommendation to the 
Minister 
a Prescribed bodies under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997 (Cwlth) are Commonwealth authorities (s. 62) or Commonwealth companies 
(controlled by the Commonwealth) and are classified as either Public Non-Financial Corporations (PNFC) or Public Financial Corporations (PFC). Some government 
bodies are also government business enterprises (GBEs) under s. 5 of the Act.  b Refers to ministerial directions in relation to performance of functions or exercise of 
powers.  c Letter services excluded under clause 5(2) of the Price Notification Declaration for Australian Post include those not reserved to Australia Post under Part 3 of 
the APC Act, those that involve supply of a special service for which a special charge or additional fee is applicable and those under an incoming mail service to which a 
convention applies.  d In accordance with the Commonwealth Government Competitive Neutrality Statement of June 1996, Airservices Australia, Australia Postal 
Corporation and Medibank Private Limited are the types of Commonwealth Government businesses to which competitive neutrality arrangements were intended to 
apply. 
Sources: Airservices Australia (2011); ARPC (2011a); Australia Post (2011); Department of the Treasury (2007); EFIC (2011a); HoTs (2009); Medibank Private (2011). 
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D.1 Governance arrangements 
Independence from government 
The enabling legislation establishes the relationship between the Minister and each 
government body, including the extent to which it is to act independently, and its 
governance arrangements. The framework set out in DOFA (2005) outlines a set of 
principles for determining the structure and governance arrangements of Australian 
Government bodies that are broadly consistent with the recommendations of the 
Uhrig Review (2003). Application of the principles requires that most CAC Act 
bodies should have a governing board if they undertake predominately commercial 
operations. The Statement of Expectations (SoE) issued by the minister is intended 
to clarify the government policies, objectives and priorities that a statutory authority 
is expected to observe in conducting its operations. CAC Act bodies respond to the 
SoE with a Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) which is agreed with their 
shareholder minister and is required to be tabled in Parliament. The SCI generally 
sets out the high level strategic objectives and outcomes of the business, including 
performance indicators. This does not include commercially sensitive information. 
The level of ministerial involvement in the operations of statutory authorities varies 
depending on the objectives and functions of the authority. However, the enabling 
legislation of most CAC Act bodies provides for the relevant minister to delegate 
general powers to the governing board to carry out performance of its functions. 
The legislation governing some CAC Act bodies allows for prescriptive ministerial 
control of particular aspects, such as entering into contracts and borrowing. For 
example, the Terrorism Insurance Act 2003 (Cwlth) stipulates that the relevant 
minister must provide written directions to the ARPC requiring them to enter into 
contracts to borrow, or in relation to matters such as the setting of premiums, and 
the extent to which risk is retained under reinsurance contracts. 
Board composition and committees 
A common feature of the governance framework of CAC Act bodies is for the 
shareholder Minister to appoint board members who, in turn, select a managing 
director or chief executive officer. Consistent with the recommendations of the 
Uhrig Review (2003), the shareholder minister is not generally represented on the 
boards of Commonwealth authorities. There are a few exceptions including EFIC, 
(where the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, or an 
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alternate, is a member on the Board (discussed in chapter 9)) the ARPC, the 
Reserve Bank of Australia and the National Library.1 
Another common feature of internal governance arrangements of CAC Act bodies, 
including EFIC, is the use of charters for the board and each of its committees. A 
charter may define the accountabilities of committee members, provide 
documentation of delegated authority from the board to executive management and 
establish procedures for such matters as entering into major transactions or 
undertaking capital expenditure. For example, the Charter for the Investment 
Committee of the Board of Medibank Private delegates powers for the Committee 
to authorise purchases and sales of derivatives to manage its portfolio within risk 
parameters determined by the Board. According to government business enterprise 
(GBE) guidelines, the composition and charter of board committees of GBEs should 
be reviewed annually (Department of Finance and Deregulation 2011). 
D.2 Reporting and disclosure 
The CAC Act (s. 17) and CAC Act Regulations stipulate the reporting requirements 
of Commonwealth authorities relating to annual reports and related obligations. A 
CAC Act body prescribed as a GBE must prepare an annual corporate plan, a 
publicly available SCI and comply with other aspects of GBE governance 
arrangements (DOFA 2005). 
Corporate plans 
Consistent with the requirements of the CAC Act for GBEs, Australia Post and 
Medibank Private are required to provide corporate plans covering a three-year 
period to the relevant minister at least once a year. Airservices Australia is a 
CAC Act body but is not prescribed as a GBE. It produces an annual corporate plan 
in accordance with its enabling legislation and the CAC Act.  
The statutory requirements for tabling and public disclosure of corporate plans vary 
among CAC Act bodies. EFIC is currently not required to make public its corporate 
plan. The Airservices Act 1995 (Cwlth) (s. 15) requires Airservices Australia to 
table its corporate plan. Australia Post is required under its governing legislation to 
include in its annual report an outline of strategies and policies as well as 
performance targets that are set out in the corporate plan.  
                                              
1 The National Library Act 1960 (Cwlth) provides that the Council of the National Library of 
Australia include a senator elected by the senate and a member of the House of Representatives 
elected by the House. 
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The CAC Regulations set out the matters that must be included in the corporate plan 
of a Commonwealth GBE. These include: 
• the objectives of the authority or company  
• its investment and financing programs  
• financial targets  
• dividend policy 
• non-financial performance indicators 
• community service obligations 
• review of performance against previous corporate plans and targets. 
In addition to statutory reporting requirements under the CAC Act, most CAC Act 
bodies are subject to general reporting requirements under their enabling legislation 
and other legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cwlth) and the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cwlth). 
In contrast to the EFIC Act, the enabling legislation of some CAC Act bodies 
provide for ministerial powers to direct board members, when preparing a corporate 
plan, to vary the content required, including financial performance indicators. For 
example, the Airservices Act 1995 (Cwlth) (s. 14), provides for the responsible 
minister to direct the Board of Airservices Australia to vary the plan in respect of 
financial targets and performance indicators relating to the provision of its services 
and facilities. The Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cwlth) (APC Act) 
provides for the responsible minister to vary Australia Post’s strategies to carry out 
the community service obligations and financial targets that are covered under its 
corporate plan. 
Reporting of financial and non-financial performance indicators 
In some instances, the enabling legislation of a government authority sets out the 
matters to be considered in setting financial targets in annual reports and corporate 
plans. These include requirements to maintain financial viability and earn a 
commercial or reasonable rate of return. This generally includes financial indicators 
such as operating margins, return on equity and dividends to be paid to government.  
A comparison of some key financial indicators of the selected CAC Act bodies, 
including EFIC, for 2010-11 are presented in table D.2. The post-tax return on 
average equity ranged from 5 per cent for EFIC (commercial account operations) to 
18 per cent for Medibank Private.  
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Table D.2 Key financial indicators of selected CAC Act bodies 
2010-11 
 Units 
Airservices 
Australia 
Australian 
Postal 
Corporation 
Medibank 
Private 
Limited 
Australian 
Reinsurance 
Pool 
Corporation 
Export 
Finance and 
Insurance 
Corporation 
Operating profita $million 36.4 241.2 299.6 61.4 30.2 (CA) 
7.7 (NIA) 
Dividendb $million 25.0 78.5 434.4 na 28.7 
Dividend as a 
proportion of total 
profit 
per cent 68.6 32.5 145.0 na 74 
Equityc $million 406 1 804 1 585 666 408 
Return on average 
equityd 
per cent 9.5 13.4 18.1 6.8 5.2 (CA) 
a Net profit after tax (not including intangibles). Operating profit for EFIC and the ARPC is pre-tax. Operating 
profit for EFIC is reported separately for the commercial account (CA) and the national interest account 
(NIA).  b Dividend for the year ending 30 June 2010 paid the following year. At the date of publication of the 
2011 annual report, EFIC’s dividend for the year ending 30 June 2011 had not been made.  c Total equity at 
end of financial year (including contributed equity, reserves and retained profits). EFIC’s equity does not 
include $200 million callable capital.  d Post-tax profit as a proportion of average equity. EFIC and the ARPC’s 
return on equity is indicative of the impact of an upper bound tax rate of 30 per cent. This is estimated as 70 
per cent of the ratio of pre-tax profit to the proportion of average equity. na not applicable. 
Sources: Airservices Australia (2011); ARPC (2011a); Australia Post (2011); EFIC (2011a); Medibank 
Private (2011); Productivity Commission estimates. 
In addition to financial performance indicators, the legislation generally also 
prescribes the non-financial performance standards required to be met by the 
government agency. For example, in the case of Australia Post, these relate to the 
frequency, speed and accuracy of its mail services (APC Act, s. 28C). The 
Auditor General is required to audit and report on compliance with prescribed 
performance standards and, where these are not met, the Minister may require a 
service improvement plan (APC Act, s. 28E).  
Airservices Australia publishes a service charter which sets out a schedule of 
services and facilities it provides and establishes a quality of service framework and 
the measurement metrics against which it reports on performance outcomes. This 
includes targets for key performance indicators relating to safety, cost effectiveness, 
capacity, environment and flight efficiency. 
Regulation and reporting of pricing 
Price regulatory arrangements and reporting requirements differ substantially 
between government bodies depending on the nature of the services they provide. 
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As monopoly providers of services, both Airservices Australia and the Australian 
Postal Corporation are subject to price notification provisions under Part VIIA of 
the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cwlth). This applies to the extent that 
they provide notified services under the Act. The object of these provisions is to 
apply prices surveillance in relation to markets where, in the view of the Minister, 
competitive pressures are not sufficient to achieve efficient prices and protect 
consumers. This requires each body to submit draft price notifications to the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) which are then made 
publicly available. Regulations under s. 32B of the APC Act allow the ACCC to 
inquire into disputes about the terms and conditions, including price of access, to 
Australia Post’s bulk mail services. The ACCC also monitors for cross-subsidy 
within Australia Post’s services and may require it to keep certain records. 
Medibank Private is able to vary premium rates subject to the approval of the 
Minister for Health and Ageing. Some provisions of the Private Health Insurance 
Act 2007 (Cwlth) may have an impact on the setting on premium rates, for example 
community rating requirements (under s. 55) and premiums payable under health 
insurance policies that are part of a premium reduction scheme.  
The premium rate charged for reinsurance contracts entered into by the ARPC are 
determined by ministerial direction having regard to the level of risk. Reinsurance 
premiums are calculated as a percentage of the premium written by the reinsured 
company that is attributable to the eligible insurance contract. The percentage rate is 
set according to the postcode tier in which the eligible property is situated. The 
ARPC reports its premium structure for different classes of reinsurance and 
aggregate risk data in its annual report. It also reports this information using an 
online client information reporting system (box D.1). 
 
Box D.1 The ARPC Reinsurance Information System 
The Reinsurance Information System (RISe) is the ARPC’s client information 
management system. The RISe allows electronic submission by clients of quarterly 
and annual returns relating to premium information, as well as submission of claims 
and loss estimates in the event of a declared terrorism incident. The RISe also allows 
clients to access information on premium rates and basic market share information. For 
example, a client (the insurance provider that purchases reinsurance known as the 
‘cedant’) can access information on its market share, which is defined as a percentage 
of the total aggregate for premiums, exposures and claims in the event of a declared 
terrorism incident.  
Sources: ARPC (2011a; 2011b).  
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E EFIC’s environmental and social 
policy 
E.1 EFIC’s environmental and social policy and 
procedure 
EFIC has developed a Policy for Environmental and Social Review of Transactions 
(EFIC 2011h) and a Procedure for Environmental and Social Review of 
Transactions (EFIC 2011i), known collectively as the Environmental and Social 
Policy and Procedure (ESPP). These documents are based on the OECD 
Recommendation on Common Approaches on the Environment and Officially 
Supported Export Credits (OECD 2007) and the Equator Principles —
Environmental and Social Risk Management for Project Finance (IFC 2006) 
(box E.1). 
 
Box E.1 International obligations for environmental and social review 
OECD Recommendation on Common Approaches on the Environment and Officially 
Supported Export Credits 
The OECD Recommendation on Common Approaches on the Environment and 
Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD Recommendation) sets out common 
processes to be adopted by OECD Members for environmental review of new projects 
and existing operations benefiting from officially supported export credits with 
repayment terms of two years or more.  
The processes involve screening applications for officially supported export credits 
relating to the export of capital goods and services to identify: 
• existing operations that are undergoing no material change in output or function in 
respect of which a Member’s share is greater than SDR10 million 
– These applications may not be classified but should be reviewed before any 
commitment to provide official support. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box E.1 (continued) 
• any new commercial, industrial or infrastructure undertaking at an identified location 
or to any existing location not covered above (referred to as ‘projects’).  
– Members should classify all projects in respect of which their share is above 
SDR10 million and all projects in or near sensitive areas where their share is 
below SDR10 million. 
Projects are classified into one of the following categories according to their potential 
environmental impacts: 
• Category A — the project has the potential to have significant adverse 
environmental impacts. These impacts may affect an area broader than the sites or 
facilities subject to physical works and may, in principle, include projects in sensitive 
sectors or located in or near sensitive areas. 
• Category B — the project’s potential environmental impacts are less adverse than 
those of Category A projects. Typically these impacts are site-specific, few if any of 
them are irreversible, and mitigation measures are more readily available. 
• Category C — a project is likely to have minimal or no adverse environmental 
impacts. 
Members should indicate to the parties involved in the project the information required 
to undertake an environmental review. This includes potential environmental impacts 
(for example, generation of significant air emissions, effluents, waste or noise, 
significant use of natural resources, involuntary resettlement, impacts on Indigenous 
people and cultural property), standards, practices and procedures to be applied by the 
parties involved in the contract and results of any public consultation with stakeholders. 
When undertaking a review, Members should benchmark projects against host country 
standards and either the relevant aspects of the World Bank’s Safeguard Policies or 
where appropriate, International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards or 
other internationally recognised standards (such as European Community Standards) 
where these standards are more stringent.  
To achieve the objectives of the OECD Recommendation, Members should aim to 
foster transparency, predictability and responsibility in decision making by encouraging 
disclosure of relevant environmental information but with due regard to any legal 
stipulations, business confidentiality and other competitive concerns. This requires 
export credit agencies to publicly disclose: 
• their involvement in category A projects and certain project information (including 
project name, location and description) and environmental impact information, such 
as input assessments, at least 30 days before a final decision is made to grant 
official support  
• information, including environmental information, on category A and B projects 
supported during the year. 
(Continued next page)  
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Box E.1 (continued) 
Members are required to report to the OECD Working Party on Export Credits and 
Credit Guarantees at least semi-annually on all category A and B projects for which 
final commitment has been issued, including reasons for the classification. 
Equator Principles 
The Equator Principles are benchmarks for financial institutions for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions. 
They are based on IFC performance standards and are applied where total project 
capital costs exceed US$10 million and also to all project financing covering expansion 
or upgrade of an existing facility that may create significant environmental and/or social 
impacts. Under this framework, participating financial institutions will only provide 
finance to projects that conform to the Principles. This includes a requirement that, for 
each project assessed as being either category A or B, the borrower must conduct a 
social and environmental assessment to address the relevant environmental and social 
impacts and risks of the proposed project. This may include, where appropriate, an 
action plan identifying measures required to manage and mitigate the impacts and 
risks identified in the assessment.  
Under certain circumstances, the borrower must publicly disclose information relevant 
to the assessment and undertake consultation processes to the satisfaction of the 
lender to establish that concerns of communities that are likely to be adversely affected 
by the project are addressed. 
Sources: OECD (2007); IFC (2006).  
 
The ESPP was revised in 2011 in consultation with non-government organisations 
(EFIC 2011a). Although the agreements that EFIC must comply with can be narrow 
in their scope and may be relevant for only some products that EFIC offers 
(table E.1), EFIC claims to extend the principles embodied in these agreements to 
all transactions it considers (EFIC 2011i). 
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Table E.1 Scope of the OECD Common Approaches and Equator 
Principles 
EFIC producta 
Do the Common   
Approaches apply?b 
Do the Equator   
Principles apply?c 
Medium–long term finance   
Direct loan (project finance) Yes Yes 
Export finance guarantee Yes No 
Documentary credit guarantee Yes No 
Lines of credit to alliance partner Yes No 
Supplier credit Yes No 
Insurance   
Export payments insurance Yes No 
Bond insurance No No 
Residual value insurance No No 
Safety net facility through confirming bank, issuing 
bank or credit reinsurance 
No No 
Political risk insurance (any type) No No 
Other   
Advance payment bond, performance bond or 
warranty bond 
No No 
Working capital guarantee No No 
a Not a complete listing of EFIC’s products and does not include the EFIC Headway working capital 
guarantee, foreign exchange guarantee, Producer Offset loan, US bonding lines or Risk Participation 
Agreements.  b The OECD Common Approaches are only used for transactions with tenor of at least two 
years.  c Equator Principles are only used for transactions of at least US$10 million.  
Source: EFIC (2011i). 
International agreements provide guidance on how transactions should be assessed 
for their environmental and social impacts. Under the ESPP: 
The type of support requested, the nature of the project associated with the transaction 
and the role of EFIC’s client determine the type of environmental and social review 
that EFIC undertakes. (EFIC 2011i, p. 2) 
The ESPP involves the screening and classification of transactions (figure E.1). 
Screening involves determining whether a project is a new or existing project, or a 
non-project. ‘Existing projects’ are those where the transaction does not result in a 
material change in output or function, and ‘non-projects’ are those where a 
transaction is not associated with an identified location. 
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Figure E.1 EFIC’s environmental and social review processa 
 
a EFIC does not apply the classification procedure to ‘existing projects’ (where the transaction does not result 
in a material change in output or function) or ‘non-projects’ (where a transaction is not associated with an 
identified location, such as transactions involving bonds). EFIC has stated that the reason it does not classify 
these projects is because the client (and therefore EFIC) is unable to assess or influence environmental or 
social risks. 
Source: EFIC (2011i). 
EFIC has stated that it uses the guidelines under the Equator Principles to classify 
new projects for their potential environmental and social impacts. Projects are 
classified as category A (projects that have potential for significant adverse 
environmental or social impacts) to category C (minimal or no adverse 
environmental or social impacts). Category B includes projects that fall between 
category A and category C (table E.2). 
EFIC has stated that category A and B projects are benchmarked against the more 
stringent of the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Performance Standards or 
the host country’s standards. Other export credit agencies (ECA), such as US Ex-Im 
Bank and Japan Bank for International Cooperation, use a similar approach to 
classify projects. 
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Table E.2 EFIC’s classification and approval procedure 
New projects only 
Category Description Procedure 
Category A Potentially significant adverse 
environmental and/or social impacts 
Assess and benchmark project 
Public disclosure of some projects is 
required. Stakeholders can make 
submissions and EFIC has stated that 
these are considered as part of the 
assessment process. The EFIC Board 
decides whether to accept or reject the 
project 
Category B Categories A and C represent the two 
extremes of a project’s potential for 
significant environmental and/or social 
impacts. Category B transactions fall in 
the broad spectrum between 
categories A and C 
Assess and benchmark project followed 
by approval decision 
Category C Minimal or no adverse environmental 
and/or social impacts 
No further risk evaluation. Decision to 
proceed made by EFIC 
Sources: EFIC (2011h; 2011i). 
For existing projects and non-projects, EFIC has stated that it undertakes 
environmental and social risk evaluation based on information provided by the 
client as part of the due diligence process. If potential for environmental or social 
impacts is identified, the benchmark will generally be the IFC Performance 
Standards. However, EFIC may use other internationally recognised standards, host 
country standards and good industry practice if they consider that they are more 
appropriate to the proposed transaction. 
Under the ESPP, EFIC’s potential involvement with new category A projects that 
meet certain criteria must be publicly disclosed on the category A register on 
EFIC’s website 30 days before a final decision is made. The criteria for category A 
register disclosure requires that new projects: 
• are located outside of Australia 
• have repayment term or policy length of two years or more 
• have a value of at least SDR10 million1 (equal to approximately $15 million as 
of 25 May 2012) unless the project is in a sensitive area, such as a national park 
(EFIC 2011i). 
EFIC also maintains an archive register of EFIC’s disclosure of potential 
involvement in all category A projects, whether the project was supported or not. 
                                                     
1  The Special Drawing Right (SDR) represents a potential claim on the currencies of IMF 
members. Its value is based on a basket of international currencies. 
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EFIC’s policy is to disclose supported transactions on a register as soon as 
practicable after the transaction is signed, including the environmental and social 
classification of some transactions. EFIC may omit some details that are considered 
commercially sensitive for a client. Transactions that involve an EFIC Headway 
working capital guarantee (now discontinued), foreign exchange facility guarantee, 
Producer Offset loan or Risk Participation Agreement are not listed in the register, 
although EFIC publishes the total value of these facilities in its annual report. 
EFIC does not disclose its potential involvement in projects located in Australia that 
are subject to the approval requirements of the relevant state or territory government 
and where appropriate, the Australian Government. This is on the basis that EFIC 
considers that it does not have the mandate nor does it seek to duplicate these 
approval processes which include disclosure and consultation processes. EFIC has 
stated that it still undertakes its own risk assessment of projects located in Australia 
including whether any approval conditions that apply to a project have any 
implications for EFIC’s transaction (sub. DR90). Where a transaction involves 
EFIC reinsuring another OECD ECA, EFIC may rely on the disclosure undertaken 
by that ECA (EFIC 2011i). 
EFIC has committed to undertaking an audit of the application of the ESPP by an 
independent expert every two years with audit reports to be provided to EFIC’s 
Board and made publicly available. The first audit is to be conducted two years 
following the adoption of its ESPP in 2011.  
EFIC has also established a multi-stakeholder forum to facilitate regular dialogue 
between EFIC and non-government organisations (referred to as civil society 
organisations) on issues related to EFIC’s commitment to upholding best practice 
environmental and social standards in the transactions it supports.  
Anti-bribery measures 
As noted in chapter 2, EFIC has stated that it respects a number of international 
agreements to deter and criminalise bribery and corruption. This includes the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (Anti-Bribery Convention), the OECD Recommendation on 
Bribery and Officially Supported Export Credits, and the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). 
The Anti-Bribery Convention requires countries to legislate against the giving or 
offering of a bribe to a foreign public official to gain or retain a business advantage, 
and adopt common rules to punish individuals and companies who engage in 
bribery transactions. The UNCAC requires countries to prohibit their officials from 
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receiving bribes and their enterprises from bribing domestic public officials, as well 
as foreign officials and officials of public international organisations, and to 
consider disallowing bribery between private firms. The UNCAC and the 
Anti-Bribery Convention are intended to be mutually supporting and 
complementary. 
Australia’s implementing legislation for the OECD Convention is Division 70 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cwlth) (Criminal Code Act).2 The Criminal Code Act 
applies to the conduct of Australian organisations and imposes criminal penalties 
for bribery of a public foreign official. However, the Act does not cover conduct 
between private firms. 
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) includes assessment of compliance 
with the Criminal Code Act in relation to bribery of public officials as part of its 
annual audit of agencies. As part of this process, the ANAO seeks representations 
from management where there is potential for dealings with foreign officials, as 
EFIC has, that there are processes in place to ensure compliance with the Act and 
procedures to undertake inquiries. The ANAO also examines potential allegations 
relating to Australian Government officials and their agents. 
Instances of bribery or corruption may not only be a breach of Australian law, but 
may also be considered an offence in the country where the alleged bribe is paid, 
received or promised. For example, Australian businesses operating overseas may 
be subject to the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977 (on which 
Australian law is modelled) and the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act 2010. 
EFIC has stated that, as a member of the Export Credits Group (ECG), it complies 
with the OECD Recommendation which includes measures to be undertaken by 
ECG members to deter and combat bribery in connection with officially supported 
export credits. These obligations, among others, require member ECAs to: 
• inform exporters and, where appropriate, applicants, of the legal consequences 
of engaging in bribery in international business transactions and encourage them 
to develop, apply and document appropriate management control systems that 
combat bribery 
• require exporters and applicants to provide an undertaking/declaration that 
neither they, nor anyone acting on their behalf, such as agents, have been 
engaged, or will engage in bribery in the transaction 
                                                     
2  The Criminal Code Amendment (Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Act 1999 amended the 
Criminal Code Act to implement the Anti-Bribery Convention. 
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• verify whether exporters and applicants are listed on the publicly available 
debarment lists of the following international financial institutions: World Bank 
Group, African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Banks 
for Reconstruction and Development and the Inter-American Development Bank 
• require exporters and applicants to disclose whether they, or anyone acting on 
their behalf in connection with a transaction, are currently under charge, or have 
been convicted within the past five years for violations of laws against bribery of 
foreign public officials of any country  
• require exporters and applicants to disclose upon demand (i) the identity of 
persons acting on their behalf in connection with a transaction, and (ii) the 
amount and purpose of commissions or fees paid, or agreed to be paid, to such 
persons 
• inform law enforcement authorities promptly if there is credible evidence at any 
time that bribery was involved in the award or execution of an export contract 
• refuse to provide support for a transaction if there is credible evidence that 
bribery was involved in the award or execution of a contract, or if due diligence 
concludes that bribery was involved in the transaction (OECD 2006a). 
EFIC is a member of Transparency International Australia, part of a global 
not-for-profit, non-government organisation focused on curtailing corruption. 
EFIC has established Anti-Corruption Policy and Procedures to manage its 
compliance with Australian law and the Anti-Bribery Convention (EFIC ndb). 
These describe its application of anti-corruption measures relating to management 
control systems, staff roles, responsibilities and training, decision making, record 
keeping, reporting and corruption allegation procedures. These policies and 
procedures are periodically audited by EFIC’s internal auditors (EFIC, pers. comm., 
18 April 2012). 
E.2 Application of the Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 
Section 28 of the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cwlth) (EPBC Act) prohibits the Australian Government or an Australian 
Government agency (such as EFIC) from undertaking ‘an action that will have or is 
likely to have a significant impact on the environment inside or outside Australian 
jurisdiction’. This is unless the action is exempted by the Minister responsible for 
the EPBC Act in certain circumstances (such as national security and emergency) or 
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the action is exempt or approved under the framework established by the 
EPBC Act. 
An action is broadly defined3 and includes:  
 … construction, expansion, alteration or demolition of buildings, structures, 
infrastructure or facilities; storage or transport of hazardous materials; waste disposal; 
earthworks; impoundment, extraction and diversion of water; research activities; 
vegetation clearance; military exercises and use of military equipment; and sale or lease 
of land.  
Actions encompass site preparation and construction, operation and maintenance, and 
closure and completion stages of a project, as well as alterations or modifications to 
existing infrastructure. (DEWHA 2010, p. 1) 
 
Section 160 of the EPBC Act requires an Australian Government agency or 
employee to obtain and consider advice from the Minister for the Environment 
before authorising one of the following actions:4  
• entry into a contract, agreement or arrangement for the implementation of a 
project under Australia’s foreign aid program that is likely to have a significant 
impact on the environment  
• adoption or implementation of a plan for aviation airspace management 
involving aircraft operations that are likely to have a significant impact on the 
environment 
• the adoption or implementation of a major development plan (as defined in the 
Airports Act 1996)  
• an action authorised by a permit under the Environment Protection (Sea 
Dumping) Act 1981  
• an action authorised by a Basel permit, or by a variation of a Basel permit, under 
the Hazardous Waste (Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1989 
• an action authorised by a grant, renewal or variation of a permit or the grant of 
an exemption certificate under the Sea Installations Act 1987  
• an action authorised by a permit or authority under the Wildlife Protection 
(Regulation of Exports and Imports) Act 1982. 
EFIC has supported some projects that are subject to ministerial approval under the 
EPBC Act. For example, it provided an export finance guarantee for the Wiggins 
                                                     
3 An ‘action’ under the EPBC Act includes a project, development or undertaking, an activity or 
series of activities, or an alteration of any of these (EPBC Act, s. 523). 
4 A decision by a government body to grant a governmental authorisation (however described) for 
another person to take an action is not defined as an action (EPBC Act, s. 524).  
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Island coal export terminal development at the Port of Gladstone.5 More recently, 
EFIC, along with two other ECAs, has provided debt facilities to fund the 
development of a liquefied natural gas processing facility at Gladstone.6  
EFIC’s involvement in such projects does not constitute it being a proponent of an 
action subject to referral, assessment and approval requirements of the EPBC Act. 
The provision of products by EFIC to support export projects are neither actions 
which are subject to s. 28 of the EPBC Act, nor actions under s. 160 of the Act that 
would require EFIC to obtain and consider advice from the Minister for the 
Environment prior to granting governmental authorisation. There is no mechanism 
under the assessment processes of the EPBC Act that requires EFIC to disclose its 
involvement in onshore and offshore projects. This is with the potential exception of 
those transactions which have a significant foreign aid component that would 
constitute EFIC making an authorisation to enter into a contract, agreement or 
arrangement under s. 160(2) of the Act.  
As an Australian Government agency, EFIC has a statutory requirement 
under s. 516A of the EPBC Act to report on environmental matters in its annual 
report which includes identifying: 
• how its activities accord with the principles of ecologically sustainable 
development7 
• how its outcomes for the period contribute to ecologically sustainable 
development 
• the effect of its activities on the environment 
• any measures taken to minimise the impact of these activities on the 
environment  
• the mechanisms in place for reviewing and increasing the effectiveness of 
measures. 
EFIC has stated in its annual report that it fulfils these statutory requirements for 
reporting on its environmental performance in two parts: 
                                                     
5  In 2008, ministerial approval was given to the Central Queensland Ports Authority and 
Queensland Rail to develop the terminal and associated infrastructure, which was subsequently 
transferred to the Gladstone Ports Corporation in 2011 (SEWPaC 2011). 
6  In 2010, ministerial approval was given for the development, construction, operation and 
decommissioning of a liquefied natural gas facility and associated onshore facilities within the 
Curtis Island Industry Precinct at the Port of Gladstone (SEWPaC 2011). 
7  Activities include developing and implementing policies, programs and legislation and the 
operation of the agency (EPBC Act, s. 516A(7)). 
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• The ESPP describe how environmental and social issues are considered in the 
provision of EFIC’s services to exporters.  
• EFIC’s direct environmental performance is measured using indicators of the 
environmental footprint of its operations, such as business travel, energy use, 
water use and wastewater generation associated with office facilities. 
(EFIC 2011a).  
As previously discussed, EFIC undertakes an environmental and social risk 
evaluation of all transactions based on the ESPP. It discloses its prospective 
involvement in new projects that are considered to have potentially significant 
adverse environmental and social impacts (classified as category A projects that 
meet certain criteria). However this does not include disclosure of all the facilities it 
provides or projects it supports. 
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